SUGGESTED REMARKS REFERENCE CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS TO THE HOOVER COMMISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000200010012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: PAPER

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SUGGESTED REMARKS REFERENCE CLANDESTINE
OPERATIONS TO THE HOOVER COMMISSION
I KNOW THE COMMISSION IS CONCERNED,
WITH THE STATUS OF OUR FOREIGN INFORMATION
C 0 L L E C T I
ON ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY CLAN-
OR SEMI-CLANDESTINE MEANS.
LICITY I
V 0 R A B L Y.
THE COLL
AT 1 ON., AS
BY STRIC
COUNTING
E XIS T I N
HAS BEEN ENTIRELY T00 MUCH PUB-
N THIS REGARD, FAVORABLY AND UNFA -
THE P UBLIC HAS COME TO REGARD
E C T I O N O F A L L I N T E L L I G E N C E I N F O R M-
A S IN I STER AND DANGEROUS OPERATION
TLY ILLEGAL METHODS. WITHOUT DIS -
CERTAIN A CTUAL DANGERS WHICH DO
THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION/
PARTICULARLY BY CLANDESTINE MEANS, I WOULD
LIKE TO STRESS THE P 0 1 N T THAT IT IS MOSTLY
ff PICK AND SH0VEL~~
A JOB SUPERVISED 8Y ABLE
INTELLIGENCE OPERATORS.
APPROXIMATELY 75% OF ALL INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION IS GATHERED BY STRICTLY OPEN
METHODS/ THAT IS -- THROUGH M ILITARY, NAVAI/
COMMERCIAL AND OTHER ATTACHES) THROUGH THE
STUDY OF READILY AVAILABLE BOOKS/ MAGAZINES/
NEWSPAPERS RADIO BROADCASTS PHOTOGRAPH]
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CONFERENCES)
I ABOUT 15% OF ALL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION I S COLLECTED BY
CLANDESTINE OR SEMI-CLANDESTINE MEANS.
BUTT WHILE THE QUANTITY IS LOWER THAN THAT
COLLECTED BY OVERT METHODS, OFTEN THE QUALITY
OF SUCH INFORMATION FAR OUTWEIGHS THE OTHER.
ABOUT 5% OF THE POTENTIAL COLLECTIBLE INFORM -
ATION D EFIES ALL METHODS OF COLLECTION AND
ABOUT 5% EXISTS ONLY I N THE KNOWLEDGE OF
TOP LEADERS I N THE TARGET COUNTRY.
YOUR INTEREST IS IN WHETHER THE JOB IS
BEING WELL DONE. LET ME REMIND YOU THAT
WE ARE BUILDING UP A SYSTEM/ UNDER RESSURE,
AND MANY YEARS BEHIND/ THAT THE BRITISH
FOR EXAMPLE/ HAVE BEEN EFFICIENTLY OPERATING
SINCE THE DAYS OF THE FIRST QUEEN ELIZABETH.
IT IS NOT A SYSTEM WHICH CAN BE PERFECTED
I N A SHORT SPACE OF TIME. OUR JUNIOR
MISSION CASE OFFICERS FOR EXAMPLE/ CAN
SELDOM BE PUT I N THE FIELD IN LESS THAN
FOURTEEN MONTHS. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED
IN THIS TIMING. HAVING SELECTED A CAND1-
DATE WHO APPEARS TO HAVE THE PROPER ACADEMIC
CULTURAL MORAL AND PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS
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IT TAKES US ArPR0XIMATELY FOUR MONTHS TO
THOROUGHLY CHECK HIS PAST LIFE,/ HAB;TS
DISCRETIONE LOYALTY AND OTHER NECESSARY
ATTRIBUTES. HAVING ACCEPTED THE CANDIDATE
HE IS PUT THROUGH A TRAINING PERIO0 OF FROM
SIX TO TEN MONTHS. UPON COMPLETION OF HIS
TRAINING I T REQU RES ANOTHER THREE TO FOUR
MONTHS TO ARRANGE HIS COVER AND TO PLACE
HIM I N THE AREA CONCERNED. WE CAN EX'ECT
LITTLE FROM HIM UNTIL HE HAS FIRMLY ESTAB -
LISHED H IMSELF AND OPENED UP HIS COMMUNICA -
TIONS C HANNELS. THIS MAY TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS.
