STUDY OF CIA REPORTING ON CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000300040002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

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TOP SECRET
STUDY OF CIA REPORTING ON
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION
IN THE KOREAN WAR
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1950
CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
OCTOBER 1955
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STUDY OF CIA REPORTING ON
CHINESE COI,}iUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR
Prepared by
CIA Historical Staff, 17 October 1955
Text of "Study of CIA Reporting on Chinese Communist Intervention in the
Korean War, September 1950 - December 1950." 15 pp (TOP SECRET)
Exhibits (classified as indicated below):
A.
ORE 45-49 Probable Developments in China, 16 June 1949 (S)
B.
IM-300 The USSR and the Korean Invasion, 28 June 1950 (S)
C.
IN-302 Consequences of the Korean Incident, 8 July 1950 (S)
D.
CIA 7-50 Review of the World Situation, 19 July 1950 (S)
E.
Memorandum Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military
Conquest of All of Korea, 17 August 1950 (S)
F.
IM-324 Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention
in Korea, 8 September 1950 (S)
G.
CIA 9-50 Review of the World Situation, 20 September 1950 (S)
H.
ORE 58-50 Critical Situations in the Far East, 12 October 1950 (TS)
I.
CIA 10-50 Review of the World Situation, 18 October 1950 (S)
J.
Memorandum for the President, "Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea," 1 November 1950 (S)
K.
NIE-2 Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, 6 November 1950 (3)
L.
NIE-3 Soviet Capabilities and Intentions, 15 November 1950 (TS)
M.
CIA 11-50 Review of the World Situation, 15 November 1950 (S)
N.
NIE-2/1 Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, 24 November 1950 (S)
0.
Indications of Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, October 1950 -
December 1950, as reported and evaluated in CIA Daily Summary (TS)
P.
CIA Estimates of CHICOMM, intervention in Korea, September - November 1950
in CIA Weekly Summary (TS)
Q.
Treatment of Chinese Communist Intervention Issue in CIA's Daily Korean
Summary, July-November 1950 (S)
R.
Summary of CIA-Collected Information, July - November 1950, bearing on
Communist China's Intentions in Korea (S)
S.
Public Controversy in April-June 1951 as to the Adequacy of U. S.
Intelligence Estimating, July - December 1950 (C)
Appendixes (classified as indicated below):
A. Chronology of Korean War, 1950 (Unclassified)
B. Key to CIA Publications Consulted (TS)
C. List of Additional Relevant CIA Estimates Other than Those Listed
in Exhibits A to N (TS)
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STUDY OF CIA REPORTING ON
CHINESE CO Z1UNIST =NTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR
Prepared by
CIA Historical Staff, 17 October 1955
PROBLEM
To make a historical survey of CIA's record in estimating and reporting
on the probability of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War.
SCOPE
This study considers CIA written intelligence furnished between
September 1 and December 1, 1950 to the President and his principal ad-
visers on military and diplomatic policy.
These publications were in two forms: (1) estimates and quasi-
estimates (ORE's; NIE' s; SE's; IM's; the Review of the World Situation; and
various memoranda to the Director) and (2) current intelligence (the Daily
Summary; the Weekly Summary; and the Daily Korean Summary). (See
Appendix B for explanation of these titles.)
As a matter of interest, germane to this study, there is added an
analysis of the public controversy that broke out in 1951 over the issue
of Chinese Communist intervention. This was taken from the press and
other public sources. It is limited to comments bearing upon CIA and IAC
intelligence having to do with intervention. (See Exhibit S.)
CONCLUSIONS
1. During the period discussed, CIA was at all times aware of the
threat of Chinese Communist intervention.
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2. CIA reports and estimates left no doubt, during the period dis-
cussed, of a Chinese Comnnini.st (and Soviet) capability to intervene at
any time with powerful or decisive force.
3. Indications that can now be seen to disclose an intention to
intervene were frequently misinterpreted by CIA.
4. The principal reason for these misinterpretations was a failure
to gauge Chinese Communist and, more particularly, Soviet strategy with
respect to the Korean War accurately in the context of the world situa-
tion.
