COMMISSION REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000100020003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
COMMISSION REPORT
ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI
HOLD FOR RELF-ASE! HOLD FOR RELEASE! HOLD FOR RELEASE!
The attac? :ted report to be transmitted to the Congress by the Com-
mission on C organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
MUST be h' ald STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, and no part, extract, or
synopsis is t ?o be divulged to any person, or published in newspapers or
telecast or broadcast prior to
JUN 2 9 1955
NEIL MacNEIL,
Editorial Director,
Commission on organization of the
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ILLEGIB
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Copy provided to OLC for Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence user
6 August 1976
STAT
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June 29, 1955
Dear Sirs-:
In accordance with Public Law lOS, Eighty-third Congress,
approved July 10, 1953, the Commission on Organization of the
Executive-Branch of the Government submits herewith its Report on
Intelligence Activities.
The Commission has had-the services of, an able Task Force
presided over by General Mark W. Clark, President, The Citadel.
Respectfully,
s/ Herbert Hoover
Chairman
The Honorable
The President of the Senate
The. Honorable
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ........................................... i
PREFACE ................................................ iii
PART I - COMMISSION REPORT ............................ 1
PART II - TASK FORCE REPORT ............................ 3
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INTRODUCTION
The investigation?into.the- Intelligence'Activities of the
Government was performed by a Task Force under the Chairmanship of
General Mark W. Clark, President, The Citadel., and comprising the
members listed below:
CLARK., Mark Wayne. General, U. S. Army (retired).
United States Military Academy. Now President, The
Citadel, Charleston., South Carolina. In World War II
commanded Allied ground forces in Italy and effected
first large-scale surrender of a German field command
in Europe. June 1945, Commander-in-Chief of U. S.
Occupation Forces in Austria and U. S. High Commissioner
for Austria. Deputy to U. S. Secretary of State in London
and Moscow with Council of Foreign Ministers negotiating
Austrian treaty. May 1952, Commander-in-Chief, Far East
Command, serving simultaneously as Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, Commanding General, U. S. Army
Forces, Far East., and Governor of Ryukyu Islands.
July 1953, signed Korean armistice agreement for United
Nations.
CONOLLY, Richard Lansing. Admiral., U. S. Navy (retired). Brooklyn,
New York. Served at sea throughout World War I and awarded
Navy Cross. In World War II commanded Destroyer Division
Six; served in Office of Chief of Naval Operations and
on staff, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Postwar duties
included Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Naval
Advisor to European Advisory Commission, President of
Naval War College. Now President, Long Island University.
HOLLINGS, Ernest Frederick. Lawyer. Charleston, South Carolina.
The Citadel and University of South Carolina. During
World War II., served in African and European Theaters with
U. S. Army. Former member South Carolina State Legislature.
Now Lieutenant Governor, State of South Carolina.
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KEARNS, Henry. Manufacturer, inventor and executive. Orange Oaks
Ranch, La Verne, California. University of Utah. Past
President, U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce; Vice President,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and Director,
Tournament of Roses Association. Chosen as "California's
Most Useful Citizen," 1944. Fellow, American Institute
of Management.
RICKENBACKER, Edward Vernon. Aviator.. New York, New York. Inter-
national Correspondence School. In World War I commanded
94th Aero Pursuit Squadron, personally credited with 26
air victories. World War II activities included special
missions for Secretary of War to nine foreign countries
and areas. U. S. and foreign government awards include
Congressional Medal of Honor. Formerly executive with
American Airways, Aviation Corporation, and North American
Aviation. Since 1933, with Eastern Air Lines, Inc. as
general manager and president; now Chairman of the Board.
RUSSELL, Donald Stuart. Lawyer. Spartanburg, South Carolina.
University of South Carolina and University of Michigan.
Practiced law in Spartanburg. Formerly member Price
Adjustment Board, War Department; Assistant to Director
of Economic Stabilization; Assistant to Director of War
Mobilization; Deputy Director, Office of War Mobilization
Reconversion; Assistant Secretary of State. Now President,
University of South Carolina.
STAFF DIRECTOR
CHRISTIANSEN, James George. Major General, U. S. Army (retired).
University of California, United States Military Academy.
Former Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces; Commanding
General, 2nd Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Texas; Commanding
General, 6th Armored Division, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri;
Chief Engineer, Far East Command; Chief of Military
Assistance Advisory Group, Rome, Italy.
The Commission wishes to express its appreciation of the services
and devotion of the members of the Task Force and to record its appre-
ciation for the information and assistance provided by the officials
of the various Federal agencies.
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PREFACE
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities, under the Chairmanship
of General Mark W. Clark, found it necessary for some of its members
to visit foreign countries to study these activities abroad as well as
at home.
Their investigations inevitably involved matters of extremely
classified character to which they were given full access. The Task
Force has, therefore, prepared two reports ?o an unclassified one
bearing on the administration and the coordination of the intelligence
services of the Central Intelligence Agency and the services of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department. The other report,
bearing the highest security classification was substantially related
to the national security. This report was sent directly to the
President and was not considered by the Commission because of its
extremely sensitive content.
Therefore this Report of the Commission deals only with the
unclassified Task Force Report.
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PART I
COA6lLISSION REPORT
The Task Force, in order to give assurance to the Nation that
all segments of the Intelligence Activities are efficiently carried
out and that the expenditures are properly administered, recommends
that a permanent "Watch-Dog" Committee be created. They recommend
that such a Committee be created from members of the Senate and
House, together with eminent citizens serving part time as needed,
to be`appointed by the President.
The Commission believes, however, that while mixed Congressional
and Citizens Committees for temporary service; are useful and helpful
to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommenda-
tions, such Committees, if permanent, present difficulties. We
there make the following recommendation.
Recommendation
a. That the President' appoint a'.committee of experienced
private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine
and report to him periodically on the work of Government
foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also
give such information to the public as the President may
direct. The committee should function on a part time and
per diem basis.
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b. That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional
Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one Presi-
dential and the other Congressional, could collaborate on matters
of special importance to the national security.
Other measures requiring legislation or of an administrative
character are recommended by the Task Force and we suggest these for
the consideration of the Congress and the Departments concerned.
The unclassified report of the Task Force requires no detailed
review, and we therefore include it in full as Part II of this report.
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PART II
Task Force Report on
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
in the
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Prepared for the
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
by the
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
MAY 1955
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Page
Acknowledgments ...........................................
Letter of Submission ......................................
Preface ........... ....................................
