CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040008-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 8, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST.
INTERVENTION IN. KOREA
Published 8 November 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
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WARNING
tional defense of the United States within the Xmeanin '
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32,
as am~~ ct
~
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the
preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper
is based on information available on 6 November 1950.
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CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA
1. To estimate the scale and purpose of Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities
Chinese Communist intervention in North and intentions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2. Present Chinese Communist troop
strength in North Korea is estimated at 30,000
to 40,000. Chinese Communist ground units
are engaging UN forces at various points
ranging from 30 to 100 miles south of the
Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action
has been marked also by the appearance of
Soviet-type jet fighters in combat with US
aircraft over Korea.
3. Present Chinese Communist troop
strength in Manchuria is estimated at 700,000.
Of this number, there are at least 200,000
regular field forces. These troop strengths,
added to the forces already in Korea, are be-
lieved to make the Chinese Communists ca-
pable of: (a) halting further UN advance
northward, through piecemeal commitment
of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to
defensive positions farther south by a power-
ful assault.
4. The objective of the Chinese Communist
intervention appears to be to halt the ad-
vance of UN forces in Korea and to keep a
communist regime in being on Korean soil.
In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese
Communists would: (a) avert the psychologi-
cal and political consequences of a disastrous
outcome of the Korean venture; (b) keep
UN forces away from the actual frontiers of
China and the USSR; (c) retain an area in
Korea as a base of Communist military and
guerrilla operations; (d) prolong indefinitely
the containment of UN, especially US, forces
in Korea; (e) control the distribution of
hydroelectric power generated in North
Korea and retain other economic benefits;
and (f) create the possibility of a favorable
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political solution in Korea, despite the mili-
tary defeat of the North Koreans.
5. The Chinese Communists thus far retain
full freedom of action with respect to Korea.
They are free to adjust their action in accord-
ance with the development of the situation.
If the Chinese Communists were to succeed
in destroying the effective strength of UN
forces in northern Korea, they would pursue
their advantage as far as possible. If the
military situation is stabilized, they may well
consider that, with advantageous terrain and
the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea
are sufficient to accomplish their immediate
purposes.
6. A likely and logical development of the
present situation is that the opposing sides
will build up their combat power in suc-
cessive increments to checkmate the other
until forces of major magnitude are involved.
At any point in this development, the danger
is present that the situation may get out of
control and lead to a general war.
7. The Chinese Communists, in intervening
in Korea, have accepted a grave risk of retalia-
tion and general war. They would probably
ignore an ultimatum requiring their with-
drawal. If Chinese territory were to be at-
tacked, they would probably enter Korea in
full force.
8. The fact that both the Chinese Commu-
nists and the USSR have accepted an in-
creased risk of a general war indicates either
that the Kremlin is ready to face a show-
down with the West at an early date or that
circumstances have forced them to accept
that risk.
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9. Actual Development of Intervention to Date.
Prior to mid-October, Chinese Communist
support of the North Koreans consisted solely
of logistical aid and moral support. Since
that time, however, the Chinese Communists
have been committing troops in increasing
number so that at present UN forces are being
engaged by Chinese Communist ground units
in varying penetrations, ranging from 30 to
100 miles south of the Manchurian-Korean
border.
To date, elements taken from the Chinese
Communist 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies
of the Fourth Field Army have been identified
in the combat zone of Korea. Units of ap-
proximately battalion size from each division
of three or more of the Chinese Communist
armies along the Korean border in Manchuria
have been combined to form units of approxi-
mately division size. One regular Chinese
Communist division has been tentatively iden-
tified. Present Chinese Communist troop
strength in North Korea is estimated to num-
ber from 30,000 to 40,000. This number, com-
bined with an estimated 45,000 North Korean
troops, constitutes an over-all enemy strength
of 75,000 to 85,000. Of this total, an esti-
mated 52,000 are in contact with UN forces.
The arrival of Chinese Communist ground
units in the Korean fighting has been accom-
panied by a marked stiffening of North Korean
resistance. The previously confused and dis-
organized North Korean units now appear to
be in process of recommitment as reorganized
and re-equipped combat units. There are in-
dications that Chinese Communist forces in
Korea are being reinforced.
Although the nationality of the hostile air-
craft involved in recent incidents over the Ko-
rean-Manchurian border has not been defi-
nitely established, the fact that Soviet-type
jet aircraft were involved indicates that the
North Koreans are receiving air assistance
from Manchuria in addition to direct ground
force support from the Chinese Communists.
