COORDINATION STAFF REPORT REGARDING THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200060079-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: May 31, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D-27. 1/18
31 May 1962
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE B:;OARD
i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Coordination Staff Report. Regarding the Committee
Structure of the United States Intelligence Board
Attached for review is a memorandum report by the Coordination Staff
on Committees of the United States Intelligence Board. This matter
will be placed on the agenda of an early USIB meeting (probably that of
27 June), for discussion and action on the recommendations contained
in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the attachment to
memorandum.
a
Executive Secretary
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Attachment
USIB-D-27.118
28 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Committees of the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB)
1. The attachment on the subject is a response to your assign-
ment of 18 December 1961 to the Coordination Staff to conduct a
review and prepare recommendations for revisions in the present
committee structure of the USIB.
2. The attachment is also a response to Joint Study Group
Recommendation No. 33 which called for a review of the functions
and activities of the USIB committees, including consideration of
possible changes and improved reporting procedures, and will also
provide a basis for a response to the White House request of
25 October 1961 for information regarding interdepartmental com-
mittees and task forces.
3. The attachment concludes that USIB needs some type of
committee structure to assist it in meeting its broad responsi-
bilities and that the desirable modifications to the present
structure would be those that:
a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the
intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and
mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the
potential for greater coordination within the Department of
Defense resulting from the establishment of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA);
b. recognize that services of common concern, like
assigned functions or primary responsibility, are essentially
functions which can and should be charged directly to an
individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the
particular service or function and for its coordination
throughout the community;
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis,
only those committees that are clearly required to support
functions specified for USIB in National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1 or to coordinate certain
important functional programs (other than services of common
concern) which are carried out necessarily by several agencies
to meet their own and community needs.
On that basis, the following 12 committees and ad hoc working
groups would be disestablished and their functions reassigned as
indicated:
Committee
Exploitation of Foreign Language
Publications (CEFLP)
Assignment of Functions
State
CIA
Procurement of Foreign Publications CIA
(PROCIB)
National Intelligence Survey (NIS)
Critical Communications (CCC)
Emergency Planning Steering
Cuban Military Build-up (ad hoc)
Berlin Situation (ad hoc)
Legislative Proposals re
Personnel (ad hoc)
CIA
CIA
DCI
Defense
When and if 'it resumes
activity, subordinate to
Watch Committee.
ad hoc) USIB in connection with
weekly survey of cold war
situation.
Not required once committee
has completed its current
report.
The following 12 committees would be retained: Security; SIGINT;
Documentation (CODIB); Watch; Critical Collection Problems (CCPC);
Economic Intelligence (EIC); Scientific Intelligence (SIC); Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence (JAEIC); Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence (GMAIC); Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); Interagency
Clandestine Collection Priorities (IPC); and
4. With respect to committee chairmen, the attachment concludes
that selection of a chairman should be based on the concept that the
principle of personal qualification rather than agency affiliation
Corrected page - 7 June 1962.
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should prevail where there is difficulty in determining a single
dominant agency interest; that where the interest of a single agency
is clearly dominant, that agency should furnish the chairman.
5. With respect to the USIB Secretariat) the attachment
concludes that the Secretariat should devote increased efforts in
ensuring that papers coming before the Board have had, where
appropriate, adequate preliminary coordination and in conducting
an effective follow-up system on Board decisions.
6. Recommendation:
That the attachment, together with this memorandum, be
circulated to the USIB for consideration of the recommendations
contained in paragraphs 8 through 12 thereof.
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Attachment
USIB-D-27.118
28 May 1962
COMMITTEES OF THE U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD
1. Recommendation No. 33 of the Joint Study Group (JSG) reflects,
with respect to the intelligence community, the growing general
disillusionment within the Executive Departments of an excessive use
of the committee system of business. That recommendation calls for
a review of "the functions and activities of the several committees
and subcommittees of the United States Intelligence Board." It
further directs that "this review should include consideration of
possible change in the committee structure and improved reporting
procedures." Implicit in the Joint Study Group's recommendation on
this point and in its recommendations for a reorganization of USIB
itself is concern at the ponderous appearance of the complex com-
mittee structure which now characterizes the organization of the
intelligence community. The concern, however, does not appear to be
directed at the functions with which the committees are charged but
rather at the question of whether the functions need to be assigned
to committees or, in fact, can most efficiently be performed by
committees.
