PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE CONCERNING NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00674R000300050002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 26, 1977
• Content Type: MF

DD/A Rog: ?.
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Office of. Security, DL`~A
nformation Services Staff, DDO
oli cy and Coordination Staff, DDO
pecial Assistant for Information, DDA
Information Systems Analysis Staff, DDA
Mr. Harry Eisen.beiss, Director of Central Reference, DDI
Special Assistant, DDS&T
Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT Proposed National Security Council Directive Concerning
National Security Information and I Iaterial
1. Attached are two proposals for implementing the Executive Order that is
to replace Executive Order No. 11652, The accompanying note to me from
participant on the group that drafted these directives, requests
any comments to be submitted to him by early November before the dir~E:ctiv? is
2. Some general comments about what should be included in such it
directive have already been submitted to me, and I am not requesting additional
remarks, especially regarding an implementing directive for an,Order that-has
not yet been finalized. However, if you wish me to transmit your comments to
Don for possible inclusion in the draft, I would be glad to do so when I make
suggestion., of lily own.
3. The "politics" of drafting which Don mentions refers to the difficulty
involved in making any changes in such directives even when they have been
circulated for official comment, as they shall be at a later date. I believe Don is
suggesting that we should attempt to make our changes now rather than later .
While I don't urge anyone to "burn the midnight oil" in order to respond, please
call me by Thursday, 3 November 1977, if you have any comments.
p cc: Acting Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
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DCI Security Committee
Attached for your information are recent
drafts of the NSC implementing directive for
the proposed E.O. on security classification.
The one labeled "draft" and dated 5 October
1977 is by Art Van Cook, Defense. The undated
one is by Bob Wells, ICRC. Wells' draft
essentially takes Van Cook's version and changes
it where Bob Wells believes such is necessary.
I find Wells' version much better (but note
that changes still need to be made to put it
into final shape). You may wish to circulate
Wells' draft for comment. Please advise me
reasonably soon (say by early November) of
comments received; earlier advice on comments
of major Community significance should be
provided as soon as received. I read the
"politics" of drafting this directive as pushing
us to use the maximum possible amount of Van
Cook's version and Wells' changes thereto.
INFORMATION
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 SIDNEY EPSTEIN, Executive Editor EDWIN M. YODER JR., Editorial Page Editor
PHILIP EVANS, BARBARA COHEN, Managing Editors
SUNDAY, JULY 2, 1978
Unsealing the `secrets'
What's in a government secret? Often very lit=
tie. The eminent British historian A.J.P. Taylor,
who is usually at war with his country's restric-
tive treatment of public documents, used to say
the Foreign Office has no secrets. He called it
Taylor's Law.
We shall see what secrets, if any, are sprung
betimes by President Carter's new executive
order relaxing and liberalizing the security
classification system. The new regulations may
bring on ' a deluge of junk that merely confirms
the applicability of Taylor's Law to U.S. affairs
as well.
One episode that reinforces that supposition
was the famous proceeding against major news-
papers publishing the so-called Pentagon
Papers. The government was challenged in
court to say specifically what secrets in that
study might compromise national security and
found itself embarrassed for reply. Yet their
publication caused a great hue and cry.
There are other kinds of controversies, for in-
stance the current court case involving Mr.
Frank Snepp's book on the CIA ' and the fall of
Saigon, that raise important but hardly crucial,
issues of secrecy.
So far as we can see, the Carter administra-
tion's plan for dismantling or at least diminish-
ing Washington's absurdly active classification
industry is intelligently conceived.
It would, to mention a few salient points:
? Reduce the number of officials who are au-
thorized to classify documents;
? Strip classification authority entirely, frgm
11 departments, agencies and commissions who
really sh ttl"fRtt WO914iSflsi-CIA
ness being entirely domestic;
? Require classifications in the name of
national security to be based on potential dam-
age that is "identifiable," not `vie and hypo-
thetical;
? Make possible the separate treatment of
various parts of a lengthy document, so that all
of it needn't be classified according to the most
sensitive sections;
? Shorten the classification period for many
documents;
? And, finally, make it easier to gain access
to a requested document by establishing a "bal-
ancing" test in'which the merits of continuing
classification must be weighed against the pub-
lic's interest in knowing what it contains.
