LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301720002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
ER FiIF DOPY
004 MAR ON
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2 August 1985
ALA LAR 85-017
2 August 1985
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secret
Review
The rebels' increasingly indiscriminate attacks on economic targets,
political agitation, and reversion to terrorism underscore their
ineffectiveness against government forces in the countryside. This
strategy also suggests, however, that guerrilla leaders believe their
tactics are more likely to undermine the government without risking
the loss of irreplaceable cadre in combat.
Brazil: Conflicts Within the Sarney Government
The need to accommodate a variety of factions and individual
politicians within the governing coalition is making it difficult for
President Sarney to build an image as a strong, decisive leader.
Brazil: Brizola's Evolving Role
Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio de Janeiro state and leader of the
leftist Democratic Workers Party, hopes the new support he has
obtained since Brazil's return to civilian rule in March will further
his goal of becoming the country's next president.
Mexico: Radical Slum Organizations
Radical slum groups are a potent force in many Mexican cities, but
recent economic problems have increased pressure from landowners
and businessmen on local governments to curtail their activities.
Venezuela: Perez's Precampaign Maneuvers
Former President Perez, Venezuela's leading center-leftist
politician, is pursuing an unprecedented second presidential term
beginning in 1989, but he faces determined opposition from
incumbent President Lusinchi and other leaders of the Democratic
Action party's Orthodox faction
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 The military has been modernizing its forces ostensibly to prepare
for defense of the Panama Canal in the year 2000, when the United
States relinquishes responsibility for it. More pressing concerns
include security of the country's northern border, support for Costa
Rica in the event of Nicaraguan aggression, a potential influx of
refugees, and drug trafficking.
The far-left Movement for National Liberation, generally known as
the Tupamaros, has been reorganizing since jailed members were
freed by a presidential amnesty shortly after Uruguay returned to
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civilian rule in March.
Argentina-United Kingdom: British Trade Ban Lifted
Argentina: Impact of Budget Cuts on Nav
Argentina-Iraq: Aircraft Sale Stalled
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret ii
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El Salvador: Insurgent Strategy
and Tactics
The rebels' increasingly indiscriminate attacks on
economic targets, political agitation, and reversion to
terrorism underscore their ineffectiveness against
government forces in the countryside, but also suggest
that guerrilla leaders believe these tactics are more
likely to undermine the government without risking
the loss of irreplaceable cadre in combat. The
insurgents probably anticipate that their urban
operations may negate many of the armed forces'
current advantages in rural areas, including artillery,
increasing air assets, and a 7-to-1 ratio in military
manpower. Moreover, hardline guerrilla leaders may
believe that by targeting the general public they will
accelerate polarization and foster a rightwing
backlash and popular disaffection, thus setting the
stage over the longer term for a Nicaraguan-style
insurrection. Although the rebels are capable of
creating an atmosphere of insecurity, we believe their
strategic and tactical disunity and diminishing
resources will hinder their chances of regaining the
tactical momentum. Moreover, the terrorist-oriented
strategy is likely to erode their domestic and
international support further, particularly if, as we
anticipate, the popularly elected and military-backed
government of President Duarte enacts prudent
countermeasures
the guerrillas' failing
war effort in the countryside is demoralizing their
supporters and cadre, some of whom may also fear
that the insurgents' image of increasing impotency is
undermining any prospect to force a political solution
through dialogue with the government, as advocated
by less militant rebel leaders. As a result, we believe
that policy debate within the insurgent hierarchy
increasingly is dominated by more ideologically
driven hardliners. The hardliners do not see their
cause as lost over the longer term and are encouraged
by the success of recent urban terrorist operations
against US and other interests. They publicly have
declared the conflict to be entering a "new phase,"
and have committed themselves to a war of attrition
calculated-as in Vietnam
military and Washington.
Central to guerrilla strategy appears to be continuing
small-unit operations in the countryside against
military and economic targets, combined with
escalating urban activities. Rebel strategists probably
anticipate that such a two-front approach will hinder
the efforts of the moderate government to consolidate
its authority and possibly provoke official repression
and a resurgence of rightist death squad activity. We
judge that the rebels envision that any official or
extraofficial overreaction would reopen public debate
in the United States over Washington's support to
President Duarte and the armed forces.
The insurgents have escalated their harassment of
common citizens, including increased kidnapings and
executions of minor officials and civilians in the
countryside. According to US Embassy reporting, the
guerrillas have abducted nearly a score of mayors of
provincial towns since the 31 March election, and 25X1
have murdered two of them. Most of the victims were
members of Duarte's Christian Democratic Party.