Introduction .............................................. viii
Scope of the Studies ...................................... xi
Organization of the Task Force ............................ xv
"Intelligence" - A Definition ............................. xviii
I - THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY - NATIONAL LEVEL ......... 1
The National Security Council .................... 1
The Central Intelligence Agency .................. 3
II - THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY - DEPAR2NTAL LEVEL .....
Department of Defense ............................
Office of Special Operations (050) ............
Joint Chiefs of Staff .........................
Department of the Array ............ . ...........
Department of the Navy .....0000000000004000060
Department of the Air Force ............o......
Department of State ..............................
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ............
5
5
5
5
6
9
12
13
16
III - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ...... ....... 0.................. 18
Evolution of Our Plans *90000000,00900000000000000 18
Post War Organization ............................ 19
Functions Divided 00000000000000000 . .. . . . . . 6 . . . . .. 20
IV - INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND SECURITY 22
Character of the Present Working Force ........... 22
G-2 Personnel and Security ....................... 23
ONI Personnel .................................... 24
Air Force Intelligence Personnel ................. 25
Industrial Security 000000000000090009090000000000 26
Individual Security Cases ........................ 27
V - "WATCH-DOG" COMMISSION ..............................
Agency Gets Wide Exemptions ......................
Would Study Complaints ...........................
29
30
32
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Pa.e
VI - FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ............................ 34
Map Procurement ... .. .......... . ......
Intelligence Libraries ... ....................... 34
VII - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................
Administrative Flaws Noted ......................
Data on Soviet Bloc Inadequate ..................
Recommendations with Respect to Personnel .......
Recommendation No. 1 ............................
Recommendation No. 2 ............................
Recommendation No. 3 0 .....................90.0.)
Recommendation Noe 4 ............. ..............r
Recommendation No. 5 .....................e......
Recommendation No. 6 ............................
Recommendation No. 7 ............................
Recommendation No. 8 ............................
Recommendation No. 9 ............................
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COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Mark W. Clark, Chairman
Richard L. Conol],y
Ernest F. Hollings
Henry Kearns
Edward V. Rickenbacker
Donald S. Russell
TASK FORCE STAFF
J. G. Christiansen, Director
John J. Dubbelde, Jr., Deputy Director
Dorothy H. Davis, Staff Assistant
CONSULTANTS
Charles C. Blakeney
Lee E. Cooper
Richard A. Ericson
Robert J. Foley
Paul L. High
Michael M. Karlene
Hen?inan 0. Lane
John L. McGruder
Eugene L. Miller
Oliver Lloyd Onion
Richard P. Ovenshine
Henry E. Richter
Terence J. Tully
SECRETARIAL STAFF
Gertrude I. Dixon
Marie K. Smith
ACKNOWLEDC,INTS
The Intelligence Task Force wishes to acknowledge the complete
cooperation it received from all the officials and members of their
staffs throughout the departments and agencies surveyed, and believes
that it was accorded free access to the "raw" intelligence material
necessary to carry out its investigative duties.
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The enthusiasm and interest which the personnel engaged in
intelligence activities displayed in their work was gratifying to
the members of this task force and its staff. Their full coopera-
tion enabled us to complete our assignments within the allotted
time.
The chairman and the staff director are most appreciative of
the support , rendered brthe executive staff of the President and
other government' officials who appeared and were interviewed and
gave us their-,timer-and the. benefit. of their knowledge; and of the
help of, the- exedutive. staff- of-.the Commission, particularly John B.
Hollister, W. Hallam Tuck, Francis P. Brassar, and Clara Demuling.
Without Miss 'Demulingo'a?--able assistance, the job of obtaining security
clearances for, the task 'force and'Itaff would not have been accomplish-
ed in time to permit completion of our survey.
The chairman'also-is deeply--obligated to and most appreciative
of the valued support and contributions of his colleagues on the task
force, the members of the staff., and the able consultants.
The task force further wishes to express its deep gratitude for
the valuable aid of those public-spirited individuals who gave freely
of their time, and who by their objective approach to the problem and
their government experience materially enlightened our members. We
are especially grateful for the' advice and the benefit of the wide
experience of Major General William J. Donovan, former Chief of the
Office, of Strategic' Services; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; William H. Jackson,, former Deputy Director
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of the Central Intelligence Agency; General W. Bedell Smith, former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Major General Charles A.
Willoughby, former Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command;
and others,
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LETTER OF SUIRISSION
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF
THE GOVERNMENT
Washington, D. C.
May 1955
The Honorable Herbert Hoover
Chairman, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch-of the Government,
Washington 25, D. C.
My dear Mr. Hoover:
We have' the honor,to? present to you the reports of the Task
Force on Intelligence Activities of our Government In these reports,
the task force-analyzes-the national intelligence effort and makes
recommendations with a"view to correcting the weaknesses, improving
the quality, and inoreasfng..the 'efficiency of- this vital operation.
The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc,, their methods of infil-
tration, subversive activities, and-propaganda employed in the cold
war now in progress, as well as the difficulty of penetration of
their security barriers, point up the fact that our intelligence
effort must be the best in our history. This,, added-to the advent
of nuclear weapons, together with their advanced delivery systems,
has made adequate and timely intelligence imperative to our national
security. The task force is fully aware of the grave responsibility
implicit in its assigned mission.
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Security requirements have made it necessary that the task force
depart in some degree from the form of the report prescribed by the
Commission. Two reports are submitted-. one, unclassified; the other,
classified TOP SECRET, with certain separate appendices which require
additional clearance.
In submitting these reports, we wish to express our personal
appreciation for the wholehearted and enthusiastic cooperation given
us by the departments and agencies surveyed.
Respectfully submitted,
Mark W. Clark, Chairman
Richard L. Conolly
Ernest F. Hollings
Henry Kearns
Edward V4 flickenbacker
Donald S. Russell
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For self-preservation, the defenders of a free world need complete,
prompt,, and continuing information on the plans and potentialities of
those who would enslave it. Nations-and people who value liberty and
a sovereign national existence in a free world now look to the United
States for leadership and inspiration in their struggle to safeguard
these inherent rights.
In the historic family of nations, this country ranks as a com-
parative newcomer. In the early days of the Republic -- not so long
ago as the world measures time -- our people felt comfortably distant
from the hotbeds of foreign intrigue and conflict,
Transportation and communication facilities in the days of clipper
ships and the pony express were so limited and so slow that they
fostered a serene assurance of isolation and geographical protection
against possible aggressors.
Technological, developments and political realignments in modern
times inspire no such sentiment as that which once led a famous Denver
editor to evaluate news on the premise that "a dogfight in Champa
Street" was worth more space in his paper than war in some minor country
abroad.