Of course it's only at the fringes and margins
that classification rules matter at all. Most
classified documents are as void of interest as
they are inaccessible. Most controversies over
leaks and such are colorful but empty games
people play. And if the new rules indeed in-
crease the volume of declassification from 350 to
about 600 million pages during the next 10 years
- as a White House spokesman suggested they
could - there will be far more chaff in the wind.
to confuse as well as instruct. Rare are the dis-
closures that startle or change perspectives.
Which, we guess, is what Professor Taylor's law
suggests to begin with.
But the new regulations move in the right
direction. The public's right to know what its
government puts on paper ought to be pre-
sumed, except in rare cases 'where security and
diplomatic sensitivity are actually involved.
Often there is a contrary presumption: that gov-
g~t is just for the
insurance
against red faces.
That presumption is always out of order.
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 the
N a R Vqffid Fo j f j 1f : ClM?4 X000' jety Inc.
Science & Technology ? National Policy & Operations
REPLY TO:
13 October 1977
Mr. William M. Nichols
General Counsel
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20503
Dear Mr. Nichols:
We appreciate having the opportunity to provide comments on the draft of the forthcoming
Executive Order, National Security Information and Material.
Our Society has previously provided comments concerning the forthcoming Executive Order
- most recently relating to a draft of the Order which was prepared in July. At that time we
prepared a draft executive order which contained all of our Society's recommendations in
addition to our comments on the structure and substance or the draft order we were reviewing.
Since a number of points to which we will invite your attention are reflected in our draft order,
we provide a copy for your information. This draft was initially furnished to the National
Security Council and subsequently to the Executive Director of the ICRC and the Director of
Information Security, OSD.
There are, we believe, three major points of weakness within the forthcoming Executive
Order draft:
1. The lack of a mandatory requirement for original classifiers to prepare classification guides as
soon as practicable and not later than the initial funding, or implementation (if funding is not
required) of a program, plan, or project. We noted, of course, the duty specified in Section 7
(b)(6). This, however, is an agency function to be implemented as the agency desires. The Order
should direct original classifiers to prepare guides which identify that information which is to be
classified, at what level, and for how long. Mandatory classification guides, widely distributed
and periodically reviewed and updated, are the most effective means of insuring cons`ster.t and
appropriate classifications; of insuring rapid and timely downgrading and declassification (to
include the ultimate elimination of the need for declassification guidelines); and for insuring that
the identity of the original classifier is recorded. We recognize that there should be a provision
for exceptions to this requirement if adequately documented and approved by competent
authority.
2. We have recommended and continue to support the philosophy that the Security Information
Oversight Office should be an office exercising Presidential authority. The Oversight Office,
supervising and enforcing the desires of the President in these matters, and the policy responsi-
bilities of the National Security Advisor to the President, should be placed on a level equal to or
higher than that of the agencies responsible for implementing the National Security Program.
One must remember that Freedom of Information, the Right to Privacy, and National Security
are of equal and paramount importance to all citizens. These items must be constantly weighed,
one against the other and will, of course, at times be conflicting - senior authority will be needed
in cases of dispute.
3. The Executive Order should, to the degree and extent possible, contain such words as are
necessary to insure that its provisions are equally and uniformly applied to all users/holders of
National Security Information whether they are within the Executive Branch or in the Industrial
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community. The draft under review lacks this direction. This can, and no doubt will, result in
imprecise and conflicting implementing directives. This potential, based on experience, is of grave
concern to the industrial and academic communities which handle vast quantities of classified
information. We wish to eliminate the do as / say, not as / do syndrome that has remained all
too prevalent in the implementation of prior Executive Orders.