5. Although those responsible for United States strategy in the
Korean War during September to December 1950 were made fully aware by
CIA that Communist China represented a grave potential danger to the UN
cause, the tenor of CIA reporting was such as to suggest that the danger
would not materialize.
BACKGROUND
(1) Most of the intelligence cited in this study was "uncoordinated"
and therefore represented the views of CIA only, though based on informa-
tion received from all agencies. This was not, however, normal procedure
for CIA before 1951. It is explainable for this period in terms of (a)
the urgency of demands for intelligence on Korea, which often did not
permit time for coordination, and (b) the circumstances outlined in (2)
below.
(2) During the period in question, the organization in CIA for
furnishing "national" intelligence was in a transitional stage. It was
reorganized in October 1949 in answer to the Dulles Report and again in
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July 1950 as a result of demands for intelligence created by the Korean
War. On November 13 an even more complete reorganization took place in
conjunction with the arrival of a new administration for CIA.
In consequence of these changes, responsibility for CIA estimates on
the Korean situation between July and October fell upon a somewhat hastily
contrived "Special Staff" within the Cffice of Reports and Estimates;
while after November 13, it was carried by the newly created Office of
National Estimates. By October 12, furthermore, General Smith had begun
signing estimates transmitted to the President, indicating that the new
administration had taken charge and responsibility for estimates a month
before the official organization of the office of National Estimates.
(3) The course of events in the Korean War clearly affected the
nature of intelligence estimates. During the first period (June 25 to
mid-September) success of the North Koreans alone was such as to make
Chinese Communist intervention seem unlikely because unnecessary. During
the second period (mid-September to late November) the North Koreans were
routed and ultimate victory seemed assured. When Chinese/Soviet forces
did not intervene (a) at Inchon (September 15); (b) at the crossing of the
38th Parallel (October 7); or (c) at the moment when UAT forces reached the
Yalu (November 1), CIA appeared to adopt the assumption that they would
not do so at all.
(4) The 1950 CIA estimates, tEien read in 1955, seem ambiguous.
They frequently speak of Chinese Communist intervention through the use
of "volunteers" or "Manchurian volunteers;" and this was, of course, the
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guise under which the Chinese Communist array actually did conduct its cam-
paigns in the Korean War. It seems clear, however, from the estimates
discussed below, that these terms were not used at the time with quite
this possibility in mind. The estimators apparently thought of Chinese
"volunteers" (who were present all through the war) as relatively unim-
portant additions to regular North Korean forces. `there is no evidence
that the estimators exactly foresaw Chinese Coznist employment of full-
scale military forces under the tacitly-accepted fiction that they were
"volunteers" not under direct Chinese Communist control.
The failure to perceive this possibility probably to some extent
explains the persistent assumption in the estimates that the Chinese
Communists could not take a decisive part in the war without inevitably
leading themselves and the Russians into a world conflict.
DISCIJSSICN
1. When the Chinese Civil War ended at the close of 1949, the
Communists had some 2,017,000 men under arms with another two million
in reserve. (ee Exhibit A, GRE 45-49, June 16, 1949.) Many of these
troops were then, and remained, concentrated along the Korean border.
During 1950, Communist armies also reached the area opposite Taiwan and
moved south to the borders of Hongkong and Indochina-Burma. It was
evident, therefore, from 1949 onward, that all these areas were faced
with a new threat. This was quickly recognized by CIA. (Exhibit A is
one example.)
2. The beginning of the Korean War was seen by Central Intelligence
as strictly a Soviet move in terms of world strategy. Such an analysis
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seemed irrefutable in terms of the well recognized fact that the North
Korean government existed only by virtue of Soviet support and was com-
pletely subject to Soviet influence.
3. Consequently, estimates concerned with the Korean situation
immediately after June 25 were written in terms of Soviet motives and in-
tentions. (See Exhibit B, IM-300, June 28, 1950.) It was recognized,
nevertheless (on the assumption that the USSR was using a method of
attrition against the United States in prolonging US involvement in the
war), that Chinese Communist troops might be employed "either covertly
or overtly." (See Exhibit C, IM-302, July 8, 1950.)