Our early philosophy of,peace still prevails,, but within our
generation and for our own protection, organized intelligence has been
forced upon us by the rapidly shrinking world of electronics, nuclear
weapons and planes which travel at supersonic speed.
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The United States emerged from World War II as the politicTr,,
leader in free-world affairs and the outstanding military power. The
advent of atomic bombs, together with the development of advanced
methods for their delivery., intensified the need for adequate and
timely intelligence so that we might fulfill our responsibilities in
international affairs and insure our own survival.
Effective intelligence has become increasingly necessary for
our protection against the propaganda, infiltration., and aggressions
of the Communist leaders
By trial and error, study, and skill, we have made progress; but
we must not labor under any complacent delusions. There is still
much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achieve-
ments up to an acceptable level.
The task force is cognizant of the grave responsibility assign-
ed to it. It recognizes the fact that it would be false economy to
stint on some phase of the intelligence operation and thereby run
the risk of another costly and tragic surprise like Pearl Harbor.
On the other hand, it is desirable and proper for us to insist that
the substantial expenditures our country makes in this field are
worth while and that the whole intelligence output is efficiently
handled and gets adequate results.
The recommendations of the task force are presented from the
viewpoint that in time of peace we must not only be prepared for war,
but also must do our utmost to prevent war. Adequate and timely
intelligence is the most effective and economical means of attaining
these objectives.
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The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives,
hereafter called the intelligence community when referred to as a
whole, includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and the intelligence sections of the Department of
State, of the Army, the Navy., and the Air Force, and of the Atomic
Energy Commission. Some of these agencies approach or exceed the
operations of the CIAin_functions and in expenditures. However,
since CIA is charged wit'hthe overall responsibility for coordinat-
ing the output of all intelligence forces, the task force gave
special attention to the work of that agency.
Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital work of
the intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere
and dedicated to the service of the nation. We discovered no valid
ground for the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the
intelligence family was being effectively contaminated by any
organized subversive or Communistic clique. Charges were made by
some individuals alleging a few members of the intelligence community
were poor security risks. All such cases, except those obviously
without, merit, were investigated by proper authority, or investiga-
tions are in the prsacess of being made.
On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force feels
that the American people can and should give their full confidence
and support to the intelligence program, and contribute in every
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possible way to the vital work in which these agencies are enga,do
We found the Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious, objec-
tive, selfless, enthusiastic, and imaginative. We are convinced,,
however,, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many
burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of
CIA's activities, The task force feels that certain administrative
flaws have developed in the CIA, which must be corrected to give
proper emphasis and direction to its basic responsibilities.
The major aim would be greater concentration on the collection
of intelligence information from our primary target - Russia and her
satellites, and Communist China.
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate
intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain, Proper directional
emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness, and persistence are
essential to achieve the desired results.
The glamor and excitement of some angles of our intelligence
effort must not be permitted,to overshadow other vital phases of the
work or to cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the
task force is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA
is necessary to give assurance that each of these functions gets
adequate attention without diversionary interest.
The task force further is concerned over the absence of satis-
factory machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Central
Intelligence Agency, It is making recommendations which it believes
will provide the proper type of "watch-dog19 commission as a means of
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reestablishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so
essential to and characteristic of our democratic form of government,
but which was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 110 and other
statutes relating to the Agency. It would include representatives
of both Houses of Congress and of the Chief Executive. Its duties
would embrace a review of the operations and effectiveness not only
of the CIA, but also of all other intelligence agencies.
One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission of this
type would be to keep the public assured of the essential and trust-
worthy accomplishments of our intelligence forces, and to. enlist
public support-and participation in the intelligence effort.
Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and
appreciation among the people of the significance and objectives of
the intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for clarifica-
tion of misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, largely
as a result of the misapplication of secrecy. However, it must be
recognized that intelligence operations require a large element of
secrecy as an essential to success.
The intelligence community should draw more widely on the available
pool of retired citizens with wide previous business experience in the
foreign field, and among retired military personnel who have specialized
over a long period in the intelligence field. It should develop a more
attractive program of career incentives for its officials, and of
benefits for its overseas employees.
Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are being
offered by the task force.
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SCOPE OF THE STUDIES
Early Instructions
Initially,, this task force was: instructed by the Commission on
Organization-of-the Executive Branch of the Government (hereafter
referred to as the Hoover Commission or the Commission) to study and
make recommendations' as to the structure and administration of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission to
embrace studies of all intelligence operations of the Federal Govern-
ment and recommendations for changes necessary to promote economy,
efficiency, and improved service in this field.
The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision of
the Commission to broaden the scope of the studies. It found at
least twelve major 'departments and agencies engaged in intelligence
in one form or another. In addition, ten or more minor agencies or
activities expend public funds'directly or indirectly in behalf of
the intelligence effort of the Government.
Thus, under the broad'definition of'its terms of reference, the
task force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and
reporting on more'than a score of major and minor departments and
agencies. It quickly-became evident that any attempt to spread its
investigations over such a large area would mean that only sketchy
results could be achieved within the allotted time.
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Task Force Procedure Revised
The most pressing need under present conditions is for officials
in important positions in Government, particularly those responsible
for foreign policy, to have readily available full and factual foreign
intelligence. (The word "foreign" as used here denotes the target of
information as distinct from the geographical source).
Accordingly, the task force suggested to the Commission that the
best results could be obtained if the dimensions of the inquiry were
limited to certain key departments and agencies.
This proposal was approved by the Commission with the understand-
ing that the task force would determine which of the intelligence
services, activities, and functions of the agencies surveyed it con-
sidered essential; those not necessary, or of similar nature and
requiring consolidation in the public interest; those non-essential
and competitive with private enterprise; and those representing
duplication or overlapping of work between agencies. Under this
revised program, the task force would cover, among other matters:
1. The intelligence functions of the National Security Council.
2. The value and effectiveness of the information supplied by
the operating agencies.
3. The effectiveness of the coordination of intelligence acti-
vities.
4. The organization, procedures, methods, and performance of
the Government agencies in the field of intelligence.
5. An examination of the operation and physical plant of the
agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficiency, and utilization.
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6. The various programs of the agencies in such fields as training,
research and development, stockpiling, reference material, and security.
70
Personnel policies and manpower utilization.
8. All programs and procedures for the collection, development,
and dissemination of intelligence information within the Government,
including collection apparatus and dissemination media.
9. Effectiveness of the coverage by the various agencies of their
specific areas of assignment., and extent of teamwork between these
agencies.
Two Reports Prepared
In the preparation of this report, the task force was motivated
by a sincere desire to present as complete an account of its findings
as considered judgment indicated would best serve the public interest.
