THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL AND SERVICE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: PAPER

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THE CENTRAL INTFLLIGENCE AGENCY
National and Service Intelligence
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first effort toward a central intelligence system was
taken in July 1941, when the Office of Coordinator of Information
(sometimes called OCI) was established by Executive Order and
authorized to collect, analyze, and make available to the
appropriate officials all information relating to national
security. The OCI included propaganda functions. The organization
was large and unwieldy. In June of 1942, the propaganda aspects
of OCI's responsibilities were transferred to the Office of War
Information (MI). The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was
established during the same month to-continue the function of
evaluating and correlating intelligence information. It was also
to be the agency responsible for secret intelligence and the
conduct of guerrilla wag are.
O6S continued t6 'perform these functions throughout the war,
Considerable thought was given in the summer of 1945 to the way
in which the central evaluation and collection of intelligence
could beat be accomplished in peacetime. Papers on the subject
were prepared for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Secretaries of War and Navy and other officials concerned
In September 1945, by Executive Order, the research and analysis
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functions of OSS were transferred to the State Department.. Prow
,his transfer has resulted the present Office of Zntelll;enoe
and Research in the State Department which now reports to an
Assistant Secretary of 3tate6 Simultaneously with the trahafer
of research and analysis to the State Department, the Strategid
ServiceseUnit (SSU) of the War Department was established t6
liquidate the rather substantial quantities of operational material
accumulated by 098 during the war. SSU was also charged with
carrying on, on a more or less caretaker basis, the secret
intelligence functions formerly performed by OSS. In other words,.
the two most important units in OSS were split between.two
departments.
By Executive Order dated January 22,, 1946, the National
Intelligence Authority, consisting.of the Secretaries of State;
War, and Navy, was established by the Presidents Under the
National Intelligence Authority was constituted an organization
known as the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under the direction
of a Director of Central Intelligence. The CIG was charged with
correlation and evaluation_of intelligence, the coordination of
departmental intelligence activities, and the performance of
intelligence services of corm-on concern.
The National Security Act of 1947 abolished the National
Intelligence Authority and transfez'red the functions of the Central
Intelligence Group to the present Central Intelligence Agency
(generally referred to as CIA).
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04064
Joe on OPM "d i i~!>Y~msed as a tepwiowsi aatiwl
sms+ tr i1 i >~E a, airy the sersieia
iMa~3ii~ws sr..sas, 'gaga 4r services, as of the M W4,
Genes at 84"1 Illl+as, A of the Air Toren, and the
eount reepda~age
tai )rre Ott i.u tiaa (*2) (with
), all MA lasg bistoeim behind thaws CIA with great
paver, pest awabrity, and great hap" was, in poijA of ties,
a !1" aft. In addition to its work with these agencies,
CIA had to establish class working relationships with a new and.
ambitious State Department intelligence branch. Its work,
therefore, shit agwarsly across and thycugh the National Military
.ktablialwnt (though it .was not, itself, a part of that
sstabllahwnt) and extended beyond the military setabliahment to
other departments of goverment. CIA was given a mission new to
our history and obviously occupies a position of peculiar difficulty.
II, C ANIZATIc O CAL DiTZI LIG11CS J 03NCT
The National Security Act of 1947 (See..102 (d)(l)(2)(3)(4)(5))
provides in substance that "for the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security" the Central
Intelligence Agency, "under the direction of the National Security
Council" shalls
"(1) ...,advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the
Goverment departments and agencies as relate to
national security;
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"(2) ...make recosmsndations to the National Security Cow oil
for the coordination of such intelligence activities of
the departments and agencies of the Gove::stsnt as rslals
to the national seonrity;
"(3) ...correlate and evaluate Intelligence relating to the
national security, and?provide for the appreirriate dis-
semination of such intollipaoe within the aovejTMW t
using where appropriate maisting agonies and,faailitios:r.
"(4) ...perfor, for the benefit of the existing
agencies, such additiopal services of oo^i^ioa oo ceea as
the National Security Covadil determdnse am be awe
efficiently acca fished oentralW;
"(5) ...perfom such other functions and duties. related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the
National Security Council sry trap time to tir direct."
The statute further pea-ides (Sea. 102 (a) and (b)), that the
Director of Central.Iate.'111geice sba11 be appointed by the
President, by and with too consent of tho.8enate, from am"
acsalissioned officers at the armed services or fry snag tadiiri s.
in civilian life. Ni. tenure is indefinite, -His mrml oespansati m
is $]4,000. If a iond"ioasd officer, he ib W *"BU raw w"
frets the sham of .?d' w 8 the three seniOS. oft - r
fC!l~t0 I of his duties as Director! s ? . no to a of iffift saw
not &f ft" llis genie. IW* or status. me liibrenos between ki*
service pay sad $2b,00D is ss-di up-.
kpressat there is ens Deputy litrratw. The Dipmt, Director
sots for, 'and is the abssae. of, the Dt:esbte, ? #e is 4h rloadpnt.
xat salad aii~l atine
lids getmeea the Director iii! the or
fawtions of the Agenm,
. CIA is divided into faun! NOW oMoes, wait bssdsd VW 10
. t Director. Ls add, t~lrsre a v .iw Nr
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administration and housekeeping, and a division charged with the
enforcement of security.
The five major offices are the Office of Reports and Estimates
(ORE), the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD), and three
other offices charged with the collection of information by
monitoring foreign broadcasts, examining foreign documents,
collecting information by clandestine means, conducting sountes-
espionage abroad, and other work.
The Office of Collection and Dissemination performs services
not only for CIA but for a number of other Government agencies as
well. It maintains, through the use of machine records, central
indexes indicating the substance and showing the location of
information relating to foreign personalities, scientists, etc.
and graphic material such as photographs of foreign intelligence
value and foreign industrial information. OCD also includes a
so-called liaison branch which endeavors to insure that routine
reciprocal channels between CL1 and other agencies (State, Commerce,
Agriculture, the Armed Services, etc.) are maintained so that
information secured by (head other agencies is available to CIA
and that reports prepared by CIA are properly distributed. OCD
also tries to eliminate duplication in the field of collection by
seeing: (1) that a request for information by a CIA division is
routed to the appropriate collecting agency (State, G-2, the
clandestine service, etc.); (2) that collection machinery is not
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put into operation at all if the information required is airea r
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available (this is aocamplished bf refereooe to die 904AiM
records) 1 and (3) that two or more regwita ate -:: MM" 1W
different individuals, branch.., or agencies for seller of 90
same information. It disseednates CIA's repots to ~b SY
Government agencies,
The. principle function of the Office at lseoar46 me
is the evaluation of intelligence and the prelaritim sd.Lrtollliw~ss
estimates. ? For this purpose (12 is divided into cis rsg - 1
branches representing geographiosl areas, '!hose braes as'
charged with the asasination of ?*' we ' information eenoslsiag t Slr.
respective areas which oaass In the tors of tbowssnds of sa41es
and reports from State Department eissiods abroad, from ai'lita=7
and naval attaches, from clandestine sources, etc. fstlaittes sods
by regional branches form the basis of reports from CU to Ala
National Security Council or other "customers".. In addition to
the regional branches there are four groups ooaaerned with
economics, science, transportation, and international or nissttepse
These groups act as expert consultants to the regional breaches
in the preparation of their estimates. The Assistant Direstoe'h
charge of ORE is assisted by a planning, refidwing, cad editorial
staff.