Insurgents massacred over two dozen people, 25X1
including off-duty Civil Defense personnel and
women passersby in the village of Santa Cruz Loma
in La Paz Department last April. More recently, US
defense attache reporting indicates that some 150
rebels stole food and money from villagers during an
attack in northwest El Salvador. Before being repelled
by badly outnumbered Army defenders, the guerrillas
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killed several civilians and extensively damaged a
number of private residences. Guerrilla propaganda
statements indicate that such attacks are aimed at
demonstrating that the government is powerless to
protect civilians and that they must submit to the will
of local insurgent cadre.
Statistics show that during the first half of 1985 the
guerrillas destroyed 75 rural townhalls and other
nonmilitary public facilities, as opposed to just 12
such acts during all of 1984. Rebels have begun
machinegun attacks on the highways against civilians
in private vehicles. Their indiscriminate mining of
unpaved country roads is causing increasing civilian
and military casualties. According to a recent defense
attache report, insurgent mines and boobytraps have
accounted for 14 percent of all combat deaths and 47
percent of all armed forces casualties this year. Most
recent civilian casualties, according to the attache,
have also been caused by mines and boobytraps left by
retreating rebels
In the capital, meanwhile,
in addition to guerrilla plans to
escalate terrorism and economic sabotage, leftist front
groups are intensifying political agitation in the form
of public- and private-sector labor strikes and student
demonstrations. Particularly ominous are credible
reports that the guerrillas have been surveilling US
personnel throughout the country for kidnaping and
assassination. According to public guerrilla
statements, the massacre on 19 June of four US
Marines and two civilians-as well as seven other
civilians-was part of an overall campaign to bring
the war to the capital and force a reduction in the US
presence in El Salvador.
Constraints on Insurgent Strategy
The rebels are likely to enjoy some successes with
their strategy. Nevertheless, we believe that rebel
disunity and diminishing personnel, materiel, and
financial resources, combined with government
countersubversion measures, will blunt its impact. In
this regard, a body of reporting from US Embassy
and statements made by guerrilla
defectors indicate that insurgent groups in the
countryside are suffering from increasing desertions,
lack of funding, and resupply problems. Some urban
units have been hurt by arrests and capture of
documents and equipment
While the 19 June massacre may have given the
rebels a badly needed psychological boost, it also
appears to have intensified factionalism.
leaders of the various
Marxist groups were divided over whether to applaud
or denounce the operation, which apparently was
carried out independently by an urban terrorist wing
of the smallest insurgent group. To avoid the
appearance of disunity, the alliance reportedly
broadcast its approval of the killing of the US
Marines, but blamed the other civilian deaths on
alleged government agents.
linsurgent leaders presented guerrilla
rank-and-file and leftist labor activists with a
sanitized version of the massacre.
Despite such efforts, some rebel political spokesmen
made an unprecedented break with the official
guerrilla line following the killings, denouncing the
act as terrorism and disassociating themselves from it.
Others, led by Guillermo Ungo, president of the
insurgents' political umbrella organization, publicly
reaffirmed support for the alliance but noted that the
political leadership could not approve of all actions
"such as the unfortunate incident that occurred on 19
June."
members of Ungo's own Social Democratic
faction are now more seriously seeking to break from
the rebel alliance and join the mainstream democratic
process because of increasing disillusionment with
hardline guerrilla tactics.
Government Countermeasures
The military's quick response to the guerrillas'
evolving tactics underscores the seriousness with
which it views the rebel threat and reflects the relative
flexibility it now enjoys with a force of some 50,000
men supported by air power. In the countryside, the
High Command has used quick-strike operations
featuring airborne troops and attack helicopters
against insurgent camps, particularly those of the
faction responsible for the slaying of the US Marines.
These strikes have been generally successful, resulting
in numerous rebel casualties, the confiscation of vital
documents, and the capture of high-ranking guerrilla
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leaders and other cadre. These operations underscore
the military's increasing effectiveness in using
information provided by defectors and prisoners,
which has also led to the capture of arms,
ammunition, and medical supplies.
the Army may now be
considering establishing patrol bases near guerrilla
camps and using small units to augment larger sweep
operations. Such tactics, indicative of the 7-to-1
manpower advantage the armed forces enjoys over the
guerrillas, would jeopardize the insurgent practice of
avoiding combat during Army sweeps and returning
to base areas upon its withdrawal
The cities pose a different set of problems, and we
believe that a greater security consciousness will be
necessary to counter the terrorist threat and to avoid
the danger of resurgent rightwing vigilantism. To this
end, President Duarte has assigned the new US-
supported Special Investigative Unit to investigate
terrorist acts, and the US-trained, 48-man Special
Anti-Terrorist Unit to react to attacks in the capital.
