S. 2284 - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OF 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00101R000100010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 22, 1980
• Content Type: MF

On file USAID release instructions apply
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2 2 FEB 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Special. Assistant to the General Counsel
Deputy Chief, n ormation Services Staff, DDA
S. 2284 - National Intelligence Act of 1980
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum., Same Subject, dated 12 February 1980
1. In addition to agreeing to the "comments and issues paper"
of the Charter Working Group attached to reference, we forwarded
reference to the DDA Offices for their comments.
2. The Offices of Finance and Training have no additional
comments. The Offices of Communications, Logistics, and Security
have forwarded their comments to you directly. The Office of Data
Processing has no additional comments other than to reinforce their
comments expressed in their memorandum to you dated 14 December 1979
(copy attached).
STAT
DC/ISS: es (22 Feb 80)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att
1 - ISS Subj w/o att
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Communications
}. Director of
S. 2284 - National Intel Iigence Act of 1)80
Director of Data
Processing
i:onnarded herewith is a
ropy of S. 2284,., the "charter"
hill recently introduced by the
SSCI. Also attached is an UGC
report on the bill and seven
"tissues papers" regarding items
that have not been rc,:,O.Ivcd
within the intelligence collunu-.
pity.
I Haan forwarding this
material for your review and any
comments you may wish to forward
to O(;C. As you will note,
Atjnirnnl Turner is tentatively
scheduled to testify 28 February,
'Therefore, any comments or
changes which need to he made
should be in OfC t s hands by
21 Fobruaxy. if you wish
I will
,
be happy to collate DDA connents~ T
However you many wish to 3
histribution:
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1 - Each other arise w/pat is
1S `nth; c ct Watts
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directly to Cyr.
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USE ONLY
lydc (14 Feb 'so)
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 ^NNI VC'.A I vI I~c~caac wvvI'J IS . vII IwI aiv-vv I I I xwww I www Iwww~-
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ISS Registry
12 February 1980
SUBJECT: S. 2284 - National Intelligence Act
of 1980
1. Attached for your information is a copy of the
subject bill which was introduced by the SSCI on
8 February 1980. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum
from the General Counsel to David Aaron which forwards
a Charter Working Group report on S. 2284 and seven
"issues papers" on issues that have not yet been resolved
within the Administration.
2. Hearings are scheduled to begin on 21 February
1980 with the DCI tentatively scheduled to appear on
28 February. I will be in touch if any specific questions
arise about matters that will be covered in the DCI's
statement.
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Office of General Counsel
12 February 1980
NEfORkNDUM FOR: David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
FROM:_ Daniel B. Silver
Chairman, Intelligence Charter Working Group
SUBJECT: Intelligence Charter Package
1. Attached are two documents:
a. A report of the Intelligence Charter Working
Group. This report lists the significant differences
between the SSCI bill and what the Working Croup would
recommend be the Administration position. In addition,
it sets forth a number of issues within the Executive
Branch that require Presidential resolution.
b. A memorandum from the Director of Central
Intelligence to the President relating to the DCI's
proposed presentation of-the Administration position on
the SSCI bill. It would seem appropriate to present
this memorandum to the President at the same time as
the Working Group report.
2. It would be desirable to have a definitive Administration
position on the points and issues set forth in the Working
Group report prior to the opening of hearings on the SSCI
bill. Discussions with the SSCI staff suggest that questioning
of the Administration witnesses will go beyond the ostensible
general purposes of the opening days of hearings next week.
STAT
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WORKING GROUP REPORT
On February 8, 1980 Senators Huddleston, Bayh, Mathias
and Goldwater, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI), introduced a new comprehensive intelli-
gence Charter bill, "The National Intelligence Act of 1980."
Although the bill was not introduced as a joint Administration-
SSCI product, in very large measure it reflects compromises
and agreements reached between the SSCI staff and the-Intelli-
gence Charter Vlor-king Group (represented by its chairman).
The purpose of this report is to list what appear to
the Working Group to be significant differences between the
bill and the draft the Working Group would have recommended.
A list of the key issues is"'set out in Section A, together
with the Working Group's recommendations. If the President
approves the Working Group recommendations, these points
will be transmitted to the SSCI as Administration positions,
and the Administration will seek appropriate modification of
the bill in the course of the legislative process.
In
addition,,a small number of points are still
the
subject
of
disagreement within the Executive Branch.
These
points
are
set forth in Section B of this report for
resolu-
tion by
the
President. An issue paper on each of the
issues
within
the
Executive Branch is attached at Tab A.
The discussions between the Working Group Chairman and
the SSCI staff have been fast-moving in recent weeks. while
the Working Group members have been kept fully informed of
the evolution of the agreed provisions found in the SSCI
bill, there has not been an opportunity for review of the
draft by the Special Coordination Committee of the NSC. Nor
has there been time for a thorough review of the draft in
the light of last-minute compromises reached in order to
reduce the number of issues requiring Presidential resolution.
Consequently, even after determination of the Administration
position on the issues presented in this report, a certain
number of changes, largely technical in nature, may have to
be made in the course of the legislative process. It is not
anticipated that these changes would require further decisions
by the President or that they would give rise to major
disputes between the SSCI and the Administration.
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 A. REI?LApNINGdDIFREIRENCES3B4/~?-,'GI~4 ~~86A~?1~1NF~'0101i@2-1
AND _I `THE SSCI
Set forth below are a series of points on which the
Working Group feels that ,the Administration should take
exception to.provisions of the SSCI bill.
1. Prior Reporting to Congress of Special Activities
The bill requires (section 142) that the two congressional
intelligence committees be kept "fully and currently informed"
of all intelligence activities, including "any significant
anticipated intelligence activities." It also provides
(section 125) that each high-risk special activity and each
category of lower-risk special activity covered by a Presidential
finding shall be considered a "significant anticipated
intelligence activity," thus requiring prior notice, except
that for a period of forty-eight hours such prior notice may
be limited to the chairmen and ranking minority members of
the two oversight committees and the majority and minority
leaders of the two Houses of Congress.
The Working Group recommends that the Administration
take a firm position against any prior reporting requirement
for special activities. The Working Group recommends that
any accommodation 'of the congressional desire for prior
notification of certain categories of major or long-term
special activities be accomplished through legislative
history and not through statutory language. The concepts of
timely notification and the obligation to keep the committees
"currently" informed should suffice to ensure that prompt
notice of significant activities (ordinarily before the
event) is given while retaining necessary Presidential
flexibility to preserve security in exigent circumstances,
especially when human lives are at stake.