10. Chinese Communist Capabilities for Armed
Intervention.
The over-all strength of the Chinese Com-
munist ground forces is estimated at 2,800,-
000. Of this number, 1,770,000 are well-
trained and well-equipped regular field forces,
and the remainder are fairly well-trained and
well-equipped military district troops. In ad-
dition, there are approximately 2,000,000
poorly-trained and poorly-equipped provincial
troops.
Since spring 1950, there has been a general
build-up of Chinese Communist tactical troop
strength in Manchuria to a point which ex-
ceeds normal security needs. The movement
of numerous major units from south and cen-
tral China is estimated to have brought cur-
rent Chinese Communist strength in Man-
churia to approximately 700,000. Of this
number, there are at least 200,000 regular
field forces, comprising possibly eight to ten
armies, plus elements of at least four other
armies.
The Chinese Communist Air Force, not
tested in combat to date, is believed to,con-
sist of 200 combat aircraft in tactical units.
Of this 200, 40 are TU-2 light bombers, 40 are
IL-10 ground attack, and 120 are LA-9 fight-
ers. It is possible that the CCAF may in-
clude 30-40 Soviet-type swept-wing jet fight-
ers formerly stationed in the vicinity of
Shanghai, some of which are believed to have
been the jet aircraft which have appeared in
recent operations in North Korea.
With these ground forces and this air
strength, the Chinese Communists could prob-
ably make available as many as 350,000 troops
within 30 to 60 days for sustained ground oper-
ations in Korea and could provide limited air
support and some armor. This could be done
without jeopardizing their internal control in
Manchuria or China proper. The Chinese
Communist Forces are therefore believed ca-
pable either of: (a) halting further UN ad-
vance northward by matching any foreseeable
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UN build-up with piecemeal commitment of
forces presently along the Yalu River; or (b)
forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions
further south through a powerful assault.
11. Chinese Communist Motives for Interven-
tion.
The Chinese Communist decision to com-
mit troops in North Korea, entailing as it does
the serious risk of widening the Korean con-
flict, would not have been taken by Commu-
nist China without Soviet sanction or possibly
direction. It must therefore be assumed that
both parties consider the anticipated benefits
to justify the acceptance of the calculated risk
of precipitating a general war in China which
could eventually involve the Soviet Union.
This calculated risk includes the possibility of
a reaction on the part of the US directly to
meet the broader issue with the USSR rather
than to allow itself to become involved in an
expensive and indecisive war with Communist
China.
The immedate occasion for Coramunist
Chinese armed assistance appears to have been
the crossing of the 38th Parallel by US forces
and the consequent swift collapse of North
Korean resistance. Unless the Chinese had
intervened, UN forces would soon have
reached and secured the Yalu River line. The
Korean People's Republic would have ceased
to exist except as a government-in-exile and
as a guerrilla movement. Confronted with
this possibility, the Chinese Communists have
apparently determined to prevent an early UN
military victory in Korea and to keep a Com-
munist regime in being on Korean soil.
It is significant that the Chinese Commu-
nists refrained from committing troops at two
earlier critical phases of the Korean war,
namely when the UN held no more than a
precarious toehold in the Pusan perimeter
and later when the UN landings were made
at Inchon. The failure to act on those occa-
sions appears to indicate that Peiping was
unwilling to accept a serious risk of war, prior
to the US crossing of the 38th Parallel.
Since the crossing of the Parallel, Chinese
Communist propaganda has increasingly
identified the Peiping cause with the cause of
the North Koreans.
The immediate objective of the Chinese
Communist intervention in Korea appears to
have been to halt the advance of UN forces.
Chinese Communist military operations to
date, including the nature of the forces em-
ployed, suggest an interim military operation
with limited objectives. This view is
strengthened by consideration of the limita-
tions imposed on military operations by win-
ter weather in this mountainous area.
In assisting the North Koreans, the Chinese
Communists can derive several advantages for
themselves, the Soviet Union, and world Com-
munism. They are:
a. To avert the psychological and political
consequences of a disastrous outcome of the
Korean venture.