YOU MAY BE INTERESTED I N THE TYPE OF
INDIVIDUAL WHO BEST FITS OUR REQUIREMENTS
FOR ASSIGNMENT AS A STATION CHIEF. LET ME
ASSURE YOU HE IS NOT THE PUBLICIZED POLICE
OR DETECTIVE TYPE. FIRST HE MUST HAVE AN
INCENSE DESIRE TO FURTHER THE INTEREST OF
HIS COUNTRY BY ANY MEANS IF NECESSARY AND
DIRECTED. HIS ACADEMIC TRAINING MUST BE
UNQUESTIONED AND HE MUST BE DIGNIFIED
CALM/ INTELLIGENT--AND ABLE TO DISCUSS A
BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS WITH INDIVIDUALS
OF ANr STATURE. YOU MAY BE FURTHER INTER
ESTED N KNOWING THE GENERAL BACKGROUND
OF EOF OUR STAT I ON CHIEFS, OCCUPYING
POSITIONS I N CURRENT HOT SPOTS:
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THESE ARE THE TYPE MEN WE STRIVE TO
PLACE IN FOREIGN FIELDS AND AS OUR BRANCH
CHIEFS HERE IN WASHINGTON. WE HAVE WE
/
FEEL BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL I N THIS REGARD.
AS TO OUR SUCCESS TO DATE. LET ME
ASSURE YOU THAT THE NATION HAS JUST CAUSE
TO BE PROUD OF THE OPERATIONS OF OUR COM -
PARATIVELY Y OUNG ESPIONAGE AND 000NTER-
EXPIONAGE SYSTEM. UNFORTUNATELY WE CANNOT
TELL THE WORLD ABOUT OUR SUCCESSES--WE
CAN .ONLY BOW TO THE CRITICISM OF OU
F A I L U R E S.
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 Approved For Release 2003/11/04 S99
ESPIONAGE
AS A MOST DANG
COMPETITIVE IN
ARE BARRED. T
OPERATIONS ARE
ALOOF TO THE C
DEALING IN THE
AND PROVEN AGE
SUCCESS I
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I S A MOST DELICATE AS WELL
EROUS OPERATION. IT I S
A FIELD IN WHICH NO HOLDS
HE MEN WHO CONTROL THESE
NATURALLY SECRETIVE AND
ASUAL APPROACH--FOR THEY ARE
LIVES OF FELLOW AMERICANS
N T S REGARDLESS OF NATI ON
N CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
NOT BASED ON THE
ABSENCE OF FAILURES.
IS BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF 0 T H 0 S E WH
TO KNOW THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS
EXCEED THE' FAILURES. THERE WILL ALWAYS
BE FLAPS AND THEY WILL ALWAYS UNFOR -
TUNATELY~ B E REFERRED TO A S INTELLIGENCE
F;ASC0SBY THE EVER PRESENT SECOND GUESSER.
ONE COMMENTATOR RECENTLY STATED.
THE FIASCOS --THEY M IGHT BE CALLED
INTELLIGENCE C A T A S T R 0 P H I E S --HAVE O CCURRED
I N RUMANIA HUNGARY FINLAND AND ELSEWHERE.
I AM SURE THAT AS TIME GOES ON", MANY OTHER
COUNTRIES WILL BE ADDED TO THIS LIST. BUT
I F WE ARE GOING TO JUDGE THE EFFICIENCY
AND COVERAGE OF OUR CLANDEST; NE INTELLIGENCE
S,'STEM BY THE FACT THAT WE 00 HAVE FAILURES--
THEN WE SHOULD GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS!
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IT IS HARD TO BE A HERO IN ONES HOME
T0WN~ P A R T I C U L A R L Y I N A T 0 W N W H E R E S 0
MANY PEOPLE ARE EXPERT IN SO MANY FIELDS.
THAT CERTAINLY APPLIES TO THE CONDUCT
Br THIS COUNTRY OF AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM.
YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN PROOF THAT OUR
PEOPLE 1N THIS FIELD ARE COMPETENT AND THAT
WE ARE BETTER APPRECIATED AWAY FROM HOME
THAN WE ARE HERE. FURTHER/ THERE ARE MANY
INDIVIDUALS HERE AT HOME WHO UNDERSTAND
ANO KNOW our 6VCCES"s
OUR EFF0RTSf\BUT WHO/ FOR SECURITY REASONS,
CAN SAY LITTLE ABOUT IT, FORTUNATELY WE
DO HAVE SOME RECORDS ALONG THE LINES OF
COMMENDATION AND I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY
OF BRINGING ALONG A FEW MISCELLANEOUS
I TEMS, I F Y 0 U D E S I R E / A N 0 W I L L P E R M I T
ME TO ELIMINATE NAMES A.ND PLACES/ I WILL
BE GLAD TO DISCUSS A FEW OF THEM. FOR
SECURITY REASONS THEY CANNOT BE RELEASED
BUT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO EITHER MR.
BROSS1 OR SCREEN INC THEM.
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HERE SUGGEST BROSS OR 25X1
PICK 4 OR 5 PAPERS AT RANDOM AND
THEN PARAPHRASE THEM.
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I T I S VITAL FOR YOU TO KNOW THAT OUR
CENTRALIZED OPERATION OF CLANDESTINE
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION I S A SERVICE TO
ALL GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AND IS NOT AN OPERATION FOR THE INTERESTS
OF CIA ALONE. DURING THE BUILD-UP OF OUR
CLANDESTINE S`ISTEM OVER THE PAST THREE
YEARS OF CIA OPERATION WE HAVE BEEN GUIDED
BY THE EXPERIENCE T H E SUCCESSES, AND THE
FAILURES OF THE CLANDESTINE SYSTEMS OF OTHER
POWERS. MANY OF OUR OPERATIONS FOLLOW A
PATTERN WHICH HAS BEEN INTERNATIONAL - RAC -
TICE F OR HUNDREDS OF YEARS. YET WE FEEL
THAT AMERICAN INGENUITY AND EFFICIENCY HAVE
PROVIDED US WITH NEW METHODS THAT HAVE
PLACED US VERY HIGH IN THE FIELD OF CLAN -
-
DESTI NE I N T E L L I GENCE. aw,,
THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS THAT OUR
OPERATING PERSONNEL ARE INEXPERIENCED IN
THIS FIELD. I F SECURITY WOULD PERMIT I
C O U L D P R O V E T H A T O U R OPERAT I NG PERSONNEL,
ON ANY BASIS DESIRED, ARE MORE EXPERIENCED
IN THE ESPIONAGE FIELD THAN ANY OTHER GROUP
OF AMERICAN NATIONALS.
THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS THAT CLAN -
DESTINE I NTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHOULD NOT
BE CENTRALIZED. THE VOICE OF EXPERIENCE
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CHALLENGES SUCH STATEMENTS FROM SO MANY
ANGLES THAT I WILL NOT TAKE THE TIME TO
DISCUSS THEM UNLESS THE COMMITTEE PARTI -
CULARLY D ESIRES A DISCUSSION ALONG THOSE
L I N E S
ONE OF OUR PRIMARY TASKS I N THIS FIELD
IS A CONSTANT SEARCH FOR NEW INFORMATION
RELATIVE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY I N THE FOREIGN
AREAS. NATURALLY THESE MATTERS TIE I N WITH
OVER-ALL SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD.
Ski-0 -- .d 1. t E N
JDI S P L A Y
08JECTI0N,/ I F T H E COMMITTEE DESIRES, TO
PERMIT CLOSER STUDY OF THIS DOCUMENT BY
E I THER MR. BROSSJ OR
I T I S OBVIOUS/ OF COURSE THAT W E
CANNOT C 0 M P L F T E L Y DIVORCE 0 U R FOREIGN
ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO WORLD COMMUNISM
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FROM OUR OWN DOMESTIC WORRIES ALONG THE
SAME LINES. T H E Y MUST B E TIED TOGETHER
WITH CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION--AND I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT COOPERATION IN THIS REGARD IS OF
THE HIGHEST. FURTHER./ WE HAVE OUR OWN
EXPERTS IN DOMESTIC COMMUNISM EACH
QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED. IN THE EVENT
YOU DESIRE TO PURSUE THIS PROBLEM F U R T H
I HAVE ASKED TWO OF OUR EXPERTS, BOTH
FORMER MEMBERS OF THE FBI/ TO BE WITH US
HERE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH CAN BE
A N S W E R E D W I T H I N SECURITY RESTRICTIONS.