2. Prior Reporting of Other Significant Intelligence
Activities
As the bill is formulated, it would require prior
reporting to the two intelligence committees of significant
anticipated intelligence collection activities, in addition
to special activities. This requirement, while found in
Executive Order 12036, is not at present embodied in statutory
law. The Working Group recommends that the Administration
position be opposed to the inclusion of such a provision
in the Charter bill, even were some form of prior reporting
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 to be a e ved of slew ng~0 /104L 5~_Iq4 ~s$6-00M1 OQ~1-Q0Q10A9~-1igence
collection is a vital aspect of the President's exercise of
his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and
protection of the national security. In contrast to special
activities, intelligence collection is more clearly within .
the ambit of exclusive Executive Branch authority. Further-
more, a statutory requirement to report sensitive collection
activities in advance to the oversight committees would
significantly restrict the flexibility now available to the
President with regard to the collection of intelligence. It
is, in our view, unnecessary to appropriate oversight, given
the extensive oversight powers elsewhere provided to the two
intelligence committees. As with special activities, a
requirement to keep the Congress fully and currently informed
would suffice without excessively impairing flexibility.
3. Absence of Intelligence Source and Method Protection
in the Oversight Process
The bill does not include in the congressional oversight
section (section 142) a key phrase that the Working Group
considers it essential to insert as a condition to the .
Executive Branch's obligation to keep the oversight committees
informed. This is that such obligation should be "consistent
with all applicable authority and duties, including those
conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches and law to protect sources and methods."
The underlined words are not included in the SSCI bill. The
function of this phrase is to provide authority for withholding
from the oversight committees extremely sensitive information,
such as the true identities of agents or information furnished
by foreign liaison services who do not wish it shared with
the Legislative Branch of our government. Without a clear
statutory basis for protecting such information, the ability
of the intelligence agencies to deal with sources and foreign
governments would be impaired. The information in question
is not of the kind required for proper oversight. Moreover,
the phrase at issue is included in section 3-4 of E.O.
12036. Failure to include it in the Charter bill, therefore,
would be a retreat for the Executive Branch from present
oversight arrangements.
STAT
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wartime Waiver
The SSCI bill contains no general provision permitting
ies
the President to waive restrictions limielwaretime activities
nt
in time of war, although there
provision with respect to the prohibition on cover use of
certain institutions. The }loclu sroGrouparecommends that the
Administration support the 1
waiver provision to read as follows:
"(a) The'President may waive any or all of the
restrictions on intelligence activities set forth in
this Act during any p
(1) in which the United States is engaged in
war declared by Act of Congress; or
(2) covered by a report from the President
to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution, 87
Stat. 555, to the extent necessary to caarry out the
activity that is the subject of the rep
(b) When the President utilizes the waiver
authority under this section, the President shall
of Committee
notify the Permanen presentatives Committee
of the House e of o# P
on Intelligence of the Senate in a timely manner and
inform those coru-nittees of the facts and circumstances
requiring the waiver."
Although considerably improved over S. 2525, the SSCI bill
still contains a variety f restrictionfs
both procedural and subs
TAT
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be anticipated or fully understood. n time o ar, restrictions and procedures may prove to impede necessary
action, forcing the President to choose between danger to
the national security and deliberate violation of the law.
The limited waiver proposed by the Working Group would deal
with these exigent circumstances, While at the same time
preventing any potential abuse by requiring notification to
the two oversight committees.
6. FOIA Amendment
The SSCI bill provides (section 421(d)) an exemption
from the Freedom of Information Act for certain CIA opera-
tional and technical files-, except in the case of "first
person" requests by United States persons. This provision,
while acceptable to CIA, fails to provide any relief for the
NSA and other Intelligence Community components that also
have confronted serious problems under the FOIA. The Working
Group prefers the formulation proposed by the Director of
Central Intelligence, under-,which the DCI. would be empowered
to designate operational and technical files not only within
the CIA but in any component of the Intelligence Community,
and thereby exempt such files from the FOIA except in the
case of first person requests. Language for this purpose is
set forth at Tab B. The Working Group recommends that the
Administration support modification of the SSCI bill to'
accomplish this broader FOIA relief.
7. Protection of Identities
-The SSCI bill contains a provision establishing criminal
penalties for disclosure of the identity of an undercover
intelligence officer or agent (Title VII) . The provision,
however, would apply only to a person who had authorized
access to classified information and would not cover aiders,
abettors, accomplices or conspirators who knowingly assisted
in the commission of the offense. The Working Group
considers this provision inadequate and recommends that the
Administration support a more extensive provision. There is
disagreement, however, between CIA and the Department of
Justice as to the scope of the substitute provision the
Administration should support. An issue paper on this point
is included in Tab A. The Working Group proposes that the
Administration advance whichever of the alternate formula-
tions is chosen by the President.
8. Foreign Intell~_e~nce_ Surveillance Act
The SSCI bill contains amendments to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (FISA) for purposes of including
physical searches in its scope. The Working Group feels that
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 Alp~pr9vreqtE?D~elg3/p4JJ5 SCQI_~8fe0Qb?tF(iIIb4O0~QUOQ2i Ppo s a 1
the Admi s
dealing with the FISA without at the same time taking account
of significant inadequacies in the FISA that have become
apparent since.its enactment. The changes required to
-
remedy these problems are:
a. Modification of the targeting standards to
permit targeting of dual nationals who occupy senior
positions in the government or military forces of
foreign governments, while at the same time retaining
United States citizenship. Frequently the activity-of
such persons when they visit the United States on
official business is not such as to bring them under
the quasi-criminal targeting standard now found in the
FISA.
b. 1'5odification of the targeting standards to
permit targeting of former senior foreign government
officials even if they: are not acting in the United
States as members of a-foreign government or faction.
Again, this problem was not anticipated at the time the
FISA was passed, but various situations have arisen in
which it is clear that a former foreign government
official (such as a deposed head of state) who is
present in the United States may have significant
foreign intelligence information. Under present law
such an official can be targeted only if a member of a
'foreign faction or government.
c. Clarification of the FISA to make it clear
that the Attorney General, in authorizing the limited
category of surveillances not subject to court order,
has the same power as the court to authorize non-
consensual entry of premises to effectuate the surveil-
lance.
d. Extension of the emergency surveillance period
from twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Recent experience
indicates that the twenty-four-hour period is inadequate,
leading to the necessity of delaying implementation of
emergency surveillances.
A classified memorandum from the National Security Agency
setting forth reasons for these changes to the FISA is
attached at Tab C.
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 B. DIFFERENCES REQUIRING RESOLUTION \'ITHIN THE EXECUTIVE
Attached at Tab A are seven issues papers describing
issues that require resolution by the President and as to
which there is not unanimity among the departments and
agencies represented on the Working Group. These issues
are:
1. Should the provisions imposing criminal penalties
for unauthorized disclosure of identities of intelligence"
personnel follow the Justice Department or the CIA version.
.2. Should positive foreign intelligence collection
directed- against United States persons by extraordinary
techniques be authorized only if the court finds that the
intelligence sought is "significant" foreign intelligence.
3. Should CIA and NSA employees serving overseas
receive benefits comparable to State Department employees.
4. Should NSA overseas employees be provided special
retirement benefits equivalent to the CIA retirement system.
5. Should the Intelligence Oversight Board be given
express authority to review the internal practices, pro-
cedures and guidelines of the intelligence agencies.