ORE also performs a service of common oonosrn to ma
Government departments through the medium of alisp Broach wber+s
central indexes of foreign maps are kept and fesilitiis tae sso
making are available,
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M. OTH D TE[.LIO JCE AG 1CIES
CIA is the apex of a pyramidal intelligence structure. Other
Govoraasat intelligence agencies, without which no intelligence
service could be complete, are numerous and important. This study
is primarily concerned with CIA since the Committee's work schedule
did not permit detailed examination of the atrueturds of the
separate service departments. The State Department and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other Governmental departments with
intelligence activities lie beyond the scope of the work of the
Cc ittee. Nevertheless, it would be misleading and inaccurate
.to focus attention solely upon CIA without meaningful reference
to the other intelligence agencies.
The service agencies are three-the Array G-2, the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and A-2 of the Air Force. The Federf.l Bureau
of Investigation is charged with counterespionage in this Country,
although the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps carries out investiga-
tions within army ranks. The Navy and the Air Force also investigate
their own personnel, calling in the F.B.I. from time to time. The
State Department maintains its own intelligence branch. Each of
these services maintain sizeable organizations for the collection
of intelligence (through military, naval, and air attaches and by
other means), for its classification, and for its evaluation and
analysis. Each maintains certain expert advisers and specialists,
each some researchers. Each must cooperate with and dovetail into
the other; each must support and maintain CIA if there is to be
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effective intelligence. Neither these agencies nor CIA can operate
with success independently; they are all interdependent..
Contact between the National Security Council and CIA is
maintained through the Director of CIA who.attends Council metings..
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Three joint committees contribute to the relationship between
CIA and other Government agencies:
(a) By National Security Council directive there exists
an organization known as IAC (Intelligence Advisory Committee)
consisting of the principal intelligence officers of State,
Army, Navy, Air Force,, the Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy
Commission. The Director of CIA acts as chairman, although
CIA technically is not a member of the committee.. In the
past it has dealt largely witb procedural matters, although
on occasions it has met to consider matters of substantive
intelligence. The Intelligence Advisory Committee was probably
originally established by the National Security Council as a
forum to deal with problems arising in tho course of CIA's
discharge of its statutory duty "of coordinating the intelligence
activities of'the several Government departments....."
(b) Within CIA is a group known as'ICAPS (Interdepartmental
Coordinating and Planning Staff) which consists of a number of
individuals assigned to CIA by the State Department and the
military services. Its activities to date have largely
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consisted of handling papors of procedural concern to
Intolligonco Advisory Committoo agoncios. The chairman of
ICAPS is tho official CIA roproaontativo at mootinga of tho
National Security Council staff. A roprosontativo of CIA's
Offico of Rosoarch and Estimatos attonda meetings of tho
Council's staff uhon invitod, and is thus dovoloping an
informal working relationship botwoon CIA and tho Council's
staff.
(c) A third Committoo is the so-called "Standing
Committoo" which consists of roprosontativos of State and
the military sorviooe on the "Colonol" lovel who are not
assignod to CIA but are chargod within thoir roepoctivo
agoncios with cognisanco of CIA matters.
Tho Director of CIA has no direct, formal contact with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Intolligonco Committoo of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff doos not include him in its momborehip
although tho lowor-ocholon Joint Intolligonco Group of the Joint
Staff Includes a CIA roproaontativo. Reprosontativos of both the
Joint Staff and of CIA participato in Intolligonco Advisory Com-
mittoo meetings, which door provide a oortain contact--though a
tenuous ono--bot?Joon the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA.
Vlorking relations with outaido agonoios aro maintained through
tho liaison sections of the Office of Collection and Disaomination
of CIA. Thoao maintain channels for routine rooiprocal intorohango
of information needed by CIA or other Government agonoios and for
tho distribution of roports. Working relationships also are boin
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built up with varying degrees of success between the regional branches
of the Office of Reports and Estimates and their opposite numbers in
State, G-2, etc.
Another type of relationship is the ad t14g committee, of which
a number have been constituted. An example is the committee formed
under the chairmanship of a representative of ORE, to allocate amongst
Government agencies responsibility for compiling appropriate sections
of basic regional studies (political sections to State, sections on
road communications to Army, etc.) and to determine the priorities
to be accorded to studios. of various areas.
A working relationship exists between FBI and CIA. As CIA
interrog:,tes foreigners who are in the United States and who are
potential sources of information about developments abroad and as
the FBI is concerned with the security aspects of foreigners within
the United States, the jurisdictions of the two agencies overlap.
Liaison is accomplished by representatives of CIA and FBI, designated
for the purpose. Liaison is also maintained by interchange of reports
between the counterespionage officials of CIA and appropriate
representatives of FBI.
The FBI formerly investigated all prospectivD CIA employees far
security, but due to the pressure of these and other commitments
FBI has felt obliged to discontinue this service. The FBI, hoNever,
cooperated with CIA, on the latter's request, in special security
checks.
A type of relationship of considerable importance is exemplified
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(a) Genes
There has been some newspaper and much official and unofficial
criticism of the personnel of CIA. During the course of a much too
rapid expansion of the organization which took place under a previous
Director, mistakes in personnel procurement were made. There is
evidence, however, of improvement in the recruiting of men and women
with appropriate education, experience, and, personality, although
additional improvement is needed. Many of the individuals on the
"desk" or staff level appear to be intelligent, enthusiastic, and
competent. Time, experience, and training are necessary, probably
requiring years, to build up a fully competent staff for all offices
and echelons of CIA. This can only be accomplished as a matter of
internal administrative development with continuity of competent
leadership.
(b) Size of Operating Staff
A number of the services that CIA performs as a matter of common
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concerh to other agencies of the Government require substantial
staffs. These include the staffs necessary tot (1) maintain a
reference library and central indexes of all intelligence materials;
(2) perform certain essential liaison functions;
the editorial staff necessary to monitor an average of two million.
words a day broadcast by foreign radio stations, and to distribute
daily digests of information taken from these broadcasts; (4) maintain
a central map service for all Government agencies, and (5) examine
quantities of foreign documents measured in tons. The number of
individuals employed in the conduct of CIA's clandestine activities
is probably not excessive when the peculiar services required for
such operations are considered. A considerable staff will inevitably
be necessary to enable CIA to perform its evaluating function.