2. Now that the membership of USIB itself may be reduced and
that the Defense Intelligence Agency has the responsibility for
coordinating all intelligence activities within the various elements
of the Department of Defense (save those under the control of the
National Security Agency), there are occurring basic changes in the
high-level structure of U. S. intelligence which even more clearly
imply a need for change at the supporting level. The observations
that follow are directed at establishing a concept of coordinated
support for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and for the
USIB that is workable, efficient, and compatible with the top.
structure. As will appear -- and again the point is emphasized --
there is little question that the great majority of the USIB com-
mittees have been and are performing useful functions. The suggestions
below are designed to ensure that the functions are carried out
under closer supervision and clearer assignment of responsibility.
3. At the present time, USIB has 20 permanent and four ad hoc
committees, concerned with a variety of production, collection and
support activities. The purposes for which these committees have
been established fall, in a general sense, into three categories:
a. to provide a mechanism for achieving coordination of
a specific community-wide activity, such as economic intelligence;
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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b. to provide a mechanism for roviding community guidance
activity to an of common concern
c. to assist USIB in carrying out one of its assigned
functions, such as security.
ii. The general functions of USIB are specified in NSCID No. 1.
In addition to assisting the DCI to carry out his coordination
functions, USIB has certain other specific responsibilities, in brief:
a. Establish policies and programs for the guidance of
departments and agencies.
b. Establish priority national intelligence objectives
and requirements.
c. Review and report to the National Security. Council
(NSC) on the national foreign intelligence effort.
d. Make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters,
particularly to the Secretary of Defense concerning matters
under the cognizance of the Director, National Security Agency
(NSA).
e. Develop and review security standards and practices.
f. Formulate policies concerning arrangements with
foreign governments on intelligence matters.
5. It is clear that USIB needs some type of committee structure
to assist it in meeting these broad responsibilities. The variety of
problems for which the Board has responsibility places a heavy burden
upon the members. The Board deals effectively with national estimates,
in large part because the mechanism of the Office of National Estimates
(ONE) provides for community-wide staffing of the problem and for
clear definition of points at issue. It also receives comparable
coordinated support through the Watch Committee procedure. On other
problems, particularly in the field of collection, the Board has had
less effective machinery for coordination and for the initiation of
remedial action and too often has faced such problems at a late date,
sometimes without benefit of community-wide proposals for their
solution and with less than adequate knowledge of the views and
reasoning of other agencies regarding them.
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6. Various alternatives have been suggested. One that has some
appeal is a structure composed of three high-level committees, one
for Production, one for Collection and one for Support. Within this
trio could be logically encompassed, functionally, the various responsi-
bilities now charged to all the USIB Committees and to USIB. Under
this concept, the senior committees would be composed of the chiefs
of their deputies of the production, collection and support components,
respectively, of the USIB agencies. At this level the individuals
involved, being specialists in production, collection or support,
could take action to ensure that their principals in USIB were called
upon only for decisions of the highest order. Upon further analysis,
however, it becomes apparent that there are important weaknesses in
this line of solution. In the first place, there is no demonstrable
need for a "Support" committee, since USIB is not charged with the
administrative, logistics, legal, comptroller and similar responsi-
bilities inherent in the operations of the individual intelligence
agencies. In the second place, it is very difficult to establish
that a production committee is necessary or even appropriate to meet
USIB's needs for coordination of the production effort of the
community. As mentioned earlier, the estimative process developed
and operated by the community through the ONE as the DCI's instrument is
a proven and effective method of demonstrating in broad terms
the community's capability to produce all types of intelligence
required in support of national security policies. The Watch
Committee process adequately covers the problem of indications of
hostilities. Two major fields of intelligence production for which
responsibility is necessarily assigned to a number of agencies
and therefore require community coordination, are scientific and
economic. For both of these technical, specialized fields,
mechanisms for coordination are already available through existing
scientific and economic committees.
