MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130123-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: February 26, 1955
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000-100130123-0
26 February 195+
General Mark Clark called to see me by appointment at 4 P. M.
on 17 February 1955 and we had a talk slightly over an hour and a half.
General Cabell, Frank Wisner and Kermit Roosevelt joined us for the
last half hour of the conversation.
General Clark stated that he wished to arrange a general briefing
for the entire Task Force covering our operations sometime toward the
and of March and he would shortly suggest a definite date for it. This
would, of course. be after the return of all those who had gone to the
field to look at operations there. He suggested that among the types
of items he would like to have covered, would be some of the following:
What do we know of Soviet intentions;
2) What particular intelligence successes have we had;
3) The work of the Watch Committee and its reports;
4) What intelligence do we give to the President and
high policy officials;
5) How do we influence policy;
6) Our National Estimates.
In addition, I asked whether he would like to have some information on
certain operations and mentioned Guatemala, Iran and the development
of Magsaysay, etc. He felt this would be useful.
ns
I said that we would coordinate with Gener hr i stiaanc redraw up an
agenda for the briefing which we would submit to him for approval. (At
this stage I did not raise the question of clearances of all of the Task
Force for all of our operations, but believe this is a matter which
should be cleared at this highest level.)
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130123-0
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130123-0
General Clark referred to my communications to him about the
McCarthy material. He said that he had looked it over and indicated
that he did not consider it of any great significance. He said, however,
that McCarthy had promised to look through his papers and that he had
quite a lot more he would want to give to the Clark Committee. General
Clark added that nothing further had come recently. I clearly gained the
impression that General Clark did not feel that anything was disclosed in
the papers which required mediate action by CIA. I made it entirely
clear to him that if such was the case, I would want to investigate it
immediately.
I also took up with General Clark the necessity for insuring that
highly classified documents were not included in any reports which were
given any circulation, bad naturally not in reports which would get
publicity through being submitted to the entire Hoover Committee with
its large representation from the Congress. The General indicated that
he was fully aware of the problem and would see that any classified
material was properly handled.
The balance of the conversation was a rather desultory discussion of
Intelligence problems, I mentioned to him certain signal successes and
showed him some of the material recently obtained, Le., the Manual.
He did not seem much impressed with this and said that from the table
of content, it looked like the same sort of thing which our Army produced
and which was practically unclassified. I pointed out that the Manual was 25X1 C
"Secret. !7
The meeting was friendly enough, but rather fruitless and inconclusive,
The General remarked during the course of the conversation, in reply to my
offer whether he wished to read the Doolittle Report. that he had read it, but
would probably wish to look at it again when their own report was further
along. I got the impression that he did not wish to be "influenced" by the
report. The statement that he had read the Doolittle Report is not accurate
as he only had the document in his hands for some 20 minutes and then to-
gether with certain other documents, which I believe he gave higher prrity
and indicated that he had also read. Of course the Doolittle Report could
not be read in 20 minutes.
ALLEN W. DULLES
Approved For Release 2002/05/02: CIA-RDF M R000100130123-0
-2-
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130123-0
26 February 1955
1ORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
General Mark Clark called to see me by appointment at 4 P. M.
on 17 February 1955 and we had a talk slightly over an hour and a half.
General Cabeli, Frank Wisner and Kermit Roosevelt joined us for the
last half hour of the conversation.
General Clark stated that he wished to arrange a general briefing
for the entire Task Force covering our operations sometime toward the
end of March and he would shortly suggest a definite. date for it. This
would, of course, be after the return of all those who had gone to the
field to look at operations there. He suggested that among the types
of items he would like to have covered, would be some of the following:
1) What do we know of Soviet intentions;
What particular intelligence successes have we had;
3) The work of the Watch Committee and its reports;
4) What intelligence do we give to the President and
high policy officials;
5) How do we influence policy;
6) Our National Estimates.
In addition, I asked whether he would like to have some information on
certain operations and mentioned Guatemala, Iran and- the development
of Magsaysay, etc. He felt this would be useful.
I said that we would coordinate with Geneva . I tians cndraw up an
agenda for the briefing which we would submit to him for approval. this stage I did not raise the question of clearances of all of the Task (At
Force for all of our operations, but believe this is a matter which
should be cleared at this highest level.)
Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130123-0
 Approved For Release 2002/05/02.: C1A RDP86B00269R000400130123-0
General Clark referred to my communications to him about the
McCarthy material. He said that he had looked it over and indicated
that he did not consider it of any great significance. He said, however,
that McCarthy had promised to look through his papers and that he had
quite a lot more he would want to give to the Clark Committee. General
Clark added that nothing further had come recently. I clearly gained the
impression that General Clark did not feel that anything was disclosed in
the papers which required immediate action by CIA I made it entirely
clear to him that if such was the case. I would want to investigate it
immediately.
I also took up with General Clark the necessity for insuring that
highly classified documents were not included in any reports which were
given any circulation, bud naturally not in reports which would get
publicity through being submitted to the entire Hoover Committee with
its large representation from the Congress. The General indicated that
he was fully aware of the problem and would sea that any classified
material was properly handled.
The balance of the conversation was a rather desultory discussion of
intelligence problems, I mentioned to him certain signal successes and
showed him some of the material recently obtained, i. a.. the Manual.
He did not seem much impressed with this and said that from the table
of content, it looked like the same sort of thing which our Army produced
and which was practically unclassified. I pointed out that the Manual was 25X1 C
"Secret. "a
The meeting was friendly enough, but rather fruitless and inconclusive.
The General remarked during the course of the conversation, in reply to my
offer whether he wished to read the Doolittle Report, that he had read it, but
would probably with to look at it again when their own report was further
along. I got the impression that he did not wish to be "influenced" by the
report. The statement that he had read the Doolittle Report is not accurate
as he only had the document in his hands for some 20 minutes and then to-
gether with certain other documents, which I believe he gave higher pit city
and indicated that. he had also read. Of course the Doolittle Report could
not be read in 20 minutes.
ALLEN W.t DULLES
Approved For Release 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP86I9 (700100130123-0
-2..