Although these small forces promise to be useful,
senior military officials are concerned that the public
security forces-the National Guard, Treasury
Police, and National Police-are not adequately
trained or equipped to counter major urban guerrilla
warfare or to react to several simultaneous attacks.
Outlook
We believe that hardline rebels will continue to
dominate the guerrillas' decisionmaking process and
sanction more rural and urban terrorist activities
designed to demoralize Salvadoran society and
reawaken critical debate in the United States. Local
civilian elites, military officers, and US personnel will
remain prime subjects for kidnaping and
assassination. Moreover, as their military and political
isolation mounts, the guerrillas are increasingly likely
to target the general public, particularly the middle
and upper classes in the capital. The impact of such
tactics, particularly over the longer term, remains
dubious, however. Transportation stoppages, electrical
blackouts, and water shortages have become routine
nuisances over the years in the countryside and are
unlikely to constitute a major demoralizing factor for
a populace that now overwhelmingly rejects the
insurgent cause. Urban areas are more vulnerable, 25X1
and increased terrorism could bring the war more
dramatically to the capital, which for years has 25X1
escaped most guerrilla actions. Nevertheless, the
government's heightened security consciousness, new
countermeasures, and the growing capabilities of the
armed forces will complicate rebel efforts to foment
violence, although we anticipate increasing student
and labor unrest
Over the longer term, the hardline guerrilla strategy
stands to be counterproductive for the rebel alliance.
Although the insurgents still claim to be fighting
against a repressive oligarchy, their opponent now is a
government generally recognized as reformist,
representative, and popularly supported. In part, this
reality may have prompted some insurgent leaders to
begin more ruthless operations against the general
public in the belief that they may perceive they have
less to lose in negative public reaction to these acts.
We believe, however, that the tactics of terrorism may
have the greatest impact on the insurgent alliance
itself by exacerbating divisions among rebel
moderates and hardliners, and thus setting the stage
for a formal break that would leave the extremists 25X1
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Brazil: Conflicts Within the
Sarney Government
President Sarney is facing considerable infighting
within his five-month-old coalition government.
Serious rivalries exist between and within the
coalition's two parties-the late President-elect
Neves's center-left Brazilian Democratic Movement
Party (PMDB) and Sarney's smaller, middle-of-the-
road Liberal Front Party (PFL). The need to
accommodate a variety of factions and individual
politicians within the coalition is making it difficult
for Sarney to build an image as a strong, decisive
Despite the strains afflicting the alliance, we do not
expect it to collapse entirely anytime soon. Leaders of
both parties appear to recognize that, by retaining the
coalition, they stand a better chance of consolidating
civilian rule and of dominating a key constitutional
assembly scheduled for 1987. Nonetheless, the
alliance will remain an uneasy and unreliable one.
Although the two parties together hold a commanding
majority in both houses of the Brazilian Congress,
Sarney cannot count on automatic congressional
approval of government initiatives and must try to
build support for his policies on a case-by-case basis.
Differences Between the Parties
Ulysses Guimaraes, president of both the PMDB and
the lower house of Congress, evidently is not giving
Sarney his full backing.
Moreover, Guimaraes wanted to become
president himself at one point, and he may still resent
illness in March and April, even though Sarney was
serving as acting President.'
Sarney is also 25X1
concerned over increased squabbling between the two
coalition parties as they prepare for mayoral elections
in Brazil's 23 state capitals this November. In many
of these races, PMDB and PFL candidates have
formed alliances with other political groups in an
effort to strengthen their electoral prospects. In some
localities, personal rivalries further divide the two 25X1
parties. Sarney has tried to promote PMDB-PFL
cooperation in several of the contests, but without
success. According to US Embassy
the PMDB is likely to fare better than
Sarney's PFL in the mayoral elections and should win
in most cities, thanks to the efforts of state governors
from the party who have made adept use of patronage
in recent years
Differences Within the PMDB
The PMDB, now the country's largest party, suffers
from internal factionalism. The party itself is a
coalition; Neves's relatively conservative Popular
Party merged with the existing PMDB in 1981. The
PMDB's 200 members in the lower house of
Congress-out of a total membership of 479-include
approximately 60 leftwing backbenchers who have
been critical of what they regard as Guimaraes's
lackluster leadership. According to press reports,
these legislators want Guimaraes to put even greater
distance between the PMDB and Sarney. The US
Embassy reports that the party's left wing defied
Guimaraes on several occasions during recent
congressional votes on rules for the mayoral races.