Although there is duplication in the economic and political research
dono by various Government departments and agencies including CIA,
the total number of persona , employed, by the Government for research
purposes cannot, in all probability, be very substantially reduced,
(c) istrativSecurity Personnel
The size of the Security Division of CIA is probably reasonable.
The present size of the Administrative Division seems excessive,
particularly in light of requirements for an administrative staff in
each of the offices'in some of which security requires a large degree
of independence. On the other hand, an organization as large as CIA
requires a substantial amount of housekeeping, telephone service,
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maintenance of personnel records, etc. Thu problem is complicated
by the fact that accor.Lodations to house CIA centrally are not
available and could only be constructed at a substantial cost and
with considerable publicity. A certain anount of decentralization
of CIA may be desirable for security reasons. CIA is spread
amongst twenty-two separate buildings, including warehouses, all of
which must be maintained and serviced separately. Moreover CI:
by the Administrative Division. Reduction of the administrative
overhead is possible and desirable. There is some evidence-of
interference by administrative functionaries in matters of prir..arily
operational concern. A certain amount of such interference is
inevitable due to the fact that a Director will tend to entrust the
enforcement of budgetary controls to his immediate administrative
representatives. Too Much interference of this sort is undesirable,
but this is an administrative problem that must be solved internally.
VI. EVALUATION
Intended as the major source of coordinated and evaluated
intelligence, on which broad national policy could be soundly based,
the Central Intelligence Agency has as yet fallen short of the
objective. While it has made progress in organizing and equipping
itself, its product, however valid, does not presently enjoy the full
confidence of the National Security Organization or of the other
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agencies it serves and has not yet-with certain encouraging
exceptions--played an important role in the determinations of the
National Security Council.
CIA raises some difficult problems which, for reasons of
security, are not easy to discuss. The Committee feels that CIA
is properly located under the National Security Council; that its
organization needs continuing careful attention and that better
working relationships with other agencies must be established. In
this respect it suffers from a familiar fault, recurrent throughout
the whole National Security Organization. Its main problem, as is
likewise true of most of the other agencies, is one of personnel.
The Committee emphasizes a truism, that good intelligence depends
upon good personnel. CIA must have imaginative and vigorous
supervision. The Committee is certain that the director of the CIA
must have continuity of tenure and should be selected primarily on
the basis of competence, but that, other things being equal, it
would be preferable that he be a civilian.
The Committee was particularly concerned over the Nation's
inadequacies in the field of scientific, including medical
intelligence. The vital importance of reliable and up-to-date
scientific information is such as to call for far greater efforts
than appear to have been devoted to this need in the past. Scientists
in general have expressed considerable distress at the paucity of
information availabi.; and the relationship between science and CIA
does not seem to be of the bust.
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The intelligence agencies of the services, the State Department,
and the !BI asst do their proper share, and the whole must pull in
harness if our intelligence services are to be adequate to the
difficult requirements of the atomic age. The very problems that
have beset CIA have troubled, to more or lose degree, the other
intelligsnoe agenoies. Of all these problems, one looms largest--
personnel. The skilled and experienced personnel of wartime have in
most caseq*severed their connections with the services; selection
and replacement of new personnel have been extremely haphazard. In
one of the service's intelligence systems at headquarters, Washington,
no Russian linguist is now permanently employed. In Germany, the
conduct of the Armes Counter Intelligence Corps, a highly important
part of intelligence work, became notorious, yet inherently this was
not the fault of the Corps; the personnel assigned to it had no
qualifications or training for the work and was often of inadequate
caliber. The Army's remedy for this situation was not to improve
personnel selection and training, but to order all CIC personnel to
woar uniforms, live in barracks, and report for regular Army meals.
Under such a regimen they wore expected to keep in contact with the
local population and to catch spies]
Choice intelligence berths in the services have too often boon
assigned to officers not particularly wanted by other arms or branches.
Tho capable, experienced, and thoroughly devoted personnel who have
specialized in intelligence have too often soon their organizations
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and their systems ruined by superior officers with no experience,
little capacity, and no imagination. In the Corriittue's opinion,
it is highly important that an intelligence corps-or at least an
intelligence career-be provided by the services and that adequate
selection and training systems be inaugurated.
The services must also try to rid their intelligence estimates
of subjective bias. Partly because of their natural service interests,
partly because of inter-service budgetary competition, our estimates
of potential enemy strengths vary widely, depending upon the service
that makes them. The Army will stress the potential enemy's ground
divisions, the Navy his submarines, the Air Force his planes, and
each estimate differs somewhat from the others. Ian one specific
instance, an estimate of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the
Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained so many `. .
inconsistencies within a single paper that it was considered value-
less for plunning.purposes. Out of this mass of jumbled material,
and harassed often by the open aid covert opposition of the older
agencies, CIA has tried to make sense. That it has not always
succeeded has not been entirely the fault of CIA.
Intelligence can best flourish in the shade of silence. But if
it is not subjected to scrutiny it could easily strgnnte. Another
examination, two or three years from now, of our intelligence system
should be undertaken, either by a Congressional watchdog comittee,
or preferably by a committee akin to the Dulles group (described
below).. The basic framework for a sound intelligence organization
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now exists; yet the ,.uteri:-.i so far produced is by no moans adequate
to our national sr.f,ty in this age of "cold wir" ant the atomic
bomb. That framework must be fleshed out by proper personnel and
sound administrative measures. Intelligence is the first lisle of
defense.
Dulles Cornittee
:. detailed study of the organization and activities of the
intelligence divisirns of the government, including CIA, is being
made by a committee consisting of Mr. Allen Dulles,
Mr. William H. Jackson, and Mr. Mathias Correa, who are assisted by
a staff of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum, of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The Corimittuo was appointed by the President
on the recommendation of the National Security Council. It will make
its report with specific recorn.endaticns by January 1, 1949. All
problems here considered will also be reviewed by the Dulles Committee.
qualifications of Director
A moot question is whether the Director should be a civilian or
a professional military raaf. The argument in favor of a service man
is that he will command more confidence from the armed services who
talk his language and'wiil respect his position and security. With a
military man, the present pay scale will not prove a deterrent. The
job could be developed into one of the top staff assignments available
to members of the three services.-
Against this, it is said that the position requires a broader
background and greater versatility and diplomatic experience than is
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usually found in service personnel; that the beat qunlified and
riost competent officers would not -,ccept the position if to do
so nwint perm:nont retire,aent and an end of the road to important
coirr..:tr1 or operational responsibility. If a military man is
assii!ned ti) the position as a tour of duty, he will,-it is said,
inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution of his
duties, by his rank and status as compared with that of other
officers with whom he deals. He may also be influenced by concern
for his next billet.
