LEGISLATION REQUIRED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100130011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REQ

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IBVILATION 4.r1BED SI THE CENTRAL /
Ir A
In ***Meg to develop the Career Service of the Central
IstelUience Agency, a detailed study vas made of existing laws
in the field of personnel administration to determine their
Applicability to CIA, and to ascertain what additional legis-
lation should be *ought by C/A in order to strengthen its
Career Servioe. The basic requirements in this field, and
the importing data which prompts the recommeudations for
'WWI* legislation, are set forth in the staff study of the
Lepilative Talk Force which is forwarded herewith. Our
elbaellient study of these recommendations for proposed legis-
lative for CIA indicated that it would be highly desirable to
severe the following legislation:
a. Additional medical and x,spitaliiatton benefits to be
provided to C/A employees and their dependents when stationed
overseas.
b. liberalized civil service retirement benefits providing
ibelleterated retiremett credits which will permit
smut at an earlier age than under the Civil Service Retirement
Mt fOr CIA employees with overseas service to their credit.
Preeedeat exists for accelerated retirement in investigative
petitions and would tend to support a credit of 74 years for
'ash leer of overseas Service and an Additional credit of a
i year far each year of such service at an unhealthful post.
Neemver, current government thinking in this field is that
000h an acceleration will bring about retirement of an
eftelayes at an Age where he still would hate good productive
year* available far the Government. Therefore, it is
bellowed that curreot goverineental proposals will recommend
as increase of retirement annuity percentages fromli% to
2$ fOr esgloyees on hasardous service or with stated periods
St overseas service but will not accelerate the age of
retirement. CIA feels that the benefits of a Career Service
*Wad include certain benefits for overseas or hazardous
~vies and, therefore, is prepared to recommend legislation
edweiteting either an accelerated retirement age or an
imareseed annuity percentage for its employees.
C. Cagiest aecnmalations of statutory annual leave are not
sufficient to provide adequate home leave between tours of
doal'aVereeas'illtd still perilt adeqneta annual leave to
emoloyees during their tours abroad. It is our considered
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judgement that CIA employees should receive the same
statutory leave benefits as are now applied to members
of the Foreign Servicej namely, the authority to
accumulate one week of home leave for each four months
of duty outside of the United States. Legislation
will be required in this connection.
d. Legislation is required to authorize C/A to defray
at least a part of the additional expense to employees
for the cost of primary and secondary education for the
children of employees stationed overseas. This viii
serve to defray the high cost of educating children
overseas as opposed to the normal public school cost
In the United States.
It should be noted that the legislative requirement for
exemption for CIA from the provisions of the Performance Rating
Act of 1950 has already been met by Inclusion of the exemption
as Section 60l (a) of P. L. 763 of the 83rd Congress.
It should be noted that Kissing Persons legislation
, which
provides for the continuation of payments to dependents of those
missing in action is currently in force but only because the
expiration date of ,
the present Act has been extended on a year-
to-year basis by succeeding sessions of the Congress. The
Department of Defense is charged with the preparation of
permanent Missing Persons legislation, and the Congress has
alsoindicated a desire to receive such legislation. The
necessity for such legislation for CIA employees is readily
apparent, and if it were not to be proposed on a goverment
wide basis, it would be necessary for CIA to seek its own
authority in this field. All steps should be taken however,
to resolve the long standing disagreements between 41..he Depart
meat of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget on this legis-
lation so that it may be passed in the current Congress. In
connection with the four major items for Career Service
legislation noted above, (medical benefits for dependents,
liberalized retirement benefits, statutory home leave benefits,
and educational aLlovances for dependents overseas), it should
be noted that the Government in each instance is considering
government-wide action. If a review of the draft legislation
on these goverment-wide proposals indicates that they will
support the necessities of the CIA Career Service, then separate
CIA legislation on these items will not be necessary. 'weever,
? if a finaldeterminatVon is reached not to propose these items
on a government-vide basis, then CIA should be prepared to seek
its awn legislation in this field. In say event, CIA la not in
a position to seek independent legislative action now since the
Bureau of the Budget would undoubtedly request the CIA to with
hold its proposals pending clarification of the over-all
Government program.
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In addition to the above, it is suggested that there should
be a reallocation of the positions of the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence in the official governmental
structure as established by the Executive Pay Act of 1949
(P. L. 359 - 8ist Congress). This should change the position
of Director of Central Intelligence to a position equivalent to
that of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, and raise the position of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence from that of 08-18 to a position
equivalent to an Under Secretary of a Government Department.