The prestige of the world Communist move-
ment and, more particularly, the domestic and
international political position of the Chinese
Communist regime, are linked with the fate of
the North Korean satellite. A complete UN
victory in Korea would adversely affect the
power of international Communism to attract
and hold adherents. For the Chinese regime
itself, the total elimination of a satellite state
in Korea would mean a serious loss of political
face in China and in the world at large, most
notably in the Asiatic areas that have prob-
ably been selected by the Chinese Commu-
nists as their primary sphere of influence.
b. To keep UN forces away from the actual
frontiers of China and the USSR.
The establishment of a Western-oriented
and US-supported regime on the south bank
of the Yalu River is probably viewed by Peip-
ing as a threat to the security of the Com-
munist regime in China. The USSR would
likewise be sensitive to the advance of UN
forces to the northeastern tip of Korea. The
Chinese Communists apparently regard the
US as a hostile power, determined to bring
about their eventual overthrow.
c. To retain an area in Korea as a base of
Communist military and guerrilla opera-
tions.
The terrain of North Korea adjacent to the
Manchurian border is especially suitable for
such a base.
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d. To prolong indefinitely the containment
of UN, especially US, forces in Korea.
Prolonged involvement of UN and US forces
in Korea is favorable for Communist global
strategy. The containment of these forces in
Korea prevents their redeployment to Ger-
many, or to, other areas where they might be
required to oppose Communist aggression.
e. To control the distribution of hydroelec-
tric power generated in North Korea and re-
tain other economic benefits.
Peiping has an immediate economic stake in
the preservation of a friendly state south of
the Yalu. The hydroelectric installations in
North Korea, particularly the Suiho plant, are
important sources of power for South Man-
churia. The port of Antung in Manchuria is
part of an economic entity that embraces the
Korean city of Sinuiju across the river; trade
in the area would be hampered severely if no
arrangements existed for the operation of the
Antung-Sinuiju port as a single unit. River
traffic on the Yalu and the Tumen rivers is de-
pendent upon workable agreements between
political authorities in Manchuria and Korea.
f.. To create the possibility of a favorable
political solution in Korea, despite the mili-
tary defeat of the North Koreans.
It is possible that the Chinese Communists
and the USSR hope to establish a military sit-
uation that will make the UN willing to nego-
tiate a settlement of the Korean conflict in
preference to a long drawn-out and expensive
campaign.
12. Possible Developments.
The Chinese Communists thus far retain
full freedom of action with respect to Korea.
They are free to adjust their actions in accord-
ance with the development of the situation.
Their current violent propaganda-centering
as it has on (a) the "will of the Chinese peo-
ple" (rather than the government) to supply
"people's volunteers" to aid the North Koreans
and "defend China"; and (b) America's "use
of Japanese" and "aping of Japan" in its
"aggression against China"-is excellently
adapted for preserving maneuverability. It
could mean equally: whipping up of public
opinion that seems chilly toward any Korean
venture; a part of a general war of nerves; a
real intention to organize an anti-UN military
campaign on a "people's volunteer" basis; or
a psychological preparation of the Chinese
people for hostilities with the US, if not a
world war.
If the Chinese Communists were to succeed
in destroying the effective strength of UN
forces in northern Korea, the Chinese Com-
munists would probably pursue that advan-
tage as far as possible, bringing in reinforce-
ments from Manchuria to exploit the oppor-
tunity.
If the military situation is stabilized, the
Chinese Communists might well consider that,
with advantageous terrain and the onset of
winter, their forces now in Korea are adequate
to prevent a military decision favorable to the
UN, at least until spring. Such a military
deadlock would contain UN forces in Korea
and expose them to attrition. It would also
permit the reconstitution of North Korean
forces and facilitate the development of guer-
rilla operations behind the UN lines. In these
circumstances, the possibility of a political
solution as the most convenient means of
bringing the situation in Korea to a conclu-
sion would be increased.
A likely and logical development of the
present situation is that the opposing sides
will build up their combat power in successive
increments to checkmate the other until forces
of major magnitude are involved. At any
point in this development the danger is present
that the situation may get out of control and
lead to a general war.
The Chinese Communists appreciate that in
intervening in Korea they have incurred grave
risks of retaliation and general war, but have
accepted the risk. They would probably ig-
nore a UN ultimatum requiring their with-
drawal. If Chinese territory were to be at-
tacked, they could and probably would enter
Korea in full force, with the purpose of ex-
pelling UN forces altogether.
The fact that both the Chinese Communists
and the USSR have accepted an increased risk
of a general war indicates either that the
Kremlin is ready to face a showdown with the
West at an early date or that circumstances
have forced them to accept that risk.
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