The principal argument against a civilian is the difficulty of
getting a good one. It will be difficult to attract a man of force,
reputation, integrity, rind proven administrative ability who has an
r,.de--uate knowle-ige of foreign history and politics and is familiar
with intelligence techninue and the working machinery of the
Government and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low
in comparison to industry and the professions, but the reward of
success is snonymit;;. The wisdom of putting an individual who lacks
intelligence experience in charge simply because he is a competent
Administrator is dubious. civilian would have the advantage of
being frie from t..int of service ambitions or rivalries. On the
other hand a,civilian may be more subject to political pressure than
a niiitar:? ran. In certain foreign countries this has occurred.
In any event a civilian would have to be a man of comet*nding
reputation and personality in order to secure the respect and
cooperation of the services. CIA's relations with the State
Department would undoubtedly benefit from the presence of a civilian
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director, kwon and respected by the Secretary of State and his
assistants.
The intrinsic interest of the work, its potential influence on
policy, and recognition of public service to be performed might
combine to persuade a competent civilian to accept the position.
If so, his ahpointaent would seem desirable. A ehangi in the statute
that would disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended.
Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least, to amend
the statute to include a mandatory requirement that a military man,
appointed as Director, must retire from the service. A competent
officer could be persuaded to retire from his service and abandon
his career to become Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance
of a reasonable tenure of office, That no such assurance exists today
appears from the fact that three different Directors have been
appointed since January of 1946, A provision requiring the retirement
from service of any commissioned officer appointed Director might
appropriately be ineludud in the statute--if ,coupled with provision
for adenuate retirement pay in case he is removed as Director.-
Location
(1) CIA? lotion under the NEC
CIA must necessarily be centrally located both as a
"coordinator" and as an "evaluator." It must work with service
intelligence agencies and with agencies outside the National Military
Establishment. It must accomplish the allocation of responsibility
for collection and research among Government agencies and fulfill
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its responsibility for central evaluation of intelligence free
from iiepartmental prejudice, control or bias, whether real or imagined.
It must exercise authority through directives issued centrally and
moat at the same time maintain smooth and constant working relation-
ships with the other departments and services.
It has been suggested that CIA should report directly to the
President. One alleged advantage of such an arrangement is that
CIA's authority as a coordinator would thus be enhanced, as its
directives could be issued as executive orders. Another is that
CIA would then report to an individual rather than a committee.
Apart from the question of burdening the President with
additional personal responsibility, it is doubtful whether, as a,
practical matter, he has the time to pay much attention to it,
Internal administration will always remain the personal responsibility
of the Director of CIA who can be hold accountable by the National
Security Council, at the instance of any one of its members, as
effectively as by the President. It is unlikely that the Director+s
effectiveness either as a "coordinator" or an "evaluator" would
be increased by putting him on a White House level. His estimates
would, in aa11 probability, receive neither more nor less attention
from the departments if they emanated from the'executive office-of
the President or an appendage thereto. The exercise of CIA's
coordination function to allocate responsibilities must, initially
at {least, be performed on amore or lose negotiated basis. Efforts
to impose directives concerning the intQrnaa workings of a department
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upon officials of the level of the Secretary of State or'Secretary
of Defense are not likely to meet with success.
Suggestions have also been made that CIA should be in the
State Department or in the National Uilitary Establishment. But
CIA's functions and interests transcend both the military establish-
ment and the State Department. The Army has suggested that the
National Security Act be amended to provide "that the Secretary of
Defense shall be responsible for coordinating the intelligence
activities of the departments and agencies of the National Military
Establishment," and that CIA "shall deal only with the Secretary of
Defense, or such other agency or agencies as he may designate." But
inclusion of such a provision would tend to break down the necessarily
complicated but established working relationships between CIA and
individual agencies, and in any case seems redundant. The Secretary
of Defense must be, per se, the coordinator of intelligence and all
other activities within the military establishment, and CIA practically
must deal with him-as it actually does through the National Security
Council. A better mechanism than-now exists for eoordinating.:tbi
service intelligenee,Agenciee in-the Secretary's Office could be
established,. but there should be no artificial.rebtriotion of the
flexibility and authority needed by'CIA, CIA 'is properl,- placed
under the National Security Council,
(2) Location of "common services" under CIA
U Mor the statuto CIA is entrusted with the performance of suck
services of common concern as the National Security Council shall
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determine. At present these include, apart from Scientific
Intelligence, which is discussed separately, (a) aaintsnance of
central indexes of report, records and documents having intelligence
value; (b) examination of foreign documents from which intelligence
material is extracted and disseminated; (c) maintenance of central
map facilit;es; (d) monitoring of foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection
of information by clandestine means and counterespionage abroad.
There is little real dispute that the first four of these
functions should be located centrally. The question of where the
clandestine operational activities should be located has long been
the subject of debate. Wherever located, there is little doubt that
they should all be treated together as a single unit.
Proponents of the theory that the clandestine service should
be under the State Department point to
that secret intelligence is closely related to the
'formulation of diplomatic decisions. Others maintain that espionage
is essentially valuable for defense and in wartime would ihevitab]y
pass to military control and become a function of co,mand. They argue
that this service should be under the Secretary of Defense or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
An objection, sometimes made to continuing espionage under the
CIA, is that it creates so complex an administrative burden for the
Director as to render it difficult for him to function as an "evaluator";
also that as an "evaluator" he will be prejudiced in favor of
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tS &_ p0000~sd by his ow sa vloe: file objection has so-
+Ii1 A**t7 beet oast be esio-sd against serious objection to
Otadn tM ..cries .1s=here;
!lW al Malts in favor of ooctrol by the Secretary of Defense
or the Searetasy of atone are in large dadree aztually azcluaive,
and this fact suWBots retention of the service in its present spot
odder a body Phare.both are represented.