TO S U M U P. W E F E E L T H E NATION H A S DUE'
CAUSE TO BE PROUD OF ITS YOUNG BUT INCREAS -
INGLY S UCCESSFUL CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM.- THE CONTINUED GROWTH AND ABILITY
OF THE SYSTEM DEFENDS UPON A FULL
REALIZATION OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF SUCH
ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED FOR EVER - IMPROVING
S ECURITY. THE SYSTEM NEEDS TIME FOR FULL
FRUITION AND I T NEEDS THE MAXIMUM OF FREEDOM
FROM PUBLICITAND INQUIRY. THE PERSONNEL
INVOLVED ARE) WE BELIEVE) SELECTED AND
SCREENED AS N00 THER GOVERNMENTAL GROUP
H A S B E E N SELECTED A N 0 SCREENED. T H E R E W I L L
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ALWAYS BE FAILURES I N THE FIELD -- BUT A SK
YOU AGAIN TO REALIZE THAT SUCH FAILURES ARE
THE HAZARDS OF A VERY DANGEROUS GAME. OUR
SUCCESSES MUST REMAIN COMPARATIVELY UNKNOWN.
THIS IS BUT A VERr GENERAL REVIEW OF
OUR CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
THERE ARE NO DOUBT MANY QUESTIONS STILL I N
Y 0 U R M I N D R E G A R D I N G T H I S W 0 R K. W H E R E I?
CAN WITH DUE REGARD TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS
I WILL FRANKLY AND HONESTLY TRY TO ANSWER
ANY QUESTIONS YOU DESIRE TO ASK.
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SUGOZ= ARKS REF1 HENCE OLAN}EMINB
OP A IQWS TO THE SCUD E 9M I$SIOR
I know the Commission in concerned, with the status
of our foreign information collection activities conducted IV
clandestine or semi-clandestine means.
There has been entirely too much publicity in this regard,
favorably and unfavorably. The public has come to regard the collec-
tion of all intelligence information as a sinister and dangerous
operation strictly illegal methods. Without discounting ~---rtain
actual dangers which do exist in the collection of information,
particularly by clandestine means, I would like to stress the point
that it is mostly a "pick and shovel" job supervised by able intel-
ligence operators.
Approximately 75% of all intelligence information is
gathered by strictly open methods, that is-through military, naval,
commercial, and other attached through the study of readily avail-
able books, magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, photogrzphs,
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a.
by clandestine or semi-clandestine means. But, while the quantity
is lower than that collected by overt methods, often the quality of
such information far outweighs the other. About 10% of the potential
collectible information defies all methods of collection and about 5%
exists only in the knowledge of top leaders in the target country.
Your interest is in whether the job is being well done.
Let me remind you that we are building up a system, under pressure
and navy years behind, that the British, for example, have been
efficiently operating since the days of the first Queen Elizabeth.
It is not a system which can be perfected in a short space of time.
Our junior mission case officers, for example, can seldom be put In
the field in less than fourteen months. You may be interested in
this timing. Having selected a candidate who appears to have the
proper academic, cultural, moral, and physical requirements, it takes
us approximately four months to thoroughly check his past line,
habits, discretion, laoyalt?y, and other necessary attributes. Lavine;
acceptod the candidate he is put through a training period of from six
to teen months. Upon completion of his training it requires another
three to four months to arrange his cover and to place him it the
area concerned. We can expect little from him until he has firmly
established himself and opened up his communications channels.
This slay take several months.
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Tou m be interested in the type of individual who beet
fits our requirements for assignment as a station chief. Let we
assure you he is not the publicized police or detective type. First
he must have an intense desire to further the interest of his country,
ate' means if necessary and directed. His academic traininfj must
be unquestioned and he must be dignified, calm, intelli ent--cud able
to discuss a broad range of subjects with individuals of eny otaturre.
You be further interested in knowing the general back round of some
of our station chiefs, occupying positions in current hot spotes
These are the hype men we strive to place in foreign fields
and as our branch chiefs here in Washington. We have, we feel, been
very eucce;3sful in this regard.