In addition, authority stellar to that granted in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 which authorizes the establishment of not
exceeding ten divisions, each to be headed by a Director,should
be given for the six principal assistants to the Director. These
six statutory positions would be allocated to the positions
presently designated as Deputy Director for Flans, Deputy Director
for Intelligence, Deputy Director for Adatinistration, Special
Assistant for Plans and Coordination, Inspector General, and
General Counsel. It should be noted in the case of the General
Counsel that many agencies have the position of the principal
legal officer established by statute with appropriated compen-
setion.in excess of the General Schedule. This has been continued
by recent statuatory actions placing the position of General
Counsel of the Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the
Legal Advisor of the Department of State at the Assistant
Secretary level. It is felt that this statutory reallocation
of Central Intelligence Agency positions will eery* to place
them at a level commensurate with their responsibilities.
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II. ACONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE raR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. There are four present proposals being considered in
nnection with a 'Watch Dog' Congressional Committee for the
Central Intelligence Agency.
;e. The first proposal involves no change from current
procedures. The Central Intellioence Agency requests for
appropriations are handled by special subcommittees of the Committees
on and this procedure will be continued even if a
Joint Committee were established. Central Intelligence Agency
requests for substantive legislation are normally presented to
the Armed Services Committees of both HOWNS, exnept in those
instances 'where the legislation specifically falls within the
jurisdiction of other Committee*. Thus, the 83rd Congress, the
legislation authorizing the position of Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, as well as the nominations of the Director and Deputy
Director, were handled by the Armed Services Committee. However,
certain exemptions for the Agency in connection with foreign atomic
energy information were quite properly included in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and certain
personnel legislation for CIA was included in legislation before
the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service. Even ir a Joint
Committee on Central intelligence had been in existence, the Atomic
Energy and personnel items would have been properly before these
other committees. It should also be noted that the status quo
appears to be preferred by the leadership of both Armed Services
Committees and the House Appropriations Committee, all of whom
have expressed strong opposition to a Joint Committee on Central
Intelligence.
3. The second proposal would be to have the Armed Services
Committees of both Houses establish subcommittees on Central Intel-
ligence composed of three webers in each House, if the committee
meets jointly, and five webers if they meet separately. (In those
instances where the Senate Armed Services Committee has held sUb-
committee bearings on CIA in the past, the subcommittees have
consisted of five meebers. A three man subcommittee of the thirty-
mix-man HOuse Armed Services Committee may not to deemed to give
a sufficient spread). The proposal that the Armed Services Committees
set up a special subcommittee on Central intelligence has merit as
all reactional legislation for the Agency comes before these committees.
Therefore, it would appear that these committees could best exercise
a 'Vetch Doe position with regard to CIA. With appropriate aggressive
leadership, such subcommittees could request the referral of any
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compl into garding CIA to themselves, sad could rise to the
defense of the Agency when the latter is publicly attacked by
stating that they have already, or will immediately, look into
the subject matter of the attack.
4. The other two proposals Involve the establiehment of
special committees on Central Intelligence. One suggestion is
that a special joint committee be selected by the Vice President
and the Speaker of the House, and the second is that its members
be drawn from among the members of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the two Houses.
5. In order to establish a joint Congressional committee,
it is necessary to have some form of legislative enactment. Thus,
the joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy is established
by the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954. However, the majority
of such committees are established in the individual Houses- by
Senate or House resolutions, or by concurrent resolutions where
the ccemittees are joint. These resolutions are expressions of
the will of the Congress and do not require Presidential approval.
If a resolution is palmed to establish a joint committee on
Central Intelligence, the standard language would authorize the
appointment of the Senate webers by the President of the Senate
and the House members by the Speaker of the House. AS a normal
procedure, the majority and minority leaders are consulted in
these appointments, and their recommendations carry considerable
weight. The establishment of such a committee would normally
carry with it the standard authority requiring the production
of all testimony, teaks and records, the bolding of hearings
and the authority of subpoena. The Committee would also have
the authority to appoint a staff.
6. If the resolution provides specifically that the members
of such a joint committee should be drawn from the members of the
Armed Services and Appropriations Comittees? it should be noted
that there is a general reluctance, at least in the Houses for
Appropriations Committee nether* to serve on joint committees
where their substantive action might be considered binding on their
subsequent appropriations action. The appropriations' authority
is so jealously guarded that the subcomittees normally require
complete review of Agency activities regardless of the acts of
substantive committees authorizing such activities. The fact that
three or five senior members of the Appropriations Committee
were to sit as members of a Joint Committee on Centel Intelligence
would in no way obviate the used for full bearings before the CIA
Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition a resolution limiting
such a special subcommittee to selected members of the Armed
Services and Appropriations Subcommittees might well meet objection
from the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary, and
possibly from a new Joint Committee on Internal Security if one
were established.