' Under Brazil's constitution, as head of the lower house of
Congress, Guimaraes is next in the line of succession to the
Sarney's accession to the office.
he tried to wield control over the
government during the late President-elect Neves's
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Some of the leftist PMDB congressmen also are
members of the Brazilian Communist Party, which
has recently been legalized after 20 years as a
clandestine party.
PMDB leaders are concerned that the Communists-
now that their party can operate openly-will run
mayoral candidates in several cities and take votes
from the PMDB.
PMDB factional differences extend into Sarney's
cabinet. Planning Minister Sayad, a left-leaning
economist, and the more conservative Finance
Minister Dornelles, a nephew of Neves who served in
the previous military government, bitterly disagree
over what policies the government should pursue on
such issues as financial austerity and negotiations
with the IMF. On at least one occasion, PMDB
politicians successfully pressed Sarney to reverse a
decision favored by Dornelles
In addition, Labor Minister
Pazzianotto, who is tied to the PMDB left wing, and
Industry Minister Gusmao, a conservative, have
clashed over the government's handling of recent
labor strikes. Left-right infighting within the party
almost certainly will continue to complicate Sarney's
efforts to govern, in our judgment
Differences Within the PFL
Sarney's PFL is a loosely organized party with about
75 congressional seats. It was formed last year by
dissidents from the conservative Social Democratic
Party, which supported the military regime.
The personal ambitions of several PFL leaders are a
major source of divisiveness within the party. The
party's titular head, Minister of Mines and Energy
(and former Brazilian Vice President) Chaves, wants
to be the country's next President, and Education
Minister Maciel may harbor similar ambitions.
intent on diminishing Sarney's stature within the
party, even though the President thus far has shown
no interest in becoming a candidate himself in the
next election, expected to take place in 1988.
Outlook
Given the rivalries within and between the coalition
parties, Sarney cannot count on automatic support
from the alliance's majority in Congress. He will have
to try to build congressional support on an issue-by-
issue basis, using different mixes of members each
time.
Although the divisions plaguing the coalition may
sharpen in the coming months as it faces tough
choices on economic and social issues, we believe there
is a good chance the alliance will survive for another
couple of years. Both of the coalition parties view Rio
de Janeiro's state governor, leftist Leonel Brizola, as a
major contender for the presidency and have an
interest in cooperating to reduce his chances. Thus,
the PMDB and the PFL may well close ranks during
the 1987 constitutional assembly, which will set the
rules and timing for the presidential election. They
may, for example, join forces to enact a runoff
provision for that election, a move that some observers
believe would hurt Brizola's prospects
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Brazil: Brizola's Evolving
Role
Shifting political alliances in Brazil are benefiting
Leone] Brizola, governor of Rio de Janeiro state and
leader of the leftist Democratic Workers Party (PDT).
Brizola, who hopes to become the country's next
president, was a key figure in pre-1964 Brazilian
politics, and has enjoyed increasing importance since
the return to civilian rule in March. According to the
US Embassy, many political activists have left other
parties in recent months to join the PDT.'
Brizola hopes to use this new support to further his
political career and his agenda for Brazil. Among his
policy goals are a tougher stance toward the IMF and
Brazil's other creditors, greater social welfare
expenditures, and a far-reaching agrarian reform
program. Recent statements by Brizola accusing the
United States of attempting to postpone a direct
presidential election in Brazil indicate to us that he
retains his longstanding animosity toward
Washington. F____1 25X1
Although Brizola's popularity is on the rise, his
chances of gaining the presidency are far from
assured. His outspoken advocacy of leftist policies
worries moderate Brazilians, according to US
Embassy Military leaders, for
their part, have hinted that they would block Brizola
from taking office. Whether or not he becomes
president, we believe Brizola will continue to play an
important role in Brazilian politics.