As to our success to data. Let me assure you that the
nation has just cause to be proud of the operations of our comparatively
young espionage and counter-espionage system. Unfortunately we cannot
tell the world about our successes-we can only bow to the criticism
of our failures.
Espionage is a soot delicate as well as a most dangerous
operation. It is competitive in a field in which no holds are barred.
The son who control these operat ons are naturally secretive and
aloof to the casual approach-for they are dealing in the lives of
fellow Americans and proven agents regardless of nationality.
Success in clandestine operations is not based on the absence
of failures. It is based an. the knowledge of "those who need to know*
that the successful operations exceed the failures. There will always
be 'flaps' and they will always, unfortunpte3y, be referred to as
'intelligence fiascos" by the over present second guesser.
One commentator recently stateds
"The fiascos -.-they might be called intelligence
"cataetro es"--have occurred in Rumania, Hungary, Finland and
elsewhere. a.
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I am :sure that, as time goes on, many other countries will be added
to this list. But if we are going to judge the efficiency and cover-
age of our clandestine intelligence system by the fact that we do
have failu es--then. -ore should get out of to busineest
It is hard to be a hero in one's own home town, particularly
in a town where so mazy people are expert in so many fields. That
certainly applies to the conduct, by this country, of an espionage
system. You will be interested in proof that our people in this field
competent and that we are better appreciated away from home than
_sLre we are her*. Further, there are many individuals here at home who
understand ou ? efforts but who, for security reasons, can say little
about it. Fortunately we do have some records alon the lines of
comwndation and I have taken the liberty of bringing along a few
miscellaneous items. If you desire, and will permit me to eliminate
names and places, I will be glad to discuss a few of them. for
security reasons they cannot be released but we have no objection
to either Mr. Bross or screening them.
It is vital for you to know that our centralized operation
of clandestine intelligence collection is a *service* to all zovern--
mental intelligence activities and is not an operation for the
interests of CIA alone. During the tuild-up of our clandestine
system over the past three years of CIA operation, we have been lidded
by the experience, the successes, and the failures of the clandestine
systems of other powers. May of our operations follow a pattern
which has been international practice for hundreds of years. Yet
we feel that American ingenuity and efficiency have provided us with
new methods that have placed us very high in the field of clandestine
intelligence.
There have been statements that our operating personnel are
inexperienced in this field. If security would permit, I could pray
that our operating personnel, on any basis desired, are more experi-
enced in the espionage field than any other group of American nationals.
Here suggest Braes or pick
( 4 or 5 papers at random a en para-
phrase them.
-. ----- _ -- _ _ ..- _..___--
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There have been statements that clandestine intelligence
collection should not be centralised. The voice of experience
challenges such statements from so mai angles that I till not take
the time to discuss them unless the Committee particularly desires a
discussion along those lines.
One of our primary tasks in this field is a constant search
for new information relative Communist activity in the foreipn areas.
Naturally these matters tie in with over- LU Soviet activities in the
field. 8ecau-ie of security restrictions, I cannot show this document
(display
It is obvious, of course, that we cannot completely divorce
our foreign activities with regard to world ca :aatnism from our own
domestic worries along the same lines. They must be tied to et`=aer
with close collaboration with the Federal 8 xeau of Investigation----
and I can assure you that cooperation in this regard is of the hi cheat.
Further, we have our own experts in domestic communism, each highly
qualified and experienced. In the event you desire to pursue this
problem further I have asked two of our experts, both former members
of. the FBI, to be with us here to answer any questions which, can
be answered within security restrictions.
To sum up. We feel the nation has due cause to be P-oud
Of its young but increasingly successful clandestine intelligence
system. The continued growth and ability of the system depends upon
a full realization of the sensitive nature of such activities and the
need for ever-improving security. The system needs time for full
fruition and it needs the maximum of freedom from publicity and inquiry.
The personnel involved are, we believe, selected and screened as no
other governmental group has been selected and screened. There will
always be failures in the field-but I ask you again to realize
that such failures are the hazards of a very dangerous game. Our
successes must remain comparatively unknown.
This is but a very general review of our clsnc,estina intel-
ligence activities. There are no doubt many questions still in your
mind regarding this work. Where I can, with due regard to security
restrictions, I will frankly and honestly try to answer any questions
you desire to ask.
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