The factors which argue against the establishment of production
and support committees are not, however, so apparent in the field of
collection. In this field, in fact, (as will appear in paragraph 9.h.
below) it would seem that a modification of the existing Critical
Collection Problems Committee could well benefit the community.
7. The desirable modifications in the present USIB committee
structure would be those that:
a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the
intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and
mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the
potential for greater coordination within the Department of
Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;
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Revised 17 July 1962
b. recognize that services of common concern, like
assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially
functions which can be and should be charged directly to an
individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the
particular service or function and for its coordination
throughout the community;
c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis,
only those committees that are clearly required to support
functions specified for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate
certain important functional programs (other than services
of common concern) which are carried out necessarily by
several agencies to meet their own and community needs.
8. The following USIB committees should be disestablished:
a. Committee on International Communism. This Committee
has been relatively inactive for some time and there does
not appear to be a demonstrated justification for the con-
tinuation of a committee in this field. The Committee's
assigned functions are essentially elements of an important
aspect of political intelligence for which the Department
of State has production responsibility, except for the
production of National Intelligence Survey sections which
have been transferred to CIA.
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Revised 17 July 1962
c. Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications.
DCID No. 274 charges CIA with providing for the exploitation of
foreign language publications as a service of common concern.
The Committee should be eliminated as a USIB instrument.
d. Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (PROCIB).
DCID No. 2/5 assigns to CIA responsibility for coordinating the
foreign publications procurement programs. The Committee should
be eliminated as an instrument of the USIB.
e. Committee on Exchanges. The Committee was established
for two main purposes: a to provide coordinated advice to
the Department of State on the intelligence aspects of the East-
West exchange program in order that State can consider those
aspects alongside other policy consideration in carrying out its
overall responsibility for that program; and
Moreover, much of the Committee's advice
on substantive matters, because of the specialized nature of
such matters, is in reality the product of ad hoc groups or
existing specialized committees. The need for the Committee
has thus become minimal. It should be disestablished.
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f. National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Committee. NSCID
No. 3 assigns to the Director of Central Intelligence responsi-
bility for coordinating production and for accomplishing the
publication and dissemination of National Intelligence Surveys.
The NSC, by its approval in 19+8 of the NIS Standard Instructions,
required that CIA provide overall coordination of the NIS Program.
By the same action it created the NIS Committee to assist the CIA
in carrying out this primary responsibility for the program. The
Committee should be eliminated and CIA receive whatever assistance
it requires through specified points of contact designated by
interested agencies.*
g. Emergency Planning Steering Committee. This committee
was created by USIB action and, when active, concerned itself
largely with emergency relocation matters. The Committee has
been inactive for more than a year. It is doubtful that this
committee or any similar committee can proceed successfully in
the broad field of emergency planning since there is uncertainty
as to the respective intelligence responsibilities of the USIB
agencies within the continental U. S. in time of general war and
with respect to the wartime role of the DCI in providing intelli-
gence advice and support to the President. A clarification of
national policy on these points is essential to realistic overall
intelligence war planning. The present Committee should be dis-
established and the DCI, as the principal intelligence coordinator
of the U. S. foreign intelligence effort, should undertake to
obtain this clarification.
h. Critical Communications Committee (CCC). This committee
was formed primarily to assist USIB in establishing and monitoring
the system for reporting critical intelligence. The role of USIB
itself is to assist the DCI in carrying out the latter's responsi-
bilities under NSCID No. 7 to provide continuing guidance to the
Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements
of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical
intelligence, and to define critical intelligence and establish
uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation
of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence.
Now that a well understood system for reporting critical intelligence
NSC approval for this change is not required, since NSCID No. 3 of
18 January 1961 permits amendments to the NIS Standard Instructions
by interdepartmental approval.
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has been established, this Committee should be disestablished,*
and the CIA should be made responsible for assuring continued
monitoring of the reporting system, and for assisting the DCI
to carry out his continuing responsibilities under NSCID No. 7.