Certain other facts and recommendations prepared by the task force
have been omitted from this report on the ground that their disclosure
publicly might give aid and comfort to our potential enemies or might
jeopardize our national defense and security. These findings have
been incorporated in a separate., highly-classified, comprehensive
report which has been placed in the hands of the Chairman of the
Commission.
Teams Make Firsthand Studies Abroad
In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operations,
two teams were sent abroad for on-the-spot investigations. Each team
was composed of a member or members of the task force and members of
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the staff. One group visited the European sector and the other ,:.ant
to the Far East.
These staff groups held-conferences with the senior United States
representatives 'and senior military commanders in -the countries
visited. The visits and discussions provided the task force with
firsthand information which could have been obtained in no other
fashion.
The conclusions reached'and the recommendations contained in
this report, and in the more comprehensive report to the Chairman
of the Commission, reflect the benefit of those personal tours of
inspection.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE TASK FORCE
Security Impact on the Selection of Personnel
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last investiga-
tive group authorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and deputy
of the staff assumed their duties on October 1,q 1954. The limited pool
of available personnel in this country with prior experience in the
intelligence field influenced to some extent'the structure of the staff
and its methods of operation.
The task force personnel and staff had to be screened carefully
for background security and possible prejudicial interest arising from
prior association with departments and agencies embraced in the survey.
Before a member of the task force or staff could have access to
any material, a security background investigation was conducted and
the individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access
to "Top Secret" information. In each case where the inquiry involved
access to atomic energy data,, a time-consuming special clearance was
obtained.
It was found that each department and agency had developed its
own criteria, practicea, and standards for clearance. The task force
adopted a policy in conformity with the policies and requirement3 of
the department or agency involved in each specific inquiry.
In the interest of security and economy., the task force also
decided to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material
generally was studied on the premises of the agencies.
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Staff Organization
After careful consideration by the task force of various possible
methods of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that the
most practical course would be to assign teams composed of one or two
staff members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to other
teams specific across-the-board survey functions. Individual task
force members were assigned across-the-board responsibilities parallel-
ing the work of designated staff teams.
Thus, all task force members were in a position to interject
their influence and guidance in the staff activities and at the same
time obtain valuable firsthand knowledge of the overall problem.
Procedures for Gathering Data
The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings
by top officials and employees of each agency studied. These brief-
ings were characterized by informality. Oral questions and answers
usually were employed. In some instances, however, copies of pre-
pared briefings were furnished to the staff for ready reference.
Discussions were had with many echelons of personnel in each
department and agency, from the clerks up to and including the heads
of the executive departments.
In the execution of its extensive undertaking, the task force in
certain areas found it necessary to employ the "sampling" method,
particularly in the case of the study of activities overseas.
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The task force also received expert advice from many individuals
no longer in Government employ, but who previously occupied positions
of prime responsibility in the development of our present intelligence
operations and organization. Some of these witnesses appeared before
the task force at no expense to the Government and at considerable
personal sacrifice. Their help and suggestions were of inestimable
value.
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The fate of the nation well may rest on accurate and complete
intelligence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-
level governmental decisions on policy and action in a troubled
world, where so many forces and ideologies work at cross purposes.
The Congress had clearly recognized the importance of the
role of intelligence in our national security. It has authorized
expenditures by appropriate departments and agencies to carry on
this work comprehensively.
Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of the Chief
Executive of our Government, the Congress approved the creation of
the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the intelligence
activities of the various government departments and agencies in
this field, in the interest of national security.
In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of intelli-
gence as carried out under present conditions and under the present
organization, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities found itself
confronted at the outset with the problem of arriving at a common
understanding and agreement on the meaning of the word "intelligence,"
as applied to its own areas of work and investigation.
In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to our
special field of study, it was found that each department or agency
surveyed had its own "pet" definition. Many of these definitions
were lengthy and involved use of words requiring additional interpre-
tation or delimitations to get at their precise application.
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The task force sought a definition as simple and clear as possible
and arrived at the following:
"Intelligence deals with all the things which should be
known in advance of initiating a course of action."
Useful for our purpose also, as a supplemental and extended defini-
tion, is that given in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms
for Joint Usage:
"INTELLIGENCE - The product resulting from the collection,
evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of
all available information which concerns one or more
aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations,
and which is immediately or potentially significant to
planning."
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I THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- NATIONAL LEVEL
The function of the National Security Council is to advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security so as to enable
the military services and the other departments and agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national
security.
The Council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the
secretaries and under secretaries of other executive departments and
military departments when appointed by the President, to serve at his
pleasure.
The Council, in addition to performing such other functions as the
President may direct, for the purpose of coordinating more effectively
the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment relating to national security, subject to the direction of the
President, shall:
1. Assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military
power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President to meet these problems.
2. Consider policies on matters of common interest to the
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national
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security., and make recommendations to the President on these matters.
In order to accomplish its mission., the National Security Council
has at its disposal several groups which function in varying degrees
within the field of national intelligence.
Th ties of S ecial Assistant to the President
The Council is linked closely to the President) not only because
the Chief Executive is chairman and a member of it, but also because
of the designation by him of a Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs who) as a member of the White House Staff,
has constant and direct access to the President and enjoys his com-
plete confidence.
This Special Assistant to the President is, in fact if not in
name, the Executive Officer of the NSC and is chairman of the highly
important Planning Board of the NSC.
He personally briefs the President on national security affairs,
and with the President's approval prepares the agenda for the NSC
meetings. This Special Assistant to the President does not preside
at any NSC meeting, but sits (just beneath the Council itself) at the
apex of the NSC administrative machinery.
Progress in National Intelligence Policies
The National Security Council has issued several intelligence
directives. They express the policy by which the intelligence effort
is guided and coordinated; establish) within the intelligence community.,
committees for the fulfillment of specific intelligence functions; and
pinpoint the responsibility for specific duties in designated fields
of intelligence.
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The national intelligence policy, as expressed in these directives,
calls for integration of all departmental intelligence re3ating to
national security through a process of coordination of effort by the
Director of Central Intelligence and correlation of intelligence by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Other groups have been established as appendages to the Council,
through some of which intelligence, advice, and recommendations have
been received by the Council for its use in advising and making recom-
mendations to the President,
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National Security
Act of 1947, is charged with the responsibility of coordinating,
evaluating, and distributing intelligence data affecting the national
security. The Director of Central Intelligence gives advice and recom-
mendations to the National Security Council on such matters.
