PRESS RELEASE FOR WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130096-1
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RIFPUB
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K
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12
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 1, 2002
Sequence Number:
96
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PREL
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COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
PRESS RELEASE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE BUILDING
WARRIN TON 25, D. C.
Release for Afternoon Newspapers, STerling 3-5200
Wednesday, June 29 Extension 5491
Washington, June 29--Acticn by the Congress and the President to set up
a "watch-dog" system to check the operations and expenditures of Intelligence
agencies of the Government is recommended by the Commission on Organization of
the Executive Branch of the Government.
In a report to the Congress today on Intelligence Activities of the Gov-
ernment, the Hoover Commission finds that such an arrangement is needed not only
to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the Intelligence effort, but also
to reassure the people and inspire greater confidence in the trustworthiness of
this phase of Federal operations.
The Commission's recommendation involves the creation of two committees
which might collaborate on important matters in this field. One would be a
joint Congressional committee on Foreign Intelligence, and the other would be
a compact group of trustworthy private citizens to be named by the President
and to serve on a part-time basis.
The Intelligence Task Force, headed by General Mark W. Clark, now president
of the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., in a report to the Commission proposed the
establishment of a "watch-dogs" group for the same purposes, but in a different
form. The task force urged the creation of a single small permanent commission
by Act of Congress for the Intelligence surveillance job, to be modeled after
the Hoover Commission and to include Members of both Houses of Congress as well
as distinguished private citizens.
The other proposals of the task force, involving both administrative and
legislative actial-and including broad recommendations for an internal
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reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency, were presented without
comment by the Commission along with its own report, for the consideration
of the Congress and-the Executive agencies involved.
Recommendation No. 1 of the task force report explained that the CIA
should be revamped internally "to produce greater emphasis on certain of
its basic statutory functions."
Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation
were contained in a separate, highly classified report which was submitted
by the task force to Mr. Hoover and presented by him directly to President
Eisenhower. Much of this data could not be incorporated in the public
report for security reasons.
Both of the task force reports, based on exhaustive surveys in this
country and first-hand studies abroad, emphasized that the major aim should
be greater concentration on the collection of information about technolcrical
and military developments and plans of "our primary target"--the Soviet bloc--
and called for greater boldness and freedom of action for our Intelligence
forces to overcome the present deficiencies in this country's knowledge of
Communist plans.
In a discussion of the State Department's responsibilities and the effect
of foreign policies and diplomacy on Intelligence operations, the report said:
"The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the
practice of diplomacy and more direct and active operations incident to the
collection of Intelligence and the conduct of cold war.
"While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between them must be
resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It
must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that, while national
ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of
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intelligence is a vital element in our national welfare and existence.
Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative
an attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely
action in this field."
The task force expressed the view that the legislation, and organizational
set-up for Intelligence purposes are soundly conceived, but that administrative
flaws have developed and it proposes remedies.
"Failure to produce certain elements of intelligence has been due in part
to the restrictive effects of some of our national attitudes and policies
toward the collection of Intelligence so necessary for-effective resistance
to Soviet aggression," the report added. "Also, among some of those responsible
for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there
seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even
protocol complications.
"This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has stifled
initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these efforts,
if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and immediate
results and made positive contributions to the national welfare that would
have justified the attendant political risks and possible inconsequential
diplomatic embarrassment.
"Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provokingly con-
ceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effective in comparison with
our security measures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in
this country with relative ease.
"The information we need, particularly for our Arted Forces, is potentially
available. Through concentration an the prime target we must exert every
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4
conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends
on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain cal-
culated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological
capabilities."
All elements of the Intelligence field were surveyed by the task force,
but major attention was paid to the CIA because of the special autonomous
character of that agency and because "it is charged with the overall respons-
ibility for coordinating the output of all the intelligence forces."
The recommendations included provisions for lifting the prestige of the
Intelligence forces, developing career incentives, providing greater flexibility
of recruitment of "the best qualified individuals," and relieving the shortage.
of trained personnel.
They also embraced suggestions for strengthening security surveys of
Intelligence workers and employees of industrial plants engaged in "sensitive"
work.
In the matter of personnel security checks, the task force had this to say:
"The methods used for selection of personnel were reassuring in the light
of suspicions which have been voiced that subversive and Communistic elements
were readily infiltrating into these sensitive jobs. Our investigations
indicated that the Intelligence leadership in all branches is alert to its
responsibility and is functioning under strict rules to prevent any such
infiltration.
"One flaw in the present system, however, seems to be the absence of a
general plan for periodic review of the security status of every person after
employment in Intelligence activities, to guard against the possibility that
some employee who was completely dependable and honorable when starting
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work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien
blandishments or some personal weakness such as strong drink or sexual
perversion."
To minimize this hazard, the task force recommended that measures be
instituted in all agencies for rechecking the security status of all personnel
engaged in Intelligence, at periodic intervals not to exceed five years in
any individual case. The Federal Bureau of Investigation makes such a
periodic check of all its personnel.