6. Should the bill contain a requirement that entity
heads report to the Intelligence Oversight Board intelli-
gence matters specified by the President.
7. Should the Central Intelligence Agency have statutory
authority to obtain data collected by other entities of the
Intelligence Community, including data obtained by technical
collection systems, for purposes of processing and analysis.
In closing, it should be again emphasized that this
report and the agreed portions of the SSCI bill have under-
gone numerous last-minute changes. Consequently, there may
be further issues internal to the Executive Branch or between
the Administration and the SSCI. In addition, there is the
unavoidable risk that compromises reached under some time
pressure will appear unacceptable to the parties upon later
reflection.
General Counsel, CIA
L Chairman, Intelligence Charter
Working Group
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STAT
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Issue 1: Should the provisions imposing criminal penalties
for unauthorized disclosure of identities of intelligence
personnel follow the Justice Department or the CIA version.
There is agreement among the Working Group that the
Charter should contain criminal provisions for the unautho-
rized disclosure of the identities of undercover intelligence
personnel. The version contained in the SSCI bill would
cover only disclosures made by present or former employees
of the United States Government or other persons having
authorized access to classified information and would not
apply to persons who are accomplices or co-conspirators with
such government employees in bringing about the unauthorized
disclosures. The Working Group is of the opinion that the
Charter provisions should go farther. There is, however,
disagreement between the Justice Department and the CIA as
to the nature of the proposal that should be made. The
Justice Department has proposed a bill for this purpose, a
copy of which is attached. The CIA prefers the bill intro-
duced by the fourteen Members of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (H.R. 5615), but with the addition
of certain portions of the proposed Justice Department bill.
The CIA version also is attached.
Justice Department Position:
The Department of Justice supports new legislation to
penalize the unauthorized disclosure of information that
identifies covert intelligence agents. The Justice Department
also believes, however, that such legislation must be effective
in order to achieve those purposes. The criminal provision
proposed by CIA for inclusion in the intelligence Charter
legislation will not, in the opinion of the Justice Department,
be effective and raises serious constitutional as well as
enforcement and prosecution difficulties. An alternative
provision has been proposed by Justice and approved personally
by the Attorney General. Justice believes this alternative
minimizes potential difficulties and provides a meaningful
deterrent and prosecutive basis for harmful disclosures.
Accordingly, the Justice Department's alternative should be
the version included in the Charter legislation that is
endorsed by the President.
The Justice Department version provides criminal penalties
in a variety of situations and covers both employees and
non-employees. It would be a crime under that proposal for
any present or former government employee who has ever had
access as such an employee to information concerning identities
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of covert agents to disclose such information to any unautho-
rized person whether or not the disclosure is based on
official sources, pure speculation, or publicly available
information. This provision in combination with the general
federal conspiracy and accomplice statutes would also provide
a basis for prosecution in appropriate cases of private
persons or publishers acting in concert with former employees
who make unauthorized disclosures.
In addition, the Justice Department's bill would provide
a criminal penalty for any person, whether or not a present
or former government employee, who discloses information
identifying covert agents when such disclosure is based on
classified information.
The Justice Department proposal would minimize the
constitutional difficulties inherent in the CIA version
which would, in addition to-persons covered under the Justice
Department proposal, authorize prosecution of any private
citizen who, without any collaboration with a government
employee or any access to classified information, discloses
publicly available information that relates to the identities
of covert agents. The Justice Department provision does not
require, as does the CIA version, that the disclosure be
made with an intent to impair or impede U.S. foreign intelli-
gence activities. Inclusion of this requirement will make
prosecution excessively difficult and is likely to present
serious evidentiary and "graymail" problems, problems that
are minimized in the Justice approach.
CIA Position:
CIA believes that the Administration should support the
identities provision included in the attached CIA draft,
which incorporates the terms of H.R. 5615, the identities
bill co-sponsored by all the Members of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), and also incorporates
the principal provision of the attached Justice Department
bill. The difference between the two versions is that the
CIA version would permit prosecution of a person who did not
have authorized access to classified information, but who
discovered the identity of an undercover U.S. intelligence
officer or agent through any of a variety of means, including
leaks or physical surveillance. This category would include
those who are doing the greatest damage at present and who
we believe, but could not prove in a court of law, are in
collaboration with renegade former U.S. Government employees.
Constitutional objections to prosecution without proof that
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the disclosure was based on classified information are fully
overcome by a specific intent requirement under which the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
perpetrator acted for the purpose of impairing or impeding
U.S. intelligence activities. It is the CIA's view that no
respectable journalist could have any reason to fear prosecution
under such a statute.
The plain fact is that any statute dealing with the
disclosure of identities necessarily raises constitutional
questions, since it purports to regulate a form of speech.
The real issue is whether this kind of speech can be regulated
because its serious threat to important social issues outweighs
its social utility. We think that the answer to this question
was well stated by the Attorney General in his recent lecture
at Columbia Law School:
The existing law provides inadequate protection to the
men and women who serve our nation as intelligence
officers. They need --and deserve -- better protection
against those who would intentionally disclose their
secret.mission and jeopardize their personal safety by
disclosing their identities. Public comment and criticism
of intelligence activities and specific operations is
proper. Revealing the identities of particular intelli-
gence personnel and placing them in danger, on the
other hand, serves no legitimate purpose. Our proper
concern for individual liberties must be balanced with
a concern for the safety of those who serve the nation
in difficult times and under dangerous conditions.
If one accepts that this pernicious activity requires
criminal regulation, it is imperative that any new legislation
enacted be capable of application to the known present
perpetrators of these disclosures. Given investigative
constraints which preclude most means of discovering and
proving connections between those who publish lists of
undercover CIA officers and their suspected sources of this
information, the HPSCI formulation seems to provide the only.
possibility under which such individuals could be prosecuted
based on their own public activities and expressed intentions.
.The Department of Defense supports the CIA position.
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 APPENDIX -DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BILL
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To a?Obibit the disclosure of :inf or.-,alien identi=';j'_n-
certa_n 1'?C=JiG7':a~ S c-rgaoed or assi n~ ! n fcren
e? I e:1ce
That,
o the United States o'' ~i:+eri ca in Con= ess asse :"bled
this Act ...,y be c_-Lad as the 't^orei;n Intelliu;e?ice identities
?rctecticn Act. rt
S':ATE.:ENT C F_N ?INJS
activities o~ the United St es.
en=cted -'by the Senate _':d - .:'-:se of -7'ecresen. at--es
Sec. 2. The Congress hereby ,_'ces the 'ol-c:q-r, I in nss:
(a) S~ic~e sful and cC c ent_y ,cc ~~~~~ted `'c. e _yn
of the United States.