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7. The fact that a substantial number of Senators have proposed
a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence reflects
Congressional feeling for greater Congressional knowledge of the
activities of CIA. This would tend to indicate that the first
alternative?namely the retention of the status quo in CIA--
Congressional relations is noloager advisable. On the other hand,
it should be reiterated that there are leaders in the Congress
who feel that there should be no change in the current relationship.
a. In connection with the alternative to establish a Joint
Committee on Central Intelligence, the following points should be
noted:
a. If such a Committee were established, its jurisdiction
should be limited to organizational and administrative matters
and not include review of CIA operations as such. If a Joint
Committee were to attempt to substitute its judgement for that
of the Executive Branch, or exercise a veto power over specific
operations, a serious Constitutional problem involving the
doctrine of separation of powers would certainly arise.
b. The greatest care would have to be taken in selecting
the members of this joint Committee, and for security reasons
It should be kept to the smallest possible size, preferable
three members from each House.
c. A Joint Conatittee would require a special staff which
would eventually cone into possession of :more information
regarding the secret operation. of the American intelligence
service than is possessed by any but a fey of the most senior
officials of the Agency. This presents a serious security
problem.
d. The workload of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence
would be comparatively small. The Central Intelligence Agency
averages about one piece of legislation a year as opposed to the
Atomic Energy Commission which has about twenty bills a Session.
The many public facets of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission
includes the operation of towns, adjudication of patent claims,
peacetime applications of atomic energy, etc. This presents a
heavy workload for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which
would not be present in connection with CIA. A light workload
would tend to justify a separate Joint Committee and staff,
but would tend to support the proposition that existing
Congressional Committees?namely Armed Services?could include
CIA within their own jurisdiction.
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In view of the above, it would appear to be referable
Armed Services Cosseittees would exercise jurisdiction
jointly or separately) over CIA. This jurisdiction is
apply supported by the standing rules of the Senate and the Nouse.
These Committees could be infOrmed on the general activities of
the Agency, and Its andnistration, and could continue to handle
the Agency's substantive legislation. They could be focal points
for complaints forwarded to the Congress and serve as the "Watch
Dog" of the. Congress in connection with the Agency. The forthrigh
kcceptance by the Armed Services Committee of this responsibility
would so a long way toward answering the implied criticisms of
those who feel that the Congress is not sufficiently Informed
regarding the Agency, and would not raise the serious problems
which would be inherent in a separate joint Committee on Central
Intelligence.
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Several bills were introduced into the 83rd Ceegress to es tab-
11th a Joint Committee with supervision of the Central Intelligence
Agency or the intelligence !Unction generally.
(1) S. Cot. Res. 42 (introduced by Senator 1d) and
H. Con. Res. 167 (introduced by Congressman Patters established
a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be compoeed of nine
members each from the Senate and the Reuse. S. Con. Res. 69 (intro-
duced. by Senator Mansfield with twenty-four co-sponsors) and H. Con.
Res. 216 and 217 (introduced by Congressmen Richards and Brownson
respectively) were identical, except the membership was to be
composed of five members from each Rouse. These bills provided
that the Joint COmmittee study the activities of CIA and problems
relating to the gathering of intelligence relating to the national
security and of its coordination and utilisation by the various
agencies of the Government. CIA shall keep the Joint Committee fully
and currently informed with respect to its activities. All legislation
and other natters relating primarily to CIA shall be referred to the
Joint Committee.
The Director of Central Intelligence has held several extremely
cordial conversations with Senator Mansfield regarding his legislation,
which the Senator introduced with a firs conviction that it would be
moot helpful to CIA. Inlloving the introduction of S. Con. Res. 42
which called for a Joint Committee of ei.ehtetnxnumbers, Senator
Mansfield came to the conclusion that such a Committeeleuld be too
large in viev of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter. As a
result, he introduced S. Con. Res. 69, which called for a ten member
Joint Committee. Subsequent conversations with Senator Mansfield
indicate that at present he would tend to prefer a small Joint Com
nittee appointed by the Vice-President and the Speaker, or selected
from the membership of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.
(2) H. Con. Res. 168 and 169 (introduced by Congressmen Kelley
and Zablockl respectively) established a Joint Committee on Intelligence
Matters to be eomposed of nine members each from the Senate and the
Hawse. These resolutions were similar to those on the Central Intel-
ligence Agency alone, except that they were broadened to include
related intelligence services" as well.