Considerable thought must be given, however, to the desirability
of splitting CIA in time of war and transferring two or three of its
five major divisions-certainly the operational services, the open
and covert collection of information---to the National Military
establishment, where they could function under the'Joint Chiefs of
Staff (preferably) or under the Secretary of Defense. If inclusion
of these services in the wartime chain of command is deemed desirable,
the objective could be facilitated by a slight, and at the same time
a desirable, change in CIA's present organization-the grouping of
all operations under a Deputy Director who should havo considerable,
though not unlimited independence. In time of peace, the Deputy
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Director in charge of operations would function under the >I.rector
CIA; in tine of war be aright if necessary report directly to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Continued experience my suggest other changes, but aiapge is
disruptive in itself, and ens great present need of the intelli4pme
services is a relatively r organisation-free period in throb to tot
out their problem.. It at semis future Liver it appears desirable to
transfer CUs operational functions to ano fey yssy, the trawslw
might be accomplished with the approval of the ^ational Security
Council, the Director CIA, and the president.-
Inerr~n Rsormisetjon
Some changes in the internal structure of CIA, in sdditic to
the goupsnnt of the operating offices under a deputy director, =W
be needed. The vwry large number of people employed bF CIA in itself
suggests that a careful survey should be made of its adsitdstrattve
Procedures with a view to greater eoanoW. The . 4itstretive
division seems too large with danger that the tail mss be wedeLme the
dog. The Cffioe of Collection and Dissemination sometimes is the piss
has acted as a bottleneck but under its new heed-it appears to be
performing on eftisieert job.. Same thought adould be given to rag
the man comic.., 'AM a dw the Ottici of Lsoasah and itinates, Via
the other refesesse f"t3ities under the Cflico of Cslleotirs and
Dissedjne-td-on. The same at this latter *Mae is a skamma -j it
PrdWWj should bsocss pwrs1y a refeereace seriioe with its !cu WMGLSO
wed to this iaporta t ,>tsat.. Its liaison functions sd41rt be spy
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eff to form a separate small section. The Dulles study will
undoubtedly make more detailed recommendations for internal reform.
Intelligence Evaluation Board
The greatest need in CIA is the establishment at a high level of
a small group of highly capable people, freed from administrative
detail, to concentrate upon intelligence evaluation, The Director
and his assistants have had to devote so large a portion of their
time to administration that they have been unable to give sufficient
time to analysis and evaluation, A small group of maturo men of the
highest talents,, having full access to all information, might well.
be released completely from routine and act to thinking about
intelligence only. Lamy of the greatest failures in intelligence have
not been failures in collection, but failures in analysing and
evaluating correctly the information available,
Duplication
There is some duplication in'the work done by the Office of
Research and Estimates and'the work in other governmental intelligence
agencies. This duplication is caused in part by the fact that ORE
and other agencies, notably the intelligence division of the State
Department, but also sections of 0-2, ONI, A-2 :end even the Department
of Coiiaerce, examine the same basic material for the purpose of making
intelligence estimates. To some degree this may be inevitable and
even desirable as CIA must be in a position to verify the intelligence
that it evaluates. Examination of basic matcrisl for this purpose
might be accomplished with fewer people by placing CIA analysts in
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the message centers and secretariats of the departments and services
to sift out really important material for routing to CIA.
The present size of ORE is in considerable measure due to
CIA's dopunde9cc on its own facilities.for research. Research
divisions of other agencies are preoccupied with their immediate
departmental requirements and are unable to meet or are otherwise
unresponsive to CIA's priorities. CIA accordingly tends to do its
own basic research. Duplication in the field of economic research can
probably be reduced over a period of time, by intelligent use of
"coordinating" power exercised over many Government agencies,
Duplication in the field of political reporting
remains in issue
between CIA and the State Department. Some. duplication may be justt-
fled on the ground that "two guesses are better than one"; also because
CIA and the intelligence division of the State Depart4ent work with
different objectives and different priorities. However, it is now
clear in retrospect that it was a mistake to split up the Office of
Strategic Services after the war and to assign part of its tunetions
to one department (State) and part to anoth,:r (Army). This mistake
now has been largely remedied by arettion of CIA, but its effects
linger on in the research and analysis duplication--particularly marked
in the economic and political field-between CIA and State. The
feasibility of shifting a large part of the State Department's
intelligence section to CIA should be studied. If this should prove
to be impractical or undesirable, unnecessary duplication should be
eliminated by progressive coordination, interchange of personnel, and
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Ift aUMWMM d qpsdta r W 1it3es to wriow agencies bw
`
iML W aswitl 41110"UVISe
'olds lWAWLSs is ewer, ,l7 pwfos'sd by daily intelligence
des ssgdsLdeg sapots iatelligsnce itms ihich ge to the
!resident, ssbsl+s of the Imo, - and others. 'weekly and nonthly
estimates of the wr3.d ,istslligenee situation are also prepared as
1sll as estimates of specific situations. These we drawn up from
tins to time, as oooasiQm arises, on CIA' s own initiative or in
response to rsqusata from the Iational Security Council or other
apsnai",, s ch u the joint Chiefs of Staff, concerned with national
wuj ivy.
CIA's estimstes and surveys are criticised principally on two
grarpds. One is that as a normal routine they receivo insufficient
eosrsidsraticn from the policy makers, and are not responsive to their
leisdiate problems and requirements. A second criticism, which is
allied to the first, is that CIA estimates are made without access to
all relevant information including information concerning activities
and decisions of the military services, operational in nature, such
as the eottent and deployment of the fleet in the Pacific, etc. Both
these criticisms have sage elements of truth. The military services
tend to withhold operational information and the details of military
,plans on the grounds of securityf In formulating plans the State
Department tends to rely on its own judgu:ent and inforr,.-tion without
consulting CIA.- Although CIA appears to be supplied with all
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of spsaltia r~ssPsnalbilities to various agencies by
i lsasdtir Oweoil dis+sotivws,
and
lids tunetioa is eerrently performed by daily intelligence
"saries QeaRMdadAg egPo'ts intelligence iters which go to the
President. a^Obse+s of the MSC, - and others, Weekly and monthly
causalUs of the wetid intelligence situation we also prepared as
well as sst1 tee of specific situations. These we drawn up from
time to tilts, as oooasipn arises, on CIA's own initiative or in
response to requests from the Iational. Security Council or other
agencies, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerned with national
see unity.
CIA's estimates and surveys are criticised principally on two
gravada. One is that as a normal routine they receive inaufficiant
eoaaidsretion from the policy makers, and arcs not responsive to their
isrsdiate problems and requirements. A second criticise:, which is
allied to the first, in that CIA estimat(-?s are made without access to
all relevant information including information concerning activities
and decisions of the military services, operational in nature, such
as the extent and deployment of the fleet in the Pacific, ctc. Bcth
these criticisms have some elements of truth. The military aerv.cees
tend to withhold operational information and the details of riiUSt-iry
plans on the grounds of security. In foraulating plans the State
Department tends to rely on its own judgr..ent and inforr..tion wi th,):,t
consulting CIA. Although CIA appears to be supplied with all
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information of a strictly "intelligence" nature, it is not clear
that CIA has adequate access to information about operational
developaents. -Ywt effective intelligence is possible only when it is
closely linked with planning and policy-making.
Plans and decisions affecting national security are presently
made at various places; by the National Security Council, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,
by the State Department and by the military services individually.