The investigations of the task force with respect to industrial personnel
security indicated "a serious weakness" arising from the fact that an individual
who has been declared to be a security risk. although removed from work of a
classified nature, might still be retained an some other work in the same
plant, be in daily contact with workers engaged in sensitive production and
enjoy freedom of movement within the plant.
"The military departments are aware of the situation," the task force
said, "and have recommended legislation to correct this deficiency. The task
force commends such a proposal and feels that this loophole in our security
barriers should be closed promptly. . .
"Although detailed study of the policies, functions and procedures of the
departments and agencies collecting and handling Intelligence data, as out-
lined to us by the Commission, did not primarily entail the investigation of
the security angle of every individual engaged in Intelligence, we recognized
the fact that the character of personnel affects these Intelligence functions,
and we faced squarely the issue of individual cases under suspicion or brought
to our attention from various sources. A number of names came to us with
supposedly derogatory information or merely with derogatory implications.
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"When any such information or any name was brought to our attention
from any source concerning individuals employed in the Intelligence field, or
even if not so employed, every case except those obviously without merit was
referred to the FBI, or where appropriate, to the responsible agency, or to
both, with a request for a report.
"Up to the time this report was prepared, some replies to our inquiry
developed information to the effect that the records contained no adequate
basis for suspicion of the individuals as security risks. Some replies indi-
cated that the individuals were under investigation and that the investigations
were continuing. One of the individuals is on leave without pay, pending
completion of an investigation now in process, and appropriate disposition."
The report by General Clark's group said its investigations showed that
the "sensitive and vital wont of the Intelligence community is being led by
a group which is sincere and dedicated to the service of the nation," and that
it felt the American people "can and should give their full confidence and
support to the Intelligence program, and contribute in every possible way to
the vital work."
"We found the Director of Central Intelligence," it continued," to be
industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic and imaginative. We are con-
vinced, however, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many
burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of CIA's
activities."
The report suggested that the Director of CIA employ an executive director,
or "chief of staff," so that he might be "relieved of the chore of many day-to-
day administrative and operational problems, and thus be able to give more
time to the broad, overall direction of the agency and the coordination of
the entire Intelligence effort."
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The task force expressed concern over the "possibility of the growth of
license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, person-
nel and functions are precluded by law,". as is the case with CIA. Although
the investigation showed no indication of such abuses, as a matter of future
insurance it recommended that its proposed "watch-dog" commission including
distinguished public-spirited citizens as members, be empowered by law to
ask for and receive, under adequate safeguards against "leaks," any informa-
tion from any source it might need for its own use.
Within the Armed Services Committee, it explained, there is a liaison
channel between the Congress and CIA which "serves a worthy purpose" but
which cannot include private citizens and does not encompass the wide scope
of service and continuity which the investigators consider essential for this
task. It found the same defect in more than a score of bills introduced in
this session of the Congress to provide for review of CIA's work.
In a discussion of the evolution and growth of our Intelligence program,
giving the public a clearer conception of the significance of the operations
in modern times, the task force report says:
"For self-preservation, the defenders of a free world need complete,
prompt and continuing information on the plans and potentialities of those
who would enslave it. Nations and people who value liberty and a sovereign
national existence in a free world now look to the United States for leader-
ship and inspiration in their struggle to safeguard these inherent rights.
"In the historic family of nations, this country ranks as a comparative
newcomer. In the early days of the Republic-not so long ago as the world
measures time--our people felt comfortably distant from the hotbeds of foreign
intrigue and conflict.
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"Transportation and communication facilities in the days of clipper
ships and the pony express were so limited and so slow that they fostered a
serene assurance of isolation and geographical protection against possible
aggressors. . . Our early philosophy of peace still prevails, but within
our generation, and for our own protection, organized Intelligence has been
forced upon us by the-rapidly shrinking world of electronics, nuclear weapons
and planes which travel at supersonic speed.
"The United States emerged from World War II as the political leader in
free-world affairs and the outstanding military power. The advent of atomic
bombs, together with the development of advanced methods for their delivery,
intensified the need for adequate and timely intelligence so that we might
fulfill our responsibilities in international affairs and insure our own
survival.
"Effective Intelligence has become increasingly necessary for our pro-
tection against the propaganda, infiltration, and aggressiveness of the
Communist leaders. By trial and error, study and skill, we have made progress;
but we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still much to
be done by our Intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an
acceptable level."
The task force report cites "the tremendous importance to our country
of the Intelligence effort and the unpublicized and selfless duties performed,"
and says that these services "demand that the prestige of this function, and
of the personnel involved, be recognized through the use of adequate career
incentives and benefits to encourage full development of talent within the
Intelligence community."
To that end the task force recommends that the Executive Pay Bill of 1949
be amended to increase the annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence
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to the equivalent of that of the Deputy Secretary of Defense ($20,000); to
bring the pay of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence up to $17,500,
the same as that of most under secretaries of the Executive Branch; and to
provide operating directors of areas of responsibility in Intelligence with
proportionate salaries.
The recommendation further would Provide that the chiefs of the various
Intelligence units of the military services be elevated in the organizational
structure to the level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Air Force,
and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy.