~b) Successful and efficient foreign inter;sence
activities depend in large part upon conc ea :.:e;'.t of re-
I s bet:oeen ccinponents of t;.e ited S tales
e ^lcjeeS
c ar:.'y out
those activities and certain
The disclosure of s.rch r elatiG.'-s::'^s to u.: _uthoi -zed
{S detr'?:,enta_ to the sicccss_ful and eff_c,_nt
?? y +
4 -frrel-Sn arid
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(d) Individuals who have a concealed relationship with
foreign intelligence components of the United States government
ay ne exposed to -phi sisal danger if their identities ar e
disclosed to unauthorized persons.
Scc. 3. Title 181 United States Code is aTended by
add no the following new chapter: -
_ r - -
"Chaote. 3S--DISCLCSU~E Or
C~ AIN ' i 1"- - r
. GAG EO OR r SSIS T._. G IN FOREIGN 11'4',~T ~! CE:]CE
r, T~Sll
-
AC, ~V_
Section 9-00. Def _ni tt,ions . ~s used i1 this l'. ar
"Discloses" means to co--, unicate, provide,
art trc:is-.I.i t='ons' er, _convey, ouol sn, Or Oierliise
.: e aii;:_za?e to any una'-1thor'_ ed person.
(o)j ."urauthorized" _,ea' s without authority,
rIjr t~ or : erm'ssion purs'._ont to the 'provisions of a statute
or Executive Order cchcerning access to national security
the cirection of the head of any c'e:;art:iaent or
r - e 1 -
=-..i foreign inte_li.~-_rce act'vizs, t:;a order
.,
of a of any United Stars court, or a r.~so'~strcn of
1 - I
t tiii'? ted States Senate or House of e :'eSCntati':tiS which
SS'z".S r?_spons=Clity for he oversight C: ~']tel ; i - nce
lc) .sled. a+ _nt" '; earls any - -sent or ~~?'= o ,
-:ee cr source of an
ILLEGIB
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 4+ - 3 '
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:.e-be_ of t -e Armed -rces assi fined to duty with an intel114ence
agency (i) :r.^ose present, or f or_i.er r elattionsnip 'r..- ti [1 the
_ntelIii-nce agency is protected by the a
cover or as identity, or, in the' case of a source, iS
protected by the use of _ a c i Doestine deans of co.:r un_cation
or nee ink to conceal tie =elab=c snp and (i ) who is
Sci ? _2 the li!?'te~ States or has 4 t-h_n7 -ie -s t
~'__'~ o ~S
five years served outside the United States.
(d) -"Tntel i ig2 ,ee at-enC jrt .:.e '?S `-e f ;_- ~--?2l
;nte1 c-nce P envy or any -:ore _gn' inte11'nce cow z?onent`. of
the Dc ar t; ens of Defense.
L ? v v
-t at nos been de t t=r_:,i _ec by t.e v^ t
e States
',ove _.~ent 'aant tt.o an eY,ecut='e o_" e , sta~ilte, or
at=071 LO` _ =ou i e 7rotect_on a i :st u . U Cr 'iced
ti -
^'_S:'=CSure -for reasons of national S?cur_ty.
C~'=ssif i e`I infor latlOn" nears any infor a%_on
Disclosure of Intelligence
: hoover tngly c_sclcses
co - _., .y - "?t.._'? _s a'!Ct:?rr person =s a. cavort
at such disclosure is based on c__-~ssi f ied
Infc.'.'._.. n,
or attc^_,tts to do so,
- s aui l tty of -gin of f=nse.
? J lor'e' t`, an .e- , O or
a n :?-n -:=ar s, ^.? -o.il.
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 4 _
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(c) There Is Jurisdiction over an offense under
this section co.T~nitted -outside the United States, if the
individual co. -i fitting the offense is a citizen of the United States
or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for
ce= =anent residence.
Section. 802 .
Disclosure-of Intelligence Identities by
Government Employees.
Whoever, being or having been an ci-,,uloyee. of
the United States govern::ient '.Jitth access to infor_I.ation
revealing the identities of covert agents, kncwingly d'sclcses
infor.-at ion. that correctly identifies anctner person as a
covert agent, or ztte.apts to do so, is guilty of an offense.
(b) An offense 'under this section is punishable
by a fine of not more than $25,000 or' imprisonment for not:
more than five years, or both.
(c) There is jurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed outside the United States if the
indiv'd,;al committing the offense is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United~Stztes
for oeranent residence.
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CIA PROPOSAL
Unauthorized disclosure of information
identifying certain individuals engaged
or assisting in intelligence activities.
(a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access to
classified information that--
"(1) identifies as an officer or employee of an
intelligence agency, or as a member of the Armed Forces
assigned to duty with an intelligence agency, any
individual (A) who in fact is or has been such an
officer, employee, or member, (B) whose identity as
such an officer, employee, or member is classified
information; or
"(2) identifies as being or having been an agent
of, or informant or source of operational assistance
to, an intelligence agency any individual (A) who in
fact is or has been such an agent, informant, or source,
and (B) whose identity as such an agent, informant, or
source is classified information, intentionally discloses
to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information any information that identifies an individual
described in paragraph (1) or (2) as such an officer,
employee, or'member or as such an agent, informant, or
source, knowing or having reason to know that the
information disclosed so identifies such individual and
that the United States is taking affirmative measures
to conceal such individual's intelligence relationship
to the-United States, shall be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
"(b) Whoever with the intent to impair or impede the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States discloses
to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information any information that--
"(1) identifies as an officer or employee of an
intelligence agency, or as a member of the Armed Forces
assigned to duty with an intelligence agency, any
individual (A) who in fact is or has been such an
officer, employee, or member, (B) whose identity as
such an officer, employee, or member is classified
information; or
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..
"(2) identifies as being or having been an agent
of,
or
informant or source of operational assistance
to,
an
intelligence agency any individual (A) who in
fact
is
or has been such an agent, informant, or source,
and
(B)
whose identity as such an agent, informant, or
source is classified information,
knowing or having reason to know that the information disclosed
so identifies such individual and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be.
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
(c) Whoever discloses to any individual not authorized
to receive classified information any information that--
(1) identifies as an officer or employee of an
intelligence agency, or as a member of the Armed Forces
assigned to duty with an intelligence agency, any
individual (A) who in fact is or has been such an
officer, employee, or member, (B) whose identity as
such an officer, employee, or member is classified
information; or
(2) identifies as being or having been an agent
of,
or
informant or source of operational assistance
to,
an
intelligence agency any individual (A) who in
fact
is
or has been such an agent, informant, or source,
and
(B)
whose identity as such an agent, informant, or
source is classified information,
knowing or having reason to know that the information disclosed
so identifies such individual, is based upon classified
information, and that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such individual's intelligence relationship
to the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(d) It is a defense to a prosecution under section 501
that before the commission of the offense with which the
defendant is charged, the United States had publicly acknowledged
or revealed the intelligence relationship to the United
States of the individual the disclosure of whose intelligence
relationship to the United States is the basis for the
prosecution.
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(e) No person shall be subject to prosecution under
subsection (b) by virtue of section 2 or 3 of title 18,
United States Code, or shall be subject to prosecution for
conspiracy to commit an offense under such subsection unless
that person has acted with the intent to impair or impede
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
(f) In any prosecution under section 501(b), proof of
intentional disclosure of information described in such
section, or inferences derived from proof of such disclosure,
shall not alone constitute proof of intent to impair or
impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States.