These various authorities rely, in formulating their plans and decisions,
on the respective departmental intelligence services, oil the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs- of Staff, and the Joint
Intelligence Group, which is the working body for the JIC, as well as
on CIA.' If CIA is to perform adequately its function of evaluating
and correlating intelligence relating to the national security, it =at
be aware of, and participate in, the thinking at all these levels,.
It is particularly desirable that khe association between ~,ne
Joint Staff and the CIA be as intimate as possible,. CIA is the
logical arbiter of differences between the services on the evaluation
of intelligence. Asauuptions made by the Chiefs of Staff both for
planning and operational purposes should be formulated with CIA
participation or at least revie*ed by lCIA.
For the purpose of fostering a closer relationship between CIA
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consideration should be given' to
including the Director CIA among the membership of the Joint Intelliges
Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. furthermore, it would seep
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desirable that the Intelligence Advisory Coia[.dtteu n,:ut more frequently
to consider questions of substantive intelligence. This would
contribute to an intereh ungu of intelligence opinion between the
principal intelligencb officers of the Government and would in itself
insure a closer relationship between CIA and the Joint Intelligence
Committee both of which participate in Intelligence Advisory Committee
meetings,
It is also desirable that a closer working relationship be
established between the sections in CIA responsible for the preparation
of estimates and both the National Security Council staff and the
Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
Scientific Intelligence
Failure properly to appraise the extent of scientific developments
in enemy countries may have more icnediate. and catastrophic consequences
than failure in any other field of intelligence. What is needed is
a central authority responsible for assimilating all information
concerning developments in the field of science abroad and competent
to estimate the significance of these developments, This.agency
obviously must have access to all available information bearing on the
problem. It must also be able to provide intelligent direction in the
collection of items of information likely to have significance in the
scientific field.
At present, responsibility for intelligence evaluation in such,
fields as biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics,
developments in `aided missiles, etc., is spread amongst various agencies,
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including the Chemical Warfare Service (GYMS), 0-2, A-2, ONI, and the
Atomic Energy Commission as well as CIA. kedioal intelligence is
virtually non-existent.* Estimates of foreign potentialities made by
various agencies are inadequate and contradictory. In CIA itself
responsibility for scientific intelligence is divide4.between the
Scientific Branch of ORE and a group concerned with atomic energy.
Collection of information concerning scientific developments abroad
is clearly inadequate.
On the recommendation of
then Chairman of the.
R&DB, a scientist.-of reputation has directed the work of the Scientific
Branch of ORE for the past year. He recently resigned** and the office
is awaiting the recommendation of a successor by
has replaced As presently conatitutod, the Sdiontifte Branch
of ORE is not in a position either to evaluate intelligence or to
stimulate the collection of necessary information. There is no
physician and no mechanism for collecting or evaluating medical
intelligence in CIA.
Some of the difficulties presently experienced are inevitable.
Any eminent scientist will be impatient with routine regulations, and
some "red tape" exists in any government orgaiLization. It is desirable,
however, that the individual responsible for scientific intelligence
See Chapter XIII, Medical Services and Hospitalization in the
Military Services.
The Committee has been advised that CIA has been successful in
finding a satisfactory replacement,
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within CIA be freed, as far as possible, from subordination to
administrative officials. This might be accomplished in CIA by
raisins the Scientific Branch to an offioe level and Making its
chief an Assistant Director.
A consideration that sakes it difficult to keep qualified
scientists in CIA is-the undesirability ofpublic acknowledgment of
the nature of the activity. The practical result is to create the
impression that the individual in question isn't employed by anybody.
This makes it difficult for him to attend conferences or write papers,
and he soon loses standing in his profession. For these reasons, it
is highly desirable that arrangements be made whereby any eminent
scientist employed by CIA be given a "cover" position. A currently
popular but baseless theory that scientists are inherently insecure
is advanced as an argument why individuals responsible for scientific
intelligence should be denied opportunities for active association with
other scientists at conferences, etc., on any basis. Security would
appear to be a matter of individual responsibility. No evidence
justifies the conclusion that insecurity is an occupstional failing
peculiar to scientists.
The activities of Scientific Intelligence should bt directed by
a scientist and not by some otherwise competent individu.r+l whose
education and experience in the scientific field is superficial. ,n
educated guess !is to the implications of a given scientific development
can be made only if the guesser has a real understanding of the
potentiality of scientific development. Not only must he be fully
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competent to appreciate the significance of development himself,
but, if he is to be effective, he lust be able to convince other
scientists that his interpretation of a given dsvelopmsrit is
reasonable, He must speak the scientific language.
Security considerations occasioned the divorce between the group
in CIA concerned with atomic energy and the 8oientific Brag, It
-aa felt that individus]ls concerned with devel4msnts in the atoejo
field should be strictly isolated. Present arrangaments Zr
ointelligence relating to atomic energy seem to be wori4ng more
c-othly than those in other scientific fields although the collection
If foreign information is slow and di.!.fioult, and our atomic energy
Intelligence is by no nowu s adequate.
?Logic suggests that at some future time rewponsipility for all
Scientific intelligence be oentralised, An immediate
recl'guaimataosn
for this purpose would probably be pramstuape and simply retard the
development of atomic intelligence without contributing to the iapeova?
nett of scientific intelligence generally.
Vigorous action is imperative to improve all facilities for
--valuating and stimulating the collection of scientific intelligence.
Outside the field of atomic energy this most be done b- increasing the
authority and support given to the official responsible for ssisatifie
intelligatW within CIA whether he remain on a branch or be raised to
an office level. Non-teebniosl as well. as technical intelligence
information contributes to the evaluation of torsipl ssientil'ie
developmenzo. For this reason scientific inter ipsUdi"
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medical intelligence should be evaluated centrally where intelligence
information of all kinds is imaediate]y available.
Evaluation of Operations and Lmation of Counterespionage
For security reasons no attempt has been made at a detailed
analysis or appraisal of the clandestine operational activities of
CIA. Senior officers of the government who testified before the
Committee on the National Security Organisation expressed themselves
as fairly well satisfied with the necessarily slow progress in this
field, although there was a distinct feeling that progress could be
more rapid. Even this limited satisfaction is not echoed in lower
ranks.
The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly
integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations. Although arguments
have been made in favor of extending CIA's authority to include
reeporsibility for counterespionage in this Country, such an extension
of jurisdiction does not at present appear justified. For one thing,
concentration of power over oounterespionage activities at home in
the hands of a Director of-Central Intelligence responsible for
espionage abroad might Justifiably arouse public suspicion and
opposition. Conceivably it could form the basis for a charge that
a gestapo is in process of creation even though the power to arrest
were specifically withhold. To transfer responsibility for docsstio
counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established organisation
and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped for the assigmt to me
Aryr.