The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor and to the post-war investigation into the part intelligence
or lack of intelligence played in the failure of our military forces to
receive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese attack,
That investigation of events leading up to the t1day of infavy
impressed upon Congress the fact that information necessary to anticipate
the attack actually was available to the Government, but that there was
no system in existence to assure that the information, properly evaluated,
would be brought to the attention of the President and his chief advisers
so that appropriate decisions could be made and timely instructions
transmitted to the interested military commanders,
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It also demonstrated that in the pre-war Government organization
no single official was responsible for whatever failure of intelligence
was involved; and the blame for the military surprise fell, justly or
unjustly., on the military commanders present and immediately involved
in the debacle,
Therefore, in 19479 when legislation for a national intelligence
organization was being considered, there was a widespread feeling
among members of the Congress that responsibility for the coordination
of the production of national intelligence, as distinguished from
departmental intelligence, and for its dissemination, must be centered
at one point.
Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its director
charged with the coordination of the intelligence effort, was authorized
to fill this need. The Director of Central Intelligence, in the
performance of this responsibility, receives pertinent information from
all branches of the Government engaging in collection of intelligence,
including the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides for the
administration of the Agency and grants the Director wide autonomous
authority,
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II THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of Special Operations (OSO)
Authority, Responsibility, and Functions
The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for intelligence
activities in the military services is not specifically defined in
legislation or executive order, but is implicit in the following
provision of the National Security Act of 19471
"The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal
assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department of Defense. Under direction of the President,
and subject to the provisions of this Act, he shall have
direction, authority, and control over the Department of
Def ense .'E
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
was designated to fulfill a requirement for staff participation and
representation in matters affecting defense and national intelligence
efforts. His authority and responsibilities are set forth in various
directives and memoranda of the Secretary of Defense.
The organization is small and is neither intended nor prepared to
exercise administrative control over day-to-day intelligence activities
of the armed services.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence Unit
As an adjunct of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a Joint
Intelligence Committee composed of the intelligence chiefs of the
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members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee members area the
Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, who acts as com-
mittee chairman; the G-2 of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence;
and the Director of Intelligence, Air Force.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff heads the
Joint Intelligence Group, performing the intellig?nce functions and
duties assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the
Director of the Joint Staff.
Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are
within the Department of Defense, the Joint Intelligence Group supports
the Secretary of Defense in intelligence matters.
Department of the Army
Responsibilities of the Assistant Chief of Staff G?2 Intelli ence
ACS G?2
The AC/S, G-a2, under supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff
and of the Comptroller of the Army, within his scope of responsibility
plans, coordinates and supervises the collection, evaluation and
dissemination of intelligence information pertaining to the war
potential, topography, military forces and military activities of
foreign nations, and the strategic vulnerability of the United States
and its possessions.
The AC/S, G-2, also gives staff guidance and coordination to the
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIO) and to the Army Intelligence Center
(AIC).
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Attache System
Army efforts in the intelligence collection field are carried out
largely through its Attache Systen which maintains stations in many
foreign countries.
Officers are assigned in the Attache System on a highly selective
basis in conformity with rigid requirements aid standards established
for candidates for this type of duty.
After selection, officers are
assigned to language and intelli-
gence schools to prepare them for their assignments.
G-2 Training Interest
G?21s training interest lies principally in the areas of policy
guidance and planning. The training division establishes the policies
under which intelligence and language schools operate., and monitors
their program.
Elements of the division also monitor training programs in the
intelligence field, which are conducted by the various field commands
and agencies, to insure conformance with G-29s guidance.
Counter-Intelligence Corps
This Corps operates under the command of a major general, who is
also, in effect, a deputy of AC/S, G-2, for CIC matters. However,
while the Corps commander is responsible for certain administrative
? and security functions, he does not exercise a true command control
over the personnel of the Corps. Based on the principle that security
is a function of command, elements of the Corps generally are assigned
to field units and operate directly under command of the unit to which
they are assigned.
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The mission of the CIC is to ferret out any treason, sedition,
subversive activity or disaffection, and to detect and prevent enemy
espionage or sabotage within the Army Establishment and its area of
jurisdiction.
In the pursuit of their primary functions, members of the Arn7Vs
Counter Intelligence Corps acquire some intelligence data, and these
are fed into the intelligence system.
Relationship to Other Agencies
G-2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of cooperation and
understanding in its relationship with other segments of the intelli-
gence community. Committee, subcommittee, and working groups provide
for ready interchange of material, practices, methods, and other
pertinent intelligence information.
Much of the effectiveness of this system is achieved through
personal contacts. Material, of an urgent nature can be disseminated
throughout the intelligence community through these contacts without
being delayed to await scheduled committee meetings. There is
positive evidence of an aggressive willingness and desire among those
engaged at the working level to promote the overall intelligence effort.
Language Training Program
Language training for the Attache .System and for the Foreign Area
Specialist Training (FAST) is conducted at the Army Language School
in Monterey, California. Use also is made of the Naval Language School
in Washington, D. C., and civilian colleges. The Army conducts
language courses for CIC personnel at Fort Holabird, Maryland.
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Department of the Navy
Office of Naval Intelligence (0 1
)
The Office of Naval Intelligence is part of the organization of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Director of Naval
Intelligence is designated as an Assistant Chief of Naval operations.,
and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He also
has a direct responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy.
Under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.,
the Director of Naval Intelligence is required to administer., operate,
and maintain an intelligence service fulfilling the intelligence and
counter-intelligence requirements of the Department of the Navy for
the purpose oft
1. Informing the Naval Establishment of the war-making
capabilities and intentions of foreign nations.
2. Providing the Naval Establishment with the intelligence
needed for plans and operations.
3. Warning Naval authority of threats to security of the
Naval Establishment.
4. Providing the Naval contributions to joint, national,
and international intelligence.
5. Promoting the maximum intelligence readiness of the
operating forces and other components of the Naval Establishment.
6. Coordinating the intelligence effort of the Naval
Establishment.
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7. Developing and promulgating, subject to approval of the
Secretary of the Navy, policies for the protection of classified
matter, including such policies applicable to industrial security.
8. Advising the Chief of Naval Operations concerning all
matters relating to Naval intelligence and security policies for the
protection of classified matter.
Organization in the Field
In the field, three organizations assist in carrying out the
intelligence mission of the Navy;
1. Naval District Intelligence Officers, who are under
ONI's management control and operate in the continental United States
and in certain outlying areas.
2. Intelligence organizations within the forces afloat,
which, although directly under their respective commanders, are still
under ONI's technical supervision.
3. The Naval Attache System, which also is under juris-
diction of the ONI.