Brizola's popularity stems from his personal charisma,
compared to other Brazilian political leaders; his
skillful use of television; and his populist positions on
economic and social issues. His most ardent
' Although the parties' numerical strength is in a state of flux and
precise membership figures are unavailable, the PDT is Brazil's
fourth-largest political party in numbers of congressional seats,
after the two government coalition parties-the center-left
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party and the middle-of-the-road
Liberal Front Party-and the Social Democratic Party, which
The PDT: History and Ideology
The history of the Democratic Workers Party (PDT)
typifies the ephemeral character of Brazilian parties
and political alliances. The party was formed by
Leonel Brizola in 1981 as an offshoot of the late
President Getulio Vargas' Brazilian Labor Party
(PTB). The latter party was abolished after the 1964 25X1
military coup, but was reestablished in the late 1970s
under the leadership of Vargas' niece, Ivete. A
leadership struggle between Ivete and Brizola, who
also had been active in the pre-1964 PTB, led Brizola
to establish his own party.
Since its creation, the PDT has served primarily as a
personal political vehicle for Brizola. The party is
strongest in Rio Grande do Sul state, where Brizola
was a prominent political, figure in the 1950s and
1960s, and in Rio de Janeiro state, where he is now
governor. 25X1
According to US Embassy reporting, the PDT is
attempting to expand its political base to other areas
of Brazil, and it appears to be making some headway.
In 1982, the party held a total of only 73 elected 25X1
offices nationwide. Within two years the number had
grown to 484, making the PDT the third-largest party
in Brazil in numbers of elected officeholders. With
the establishment in mid-1984 of the Liberal Front 25X1
Party-a breakaway faction of the pro-military
government party-the PDT is now fourth nationally
in terms of congressional seats.
The party's ideological orientation reflects Brizola's
longstanding militant leftism. According to US
Embassy reporting, however, he has lately begun
trying to remold the PDT's image along the lines of
center-left West European Social Democratic parties
in the hope of winning support among more moderate
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supporters are the slumdwellers, or "favelistas," in his
present home state of Rio de Janeiro. Brizola has
strongly championed the interests of this group, along
with those of the urban and rural poor elsewhere in
Brazil. The recent enactment of a law enfranchising
illiterates should significantly expand his voting
constituency.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the PDT is
gaining new members in several parts of the country
at a time when other major parties are having
difficulty maintaining their strength. The Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party, the senior partner in
President Sarney's ruling coalition, is suffering from
internal strife between leftists and more moderate
members. The coalition's junior partner, Sarney's
Liberal Front Party, was created only a year ago and
has not yet managed to build a strong political
organization or gain broad popular support. The
center-right Social Democratic Party is trying to live
down the negative image it earned through its
affiliation with the military government. The
problems of these parties are leading many of their
members to switch to the PDT, according to US
Embassy and Brazilian press reporting. Brizola may
reap the benefits of these trends in November, when
municipal elections will be held in Brazil's 23 state
capitals.
Presidential Aspirations
Brizola is pressing for a direct presidential election in
1986-two years earlier than the Sarney government
plans to hold such a vote.
probably reasons that an early election would improve
his chances for victory, given the difficulties plaguing
the other parties. He may well be correct on this
score, since putting off the election until 1988 would
give those parties more time to overcome some of their
organizational and other problems.
We doubt, however, that a direct election will be held
before 1988, notwithstanding Brizola's efforts. The
Congress has approved a proposal by Sarney for a
constituent assembly in 1987
a key responsibility of this
assembly will be to arrange a direct presidential
election that would probably be held the following
year. US Embassy and press reporting from various
sources suggests that most of the public appears
content with the prospect of a direct election in 1988.
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Mayoral and Gubernatorial Elections
Brizola is working hard to position himself as a strong
candidate regardless of when the presidential election
is held. In the current campaign for municipal
elections this November, he is backing the mayoral
candidacies of several politicians from parties other
than the PDT. According to US Embassy and press
reporting, Brizola hopes that these candidates, in
exchange for his backing, will support his presidential
bid.
The PDT's own prospects in the mayoral elections
appear strongest in Rio de Janeiro, where Brizola has
chosen a popular Senator, Saturnino Braga, as the
Brizola is also planning his strategy for gubernatorial
elections that will be held in 1986.
Brizola-whose gubernatorial
term in Rio expires in 1986-is considering running
for governor of Rio Grande do Sul state, a post he
held prior to the 1964 military coup. Brizola
reportedly believes that he needs a position from
which to maintain his political visibility in the event
that the presidential election is not held until 1988.
Obstacles
Notwithstanding his popular appeal and his party's
improving fortunes, a number of factors are
complicating Brizola's presidential quest:
? Dissidence within his party. Many of the PDT's new
members are not supporters of Brizola, but rather
dissidents from other parties who see the PDT as
their most viable option. Some of these people do
not share Brizola's leftist views, according to the US
Embassy. Thus, while the PDT has been expanding,
Brizola's ability to control it and to marshal its
support for his political ambitions may be eroding.