The soneral frames k of car intolll,/eass cram satime- is conceived. The pertinrst assooiss are mWe.o! its assets gad owmwft
Liabilities, of its sir%gss and ahaetcagia . Is,$atioaal ass^rit,
Connoil, which has pr rly oonosrnsd itself rit '.Xt Ammid give
more thouiht and attmstioa to the rsLtias L of M nifh aghw
i.rhtallissnse a&UQies gad aWtLng throw the. .qt 8sfas.
gird the Secretary of $ats, uhould embo ump the 11464mim" of
-t her int.llisee o, agsnct..
t th of the reform s d? by this wtrt 7 . #at by tale VaLi s
+O ittm., as .arm aosePt.d, should be aada prssptjr, VA slwt, eif~ioal
has been taken, CIA and girther flsesrfiNat iat.Uigsm" SomelN NAo03,d
be oerra .tted a period at iu6at~oai ' as .o t free from ths #i aip~ ota
r_f oontiems], ee sdnation and Y tr #s PWOU from p tom,
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basis, to a qualified educational institution or industrial corpora-
tion, The ooat of this operation, a non-rocurring item, has boon
oatimntod by OCDP at, in round figures, $5 pillion.
The coat of running the Office of Civil Defense for the first,
full, poaoetimo year has boon estimated at $3,547,990. This includes
personal services, travel, printing, communications, etc.--all the
usual items that go to make up the expense shoot of a Government
agency. Coats in subsequent years may run higher, depending on sub-
sidies for mobile reserves and other expenses that night be assured
by OCD. The above figure, therefore, represents the minimur,; cost
ostinlatod under present conditions.
On April 2, 1948, at its ninth meeting, the National Security
Council (generally referred to heroin as NSC or the Council) author-
izod its Executive Secretary, with the assistance of roproscntativcs
from the departments roprosontod on the Council and other interested
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to ;,r,;-
pare a study and rocommondations on the subject of the nterml Secur t
of the United States for Council consideration. Pursuant to this
authorization, the Council employed a temporary consultant* to preparo
the study and rocomaondations with the assistance referred to abcvc.
He began his survey on April 14; his report was subaittod under date
* Soo Vol. II, Chapter I, National Security Council.
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"The term 'civil defense' is generally used to denote
the organized activities of the civilian population (1) to
minimize the effects of any enemy action directed against
the United States and (2) to maintain or restore those
facilities and services which are essential to civil life
and which are affected by such enemy action. It does not
in general include internal security or active defense
measures, such as aircraft warning, which, although they
may utilize civilian volunteers, are a responsibility of
the ,rmed Forces."*
On June 28, 1948, the internal security report was submitted to
the National Security Council-by its Executive Secretary v-rith the sug-
gestion that the Council adopt the conclusions and rocommandrtione
thoroin and submit them to the President for approval. The Council
considered the report and finally referred it to the Stato-i.rry-i+avy-
i,ir Force Coordinating Committee (SAN.aCC) for further study aad ap-
propriato implementation.
In furtherance of this reference, S1-NiCC, in turn, appointed .,ork-
ing committous to occupy thomeolvus ;.ith the problems of internal
security. In addition to the members of SA.NnCC, the cortmittocs had
re,'rescntativos of the Departments of Justice and Treasury and of the
office of the Secretary of Defense. The committoos also called in
as consultants and observers reprosuntntivos of certain other agencies.
This group found--confirming the above-mcntionod report to the National
Security Council--that internal security in one form or anothor was
the concern of more than tionty-fivo different Government agencies,
that its problems wore both complex and manifold--it listed 52--and
+- Memorandum by Secretary of Defunso, Subject - Office of Civil
Defense Planning, March 27, 1948.
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'The term 'civil defense' is generally used to denote
the organized activities of the civilian population (1) to
minimise the effects of any enemy action directed against
the United States and (2) to maintain or restore those
facilities and services which are essential to civil life
and which are affected by such enemy action. It does not
in general include internal security or active defense
measures, such as aircraft warning, which, although they
may utilize civilian volunteers, are a responsibility of
the firmed Forces.'*
On June 28, 1948, the internal security report was submitted to
the Rational Security Council by its Executive Secretary with the sug-
gestion that the Council adopt the conclusions and rocommondations
therein and submit them to the President for approval. The Council
considered the report aqd finally referred it to the Stato-Lrmy-i;avy-
6ir Force Coordinating Committee (SAW CC) for further study c.nd ap-
propriate implementation.
In furtherance of this reference, S4&CC, in turn, appointed -
.work-ing committees to occupy themsolvos with the problems of internal
security., In addition to the members of 8LJ(CC, the committees had
representatives of the Departments of Justice and Treasury and of the
office of the Secretary of Defense. The committees also called in
as consultants and observers representatives of certain other agencies.
This coup fwd--confirming the abovo-montionod report to tho National
Security Council-..that internal security in one form or another was
the concern of mono than twenty-five different Government agencies,
that its problems were both complex and manifold--it listed 52--and
~ MMWAO&M by 8eorutary of Defense, Subject - Office of Civil
Dafsnse Planning, rob 27, 1948.
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emphasized that responsibility for coordinating policy and operations
had not been focused.
To date, the committees have arrived at certain recommendations
but not unanimously. Because of the lack of unanimity, the matter
has been referred back to SANACC. In the meantime, the President has
instructed the National Security Council to place internal security
on its agenda for further consideration.
The Committee feels that the importance of the subject demands
prompt action. There are few problems of greater significance to
national security.
There is, at this writing, in the Bureau of the Budget, but not
yet submitted to the Congress, the draft of a bill to amend the
Espionage Act* and other Acts relating to the national security. The
proposed bill tightens Section 1 and 4 of the Espionage Act and allows
indictments for violations of Sections 1, 2, 3, or 4 of Title I of the
Act to be found without regard to any statute of limitations. It adds
a, new category to those persons required to register as a?,ents of a
foreign power which would, apparently, apply to many employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency, a provision that seems extremely strin-
gent. It also provides for an exception to the Communiontions Act**
in authorizing the heads of certain investigational agencies to require
that certain messages or communications be disclosed to authorized
* (50 U.S.C.A. 31, 34)
** (47 U.S.C.A. 605)
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agents of such agencies; such information to be admissible in evidence
but only in a proceeding in which the Government is a party. The pro-
posed bill also provides penalties for violation of regulations per-
taining to the protection or security of vessels, harbors, water-front
facilities, etc., and of aircraft, airports, or airport facilities.
The Committee heard testimony on this subject and an explanation
of the Government's efforts. Testimony was given on the understand-
ing that the Committee would not divulge its contents.