I1.. Meanwhile, however, in view of the US situation in Asia, and the
military strength and disposition on the Asiatic mainland of both Commmunist
China and the USt, the possibility had always to be taken into account
that the Korean War might be in the nature of a diversionary move. The
principal fears in this regard were directed toward Taiwan and Japan with
secondary emphasis on Indochina, Burma and Hongkong-Macao.
5. Fears for Taiwan were reinforced by the tenor of Chinese Communist
propaganda, Chinese Communist military dispositions, and the consequences
of final overthrow of the Chinese Nationalists. In spite of the apparent
difficulties involved for the Communists in attacking Japan, American
leaders in Japan in 1950 feared for its safety because of preponderant
Communist strength in the area and the weakening of the islands incident
to the Korean campaign.
6. Numerous estimates were written with reference to all these
possible Soviet-inspired moves. (See Appendix C.) Taken together, they
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represented an alternative that tended to distract attention from the more
direct use of Chinese Communist forces in the Korean War itself.
7. As early as July 19, 1950, CIA gave special notice to the possi-
bility of Chinese Communist intervention in these statements: "Chinese
Communist troops can be brought into action covertly and, if necessary,
openly;" and It is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the Chinese
Communists to give open military support to the Korean operations or to
start a new operation elsewhere in the area. The Peiping regime almost
certainly would comply with a Soviet request for military action." (See
Exhibit D, CIA 7-50, July 19, 1950.)
8. On August 17,. CIA again discussed the possibility, but in an en-
tirely different context. In this case, the discussion was of the
desirability of extending the Korean War into a military conquest of the
whole peninsula. In enumerating the preponderance of adverse considera-
tions for such a plan, CIA said, among other things, " ... the invading
forces might become involved in hostilities with the Chinese Communists.
As it became apparent that the North Koreans were being defeated in
South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north of
the 38th Parallel. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any
stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful
at the 38th Parallel where UN members could legally discontinue their
support of the US policy." (See Exhibit E, "Memorandum" of August 17,
1950.)
9. On August 16, under the title, "implications of a Military
Advance in Korea beyond the 38th Parallel," CIA seems further to have
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discussed the factors affecting a decision to cross or not to cross the
38th Parallel. This was a memorandum, probably to the Director, prepared
by the "Special Staff" of the Cffice of Reports and Estimates. it could
not be found, however, in connection with this study.
10. On September 8, a week before the Inchon landings, CIA directly
discussed the "Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in
(See Exhibit F, IM-324,of September 8, 1950.) This estimate
spoke of some 400,000 Chinese Communist troops near or moving toward the
Korean border and stated: "It is clear that intervention in Korea is
well within immediate Chinese Communist capabilities." It further re-
ported that: (a) military construction had been observed along the Yalu,
(b) Chinese Communist aircraft had arrived in the same area; (c) recent
Communist propaganda "may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move";
and (d) replacements must be supplied to the North Koreans if they were
"to achieve complete control over South Korea before the end of the year."
The estimate of September 8 concluded, however: "In view of the
momentous repercussions from such an overt action ... it appears more
probable that the Chinese Communist participation in the Korean conflict
will be more indirect, although significant, and will be limited to in-
tegrating into the North Korean forces 'Manchurian volunteers', perhaps
including air units as well as ground forces."
11. On September 20, CIA again took up this theme:
"The concentration of Chinese Communist troops near the
Korean border in Manchuria constitutes a powerful secondary
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reserve for the North Koreyn forces, which, if Moscow and
Peiping should agree on it despite the attendant risks, could
enter the battle and materially change its course at any time.
"It is doubtful that either Soviet or Chinese Communist
forces will be committed south of the 38th parallel. Moscow
and Peiping are much more likely to aid the Communist cause in
Korea by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese Communist
(M'Ianchurian 'volunteer') units, perhaps including small. air
units, for incorporation in the North Korean forces." (See
Exhibit G, CIA 9-50, September 20, 1950.)
12. on October 12, 1950, three days before President Truman's con-
ference with General MacArthur on Wake Island and five days after the
UN decision to cross the 38th Parallel as well as five days after a new
administration had taken control of the Agency, CIA gave what might be
termed its most official view to date on the subject of intervention, in
that the estimate had the concurrence of all members of the IAC. On
this date, reporting directly to the President, CIA said:
"The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking
requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening
effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean
conflict. There are no convincing indications of an actual
Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale inter-
vention in Korea. After reviewing the factors favoring, and
those opposing, Chinese Communist intervention, it is concluded
that while fall-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea
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must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration
of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a
Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable
in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be
confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans."