Although it may appear, albeit superficially, that most of our prior recommendations are
included in the draft at hand, let us hasten to assure you that the permissiveness, the vagaries of
language, and the imprecision of definition and expression of the proposed Order have greatly
weakened or destroyed many of our recommendations. In contacts with other agencies we find
that they too have difficulties with the language and semantics of the proposed Order. We find
also conflicting opinions on the same items, frequently because of interpretations. On an allied
point, there needs to be remembered that a "goodness of fit" is important among this Order and
the forthcoming revisions to EO 11905 and EO 10450. We have stated our major objections. We
enclose a list of points which we believe are worthy of your consideration. We do not repeat in
detail our rationale for these points as it is already contained in our enclosed draft.
Again, we appreciate this opportunity to express the views of the National Classification
Management Society and offer whatever further comments or views you may find contributory.
As a Society and as individual citizens, we consider the efforts underway of significance to the
defense of the nation and to providing a proper flow of information to the public.
Respectfully yours,
Attachment and Enclosure
Copy to:
James A. Buckland
"resident
Chairman, ICRC; Departments of State, Defense, Justice; ERDA; CIA; Mr. Robert Gates, NSC
(with attachment but not enclosure)
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POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR CHANGE
NOTE: Page and section identification refers to your draft of 13 September 1977 Citations of page and section
within a comment refer to the enclosed draft executive order prepared by the Society.
1. Page 7, Section 2c.: This section should include a prohibition relating to the classification status of officially
released information (page 5, subsection (5)).
2. Pages 8.10, Section 2 (d): This subsection lacks the clarity and the conciseness of definition so necessary for the
proper interpretation of its meaning (pages 6, 6a, and 7).
3, Pages 11/12, Section 2 (f): As stated in our covering letter and pages 8 and 8a of the enclosure, we believe that
the failure of the draft order to make mandatory the preparation of classification guides is the most serious
deficiency. Our Society's members through surveys, at seminars, at schools, and during training sessions have
consistently indicated that lack of current, concise classification guidance is their major problem. The ERDA, of
course (continuing from the predecessor AEC) has issued detailed guidance since the inception of the Atomic
Energy Act with singular success. More recently to be commended is the Department of Defense for establishing its
Index of Security Classification Guides along with the Department of Navy for its more advanced "RANK/N"
system for indexing and changing classification guides. Such actions are considered major steps forward in the
control of National Security Information.
4. Page 12, Section 2 (g): The "Identification of the original classification authority" is, at best, elusive if not
evasive. This identification requirement could be eliminated if mandatory classification guides were required (Pages 9
and 9a).
5. Page 15, Section 4 (a): This subsection should, in the last sentence, make the "guidelines" available to all
holders of the material concerned.
6. Page 21-22, Section 5: The need to notify individual holders of material being downgraded should not be
required when the action results from published guidance (page 11, Subsection (b)).
7. Page 22, Section 6: This section, in one of its subsections, should require the uniform application of the
provisions of the Order - as stated in our covering letter. "Dual standards" exist between agencies of the Executive
Branch and organizations in the "industrial community" and these are unconscionable. It goes almost without
saying that the diverse approaches of the Legislative and Judical Branches give concern.
8. Pages 25/26, Section 6 (e): This subsection should be eliminated. These instructions, if required, should, more
appropriately, be placed in implementing directives. However, should they be retained in the Order they must be
clarified and s:m7'ificd. It is of interest to note that the Society's U rectors cou'd not reac'i a uniform, interpre-
tation of this subsection.
9. Page 26, Section 7: As stated within our covering letter, the placement and authority of the Security
Information Oversight, Office is considered of paramount importance.
10. Page 28,- Section 7 (b)(1): We believe that agencies should "submit for review" rather than submit for approval.
We suggest, however, that the words "submit for review and determination of consistency. . ." would make clear
that the uniform application of the principles of the Order is required (page 17, subsection (b)(1)).
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