(g) It shall not be an offense under section 501 to
transmit information described in such section directly to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(h) There is jurisdiction over an offense under section
501 committed outside the United States if the individual
committing the offense is a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence (as defined in section 101(a) (20) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act).
(i) Nothing-in this title shall be construed as authority
to withhold information from Congress or from a committee of
either House of Congress.
(j) For the purposes of this title:
"(1) The term 'classified information' means
information or material designated and clearly marked
or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a
statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order
issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as
requiring a specific degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
"(2) The term 'authorized', when used with respect
to access to classified information, means having
authority, right, or permission pursuant to the provisions
of a statute, Executive order, directive of the head of
any department or agency engaged in foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence activities, order of a United
States district court, or provisions of any Rule of the
House of Representatives or resolution of the Senate
which assigns responsibility within the respective
House of Congress for the oversight of intelligence
activities.
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"(3) The term 'disclose' means to communicate,
provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish,
or otherwise make available.
"(4) The term 'intelligence agency' means the
Central Intelligence Agency or any intelligence component
of the Department of Defense.
"(5) The term 'informant' means any individual.
who furnishes or has furnished information to an intelligence
agency in the course of a confidential relationship
protecting the identity of such individual from public
disclosure.
"(6) The terms 'agent', 'informant', and 'source
of operational assistance' do not include individuals
who are citizens of the United States residing within
the United States.
"(7) The terms 'officer' and 'employee' have the
meanings given such terms by sections 2104 and 2105,
respectively, of title 5, United States Code.
"(8) The term 'Armed Forces' means the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
"(9) The term 'United States', when used in a
geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands.".
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Issue 2: Should positive foreign intelligence collection
directed against United States persons by extraordinary
techniques be_ authorized only if the court finds that the
intelligence sought is "significant" foreign intelligence.
Section 221(c) of the SSCI bill permits the special
surveillance court to authorize the use of extraordinary
techniques (foreign electronic surveillance and foreign
physical search) to be directed at a United States person
for the purpose of positive foreign intelligence collection
if the court finds that "the information sought is foreign
intelligence." This provision is acceptable to all of the
departments and agencies except the State Department. The
State Department wishes to raise the standard so as to
require the court to find that the intelligence sought is
significant foreign intelligence.
State Department Position:
The Department of State believes the word "significant"
should be inserted before the words "foreign intelligence".
This would require that, before the court approves the use
of extraordinary techniques outside the United States to
gather foreign intelligence from a United States person, the
court must find that the information sought is "significant
foreign intelligence," not merely "foreign intelligence."
State Department recognizes that, under ?213 (b) (1) , the
President must make a finding that the foreign intelligence
is essential to the national security, so there is already a
substantial degree of protection. However, the suggested
change gives the court increased responsibility to review
the government's application for a warrant, thereby giving
greater protection against the possibility that the term
"foreign intelligence" will be overbroadly interpreted in
the future. It will also establish the same standard for
review by the court in foreign intelligence as in counter-
intelligence and counterterrorism, ?221(d)(1).
Working Group Position:
There is no reason to change this language, which has
been accepted by the SSCI. Positive foreign intelligence
collection against United States persons cannot be approved
by the court unless the Attorney General certifies that an
appropriate finding was made by the President or the President's
designee. Depending on the type of United States person
involved, ?213 requires a finding by the President that the
intelligence is essential to the national security or by
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the President's designee that it is important to the national
security. These present safeguards render superfluous a
requirement that the court find the intelligence to be
"significant." Moreover, the change sought by the State
Department in effect would invite the court to second-guess
the determination made by the President or his designee.
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Issue 3:_ Should CIA and NSA employees serving 0 erseas
receive benefits comparable to State Department employees.
Several sections of the SSCI bill would have the effect
of equalizing benefits for CIA and NSA employees serving
overseas with those of Foreign Service employees. OMB
wishes to have these provisions deleted.
STAT
OMB Position:
The SSCI bill would provide to CIA and NSA employees
the same allowances and benefits provided under legislation
for Foreign Service employees, this legislation having
traditionally provided the most liberal set of allowances
provided to any group of federal employees. In certain
cases enhancements to Foreign Service benefits and allowances
have been enacted over strong Administration opposition.
While in certain ways they are similar, the Foreign
Service, CIA and NSA are sufficiently different in operations
and types of activities to warrant determination of merit
for benefits and allowances on an individual basis. Further,
automatic extension of the liberal Foreign Service benefits
to CIA and NSA employees would simply serve to accentuate
the inequities which exist between these employees and the
vast majority of federal civilian employees overseas, primarily
those involved in.DoD non-intelligence activities, who do
not receive such liberal benefits. The direct costs of this
provision under current Foreign Service benefits and allowances
we estimate at $3 million annually; if extended to all overseas
federal civilian employees (U.S. citizens), the additional
costs would be approximately $20 million annually. Further
additions to Foreign Service benefits and allowances would,
of course, increase these amounts. The intelligence Charter
legislation bill is an inappropriate vehicle for this type
of special pleading.
CIA Position:
Intelligence agency employees serving overseas work
side by side with Foreign Service employees, but typically
under conditions more arduous and dangerous. It is anomalous
and unfair for there to be a marked discrepancy in benefits
for overseas service. These armful to
of overseas em to ees.
.mnrale
opposition ot OMB to certain e ene i s o reign
Service is no justification for perpetuating inequalities.
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NSA Position:
NSA considers the situation of its employees to be
comparable to that of CIA employees in this regard.
State Department Position:
All U.S. Government civilian personnel required to serve
abroad for a major portion of their careers in successive
tours in different countries should be entitled to the same,
or as similar as possible, pay and benefits. The Department
of State, therefore, supports CIA and NSA on this issue.
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 STAT
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Issue 4.: Should NSA overseas employees be provided special
---- --------------------
retirement benefits equivalent to the CIA retirement system.
Section 633 of the SSCI bill would establish a special
retirement system for NSA applicable to employees serving in
certain hazardous or specialized positions overseas. The
benefits are equivalent to those of CIA. OMB objects to
this proposal. -
OMB Position:
The SSCI bill would give certain NSA employees substan-
tially enhanced retirement benefits, comparable to those now
received by CIA employees with significant overseas duty.
Employees of NSA are now covered by regular civil service
retirement. The rationale for higher benefits for CIA
employees with overseas duty was the need to provide some
added compensation for hazardous duty and to allow early
retirement. While this may be appropriate for certain CIA
clandestine service officers, NSA employment overseas consists
almost exclusively of work at large fixed installations or
non-clandestine employee activities. We do not believe it
is more hazardous than other normal government employment.