The primary functions of the District Intelligence Officers are
the conduct of counterintelligence and the implementation of security
policies. The District Intelligence Officer serves on the staff of
his Naval District Commandant, and in certain designated districts has
additional duty on the staff of the commander of the sea frontier in
which his district is located, The Naval District Intelligence
Offices are the major source of domestic counterintelligence of
special concern to the Navy.
In the forces afloat, each area, fleet, type, and task force com-
mander, and all flag officers exercising command have a staff intelligence
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section. This is headed by an intelligence officer who is responsible
for the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence for
the command. ONI supports their intelligence requirements and assigns
them collection missions within their capabilities to execute.
Naval Attache System
Naval attaches and their staffs are officially a part of ONI, but
they also have a responsibility to the ambassador or minister who is
the chief of the diplomatic mission to which they are assigned.
Normally, attaches are stationed only in those countries which are of
primary Naval interest to ONI.
Each of the ambassadors to countries having ports of call for our
Naval elements would like to have a naval attache to take care of many
problems arising from these visits and the attendant shore leaves.
Administration
Administrative work in the Office of Naval Intelligence is handled
by the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Administration. Man-
power and management surveys are conducted continuously by this division
to maintain efficiency and econo r throughout.ONI.
"Special Duty Only"
Most of the military personnel assigned to intelligence duties are
line officers, not specialists. The Military Personnel Act of 191L7 made
provision, for intelligence specialists in the Regular Navy. However,
since by law none of these "Special Duty Only" officers may succeed to
command, and since command is the usual stepping stone to flag rank,
the "Special Duty Only" class of service is unpopular among line officers.
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Department of the Air Force
Organization for Intelligence Work
The civilian staff of the Secretary of the Air Force includes a
Special Assistant for Intelligence who is responsible for review and
evaluation of all matters pertaining.to plans., policies, and programs
relative to the Air Force intelligence program. He is also charged
with supervision and ultimate review of the personnel security program,
both military and civilian.
The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations., is responsible for the Air
Force intelligence activities, communications activities, and atomic
energy matters.
The Department's Inspector General is responsible to the Chief of
Staff, USAF. Among his other duties, he conducts investigations of
matters involving major crimes., violations of public trust, subversive
activities., sabotage and espionage; and performs related counter-
intelligence functions for the Department.
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, is directly
responsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff., Operations. This organiza-
tional relationship places him in a position subordinate to a Deputy
Chief of Staff. The interposing of an echelon between the major
intelligence element of the Air Force and the Department's Chief of
Staff and certain other functional Deputy Chiefs of Staff, such as the
Comptroller, affects adversely the efficiency of staff operation. Elevation
of the Director of Intelligence to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff
would greatly enhance the prestige of intelligence in the Air Force.
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This is a desirable and appropriate step in view of the tremendous
importance of intelligence in the overall mission of the Air Force.
Air Force Intelligence Training
Recognizing the need for continuing intelligence training., the
Air Force has established such a program for officers and airmen,
embracing courses ranging from those of an introdu,.;l;ory nature to
those appropriate for staff officers in higher headquarters.
In addition to the service schools, college facilities are used
for language training and special studies. Training courses also
are available for Air Force reserve personnel.
The Air Force training program generally is adequate for current
requirements, even in technical areas where the personnel turnover
is heavy. Periodic studies should be made, however, to assure the
adequacy of training facilities in relation to worldwide staff
requirements. The staffing of foreign posts with inadequately
trained personnel may be not only uneconomical, but might result also
in the loss of opportunities to collect intelligence.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Responsibility for Foreign Policy
A primary function of the Secretary of State is to act as
principal adviser to the President in the determination of American
foreign policy and to implement and supervise its execution by
diplomatic means. By virtue of the authority the Secretary exercises
over all the activities of the Department and the Foreign Service, he
derives principal support for the accomplishment of this task from the
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Under Secretaries, the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs., the Special Assistant-Intelligence, and the
Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
The Special Assistant-Intelligence, with rank equivalent to that
of an Assistant Secretary., develops and implements a coordinated
program for foreign intelligence for the Department and for producing
reports essential to determination and execution of foreign policy.
Effect, of Diplomacy on the Overall Collection of Intelligence
The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method
between the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active
operations incident to the collection of intelligence and the conduct
of cold war.
While all contribute to the end in view., conflicts between them
must be resolved., usually on a high level., and always in the national
interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself;
that, while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks
avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element in the
fight to preserve our national welfare and existence. Instances have
come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an
attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely
action in the field.
Creation of the Intelligence Area
Prior to World War II, intelligence for the support of American
foreign policy was produced by the inadequate research staffs of
departmental policy offices which had many other duties to perform,
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Creation of the Intelligence Area of that Department, by Executive
Order 9621 of September 20, 19L15, recognized the need for improving
the quality of intelligence demanded by the tense international
situation,
The Secretary of State is a member of the National Security
Council. The Intelligence Area provides staff assistance to the
Secretary and senior policy officers of the Department of State,
and maintains liaison with the other members of the-intelligence
community in the discharge of the Department's responsibility in the
total intelligence program of the Government.
Better Quarters Needed
The Intelligence Area maintains its offices and records in a
converted apartment building, which does not constitute satisfactory
quarters for this special type of work. The cost of adequate
security measures consequently is high.
Existing plans for an addition to the New State Building, if
approved under the provisions of Public Law 519, would improve
working conditions and efficiency, produce savings through the
vacating of leased spaces, and reduce costs of security, maintenance,
and miscellaneous services for this branch of the intelligence
effort,
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FEDA,L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
A Bureau of Investigation was created, under jurisdiction of the
Attorney General of the United, States, by Executive Order of July 26,
1908. The policies now followed in the administration of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were established in 19241, and in July 1935, this
agency became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In view of the limited activities of the FBI in the positive and
foreign intelligence fields, a detailed study of this agency was not'
made. However, its functions in the counterintelligence effort were
studied with deep interest by the task force, in order to fill out the
intelligence picture.
We found the Director of the FBI, through his forcefulness, initia-
tive, and managerial ability, to have developed his agency into a model
organization of its kind. We are confident that in the FBI we have a
most effective counterintelligence service.
FBI Responsibilities in Counterintelligence
Among other assigned responsibilities, the FBI has jurisdiction over
investigations relating to espionage, sabotage, treason, and other mat-
ters pertaining to the internal security of the United States. This
jurisdiction places the FBI directly in the field of counterintelligence.