(3) H. J. Res. 473 (introduced by Congressmen McCarthy) was even
broader and established a Joint Committee on Information, Intelligence,
and Security.
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(4) N. R. 9660 (introduced by Congressman nghwaen)
etb-
11e1* a Commission an United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,
composed of five members to be appointed by the President and two
each from the Senate and the Noose. The Commission vas to make a full
and complete investigation and study of the foreiga intelligence activities
of the United States and of the security of our intelligence agencies
from penetration by subversion. It was also te study the questions
of overlapping and duplication, staffing, and efficiency.
None of these proposals were reported out of Committee.
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III. JUSTIFICATION FOR A laTti CIA HEADCVARTSRS =DINO
1. A new CIA headquarters building in which office space would
be provided for the entire Agency would result in improved security,
increased efficiency, and greater economy.
Security:
a. Office space for the Agency is now located in thirty
three separate, dispersed buildings, twenty-nine of
which are temporary, converted-type structures.
-b. There is a substantial security risk in the transfer of
many highly sensitive papers between these various
widely dispersed offices on a continuing basis.
No reasonable expense or effort would secure these tem-
porary structures sufficiently to insure against force-
able entry by unauthorized persons nor is it possible
to maintain a satisfactory standard of fire prevention
in these structures in which same of the most sensi-
tive end vital clandestine documents in or available to
this Government are housed. It would be virtually im-
possible to replace these documents and to attempt to
do so would necessitate undertaking a program involv-
ing years of operations and an expenditure of Roney in
the millions of dollars.
For security reasons, perhaps as much as fifty per cent
of the Agency's business cannot be conducted over the
telephone but must be conducted in personal conferences.
For example: Considering time in transit, a minimum of
one hour is necessary for an individual located in the
Potomac Park area to conduct one hour's business
with an individual located in the Administration
Building.
b. During Fiscal Year 1954 six Agency shuttle busses and
twenty passenger vehicles transported more than
passengers in the conduct of Agency business. An esti-
mated ninety-five per cent of the time lost in transit
would be saved if the entire Agency were quartered in
one building.
C. Timeliness in intelligence is of paramount importance.
Meaningful reports can, in many instances, only be made
atter consulting central files and library facilities
which it is impossible to make easily accessible to in-
telligence analysts in our present dispersed situation.
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d. The design and deteriorating condition of presently
assigned temporary buildings are prejudicial to good
management, efficiency, =male, and working conditions
in general.
ldonomy:
a. Tangible monetary annual savings as +estimated below could
be expected from the consnlitiation of headquarters
activities in one building. It is also emphasized that
either the additional savings or additional productivity
to be expected frcat such consolidation are not included
in these 'etiolates.
Item
Guard Service
Reception Staff
Shuttle Service
Couriers & Measengers
Telephone Mileage
Building Services
Ott jeers
Rents
Maintenance &
Alterations
Loss of Time
TWX Service
TLS
Present Cost
Bst.Cost in
Cte Buildi
Eat. Owings
in One BUS.
25X1A
2. Considerations inherent in the situation outlined above have
long indicated the high desirability of providing headquarters space
for the Central Intelligence Agency in one permanent building. This
matter is now acute because of recent Congressional approval far the
construction or a new highway bridge enrage the Potomac Diver which
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would result in the reyal of several of the temporary structures
to which CIA is now assigned. In addition, there are concerted efforts
to cause the removal of the remaining temporary buildings assigned to
this Agency in the west Potomac Park area. It is our understanding
that the Secretary of the Interior has in fact been charged with the
removal -of these temporary structures at the earliest possible date.
Insomuch as the General Services Administration has indicated that
there is no other space available for assignment to this Agency
new construction appears to be absolutely essential.
3. Permanent enabling legislation has been granted by the Congress
for the construction of a new CIA headquarters building in the amount
of $38,000,000, Funds, however, have not been appropriated for this
purpose. Conferences with the General Services Admdnistratioe and the
Bureau of the Budget indicate that such new construction could be under-
taken either through the use of appropriated funds or a lease-purahase
isrrangentent.
4, It is essential that the Director be immediately available to
the President and the Rational Security Council. There are also an
estimated fifty to one hundred of CIA's senior staff who must be in
close daily contact with personnel of other agencies, particularly
the Impartments of State and Defense, and who must also be immediately
available to the Director as well as to those eceponents of the Agency
under their supervision and upon which they are dependent for support.
The necessity for such close and exeeditious coordination within the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community dictates
that the entire Agency be at one location not more than 's few miles
distant from the White Souse.
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