U N C O N V E N T I O N A L W A R F A R E
This subject also was discussed in confidence, and the Committoe
was urged. to make no mention of unconventional warfare in its report.
The Committee assumes the responsibility, however, of this brief
reference to the subject only to emphasize the groat need and i,:roor-
tanco of intensive study and more rapid progress in this field.
Civil Defense
From the outline of the Hoplcy plan presented to the Committee,
the plan appeared to be well conceived and drawn up. In general, it
should serve as an efficient guide to future dcvelopaent.
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Thorn is no doubt, in the Committee's opinion, of the need for
a Federal civil defense agency. It might well be the first ar-:oncy
required in any future war, and upon its efficiency might depend
the outcome of that war. In the atomic age some sort of organized
protection for the civilian population is imperative.
In the Committee's view, two general principles, seemingly con-
flicting, should govern such an organization. The first is that civil
defense must be what its name implies. civilians must care for them-
solves. Unless civil defense is organized as such, it could easily
onlist, in purely passive defense measures, much of the Country's
military strength to the detriment of offensive military efforts. The
second principle, which seemingly is--and under improper organization
actually could be--in contradiction to the first, is that to cope with
atomic disaster some military or semi-military forces, military disci-
plino, and military equipm;;nt and organization will be needed to help
the civilian population.
Those two seemingly irreconcilable principles can he reconciled,
howovor, by building a civil dofonso organization, as the Iiopley plan
has done, primarily around civilians and local governments, but sup-
ploricntod by training, organization, and military or semi-military aid,
Federally directed. Thcrc must be some provision in any adequate
plan--a point not porhaps sufficiently stressed--for mobile military
relief, wolfaru, and disaster-fighting columns to coma to tho aid of
local govcr.nnunts. These columns, possibly com
pos,.d of Fudoral troops
or of the Federalized National Guard, must supplement civilian relief
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organizations and State Homo Guards, trained in the cocplaxiti,;s of
disaster control.
There are several observations that the CoLLAtteo would lik- to
make about the Hoploy plan. Any civil defense plan, to be succr-ssful,
must be politically and economically feasible. The State org.niz.:tions
proposed in the plan seem somoihet large and right add unduly--ualoss
simplifiod--to the coats of the taxpayers' budget, already too larfi,o.
The some observation applies to the proposed first-year budEot of the
projected office; a more modest beginning would seem to be in order.
There is a more compelling and prociso comment. The Co.rnittcu
fools that the placement of the projected Office of Civil Defense
under the Secretary of Defense as a part of the National Military
Establishment, ahilo possessing sooo obvious advantages, also ~jntaila
done major diaadvattLgos. '~~ T
Such an office in the next war might well become a key agcy of
Government, its powers hugo, its ramifications enormous. Flo such
military control over civilians in doairablo--ovon potentially. Civil
defense should be what its title implios--of, by, and for civilians.
Its placement in the National Military Establishment :could bclio the
essential civilian character of this office, uuieht complicc:to the
nicely articulated military-civilian rolationshipa that ar;. ;ssutial
to the success of this effort, and .,ould tend to derogate the inpor-
tanco of the office. If this office wore pircod in the military
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establishment, governors of states and mayors of cities would be
ans.rcring, in this field, to the Socr;tary of Dofonso, whereas, there
should be a civilian chain of command, with military liaison at all
levels. Moreover, placement of the office under the Secretary of
Defense would put it at the Munitions Board level, rather than on
the National Security Resources Board ochelon; where it belongs.
Thu Office of Civil Defense potentially possesses such tronon-
dous powor that, in the interests of retaining a secure civilian con-
trol over the military, this office should be placed outside of the
military atructuro. In poacoti.-:o, it would soon proper to fit this
office into the structure of the National Security Resources Board,
or as an independent agency (which it should become, in time of war,
in any case) ansaorablo directly to the President. No groat buroauc-
racy should be built up, for docontralization of effort is an essen-
tial part of any civil defense program. It is obvious, however, that
Federal aid, direction, and guidance are absolutely essential to the
success of any civil defense scheme, and it is also clear that ens a
time of omorgency approaches the size of the Office of Civil Dofonso
would have to be appreciably increased.
Intornal Security
The Committee is considerably concerned by the present diffusion
of govornrient responsibility for internal security. This subject in
so broad, of course, that no single agency can operate in all the
needed fields, but there should be one agency with responsibility to
coordinate policy. No such focusing of responsibility has yet been
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made. The full implications of this ;.rohlea arc probably Jot
the nvorage American, yet in any .:,.r of the future the effi icncy-
of internal security measures might spell the difference bet.!oen
victory and defeat. Much of this problem is, and should be, pri:w.rily
a non-military problem. For example, if the military are saddiod--
against the vriahcs of many of them--with the security of :..^.:crica's
industrial plants and transportation arteries--as they :oro during
the last war--the diversion of military mrnpower to what is osson-
tially guard-duty tasks would be enormous. Some few facilities,
bottleneck plants and focal points, are of sufficient i:nIortancc to
justify a full military guard. But the great bulk of the task of
internal security, in so far as the guarding of industrial enter-
prisos, transportation, and communication systems and porter plants
are concerned, should be a task for private industry, for civilian
volunteers, for local law-enforcomont agoncies, for the National
Guard and Homo Guard; the Army should not have to build a groat
"Provost-Marshal Corps." The Committee believes that responsibility
for internal security policies should be immediately focused in one
agency. A more thorough study of the subject than any yet made must
be prosecuted, and interagency frictions must be ondod.
The Committee wishes to comment on one other point: the pro-
posed revisions of the Espionage Act. Those revisions, now in the
Bureau of the Budget, should be thoroughly studied by eactl Govern-
moat agony--the Central Intolligoncc .:gency, for instance, might be
adversely affected. It is the Committee's opinion that, followinf
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this oxaminntion, an extremely caroful study by Coner,.ss, bc.r
ciations, and civil liberties aecncics should be made bofor,~ th,
revised bill is acted on by Congress. Somc of its sections, un:ri:;cly
applied, might endanger fundamental liberties.
Psychological warfare
Tho Committee was happy to note from secret testimony that `L,:1por-
tant stops in this field r;;contly hc.vo boon instituted by Governcic.It.
Those stops, horrovor, %xro belated, and seem to the Committee to be
only the beginnings of ::hat should be developed by progressive and
unorgotic action into a voll-ordored and sizoablo program. The Con-
mittoo is certain that this subject should receive tho quiet but
continuous scrutiny of the National Security Council Lnd th Sucro-
tary of State. The battle for the minds of men is clearly an impor-
tant part of the cold vrcr.
L
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CSC ~, ~~~
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Copy provided to OLC for Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence uses
6 August 1976
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