Executive Order 10450 (May 27, 1953), which established the security
procedure covering stall persons seeking the privilege of employment or
privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment,U provides that; "All investigations conducted by any other agencies,
which develop adverse information involving loyalty or information showing
coercion of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the national
security, shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies
The Director of the FBI - along with the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; and the Director of Special In.-estigations, the
Inspector General, Headquarters, U. S. Air Force - is a member of the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IM) which is responsible
for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage,,
counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence
matters affecting internal security.
The IM Charter does not disturb the responsibilities of the -,r mbe ?
agencies, but makes mandatory such action by those agencies as is necessary
to insure complete investigative coverage of this field without duplication
of effort, through appropriate exchange and coordination of information
and action among the various pertinent agencies and departments of the
Government.
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III FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Evolution of Our Plans
Traditionally., Americans are a peace-loving people. But, a
philosophy of peace is no guarantee of peace. In a tortured world
where greed, intrigue., and lust for power exist, protection of liberty
and assurance of survival lie in alertness and strength. Alertness in-
volves adequate intelligence data on which to base adequate preparedness.
From the beginning, the United States has tried consistently to
maintain relationships with other countries openly and to refrain from
participation in secret treaties. This principle likewise established
the early pattern for the conduct of our intelligence activities. The
collection of information concerning political and military policies
and plans of foreign governments was accomplished openly and with the
full knowledge of the foreign powers. The work was performed through
the offices of our diplomatic representatives abroad and accredited
military attaches.
A substantial volume of material was collected, but there was no
machinery at home to pull this information together into a cohesive mass
and to draw from it logical conclusions upon rich to base national
policy and future plans.
On July 11, 1941, the Chief Executive., in his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces., established an Office of the Coordinator
of Information to "collect and analyze information data, military or
otherwise, which may bear upon national defense strategy- to interpret
and correlate such strategic information; to make it available to the
President and such other officials as the President may determine, and
to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary
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activities as may aei ate he securing s r o a egic orma ion
not available to the Government." This office came into being only five
months before Pearl Harbor.
Through a process of evolution, there finally emerged the office
of Strategic Services as an operating agency of the joint Chiefs of
Staff, This organization remained intact until the end of World War II.
Post-War Organization
In the fall of 1914, the Chief Executive wrote to the Director of
Strategic Services requesting recommendations as to the organization of
a post-war intelligence organization. The director submitted a plan for
the creation of a central intelligence service. The plan placed the
proposed central intelligence service in the Executive Office of the
President and called for the appointment by the President of a Director
of Intelligence who would discharge and perform his functions and duties
under the direction and supervision of the President.
It also provided for the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory
Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, mar, and Navy, and such
others as the President deemed necessary. The duties of the board would
be to advise and assist the Director of Intelligence.
The plan placed in the hands of the Director the work of coordinating,
collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence for national pur-
poses. It also recognized that various departments of the Government
should have their own intelligence bureaus for the collection and process-
ing of such information and material as might be needed in the performance
of their daily functions and duties. Each of these bureaus would be
under the sole control of its department head and would not be encroached
upon or impaired by the functions granted to any other governmental in-
telligence agency,
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The plan further contemplated that in time of war or unlimited
emergency, all programs of such an agency in areas of actual or pro-
jected military operations would be coordinated with military plans and
be subject to the approval of the joint Chiefs of Staff; or in case of
the consolidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander.
Functions Divided
Under the pressure of prompt dissolution of wartime agencies, the
Chief Executive, on September 20, 1945, divided the functions, personnel,
and physical resources of the Office of Strategic Services between the
State Department and the "War Department, The research and presentation
element was transferred to the State Department, to be absorbed or
liquidated so that the element would cease to exist on December 31, 1945.
On January 22., 1916, the Chief Executive created the National In-
telligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy, and the Presidents personal representative, to plan, develop,., and
coordinate Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the
most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission for national
security. This Presidential directive also created a Central Intelligence
Group (CIG) under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), designated by the President to assist the National Intelligence
Authority (NIA) and to be responsible to it. The directive specified
that the head of CIG would sit as a member of the NIA.
It charged the Central Intelligence Group with the task of correla-
ting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence relating to the
national security; with coordinating such activities of the intelligence
agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments as related to the
national security; and with performing other services of common concern.
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By the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Public Law
253, 80th Cong., July 26, 19117), the Congress established a National
Security Council (NSC) which took the place of the old National Intelli-
gence Authority; and created under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) as its head. The National Intelligence Authority ceased
to exist.
Under the provisions of this Act, the National Security Council
established an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) made up of the
various intelligence chiefs, to advise the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in his efforts to coordinate the intelligence activities of the
nation?
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IV INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND SECURITY .
Character of the Present Working Force
The methods used for selection of personnel were reassuring in the
light of suspicions which have been voiced th et subversive and communistic
elements were readily infiltrating into these sensitive jobs. Our in-
vestigations indicated that the intelligence leadership in all branches
is alert to its responsibility and is functioning under strict rules
designed to prevent any such infiltration.
One flaw in the present system, however, seems to be the absence
of a general plan for a periodic review of the security status of
every person after employment in intelligence activities, to guard
against the possibility that some employee who was completely dependable
and honorable when starting work might have changed character, fallen
from grace, or succumbed to alien blandishments or some personal weakness
such as strong drink or sexual perversion. The task force makes recom-
mendations to minimize this hazard.
The continuing need for skilled civilians in certain categories of
intelligence work suggests further use of the appointment method under
Schedule A of the Civil Service program by some intelligence units.
Policies and procedures to give assurance of security of personnel
follow a standard pattern in all of the agencies concerned (FBI, ONI, G-2,
AFOIN, CIA., and State) and are generally adequate. The major obstacle in
this area is the load thrown upon investigative agencies in providing
personnel clearances. Backlogs exist in all agencies, and the time re-
quired for complete clearance checks and full background investigation
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runs as high as fifteen months. Such long delays hamper certain phases
of the intelligence program to which these prospective employee.,, are to
be assigned., and some potential intelligence personnel are lost to the
intelligence community. They grow tired and restive at the long wait and
accept other offers of employment..
G-2 Personnel and Security
All military assignments to G-2 are made by The Adjutant General (TAG)
in a manner similar to other assignments Within G?2, however there ~3
certain key billets in which G-2 has a special interest. In such cases.,
selection of qualified personnel to meet specific requirements is made
from nominations by TAG.