Absent such showing, more liberal retirement benefits for
NSA employees would be unfair to other federal employees
and would encourage requests from other government agencies
for similar benefits. Although no recent cost calculations
have been made, estimates in the past have suggested that
it costs the government fully one-third more for early
retirement (age 50/20 years service) than for regular
retirement. This added cost would have to be borne from
additional appropriations, since the normal employee/employer
contributions are, actuarily, insufficient to sustain this
higher payout. The Office of Personnel Management, which
opposes the NSA retirement annuity enhancement, is currently
reviewing the appropriateness and effectiveness of all
special retirement provisions., It would be premature to
add anotherspecial.case prior to completion of this study.
The proposed special retirement provisions are required
to cover those NSA employees whose duties are in support of
activities abroad and hazardous to life or health or so
specialized because of security requirements as to be clearly
distinguishable from normal civil service employment. The
whom these benefits would be directed are
I Iworking side-by-side
visions would not be a
new retirement system but would be an adjunct to and part of
the existing Civil Service Retirement System with benefits
comparable to those provided under the existing CIA retirement
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provisions. Only specially designated field service meeting
the above parameters would be included. Because of the
conditions of service and the designated activities, not all
employees can anticipate serving the period of time required
in order to qualify to retire under the normal civil service
retirement provisions:
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Issue 5: Should the Intelligence Oversight Boar e given
express authori to review the internal practices, procedures
and guidelines of the intelligence agencies.
E.O. 12036 provides that the Intelligence Oversight
Board shall "review periodically for accuracy the internal
guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community
concerning the legality or propriety of intelligence activities,"
as well as reviewing periodically the "practices and procedures
of the Inspectors General and General Counsel with responsi-
bilities for agencies within the Intelligence Community for
discovery and reporting to the Intelligence Oversight Board
intelligence activities that raise questions of legality or
propriety." The SSCI bill empowers the Board to inquire
into intelligence activities and report to the President on
questions of legality or propriety, but does not contain-
language analogous to that quoted above. The Board would
like insertion of a provision empowering the Board to "review
the internal practices, procedures and guidelines of entities
of the Intelligence Community concerning the oversight,
legality and propriety of intelligence activities."
ILLEGIB IOB Position:
The Board believes that its authority to review and
evaluate the system of Executive Branch oversight is essential.
The review function permits the small, part-time Board to
increase the effectiveness of Executive Branch intelligence
oversight by ensuring that the agencies'. internal oversight
mechanisms are adequate. No other agency or official is
responsible for monitoring the oversight system and reporting
to the President on it.
The Board believes that existing oversight responsibilities
should not be eliminated at a time when restrictions are being
relaxed to permit greater operational flexibility. In
addition, the Board' s _ responsibility for monitoring the
Executive Branch-oversight system is especially important
in making the case that Congress should not exercise detailed
day-to-day supervision of the intelligence agencies. Including
this responsibility in the section on the IOB provides some
assurance to the Congress and the public that the Administration
maintains its commitment to internal intelligence oversight.
Statutory recognition of the additional responsibility
will not limit the President's flexibility with regard to
the oversight system. As with all the IOB powers in the
statute, this authority is subject to the President's pre-
scriptions.
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Working Group Position:
The language on the Intelligence Oversight Board contained
in the SSCI bill, although reorganized, substantively is
identical to that proposed to the SSCI by the Administration
in June 1979. That language in turn arose from careful
Working Group consideration, extensive interagency negotiations
and express consideration by the SSCI. No last-minute
change is warranted, especially since the Board is given
ample investigative authority under the existing language. of
the SSCI bill.
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Issue_ 6: Should the bill contain a requirement that entity
heads report to the Intelligence Oversight Board intelligence
matters specified by the President.
As currently drafted the SSCI bill (section 141) requires
heads of entities to report specified matters to the Attorney
General, but does not contain the obligation found in E.O.
12036 to report specified matters to the Intelligence Over-
sight Board. The Board wishes inclusion of such an obligation.
IOB Position:
E.O. 12036 requires reports to the IOB by Intelligence
Community general counsels, inspectors-general, and senior
officials. The inclusion of "senior officials" in the
Executive Order's tripartite reporting scheme ensures that
the Board becomes aware of appropriate matters that do not
come to the attention of either the general counsel or the
inspector general, provides' .a vehicle for direct communication
between the Board and the agency heads, and serves to remind
the officials who are ultimately responsible for operational
management of_their -oversight responsibilities: For the-
statute to require general counsels and inspectors general
to report to the Board as specified by the President, while
omitting an equivalent responsibility on the part of entity
heads, reflects an imbalance in the Executive Branch oversight
system and could undermine the valuable practice of "senior
officials" reporting to the Board under the Executive Order.
Inclusion of -a parallel, obligation on the part of entity
heads to report "any intelligence matters as specified by the
President" rounds out the Executive Branch oversight system
while retaining Presidential flexibility.
Working Group Position:
As with the previous IOB issue, the Working Group feels
that this last-minute change..is_not justified.and that the
language carefully worked out by the Administration-at the
time of its submission to the Committee should be left
unchanged.
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Issue 7: Should the Central Intelligence Agency have statutory
authority to obtain data collected by other entities of the
Intelligence Communit , including data obtained by technical
collection systems, for purposes of processing and analysis.
The SSCI bill provides in section 414(b)(4) that CIA
shall:
(4) analyze foreign intelligence collected by any
entity of the intelligence community, and process such
intelligence as necessary to. fulfill its responsibilities
under this Act....
Defense Department Position:
DoD considers section 414(b)(4) is a unilateral CIA
effort to settle something that has involved contention in
the past between the Agency and various elements of the
Department of Defense. CIA has assured NSA orally that appli-
cation of section 414(b)(4)'is not intended to go beyond what
is already covered in a recently concluded CIA/NSA Memorandum -
of Understanding on SIGINT matters.. Intelligence elements
of the military services, however, have no comparable memo-
randum with the CIA.
Inclusion of section 414(b)(4) would make it possible
for CIA to demand, with explicit statutory authority, direct
access to raw and unprocessed technical data collected by
DoD organizations. At present, such requests are subject- _
to negotiation. between CIA and the collecting agency, and
the outcome is dependent upon a-variety of circumstances.
Such data may reveal sensitive aspects of military operations
which are not solely intelligence operations. Expanding such
knowledge beyond the Department of Defense can only increase
the risk that such operations are compromised, and the safety
of those participating, jeopardized. Further, CIA demands
for such data often conflict with the needs and priorities---
of the collecting organization.- Such data often requires
highly specialized processing, and there may be a legitimate
difference of opinion with respect to which agency is best
able to provide the quality desired. Circumstances may also
bear upon the ability of an agency to process such data as
quickly and as reliably as required.- In some cases, cir-
cumstances may dictate a shared effort.' Defense believes
simply that the processing of raw data should be left to
negotiation between CIA and the collecting agency, and not
settled by statutory fiat.
The Defense Department would prefer that section 414(b)(4)
be deleted since it considers the paragraph serves no useful
purpose.