(See Exhibit H, ORE 58-50, October 12, 1950.)
Because this conclusion was made to depend on an assumption
that the USSR did not wish to become involved in global war, this assump-
tion is bolstered with an elaborate discussion of Soviet intentions from
the IAC point of view. Primarily on the basis of this assumption, the
estimators discounted Manchurian troop movements, Chou En-lai's threats,
factors enumerated by themselves said to favor intervention from the
Communist point of view and various other indicators. (See, for example,
Exhibits Cr., P, Q, and R. )
The estimate of October 12 might be considered crucial in terms
of the time of publication (the Chinese Communists had apparently not
reacted to the crossing of the 38th Parallel), and the fully official
nature of the statement. Thereafter, CIA could not very well make a
contrary statement unless this one was revised.
13. On October 18, the day before the UN capture of Pyongyang, CIA
wrote optimistically that, "The Soviet Korean venture has ended in failure."
Consequently, it appeared that the Communists would accept this failure by
aiding the North Koreans to hold on as long as possible and then to turn
to harassing guerrilla warfare.
Chinese Communist capabilities were noted again, together with
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the fact that "Forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained Communist troops
have, in fact, already been fighting in the North Korean army." It was
"becoming less and less likely," however, that Chinese Communist troops
would enter the war "openly." The estimate about Soviet intentions toward
global war is repeated in support of the statement. (See Exhibit I,
CIA 10-50, October 18, 1950.)
14. CIA's statements of October 18 must have been questioned, for
on November 1, the Director of Central Intelligence signed an apparently
uncoordinated "Memorandum for the President" on the subject: "Chinese
Communist Intervention in Korea." This memorandum admitted that "between
15,000 and 20,000 Chinese Communist troops, organized in task force units,
are operating in A?orth Korea while the parent units remain in Twanchuria."
Largely on the basis of current Chinese Communist propaganda regarding
protection of the Suiho Hydroelectric Zone, however, the memorandum con-
cluded that: "Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the
Chinese Communists, under Soviet direction, are committing themselves to
full-scale intervention in Korea, their main motivation at present appears
to be to establish in Korea a limited cordon sanitaire' south of the Yalu
River." The emphasis of the memorandum was on the Sino--Soviet desire to
protect the Suiho hydroelectric system. Their strategy, the memorandum
noted: "would also be in line with the general desire to further inter-
national Communism by helping the North Koreans prolong their resistance."
(See Exhibit J. Memorandum for the President, of 1 November 1950.)
15. On November 6, at least four days after signs of actual inter-
vention had been observed elsewhere than in CIA (see Appendix A), CIA,
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in a fully concurred National Intelligence Estimate, stated that the
Chinese Communists had the capability of (a) halting further UN advance
northward, "through piecemeal commitment of troops"; or (b) "forcing UN
withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by a powerful assault."
The estimate seemed inclined to the opinion, however, that the
situation would be stabilized for the winter as both sides built up forces.
It pointed out that (a) the situation was filled with risks of world con-
flict; (b) the Chinese realized the danger of retaliation; and (c) they
would enter Korea in full force if their territory were attacked. (See
Exhibit K, NIE-2, November 6, 1950.)
16. By November 15, CIA was conceding intervention by implication
at least, but interpreted it in terms of a Soviet decision to accept the
risk of global war, which CIA still considered improbable. Hence, the
inference was left that intervention would not reach dangerous proportions.
(See Exhibits L and 1,1; NIE 3 and CIA 11-50 November 15, 1950.)
17. On November 24, two days before the Chinese Communist-North Korean
offensive was begun, Ttich one month later had driven UN forces from the
Yalu to positions south of the 38th Parallel, CIA estimated that the enemy
would: It ... simultaneously: (a) Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding
operations in North Korea; (b) Maintain or increase their military strength
in Manchuria; and (c) Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimida-
tion and diplomatic means." The estimate added that: "Eventually they
may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN
.forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military
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capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do
have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions
for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might
calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea." (See
Exhibit N, NIE 2/1, November 2L., 1950.)
18. In addition to CIA's several formal estimates and evaluations
on Korea between July and November 1950, CIA reported some 40 items of
current intelligence bearing on the capabilities and intentions of
Communist China in Korea. These items appeared in its two regular bulletins --
most of them in the CIA Daily Sunnnary, but significant other items exclusively
in the CIA Weekly Summary. Nost of these current reports were quoted from
IAC agency non-clandestine sources and most of them were followed by CIA
comments, usually phrased in estimative language. These comments, which,
of course, were not coordinated with the IAC agencies, were nevertheless
not inconsistent with the formal estimates discussed above.
In retrospect, however, with the benefit of historical hindsight,
these items are astonishing in the persistence of a number of conclusions
which proved to be wrong. 'Thus, CIA seemed to regard the alleged Soviet
and Chinese fear of "general war" as the all-important factor of restraint
against intervention in Korea. CIA consistently discounted reports of war
conferences and intervention decisions in Peiping between August and
October; and repeatedly discounted specific indications of Chinese Communist
war preparations and troop mcwements, up to as late as 3 November. Finally,
once intervention was actually accomplished in November, CIA tended to
regard China's moves as largely "defensive" and based on its fears for the
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Yalu hydroelectric area; and predicted that the Chinese might soon with-
Digests of CIA's current intelligence reporting on Communist
China and Korea, September - November 1950, are appended below. (See
Exhibits 0 and P.)
19. The Chinese Communist intervention issue was also treated in
another CIA publication -- the Daily Korean Summary (see Appendix B) --
which is surveyed more fully in Exhibit Q. In this publication there
are occasional (but less frequent) estimative conclusions on Chinese
Communist intentions in North Korea, together with numerous on-the-spot
indications of CHICON troop movements and actions quoted (usually without
CIA comment) from estimates by US Embassy Seoul, by UN Command Headquarters
in Tokyo, Far East Command Headquarters, 8th Army Headquarters, and the
various US Corps operating in that area. While the latter four military
echelons sometimes appear to be disagreeing with each other, their con-
clusions (in the Daily Korean Summary) are not in general inconsistent
ti-rith estimates (see Exhibits A-01
20. Relevant reports, totalling more than 500, were collected by CIA
from its on sources, during the critical period July-November 1950. (See
Exhibit R, "Summary of CIA-Collected Information., July-December 1950,
bearing on Communist China's Intentions in Korea.") Figuring in this
broad coverage by CIA were the following: 00/C's contacts (some of them.
25X1
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OC/FDD's extensive analysis of Far Eastern newspapers and other public
media (some with a Communist slant and others oriented to the yjest); and
finally (and most numerous) OSC's reports from clandestine sources. All
of these items of information added up to a variety of military, economic,
and political indications of Chinese moves -- including moves which today,
in retrospect, can be regarded as indications of the coming military inter-
vention.
21. CIA's record of reporting and estimating on the threat of Chinese
intervention was drawn into public controversy, in the Senate and the
press, between April and June 1951, in connection with President Truman's
dismissal of General liacArthur. While only one of the three DCI's involved
(Admiral Hillenkoetter) was prevailed on to comment publicly on CIA's
record, the heads of the two major IAC agencies (the Secretaries of State
and Defense) were each questioned at some length in the Senate hearings.
General hacArthur and members of his immediate staff also commented at
length, both in 1951 and in subsequent memoirs published on MacArthur's
behalf in 1954 and 1955. President Truman was also drawn into the con-
troversy.
While Admiral Hillenkoetter and President Truman could not
recall that CIA had disseminated any advance intelligence indications of
the Chinese threat, it is clear, from the comments by the other principals,
that both CIA and the several IAC agencies, together with MacArthur's
command in the Far East, were collecting and exchanging a variety of
intervention indications well before the overt attack was launched.
Conversely, it seems clear from the public record that CIA, the several
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IAC agencies, and -lacArthur's comnand were all in essential agreement,
in the considered estimates which each produced, that intervention would
not come. It is less clear, however, from the record of the public con-
troversy, what prompted these negative conclusions in the face of these
positive indications.
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