With only a few minor exceptions, the quality of personnel in G?2
was found to be of an exceptionally high order. Contact with officers
in this field indicated that they were alert to their obligations and
duties. Personnel records of those who may have had experience in intelli-
gence are clearly marked so that such men are not lost to the system and
may be made available readily for future assignments in this uDrk. Most
senior officers wish to retain attachment to their basic branches of
service., but feel that an intelligence assignment is beneficial to their
career,
Regulations and necessary implementing procedures for compliance with
Executive Order No. 10501, titled "Safeguarding Official. Information in the
Interests of the Defense of the United States" are in effect and are well
observed. Personnel attached to G?2 are security conscious to a high
degree. Poster and lecture programs help to keep them continually alert-,.
and ever conscious of their responsibility.
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ONI Personnel
Security policy in the Navy is vested in the Secretary of ri,e Navy's
preparation of security policies has been delegated, through the Chief of
Naval Operations, to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Administrative
work in the Office of Naval Intelligence is in the hands of the Assistant
Director of Naval Intelligence, Administration. Manpower and management
surveys are continuously conducted by this division to maintain both
efficiency and economy throughout ONI.
In addition to ONI, three other offices have responsibilities in
certain phases of security. They are the Bureau of Personnel, in matters
of military personnel security; the Office of Industrial Relations, in
matters concerning security among civil service personnel within the
Navy; and the Office of Naval Material, in matters of industrial = ;curity.
Each was surveyed and appeared to be functioning adequately.
The major portion of military personnel assigned to intelligence
duties are not specialists; they are line officers. Provision was made
in the Military Personnel Act of 1947 to include intelligence specialists
in the Regular Navy. However, since by law none of these "Special Duty
Only" officers may succeed to command, and since command is the usual
stepping stone to flag rank, the "Special Duty Only" class of service is
unpopular.
The present tour of the Naval attache is two years. Because of
personnel limitations, it has not been possible to send all Naval attaches
to language schools. Many attaches are just getting proficient in the
language of the area to which they have been assigned at the end of the to`d;;-.
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The other two services use the three-year tour, and so does the ONI.
It would seem logical to bring the Naval attache's tour in line by
making it three years also.
Air Force Intelligence Personnel
Air Force security operations are centered in the office of the
Deputy Inspector General for Security. The Deputy Inspector General
has two directorates that of the Office of Special Investigations,
and of the Air Provost Marshal, with the functions of security divided
between these directorates.
The Office of Special Investigations is responsible for conducting
all personnel background investigations within the jurisdiction of the
Air Force and for forwarding final reports on completed investigations
to interested commanders for appropri action. Close liaison is
maintained with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Civil Service
Commission, and other investigative and law-enforcement agencies. Regu-
lations have been published for the purpose of establishing uniform
policies and procedures for the personnel security investigation and
clearance of Air Force military and civilian personnel requiring access
to classified information.
There is some reluctance now on the part of career service personnel
in the Air Force to take assignments or to specialize in intelligence work
because of the limited opportunities to reach the grade of general officer
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in this field. If the Director of Intelligence had greater latitude in
the selection of personnel, an improvement in this general attitl~de might
be achieved. The service would be more attractive if some of the highly
trained officers he would select could anticipate eventual elevation to
the grade of general officer.
Because of Civil Service restrictions, the Air Force also has exper-
ienced difficulty in cbtaining civilian persorin.;l suitable for special
intelligence duties. Certain specialists, such as analysts, need great
technical skill and long experience, are generally in short supply and
reluctant to be placed under Civil Service. Civil Service exemptions
for a limited number of such experts would help the Air Force to overcome
this deficiency more readily.
Industrial Security
The intelligence units of the armed services realize fully that
vital secrets placed in the hands of private industry must be amply pro-
tected without sacrificing efficiency or hampering productions "The
Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation" (AFISR), dated January 15,
1953, and issued by the Department of Defense, is the current directive
governing security in this area. Instructions to contractors regarding
the handling of classified material are set forth in a Department of De-
fense publication bearing the title "Industrial Security Manual for
Safeguarding Classified Information" (ISMSCI).
AFISR effectively coordinates the industrial security activities of
all military agencies engaged in procurement operations. Prior to its
issuance, agencies operated individually under their own departmental
directives and supervision. AFISR fixes responsibility for plant super-
vision, designates procedures for clearance of both facilities and
individuals, and eliminates duplication of effort and uncertainty over
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 areas of security responsibility.
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er a planas received agency clearance,, is a gi a to ac-
cept classified material from any agency. The agency which is having
the work performed in that plant and which gave the clearance for that
work, is responsible for the contractor's obedience to the security
instructions. A serious weakness in the industrial personnel security
program arises from the fact that an individual who has been declared to
be a security risk, although removed from work of a classified nature,
might still be retained in the same plant. Because he has daily personal
contact with employees engaged in sensitive production and enjoys freedom
of movement within the plant, such an employee still would have access
to material and information of great value to a potential enemy of this
country.
The military departments are aware of the situation and have recom-
mended legislation to correct this deficiency. The task force commends
such a proposal and feels that this loophole in our security barriers
should be closed promptly.
Individual Security Cases
In the conduct of this survey, the task force assiduously endeavored
to keep its effort focused and to expend its time and resources in the
accomplishment of the specific duties assigned to it by the Hoover
Commission - to study and investigate the present organization and methods
of operation of the members of the intelligence community,, and to deter-
mine what changes, if any, would be necessary or desirable.
Although detailed study of the policies, functions, and procedures
of the c p xaerts and agencies collecting and handling intelligence data,
as outlined to us by the Commission, did not primarily entail the in-
vestigation of the security angle of every individual engaged in
intelligence, we recognized the fact that the character of personnel
affects these intelligence functions and we faced squarely the issue of
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individual cases under suspicion or brought to our attention from
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various sources. k number of names came to us with supposedly deroga-
tory information or merely with derogatory implications.
When any such information or any name was brought to our attention
from any source concerning individuals employed in the intelligence
field, or even if not so employed, every case except those obviously
without merit was referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
or, where appropriate, to the responsible intelligence agency, or to
both, with a request for a report.
Up to the time this report was prepared, some replies to our in-
quiry developed information to the effect that the records contained
no adequate basis for suspicion of the individuals as security risks.
Some replies indicated that the individuals were under investigation
and that the investigations were continuing. One of the individuals is
on leave mi thout pay, pending completion of an investigation now in
process and appropriate disposition.
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V "WATCH DOG" COMMISSION
The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency,
as a major fountain of intelligence for the nation, must of necessity
operate in an atmosphere of secrecy and with an unusual amount of
freedom and independence. Obviously, it cannot achieve its full
purpose if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive checks and
balances which apply to the average governmental agency.
Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by the
Congress from outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal
accounts. There is always a danger that such freedom from restra-ats
could inspire laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the
American people.
Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuse J