WHAT KINDS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE MISUSE OF THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00674R000300070005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT FOR: N[emhers of the Working Group on Implementation
and Review, PRM/NSC-29 Ad Hoc Committee
FROM: Sub-Group I/R-2
SUBJECT: what Kinds of Disciplinary Actions Can be
Taken to Prevent the Misuse of the Security
Classification System by Government Officials
This Issue-Option-Recommendation paper is submitted
to the Work Group Chairman on Implementation and Review,
acting under the direction of the Ad Hoc Committee pursuant
to PRM/NSC-29.
The paper addresses the relative problems of misuse
of the classification system and the unauthorized disclosure
of classified information by government officials. It sets
forth various options and several recommendations to arrest
these problems. Specifically, the Sub-Group was asked to
consider the issue of "what kinds of disciplinary actions
can be taken to prevent the misuse of the security classi-
fication system by government officials." Arising from this
issue are three sub-issues which are set out below in dis-
cussing the various options and recommendations. The Sub-
Group has found it more convenient to use the sub-issues in
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discussing our options and recommendations as called for in
the Format. Of course, in discussing these sub-issues we
address the parent issue.
The Sub-Group concludes that the present sanction in
E.O. 11652 is too narrow, in terms of available sanctions,
and is not adequate to deal with the two problems stated at
the outset. It urges the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend that
the new Executive Order set forth sanctions, as recommended
herein, which will provide more effective methods to prevent
the misuse of the classification system and the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information. The Sub-Group
considered such preventive methods as disciplinary measures,
civil fines, criminal sanctions, increased use of polygraph
tests and secrecy agreements.
In the main, DOD, CIA and State are in agreement on all
recommendations contained in this paper, while DOJ dissents
from the recommendation that the Special Coordination Committee
consider further review of alternative proposals for civil or
criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of classification
information to determine if legislation is desirable. DOJ's
position on this recommendation is that "the price for passage
of legislation generally criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure
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of classified information is a price too high to pay for the
marginal utility of such legislation." DOJ also dissents
from the recommendation that the use of uniform secrecy agree-
ments be instituted Government-wide. Since the representatives
of the White Huse and NSC did not participate in the Sub-
Group's meetings the recommendations set forth below may not
necessarily reflect their views.
ISSUE: Is the sanction in E.O. 11652 ("repeated abuse . . .
shall be grounds for administrative reprimand") stiff enough?
Should there be criminal sanctions for extreme misuses, such
as use of classification to cover up criminal activities or
gross mismanagement?
DISCUSSION: E.O. 11652 expressly prohibits classification in
order to conceal inefficiency or administrative error, to
prevent embarrassment to a person or Department or to restrain
competition or independent initiative. The Order also includes
a general prohibition against classification ".... to prevent
for any other :reason the release of information which does not
require protection in the interest of national security."
These prohibitions are sound policy and should be included in
any superseding Order. Additional prohibitions are being
considered in Sub-Group CD/l. Enforcement of these prohibitions
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is essential to the integrity of the classification system
itself and to public confidence without which a classification
system will fail.
OPTION I: Retain the provisions of Section 13 of E.O. 11652
and of Section. X.D. of the NSC Directive of May 17, 1972.
ADVANTAGES: Departments could continue present practices
and systems for enforcement of compliance with the operable
provisions of the classification system.
DISADVANTAGES: The disadvantage of this Option is that
it only allows for a single sanction, and fails to provide for
a range of sanctions. However, the present administrative
actions allowed are n6t sufficient. The sole administrative
sanction prescribed by Section 13 of E.O. 11652 for wrongful
classification is "administrative reprimand" and, it becomes
operative only for "repeated abuse". There are no specific
sanctions or range of sanctions for unauthorized release or
disclosure of classified information. Classification and
continuation of classification in violation of the Order are
not explicitly subject to administrative sanction.
The Sub-Group as a whole feel that administrative sanctions
as set forth i:a Options 2 and 3 will prove to be adequate to
achieve the necessary compliance throughout the Executive Branch.
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There does not appear to be necessity for specific
criminal sanctions for violation of the prohibitions. In
the extreme case that an obstruction of justice is caused
by a classification made for the prohibited purpose, the
criminal sanction which attaches to that offense could be
invoked.
OPTION II: The Order should include a section concerning
enforcement which will provide for administrative sanction
for willful origination or continuation of classification of
information in violation of the Order or an implementing
directive; reLeasing or disclosing or causing release or
disclosure of classified information or material in a manner
not. authorized by the Order or an implementing directive; or
other violations of the Order.
ADVANTAGES: The importance of strict compliance with
Executive Order standards and criteria for classification and
declassification would be properly emphasized. A practical
result of strict compliance with those standards and criteria
will be a smaLler quantity of classified information, earlier
declassification of that information and more and earlier
public availability of information concerning the affairs of
Government.
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The importance of strict compliance with Executive
Order policy with respect to protection of classified infor-
mation and material from unauthorized disclosure would be
properly emphasized.
Administrative sanctions can be imposed more promptly
and more surely than criminal sanctions and at lower cost
to the Government.
A clearly enunciated and well administered program of
enforcement based on administrative sanctions will be a more
effective deterrent to non-compliance than is the risk of
effective prosecution for violation of present criminal
statutes.
Responsibility for enforcement of compliance by use of
administrative sanctions will be in the heads of Departments,
the officials to whom the Order delegates authority for
classification and responsibility for protection of classified
information .
Heads of Departments will specify the provisions of the
Order and implementing directives violation of which is subject
to administrative sanctions and will specify the applicable
schedule of sanctions in accordance with the major purposes of
the Order and the particular requirements of the Department.
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DISADVANTAGES: Departments will be required to revise
regulations pertaining to enforcement of compliance with the
Order and implementing directives and to revise the supplement
security education and training activity and materials.
OPTION III: The Order should include a section concerning
enforcement which will provide for a range of sanctions, e.g.,
warning, reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, which may
be imposed for Option I abuses or violations in accordance
with applicable law and Departmental regulations.
RECOMMENDATION: The new Executive Order should include sections
which incorporate the categories set forth in Options II and
the range of sanctions set forth in Option III. The Executive
Order should also direct that violation of relevant criminal
statutes, e.g. 18 U.S.C. 793, 794 and 798, be referred promptly
to the Department of Justice for investigation and for prose-
cution as app:ropria to .
ISSUE: Should the Ad Hoc Committee consider the issue of what
sanctions (civil or criminal) should be adopted, modified, or
continued, fo:c the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information?
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DISCUSSION: The members of Sub-Group I/R-2, Working Group on
Implementation and Review, have read with interest the draft
subcommittee Report to the SCC, dated 1 June 1977, on "Un-
authorized Disclosure of Sensitive Information." That report
concludes that a thorough review of the classification system
is a necessary first step to any resolution of the problem
of unauthorized disclosures, and we believe that the efforts
to revise the existing classification system can do much to
support executive branch attempts to safeguard information.
The greater is the integrity of the system, the greater will
be the support to uphold it. However, the sub-group members
are not persuaded by the draft report to the extent it recommends
not to seek legislation to impose sanctions for the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information. On the contrary, we
believe the dissenting comments appended to the report have
placed upon that recommendation sufficient doubt as to warrant
that further attention be given, not only to whether any sanc-
tions should be authorized, but to developing feasible alternatives.
The dissents appear to focus more accurately than the draft
report on what we perceive to be the crucial issues involved;
therefore, we believe that the question of criminal and civil
sanctions deserves more consideration than the subcommittee has
given.
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Our concern in this regard arises because we believe
that some sanctions are desirable for unauthorized disclosures,
and we are persuaded by the dissent that the problem of
prosecuting those responsible for unauthorized leaks may not
necessarily result only from an unwillingness to pay the price
of enforcing existing statutes. Rather, we agree that existing
statutes are generally not applicable to all unauthorized
disclosures, such as anonymous leaks to the press, and that
further legislation is needed. The PRM/NSC-11 subcommittee
itself states:
Because inadequate coverage of existing
laws and the difficulties involved in prose-
cutions under them, the Executive Branch has
attempted without success since at least 1957
to obtain new legislation which would generally
criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information. At page 9.
Nevertheless, the subcommittee drafters conclude that for a
variety of reasons no new legislation should be sought.
One of the major reasons for this conclusion was that
intelligence agencies have often refused, prior to any investi-
gation of a leak, to declassify information determined to be
essential for purposes of prosecution. This difficulty seems
to be capable of resolution, and we believe that the dissenting
position raises some valid points in this regard. We are
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persuaded that: a refusal to undertakeany criminal investi-
gation without: an advance commitment from the concerned agency
to declassify this information not only may preclude the taking
of adequate measures to prevent further disclosures of this
and related information, but such policy very often may pre-
clude fully-informed and rational determination of whether
or not it is actually appropriate to declassify such infor-
mation or whether or not it is actually appropriate to declassify
such information or reveal intelligence sources and methods.
Thus, while we are sympathetic to concerns that investigations
are fruitless if conducted without a firm commitment to
prosecute, we are of the opinion that investigations may often
be necessary for purposes unrelated to prosecution, such as
to provide valuable insight into the vulnerabilities of security
procedures or into methods for corrective management actions.
Existing policy, however, often may preclude consideration of
factors necessary to an informed decision of whether or not to
declassify. We urge further review of this problem.
Regardless of such policy, however, there are a number of
alternatives which this sub-group believes should be explored by
the Special Coordination Committee. Since the PRM/NSC-11
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subcommittee failed to discuss proposals for legislation
which it is our understanding had considerable support,
we urge a complete review of those alternatives. There
may very well be various conclusive political and security
costs involved in investigating and prosecuting leaks, and
price for passage of legislation generally criminalizing
the unauthorized disclosure of classified information may
be too high a price to pay for such legislation; however,
the Subcommittee Report to the SCC has not persuasively
presented its position. The dissenting comments point out
with considerable force the failure of the draft report to
adequately describe the range of viable options.
RECOMMENDATION: We recommend to the Special Coordination
Committee that it undertake a review of alternative proposals
for civil or criminal sanctions for the unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information, since it has been the
position within the executive branch that some legislation
in this regard is consistently desirable. If the SCC determines
that departure from the status quo is not feasible at the
present time, at least it shall have done so after full con-
sideration of the alternatives. We simply urge further con-
sideration of every alternative and careful weighing of all
factors. DOJ dissents.
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ISSUE: Should the new Executive Order require that each
person who has access to classified information execute a
secrecy agreement as a condition of being granted access?
DISCUSSION: The desirability and effectiveness of using
secrecy agreements as a means to prevent disclosure of
classified information was discussed in some detail in the
Subcommitee Report to the SCC, dated 1 June 1977, pursuant
to PRM/NSC-11. In E.O. 11905 the President required all
employees of the Executive Branch and its contractors to
execute a secrecy agreement as a condition of obtaining
access to information containing sources and methods of
intelligence. At present most departments and agencies have
executed agreements to comply with E.O. 11905, but there is
some question as to whether they are in full compliance. The
exception is the CIA which already had a secrecy agreement
program applicable to all employees. Under the CIA's program
an employee is required to execute a secrecy agreement as a
condition of employment, and other persons execute such agree-
ments as a condition of gaining access to classified information.
CIA would not like to see the new Executive Order con-
tain any provision which would require its present employees
to reexecute a secrecy agreement. State and DOD prefer a
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Government-wide uniform secrecy agreement as a condition of
obtaining access to classified information. This issue of
whether any secrecy agreement program mandated should be
retrospective or prospective. The Sub-Group agreed as a
whole that this issue should be left to the Ad Hoc Committee.
DOJ is not opposed to secrecy agreements in principle.
However, it raises questions about their utility as a
preventive tool. DOJ feels that the beneficial returns from
a..
the use of secrecy agreements are probably fpor less than the
administrative burdens and costs.
DOJ agrees that secrecy agreements may, in some
instances, serve as an additional deterrent and may, in
some instances, provide the Government with the legal vehicle
of a civil irJ unction, but agree that it will not deter those
who are predisposed to disclosure and will probably be de-
meaning and insulting to those who are not. Its usefulness
in seeking an injunction, says DOJ, is perhaps even more
limited since the Government will only be able to seek this
writ where it has prior knowledge of the planned disclosure,
which will be the exception.
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The Sub-Group as a whole agrees that requiring the
military, career civil service entrants or present govern-
ment employees to sign a secrecy agreement as a condition
to employment may not be legally possible. However, it
believes that requiring such persons to sign a secrecy
agreement as a condition of obtaining access to classified
information will not present any legal problems. DOJ
believes that the President has the power to impose such a
requirement upon the military as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed service, and upon career civil service entrants and
present government employees under 5 U.S.C. ??3301 and 3302.
DOD raises the question that since a secrecy agreement
is a contract where is the necessary consideration when the
secrecy agreement is based upon obtaining access to
classified information. DOJ and CIA believe that the
Government's consideration is the employee's promise to
safeguard classified information and to refrain from dis-
closing the same, and that the employees' consideration is
the ascertaining of a job that requires access to classified
information, which he otherwise could not hold.
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It was also suggested that a provision be included
calling for liquidated damages or a civil fine. DOJ objects
to such a provision on the grounds that a civil fine could
not be imposed through an Executive Order, rather it would
require legislation. And, while a liquidated damage clause
probably could be included, it would be awkward to enforce
because of the difficulty of placing a value on the
classified information disclosed.
OPTION IV: Include in the new Executive Order a section
which will require all government employees to execute
a secrecy agreement as a condition of obtaining access to
classified information.
ADVANTAGES: This Option will have educational value
and will serve as a deterrent, and it will also allow the
Government to seek a civil injunction to prevent the dis-
closure of classified information.
DISADVANTAGES: First, the administering of any
secrecy agreement program may out weigh its benefits.
Second, the Government's ability to seek an injunction to
prevent disclosure would probably prove useless in most
instances because it would not have prior knowledge of the
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planned disclosure. Third, most employees would probably
find the requirement of signing such an agreement insulting
and demeaning.
OPTION V: Include in the new Executive Order a section
which will require the use of a uniform secrecy agreement
and that all government employees execute such an agreement
as a condition of obtaining access to classified infor-
mation.
ADVANTAGES: The advantages will be the same as those
in Option IV. However, this Option would probably have
the added advantage of reducing legal problems in attempting
to enforce the agreement because of its uniformity.
DISADVANTAGES: The disadvantages of this Option are
the same as those in Option IV.
OPTION VI: Include in the new Executive Order a section
which will require all government employees to execute
a .secrecy agreement as a condition to obtaining employment
or continuing in their present employment.
ADVANTAGES: The advantages of this Option are the
same as Opinion IV.
DISADVANTAGES: The disadvantages of this Option are
the same a3 those in Option IV. It also has the disadvantage
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that it could present legal problems in attempting to apply
it to the military, career civil service entrants and
present government employees.
OPTION VII: Include in the new Executive Order a section
which will require all government employees to execute a
secrecy agreement as a condition of obtaining access to
classified information, with a provision calling for
liquidated damages or a civil fine.
ADVANTAGES: The advantages of this Option are the
same as Option IV. It could also add two additional
deterrents through the liquidated damage clause or a
civil fine requirement.
DISADVANTAGES: The disadvantages of this Option are
the same as Option IV. It also has the disadvantage that
any provision calling for a civil fine could not be mandated
by an Executive Order, and would require legislation. While
legislation probably would not be necessary in the case of
a liquidation damage clause, such a clause would prove
awkward to enforce because of the difficulty of placing a
value on the classified information disclosed.
RECOMMENDATION: The new Executive Order should include
a section which will require all government employees to
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execute a uniform secrecy agreement as a condition of
obtaining access to classified information, whereby they
agree not to publish, disclose or otherwise make avail-
able classified information to any unauthorized person.
CIA concurs, but urge that the application of such an
agreement be prospective only. DOJ dissents.
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,., : Working Group on Classification /Declassification
Chairman - Arthur F. Van Cook, DoD - 695 2686
Sub Group C/D-l
Chairman: Department of State representative ETs rty S+Mitt,] 631- 9StX
Composition: DoD, CIA, ERDA, Justice, Domestic Staff and NSA(Observer)
0 zG Sd-_ N S C.
Issue: Which information requires protection and for how long and
what criteria should be used in making this judgment
Points for Consideration:
Should the new Order prescribe minimum criteria for
classification of official information?
Should the new Order prescribe policy prohibiting classification
of certain categories of information or classification for
certain purposes, i.e., to conceal inefficiency or
,administrative error, etc?
'What is "sensitive national security information"?
Is the standard of E. O. 11652, i.e. "could reasonably
be expected to-cause damage to the national security"
an adequate legal standard?
- Are the existing categories of E.O. 11652 (i.e. Top Secret,
Secret, Confidential) meaningful? Should we re-define the
categories, perhaps reducing them to two or increasing
them to four ?
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- Should the new Executive r er establis special
categories for information protected by statute,
i. e. , the DCI's responsibility for protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and NSA.'s
responsibilities for communications intelligence?
- Should the new Order prescribe rules which would bring
about mandatory paragraph marking'.
- 'What measures can be incorporated in the new Order to
reduce the problem of over classification, unnecessary
classification and overuse of exemption authority?
- Should the Departments and Agencies prepare classification
guidelines for their employees?
Sub Group CID -2
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5-Z3
Chairman: NARS representative cot (EA,0A son] tz" 14 w , NABS
0 osition: State, OJCS, NSC and OMB
Issue: Which categories of classified material more than 20 years old
could be declassified in bulk under appropriate guidelines.
Points for Consideration:
- Should the Departments and Agencies prepare declassification
guidelines for their e-n.ployee s.
- Should more emphasis be placed on the Foreign Relations
Series, or other Departmental publications, or on programs
by the Archives to publish important papers?
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Points for Consideration:
- Should the new Order require that Departments give emphasis
to declassification comparable to that given to classification?
In this connection, should the new Order require decentralization
of declassification authority?
- Should the new Order establish criteria for declassification?
Can the automatic declassification system be
modified or expanded to accelerate declassification
or to reduce the amount of information that is exempted
from automatic declassification? Are the periods for
automatic declassification established by E.O. 11652
too long (i. e. , 10 years for TS, 8 for S, 6 for C) ?
What can be done to increase the use of the automatic
declassification system, or to use "specific event
declassification, " e. g. , conclusion of a certain negotiation
Should the new Order limit the authority of original
classifiers to extend classification life beyond a particular
period?
Could the automatic downgrading by step be eliminated?
(Is it meaningful to say that Top Secret automatically
goes to Secret after two years?)
Should the new Order provide for access to classified
information for research purposes (former Presidential
appointees), historical researchers, etc.)?
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RECO111MENDATION I
That the Agency push for the retention of the present
30 year time frame for the systematic review of classified
records. Should this prove impractical, then move for a
compromise cf 25 years.
A reduction to a 20 year time frame would give the
Agency a backlog of approximately 28,500,000* classified
pages to review. (A 25 year limit would have a backlog of
approximately 9,500,000* pages.) These figures do not take
into account the existing backlog of 1.2,000,000 pages of
OSS material (22.8% reviewed** but none released to the
public since the records required by the Executive Order
have not yet been prepared) or the estimated 1,000,000 pages
of predecessor organizations (CIG, SSU, etc..).
In addition, the Records Review Branch (RRB) which is
responsible for the Agency's review program, only came into
existence on 2 May 1977. It is realistically expected that
it will'be another six months to a year before the unit is
fully staffed and operational. And whether or not its
proposed 40 man staff can keep up with the requirements
of the.30 year time period is already open to debate.
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;e Numbers based on recent records survey which showed
that there will be approximately 1,500,00 pages to review
per year foTT the 1947-1950 period and approximately 3,500,000
per year fo:,. the period 1951-1956.
** Its- taken a 15 man annuitant team three years to
review 22.8`, of the OSS records or 2,736,000 pages of the
12, 000, 000 total.
CONCLUSION
With its present resources, the Agency will be fortunate
to meet the 30 year requirement. Should the time frame be
reduced to 20 or 25 years, the Agency could only meet this
new requirement by a large increase in its present allotted
resources. When the final product is considered, one must
question whether the additional expenditure required is
worth it or not.
ADVANTAGES IN MAINTAINING A 30 YEAR LIMIT
a. To obtain and maintain the 30 year line will
require little increase in present allotted
resources.
b.. The resulting flood of paper caused by a reduction
in the time period would greatly increase the
likelihood of an error.
c. A 20 or 25 year time frame would probably mean
fewer records would or could be released to the
public.
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d. A 20 or 25 year time span might unnecessarily.upset
our foreign sources.
C. Finally, any increase in resources programmed for a
declassification program means that CIA's primary
function of gathering intelligence will suffer since
these additional resources will undoubtedly come from
these areas.
ADDITIONAL FOINT
The CD-2 panel was also requested to consider that if
the time frame was to be reduced to 20 (or 25 years), could
the resulting backlog be completely reviewed in a 6 year time
frame? Or a. 10 year time frame?
ADDITIONAL CONCLUSION
The Agency not commit itself to a firm date when a
review of backlogged records would be completed. As shown
earlier, if the review time was to be reduced to 20 years,
the Agency would then find itself with a backlog of approxi-
mately 28,500,000 pages. To expect to review this material,
in addition to the material that would have to be reviewed
annually, in either a 6 or 10 year time frame would be
unthinkable. -It is estimated that it would require 500 to
600 people to review the material in a 6 year period and
350 to 450 for the 10 year span. Simply a luxury the Agency
could not afford. (And then there is the question of what
you would do with these people when the review ended?)
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The same would be true only to a lesser degree if a
25 year limit was chosen.
RECOMMENDATION II
That section 4 (C) of the current E.O. 11652 be retained
in its present language. (Concerns foreign material.)
RECOMMENDATION III
That section 5(E)(1) be expanded to include protection
for sources and methods as well as retaining the national.
security and the personal jeopardy provisions. Further
recommend that the definitions for these items not be made
more specific but remain in general terms.
RECOMMENDATION IV
Recommend that the Agency oppose any type of bulk
declassification moves. RRB has been exploring this possibility
and has yet to identify a single category where it is possible
to release material without some sort of review. The closest
thing yet identified was the FBIS material but even this had
to be reviewed first.
In?fact, recommend that the Agency go the opposite way
and seek categories that might be exempted from review since
they contain so much classified and sensitive material that
declassification review would be pointless. An example here
would be Agent 201 Files.
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CONCLUSION V
Take out the proposed section concerning the State
Department's Foreign. Relations series. This is a special
interest item which does not belong in an Executive Order
on Classification and Declassification.
RECOMMENDATION VI
Recommend that a statement be included that only permanent
records (as identified on approved record schedules) need be
reviewed., regardless of their age. Example: records that are
scheduled to be destroyed after 50 years would not be reviewed
since it has been determined that they are not permanent
records.
RECOMMENDATION VII
Recommend that a statement be included that working aids
which are merely copies of other records be exempt from
review. An example would be the filming of all cables within
the Agency which are then held for reference purposes. This
material should not be subject to review since it is merely
a reference aid and the original cables will be reviewed
when the files containing them are analyzed.
RECOMMENDATION VIII
Strong statement that one agency may not declassify
records that effect the functions of another until the
second agency has had an opportunity to review the documents.
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Example is the CIA information turning up in material
recently lassifi.ed by the Department of State.
RECOMMENDATION IX
Have the Director approve review guidelines and not
the lists of documents reviewed (325 forms). Experience
has already shown that this system is impractical since
the Director is usually presented a list of several thousand.
documents ar.d he really has no idea what he is signing.
Besides, the last list of material sent to the DCI's
office for signature has been over two months in processing
and has yet to be returned to RRB. Once the review program
is fully geared, and when one considers the volume, such a
time lag would be entirely unacceptable.
RECOI4MENDATION X
That the current section 9 of E.O. 11652 be retained as
written.
Also that section 8 of the current E.O. 11652 be expanded
to include a statement covering CIA and the 1.947 law requiring
protection of sources and methods.
RECOMMENDATION XI
That section VII of the National Security Council
Directive of 17 May 1972 be stricken. (Concerns data index
information on records reviewed.)
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To comply with this requirement, RRB has given ball park
estimates of between 50-1.00 million dollars. While some sort
of computer system will be required, believe this should be
left to the individual agencies.
RECOTIENDATION XII
That the National Archives be tasked with the responsi-
bility of ic'.entify:ing and marking duplicate copies of records
already reviewed by an Agency based in the results of a
previous review conducted by said Agency. This would apply,
of course, only to files already accessioned to NARS.
Example: During a recent visit to the Suitland Records
Center, a test produced the same CIA document in. 42 different
files. Personnel at Suitland further stated that had the
time and effort been. taken, the same document could probably
have been turned up an additional 40 to 50 times.
This proposal would task NARS with the responsibility
of identifying and acting upon any duplicate copies of
documents once the first initial copy has been reviewed and
its classification status determined. In other words, CIA
reviewers would review the first copy of a document encountered
and MARS would then be tasked with job of pulling and marking
any additional copies of the same document in accordance with
the Agency's review.
This would apply only to records already accessioned to
NARS and which are thereby controlled by NARS.
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