LETTER TO HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES FROM [MANNY]
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00269R000200060004-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 22, 2003
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 6, 1961
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP86B00269R000200060004-9.pdf | 197.3 KB |
Body:
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
In accordance with the discussion of a few days ago I am
transmitting my views concerning the Report of the Joint Study
Group. Overall I think the recommendations contained in the
Report are sound and I am in agreement with them except as
indicated below. I recognize, of course, that many of these
recommendations may not require Presidential approval for imple-
mentation; nonetheless I feel that it will be very much easier
to carry them out if it is established that the President has
endorsed the Report. Accordingly I would hope that we will, in
the first instance, seek Presidential approval of the basic
recommendations included in the Report.
I believe the President will went to take immediate steps
to implement the Report. Certain of the recommendations merit
a specific Presidential directive calling for immediate imple-
mentation whereas others can appropriately be achieved by the
agencies themselves. Therefore, I propose, subject to the
reservations below, that the President be requested to order
immediate action on recommendations 1, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 21, 23,
24.1 26 - 31, 34, 36, 37, and 11-0. The other recommendations,
which I generally approve, can be put into effect without
Presidential action although some of them may require study ard
refinement.
Specifically, however, I would offer the following general
observations and reservations concerning the Report:
For some time there has been ambiguity concerning the
precise authority of both the Director of Central Intelligence
and the U. S. Intelligence Board in the management and coordination
of the intelligence community. The Joint Study Group obviously
felt that existing authority provides an adequate base on which
to exercise more vigorous coordination. Whereas I tend to agree
with this conclusion, I would not object to changing National
Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 in order to provide
clarification if you think it necessary. The objective of more
positive coordination is desirable, in my opinion, and I would
support whatever means are essential to achieve it, including
particularly establishment of staff elements recommended in the
On file OMB Report.
release
instructions apply. As relates to coordination within the Department of Defense,
it is here that I fear the possibility of serious difficulties.
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I am a firm advocate of ultimately having a single military in-
telligence service and believe that the sooner this can be
achieved the better, both from the viewpoints of good intelligence
as well as the most efficient utilization of limited resources.
I had hoped the Report would explicitly refer to this as an
ultimate objective; since it does not I would appreciate your
indicating my feelings on it in the covering memorandum to the
President. While a single military intelligence service cannot
be achieved overnight, I would urge that the steps recommended in
the Report for coordination be taken forthwith as steps toward
this ultimate objective.
I realize that the independent services may feel distressed
at losing their individual positions on the U. S. Intelligence
Board. However, this would cause no serious concern if and when
the Intelligence activities of the Department of Defense were
reorganized to the full extent contemplated in the Defense Reor-
ganization Act of 1958. The USIB should mirror the organizational
responsibilities of the Department of Defense. I see no reason
why military service intelligence components should continue in-
definitely to have an independent voice in the high-level matters
discussed at the USIB level.
The recommendations of the Joint Study Group seem to assume
a functional split within the Department of Defense even after the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 is fully implemented. Thus,
there is proposed a focal point in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense through which high-level policy matters related to in-
telligence and general guidance of the cryptologic agencies can
be coordinated. At the same time the determination of requirements
and the actual operational activity of our military forces, which
military intelligence must serve, will be controlled through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism. Ideally I should prefer having
only a single spokesman for the Department of Defense. Nonetheless
I recognize the need for representation on the USIB of representatives
of both OSD and JCS to include both military policy and military
operational viewpoints.
It is strongly urged that Presidential approval of the Report
be subject to the understanding that the "focal point" in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense have responsibility and authority
to (1) recommend to the Secretary approval or adjustment of in-
telligence objectives; (2) review and approve requirements and
(3) supervise the development of programs and appraise operations;
exercise constant surveillance on intelligence costs in relation to
results.
It is clear that the photographic intelligence business will
in all likelihood expand in the years ahead. I believe that a
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National Photographic Intelligence Center having certain assigned
responsibilities is essential to the effective use of total
resources and think that such a center would most properly be
placed under the administrative control of the Central Intelligence
Agency. I have grave fears that the Air Force will continue to
expand its own photographic interpreting efforts and that the
end result could easily be the establishment of two huge centers.
I would suggest, therefore, that during the period of developing
a new National Security Council Intelligence Directive on
photographic intelligence there also be resolved the clear assign-
ment of responsibility to the CIA in order to keep duplication
to an absolute minimum. My conclusions are based on the belief
that in the long run photographic intelligence will have far more
significance as a basic source of information of allld.nds than
the means to obtain early warning and other more limited types of
intelligence desired by t11 Air Force.
These are my primary thoughts on the Report of the Joint
Study Group. I hope that it will be possible to obtain
Presidential endorsement of the recommendations before the
President leaves office and furthermore that the new President
will be apprised of it soon in order to gain his support for its
continuing implementation.
Sincerely yours,
Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
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