The Secretary of Defense also has continuing responsibilities
under NSCID No. 7 for the establishment, operation and perfection
of the means of communication for critical intelligence, which
he should continue to exercise. Specific points of contact
should be designated by all interested agencies as well as by
the Department of Defense and CIA to ensure proper coordination
of their respective efforts in this field.
9. The following USIB committees should be retained or modified
(See Tab A):
a. Security Committee. The Security Committee provides
direct support to USIB with respect to a specific function
assigned to USIB by NSCID No. 1, namely, the development and
review of security standards and practices. It should therefore
be retained.
b. The SIGINT Committee. The SIGINT Committee provides
advice and assistance to USIB in direct support of all the
functions related to COMINT and ELINT matters assigned to USIB
by NSCID Nos. 1 and 6, including particularly recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense and other officials, as appropriate,
on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director,
NSA. It should therefore be retained.
c. Committee on Documentation (CODIB). The Committee on
Documentation should be retained since it supports USIB with
respect to the coordination of important, complex, accelerating
programs necessarily conducted by most USIB agencies and
influenced by similar programs in progress in many non-USIB
agencies. Moreover, it directly supports USIB in carrying out
approved JSG Recommendation No. 4+0 relating to automatic data
processing systems.
d. Watch Committee. The Watch Committee, in view of its
special relation to an important USIB function directly related
to the national security and the necessity for broad, community
participation in finalizing reports within urgent time limits
on imminence of hostilities, should also be retained.
In view of certain unfinished business that is now before the
Committee, it is suggested that the act of disestablishment be
deferred until 1 July 1962.
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e. Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC). The work of the
EIC and its subcommittees covers a wide variety of specialized
fields of economic analysis to which specialists within and without
the USIB agencies can make unique contributions. Moreover, no
single USIB agency has such a primary responsibility, either on
an area or functional basis, that the concept of a "service of
common concern" can be made to apply. Thus, the Economic
Intelligence Committee should be retained, since its responsi-
bilities involve the coordination of important functional
programs necessarily related to the normal responsibilities
of the various USIB agencies as well as some nine non-USIB
agencies.
f. Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC).* The Scientific
Intelligence Committee should be retained becauseof its general
production and coordination responsibilities in an important
field in which several USIB agencies have large:active programs.
g. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)*
and Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
GMAIC .* The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and
the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
should also be retained because of the critical importance of
their individual responsibilities, the direct and priority
national security significance of these subjects that touch
upon the responsibilities of all USIB member agencies and the
concomitant need for civilian as well as military agencies to
participate actively in the deliberations of the two Committees.
h. Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC). Recent
USIB actions to intensify collection efforts in Southeast Asia
and Berlin, as well as current community interest in improving
collection in a number of important scientific and technical
fields, illustrate the need for a mechanism which can ensure
that collection efforts utilizing all community resources in
these and other similar major problem areas are. adequately
coordinated, and which can anticipate collection problems and
undertake remedial action thereon on its own initiative.
* Because of the close relationship of these three scientific com-
mittees, close coordination is imperative. The SIC should be
charged with taking the initiative in insuring that such coordination
is effected in areas of joint or overlapping concern, such as the
field of anti-ballistic missiles. This does not imply that SIC
should, '.have a ,supervisory role, over the'?hormal activities ' of JAEIC
and GMAIC in their respective fields.
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The y 'll6g 4e7b q/2$c-E6 F 36800W?iDQ020 0019-7 activities are limited by DCIT).) No. 2/2 solely to those collection
problems of a critical nature specifically referred to it by the
USIB. The required mechanism could be provided by broadening
the present charter of the CCPC (DCID No. 2/2) to permit the
Committee to concern itself with collection problemsof general
community interest, not only when referred to it by USIB, but
also when identified by a USIB committee or agency or by the
committee itself, subject to approval by the DCI of the nature
and scope-of the committee study prior to its initiation. In
dealing with such problems, the revised CCPC should have essentially
those responsibilities listed in paragraph 1 of DCID No. 2/2:
(1) Making an inventory of collection capabilities
or action being taken or planned.
(2) Allocating by agreement or:recommending actions
to be taken to improve collection capabilities.
(3) Fostering the generation of new ideas and
techniques for collection; selecting those of value
and supporting their development and use.
(L1) Studying results of collection actions in order
to recommend improvements.
(5) Recommending actions to improve speed and
accuracy of collection and dissemination of information.
The revised and strengthened CCPC should keep itself fully
informed of the collection activities of the more specialized
USIB committees in order to ensure that the activities of such
specialized committees bearing on an identified problem are
appropriately coordinated and correlated with other collection
activities. The chairman should be prepared, at least in the
initial stages of development of the new CCPC,. to devote his
full time, perhaps assisted by a small professional staff, in
establishing a continuous basis for community-wide scrutiny
of and action on collection problems.
i. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),
Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC)
t might appear at
first glance that these three committees, each of which has a
significant role in the collection of critical or priority
intelligence information, could logically become subcommittees
of the proposed strengthened CCPC. The efforts of COMOR,
IPC ight, and frequently would, contribute to a CCPC
undertaking. However, the responsibilities of the new CCPC
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would be attuned to particular collection problems focused
either area-wise or subject-wise or both and normally involving
consideration of all t es of collection assets. On the other
hand, COMDR, IPC provide the community with necessary
operational and policy guidance in their respective important
and specialized intelligence fields. Their work is of direct
concern to USIB and frequently involves urgent policy decisions
either by USIB, other governmental bodies or individual agencies.
Their subordination to CCPC would simply interpose an. extra
echelon that would inevitably impair their recognized effective-
ness. For these reasons, COMOE, IPC should be retained
as USIB committees.
10. The following USIB ad hoc committees and working groups
should be removed from the USIB committee category and be redesignated
or disestablished as follows:
a. Ad Hoc Committee on the Berlin Situation. The work
of this substantive committee covers a continuing problem
directly related to the responsibilities of the Watch Com-
mittee and involves military, political and psychological
factors. The Committee has been recessed by recent USIB
action. When and if the Committee resumes activity, it should
be redesignated as a subcommittee of the Watch Committee.
b. Ad Hoc Committee on the Cuban Military Build-up. The
work of this substantive committee covers, by definition, a
military problem that is clearly the primary responsibility
of the Department of Defense. The,Committee should be
disestablished and its functions performed in accordance
with normal production responsibilities.
c. Ad Hoc Committee on Legislative Proposals re Personnel
Security. The Committee will soon complete the work for which
it was established. Upon completion of that task, the Committee
should be disestablished.
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11. Committee Chairmen. The coordination responsibilities of the
Director of Central Intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency
have, traditionally, tended to suggest that CIA provide the chairmen
for the great majority of the USIB committees. In fact, however, these
committees are responsible to the USIB and not to any single agency.
Nonetheless, where the interest of any one agency is clearly dominant,
that agency should furnish the chairman. Under the proposed new com-
mittee structure, however, there are a number of cases in which it is
difficult to demonstrate that a single agency has such a dominant
interest as.would clearly entitle it to leadership; in such cases, the
principle of personal qualification rather than agency affiliation
should prevail. In any case, a chairman of a USIB committee should
in that capacity be considered as a representative of USIB and should
report to the Chairman of USIB.*
To state these principles of chairmanship is not to imply that
changes in existing chairmanships are necessary or warranted. It is
proposed, however, that in the future a USIB committee chairman be
selected on the basis of the principles outlined, and that he be
expected to report on his chairmanship to the Chairman of USIB who
should also evaluate his performance of this task.
12. USIB Secretariat. The USIB Secretariat should devote
increased efforts in ensuring that papers coming before the Board
have had, where appropriate, adequate preliminary coordination and
in conducting an effective follow-up system on Board decisions.
In cases where it is determined that the chairman should be assigned
on a full-time basis, his parent agency should provide-another
individual as its member on the committee.
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rumen- lgecurit~,
ation (CODIB
Interagency
Clandestine
Collection
iori-
ies:(IPC
Corrected page 7 June 1962
Overhead
Reconnais-
sance
(COMDR
cien-
ific
Intell.
(SIC
oint
tomic
nergy
Intell.
JAEIC
uided
ssil
& Astr
haautic
Intell.
GMAIC
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