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At a minimum, however, DoD recommends the paragraph be
amended, to read:
(4) analyze foreign intelligence 'collected by any
entity of the Intelligence Community, and with the
concurrence of-the __collecting organization, process.
such intelligence as necessary to fulfill its responsi-
bilities.
CIA Position:-
If CIA is to adequately fulfill its responsibility to
"produce, publish, and disseminate intelligence to meet the
needs of the President, the National Security Council, the
Director of National Intelligence, and other officials and
departments and agencies" (section 414 (b)(5)), it must have
the authority to obtain significant foreign intelligence
collected by other entities of the Intelligence Community.
Contrary to DoD's position,- CIA does not seek the right to
initially process intelligence collected by other departments
and agencies, nor to displace such departments and agencies
as the primary-processors of their intelligence.
CIA does believe it should have-the-right to analyze
significant foreign intelligence collected by other departments
and agencies, including the right to process. such intelligence
in a timely fashion after the collecting entity has been
given an opportunity to do so. Processing should not really
be an issue if CIA's right to access is recognized, since ___
the Agency is willing to subordinate its processing, need to
those of the collecting entity, provided that CIA is allawed
to process and analyze the data in question in a timely
fashion.
The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 403(e)'
allows the Director of Central Intelligence to obtain intelli-
gence collected by other departments and agencies, "to the
extent recommended by the National Security Council and
approved by the President." chile there has been no formal
implementation of the 1947 Act's access provision, CIA has
cited it on occasion in order to obtain intelligence collected
by other entities. It was partly in recognition of CIA's
need for access to such intelligence that the proviso was
added in the 1947 Act charging the DCI with responsibility
"for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." The real issue reflected in the 1947 Act
provisions,. and. now, at issue again, is whether there should
be an independent entity responsible for performing competing
analysis of significant intelligence collected by other
entities. The necessity for competing analysis has been
recognized by Administration and Congressional officials,
and endorsed by the DCI.
2
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The compromise language proposed by DoD is not acceptable
because it would give DoD authority to deny requests for
access to intelligence. In the past negotiation with DoD on
this issue has been unsatisfactory and CIA has either been
denied access to DoD-collected intelligence, or has received
such intelligence only after extended delays. The provision
in the SSCI bill was acceptable to the Committee and should
be retained by the Administration.
It would be an acceptable compromise to require the
concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, as
opposed to the collecting organization, for CIA to process
foreign intelligence collected by other entities of the
Intelligence Community.
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FOIA AMENDMENT
"The Director shall be responsible for the protection
from unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods and shall establish for departments and agencies
minimum security standards for the management and handling
of information and material relating to intelligence sources
and methods. In furtherance of the responsibility of the _
Director to protect intelligence sources and methods, infor-
mation in files maintained by an intelligence agency or -
component of the United States Government shall be exempted
from the provisions of any law which require publication or
disclosure, or search or review in-connection therewith, if
such files have been specifically designated by the Director
of Central Intelligence to-be concerned with: The design,
function, deployment, exploitation or utilization of scientific
or technical systems for the collection of foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence information; Special activities and
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations;
Investigations conducted to determine the suitability of
potential foreign:intelligence orLcounterintelligence sources
Intelligence and security-liaison--arrangements or information
exchanges with-foreign-governments or their intelligence or
security services; Provided that requests by American citizens
and permanent resident aliens for information concerning
themselves, made pursuant to Sections 552 and 552a of title
5, shall be processed in accordance with those Sections.
The provisions of this Section shall not be superseded
except by a provision of-law which is enacted after the date
of this Amendment and which specifically repeals or modifies
the provisions of this Section."
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 cC c: SG Ci.23/
The Dircclor of Ccnlril Inlclligcncc
2-1- S'c
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3 ' ''C il:!49
12 February 1980
SUBJECT: Testimony on Charters Before the Senate Select.
Committee on Intelligence
With reference to the charters for the Intelligence
Community, once you make your decisions on the points of
difference between the Administration and the Huddleston
Bill, we all need to communicate those differences to the
Senate Select Committee in precise language. One of those
points, I believe, should be the organization of the Bill.
We have proposed a logical sequence which would successively
describe our authorities, the restrictions on us and the
system of oversight to check on use of the authorities or
possible abuse of the restrictions. We need, I believe,
this emphasis on the oversight process to help us ward off
amendments that would add restrictions to the Bill. The
Huddleston draft obscures the oversight process.
I would, therefore, like to approach my testimony on 26
February with a marked up revision to the Huddleston Bill.
It would reorder the sequence of articles as noted above and
it would insert the appropriate language where we differ
with the Committee's draft. This would not be the tabling
of an Administration Bill, but simply a means of clarifying
for the Committee the points on which you differ with the
Huddleston Bill. It seems to me there is some merit in
having before the Members of the SSCI a legislative vehicle
which contains the precise Charters language you would like
to see them pass.
/s/ Stan sfield Turner
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2 1 FEB 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff
STAT FROM
n Staff, ODP
SUBJECT S. 2284 - National Intelligence Act of 1980
REFERENCE a. Your Form 610, same subject, dated
14 Feb 80 (ISS 80-120/2)
b. My memo to SA/OGC, subj, SSCI Intelligence
Charter Drafts of 6 November 1979, dtd
14 Dec 79 (ODP-9-1789)
Thank you for the opportunity to review a copy of S. 2284,
the "charter" bill recently introduced by the SSCI. We would
appreciate if you would reinforce in your response to OGC
the comments we expressed in paragraph 2 of reference b
(copy attached).
Attachment: a/s
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STAT
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2 1 FEB 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff
ie , Management Staff, ODP
SUBJECT . S. 2284 - National Intelligence Act of 1980
REFERENCE a. Your Form 610, same subject, dated
14 Feb 80 (ISS 80-120/2)
b. .114y memo to SA/OGC, subj, SSCI Intelligence
Charter Drafts of 6 November 1979, dtd
14 Dec 79 (ODP-9-1789)
Thank you for the opportunity to review a copy of S. 2284,
the "charter" bill recently introduced by the SSCI. We would
appreciate if you would reinforce in your response to OGC
the comments we expressed in paragraph 2 of referannA b
(copy attached).
Attachment: a/s
STAT
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ODP-9-1789
14 DEC 1979
MMDUM POR: Special Assistant to the General Counsel
FRQ24 s
cnier, ement Staff, ODP
SSCI Intelligence Charter Drafts
of 6 November 1979
CE Your Memo, Same Subject: dtd 4 Dec 1979
(OGC 79-10881)
1. We were asked by the Deputy Chief of the Informa-
tion Services Staff to review the latest drafts of SSCI
Intelligence Charter Drafts for Titles I through VII dated
6 November 1979 and respond directly to you with a drop
copy to C/ISS.
2. We reviewed Title IV in detail and were delighted
to see the following provisions in Title IV and strongly
urge that they be retained.