Under this plan also the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would
be amended to provide additional medical and hospital benefits and services
for dependents of CIA employees when stationed overseas, similar to the benefits
authorized for dependents of the members of the Foreign Service; and statutory
leave benefits, or accumulation of leave, for employees of CIA overseas, as
now applied to members of the Foreign Service.
The task force calls attention to important contributions which might be
made to the Intelligence effort by retired civilians with long business expe-
rience in the foreign field, and suggests that "this resource should be
exploited fully." It points also to the valuable reservoir of retired military
personnel with foreign experience which might be utilized.
One major advantage in the exploitation of these trained groups, accord-
ing to the task force, would be the speed with which they could be fitted into
the Intelligence picture. Certain outmoded restrictions now are placed on
the full use of this pool of talent.
To remedy this situation, the recommendation is made that the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amended to authorize the employment by the
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CIA of retired military personnel of the Armed Services "without an arbitrary
limitation on the number of such employees." The limit now is fifteen. Such
personnel would be authorized to accept either their military retirement pay
plus any difference between their retirement pay and the proper pay of the
office they would hold in CIA, or the proper pay of the office, but not both.
The recommendation further proposes that the Department of Defense make
extensive use of Schedule A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive
appointments) in the employment by the military services of civilian Intelli-
gence analysts and other specialists "in order to provide the necessary
flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel and to facili-
tate the interchange of such personnel between Zone of Interior competitive
service and the overseas excepted service. Such appointments would take in
retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field.
"Lack of adequate linguistic preparation often has proved to be a serious
handicap to our representatives *abroad," the task force further reports. "This
became painfully apparent during the Korean War. The ability to write and
speak the language fluently, and to interpret foreign words and idioms accu-
rately always helps an American to get around in an alien land, to win the
confidence of its people, and to understand them-"
To meet the present deficiency, the task force recommends that a "compre-
hensive, coordinated program be developed to extend linguistic training among
American citizens serving the Intelligence effort; and that the Department of
Defense expand and promote language training by offering credit toward Reserve
commissions to ROTC students and drill credit to Reserve personnel for com-
pletion of selected language courses."
As an added means of insuring adequate supervision over certain special-
ized phases of Intelligence activities, the task force also urges that prompt
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steps be taken "to introduce highly selective methods of choosing members
of the coordinating committee on atomic energy Intelligence, not only to get
the benefit of service by the most competent individuals, but also to assure
long tenure in this important assignment.!'
On the ground that efficient and economical handling of Intelligence
information demands modern quarters for the personnel and records, General
Clark's group recommends that the Congress appropriate "as soon as possible"
funds to construct adequate headquarters facilities for the CIA in or near
Washington, D.C. It points out that after eight years of operation, the
agency still lacks such facilities.
The CIA is known to have its headquarters records and workers scattered
about in more than thirty buildings here, some of them outmoded "temporaries"
dating back to World War I. A bill now before the Congress calls for the
erection of a central CIA structure estimated to cost about $50,000,000, with
not more than $6,000,000 additional for an appropriate site and site
improvements.
Officials of the agency have estimated that about $2,920,000 could be
saved annually if all of its offices, records and headquarters personnel could
be brought under one roof.
The savings would include $853,000 now spent for twenty-four-hour guard
service in all buildings and for extra guards necessary in protecting informa-
tion and records, orders and other material which must be shuttled about
daily from one office to another; $607,000 in loss of time now required for
officials and employees to get from building to building; $133,500 now being
paid for some rented quarters; $80,000 for receptionists required at each
set of offices; $36,800 for shuttle service between offices; $32,800 in tele-
phone mileage charges and $25,000 for PWX service; $69,900 for couriers and
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messengers; $50,000 for building servicing; and more than $1,000,000 to
pay for alterations and improvements to old buildings to keep them in suit-
able shape and for heavy expense in moving and switching offices.
These expense items now are said to come to $3,800,000 a year, and
could be out to $8130,000 a year in a single headquarters building, according
to CIA estimates.
The task force finds fault with the present system of gathering and
assaying foreign scientific progress, and proposes new methods for handling
this work.
"Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully exploiting
the possibilities of valuable military and technological data potentially
available in scientific reports and technical publications issued in foreign
countries," the report comments. "The State Department now is charged with
this duty. Under this arrangement, we lack adequate collection facilities
and staff experts to evaluate the material."
To correct this situation, it recommends that the responsibility for
procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific Intelli-
gence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA,
"with authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to
carry on this work abroad."
Serving with General Clark on the Intelligence Task Force were Admiral
Richard L. Conolly (retired), of Brooklyn, now president of Long Island University;
Ernest F. Hollings, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina; Henry Kearns, manu-
facturer and executive, of La Verne, Calif.; Captain "Eddie" Rickenbacker,
of New York, chairman of the board of Eastern Air Lines; and Donald S. Russell,
president of the University of South Carolina. The staff director was Major
General James G. Christiansen (retired).
# 1*11 ;Ld GPO 894308
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