"Sec. 421. (a) In carrying out its functions under
this Act, the Agency is authorized to--
(4) maintain and operate full-scale printing
facilities for the production of intelligence and
intelligence-related materials and lease or purchase
and operate computer and communications equipment
as appropriate to carry out authorized functions;
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(k) Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
the authorities contained in subsections (a) through
(e) and ti) of this section may be exercised notwith-
standing any other provision of law.
-Sec. 422. (b) The provisions of chapter 137, relating
to the procurement of property and services, and chapter
139, relating to the proctareaaent of research and develop-
t services,of title 10, United States Code, as
amended, shall apply...except that the Director of the
Agency may specify by regulation when any or all of
the provisions of chapters 137 and 139 of title 10
may waived for the effective perforaanc,e of author-
ized functions."
STAT
ccs dies
DD/A/ODP
DD/P/ODP
C/SFS,, 0VP
FGf~9S/QP
DISTRIBUTION:
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?'-2-- O/D/ODP
1 - MS Chron?
2 - ODP Registr
y
ODP/M1 Ijal/14Dec79
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2 1 FEB 1980
MEMORA14DUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
ATTENTION:
FROM:
Acting Director of Security
SUBJECT: S. 2284 - National Intelligence Act
of 1980
REFERENCES: (a) Memo from D/Sec to OGC, dated 24 January
1980, subject: Charter Legislation,
Title VI, National Security Agency
(b) Memo from AD/Sec to OGC, dated
22 October 1979, subject: Charter
Legislation, Title VI, National
Security Agency
1. The Chief, Information Services Staff, DDA has
forwarded the subject Charter Legislation for comments by
this Office. We have reviewed this matter and are pleased
to find that basically Office of Security equities are well
protected and established. We remain seriously concerned,
however, with the sweeping language of Title VI pertaining
to the Charter for the National Security Agency.
2. The concerns which we expressed in the referenced
memoranda remain very much at issue in the instant title.
Specifically we refer to page 94, Section 613(c) where the
Director of NSA is given the duty to "prescribe and enforce
. security rules, regulations, procedures, standards,
and requirements with respect to personnel security clearances,
authorizations for access to facilities and information,
physical security of facilities, . . . ." This pervasive
authority is tempered to a very vague degree by the statement
that "enforcement of all such rules, . . . shall be coordinated
with the head of each concerned department or agency." Such
coordination could merely consist of notifying the CIA that
NSA was about to descend on us for inspection purposes.
OS 0 0482A
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Moreover, the very next paragraph provides the Director of
NSA with the authority to demand any data he might require
in fulfilling the aforementioned duties. This clearly would
give DIRNSA the right to demand to see our security files
over and above the other unacceptably intrusive authorities
provided by the previous paragraph.
3. It is interesting to compare this broad, sweeping
DIRNSA authority with that given to the Director of National
Intelligence on page 50, Section 304(j) wherein the DNI is
empowered to establish for departments and agencies "minimum
security standards for the management and handling of information
and material relating to intelligence sources and methods."
Another interesting comparison is to be found in Executive
Order 12036 Section 1-1202(a) where the National Security
Agency has the responsibility for the "Establishment and
operation of an effective unified organization for signals
intelligence activities, except for the delegation of
operational control over certain o erations t-hat are
condiictec throe of is e eements of the ntelf ence
Commu- ty. ' n erlinfng is arc e for emp iasss. Tnis same
Executive Order, on the other hand, empowers the Director of
Central Intelligence, Section 1-601(i) to "Ensure the
establishment by the Intelligence Community of common
security and access standards for managing and handling
foreign intelligence systems, information and products."
4. It is clear that the subject Charter is a blatant
expansion of NSA authorities at the expense of those of the
DCI and we urge that this matter be clearly and forcefully
brought to the attention of the Director so that he may take
Attachments
References
Distribution:
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1 - C/ISS/DDA
STAT
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2 4 JAN 1930
-1EMORA:"NDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
STAT ATTENTION:
FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Charter Legislation, Title VI,
National Security Agency
REFERENCE: Memo from AD/Security to OGC, dated
22 October 1979, same subject
1. In response to your telephonic request of 22 January
1980 for Office of Security continents concerning the proposed
Title VI, Charter Legislation, reference is made to the
22 October 1979 memorandum to 0GC from the Acting Director
of Security, same subject. That memorandum presented the
objections of this Office to the wording of Section 613(b)
of the proposed legislation and these objections remain valid.
2. The sweeping language of the opening sentence of
paragraph 613(b), which gives DIRNSA the responsibility for
prescribing and enforcing the Security rules, regulations,
procedures, etc. for all U. S. SIGINT activities, remains
of serious concern to this Office. While it may be argued
that this language is tempered by the second sentence, which
states these actions shall be in accord with applicable law
and policy guidance from the DCI, the potential for differing
interpretations and conflict is great. It must be recognized
that even if DIRNSA prescribes rules and procedures that do
not conflict with DCI guidance, the legislation as proposed
gives DI.TNSA authority to enforce those rules and procedures.
In order to enforce them, NSA would have the authority to
inspect all U. S. SIGINT activities to insure that the rules
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and regulations are being carried out. This is unacceptable
to the Office of Security. Similarly, DIRNSA appears to be
insisting on the authority to establish the requirements for
personnel security clearances and to have the final voice in
decisions concerning individuals who are authorized access
to our own SIGINT facilities. This also is unacceptable to
the Office of Security.
3. This Office firmly believes that we must obtain
relief from the proposed enforcement authority of DIRNSA as
it relates to the security of CIA SIGINT activities.
STAT
Robert W. Gambino
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2 2 OPT 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
STAT ATTENTION:
Acting Director o Security
SUBJECT: Charter Legislation Title VI -
National Security Agency
1. The Office of Security has reviewed Title VI of the
proposed Charter Legislation and is struck by the sweeping
authority which this Charter imparts to NSA. The result would
appear to be a pervasive control over the SIGINT activities
conducted by all other members of the intelligence Community.
2. Insofar as Office of Security equities are concerned,
we are particularly troubled by Section 613(b), which authorizes
DIP.SA both to proscribe and enforce added) security
rules and regulations con erring personnel clearances, physical -
security standards, and facility approvals for all U. S. Govern-
ment signal intelligence activities. This is a sharp departure
from existing practices. It would appear to usurp the existing
Director of Central Intelligence functions (expressed in
DCID 1/14 [personnel security standards] and USIB physical
security standards) as well as the authority of the Director
of Security, CIA, with respect to SI approvals ,within CIA.
3. In an attempt to clarify the statutory responsibility
of DIRNSA in the SIGINT field, as well as to preserve the
overall DCI aut_hority,to set standards for access (thus pro-
tecting sources ..and: r;ietaods).,: ;I suggest that Section 613(b)
be rewritten to authorize DIRIN15A, in coordination with the
DCI, to'Prescr.ibe_ (but.:not enforce), etc. This will allow
the DCI to raainta.in, his role in establishing overall security
policy -and ..preclude DIRNSA from assuming any security policy
or physical inspection role over CIA SKINT activities.
(b
STAT
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