? Dissatisfaction with his performance as governor.
According to US Embassy and Consular reporting,
many residents of Rio de Janeiro are unhappy with
Brizola's performance as an administrator. He is
particularly unpopular with the state's sizable
organized labor movement, which resents his
favoritism toward slumdwellers and his lack of
attention to union concerns. Moreover, in Rio as in
other parts of Brazil, most members of the upper
and middle classes, including business interests, 25X1
dislike Brizola's leftist orientation.
Outlook
Rules governing the presidential election, which will
be formulated by the constituent assembly, will have a 25X1
major impact on Brizola's electoral prospects, in our
judgment. A decision by the assembly to establish a
runoff system would probably hurt his chances of
victory because other, more moderate candidates
could join forces to defeat him if his charisma and
campaigning skills carried him to a first-round
plurality. If, on the other hand, the constituent
assembly opts for a plurality system with no runoff,
we believe Brizola's. prospects would be enhanced.'
Regardless of the outcome of his bid for the
presidency, we believe Brizola's role in politics will
continue to be controversial. He is virtually certain to
continue pushing for costly social welfare programs
for the urban and rural poor. We also expect him to
increase his criticism of the government's economic
stabilization policies and its efforts to reach
agreements with the IMF and Brazil's Western bank
creditors. Moreover, if he is not satisfied with the
progress of his presidential quest, he may try to stir up
popular unrest, a development that would cause great
concern within the military.
2 Congress recently passed a measure providing for a runoff, but
this action is subject to change by the constituent assembly.F_
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According to the US Embassy, Brizola's recent
allegations that Washington is meddling in Brazilian
politics ended a period of several years in which he
had been largely silent about the US role in Brazil.
We expect him to continue to use the United States as
a scapegoat from time to time.
The municipal elections in November will be an early
indicator of Brizola's future prospects. If the PDT
cannot win a significant number of posts, Brizola's
chances of eventually gaining the presidency will
suffer. Nevertheless, he is likely to retain a significant
following and remain a major actor on the Brazilian
political scene for years to come.
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Secret
Mexico: Radical Slum
Organizations
Radical slum groups are a potent force in many
Mexican cities, but recent economic problems have
increased pressure from landowners and businessmen
on local governments to curtail their activities. The
Mexican military has also expressed concern about
the emergence of radical groups, including those in
urban areas,
In the past, these organizations were
considered a tolerable nuisance and allowed to
demonstrate and agitate without fear of reprisal. In
recent years, however, efforts to draw these urban
groups into the political and economic mainstream
have intensified, and eventually most probably will
either be co-opted or destroyed.
The early 1970s saw the beginning of urban slum
organizations, most notably in the cities of the
northern border states. These slumdweller groups,
with names like Tierra y Libertad (Land and Liberty)
and the Committee for Popular Defense, espoused
separatist and sometimes Marxist rhetoric and used
confrontational tactics to intimidate local officials. A
national organization of slumdwellers has not been
formed, but the National Coordinator of Popular
Urban Movements (CONAMUP) has affiliated slum
groups in many states. Despite claims to represent
many thousands of slumdwellers, these groups
actually represent only a small percentage of Mexico's
17-20 million urban poor.
to the colonias. They hoped that their separatist
ideology would spread among the urban poor, but
squatter communities in other parts of Mexico that
have assumed the TyL name, such as a colonia in
Mazatlan, have not followed the TyL philosophy of
separation and local autonomy.
The authorities in Monterrey responded by instituting
the Fomento Metropolitano de Monterrey
(FOMERREY) program in 1974. This program has
two objectives: grant legal land titles to squatters and
integrate these communities into the metropolitan
system. FOMERREY housing sites are
geographically dispersed throughout the metropolitan 25X1
area, probably to ensure that the low-income earners
are not concentrated in one area of the city, and to
prevent them from making unified demands on the
system. FOMERREY has served 63,000 families in
developments that range from small plots with some
utilities for self-built homes to already constructed
dwellings with all utilities. The program also includes
the construction of schools and medical clinics.
The FOMERREY program effectively split the TyL 25X1
community into two factions in 1982. One faction
sought to retain its autonomy, while the other
supported integration into the metropolitan system.
The split prompted violent demonstrations, and in
early 1984 the leader of the faction supporting
autonomy was jailed. The group supporting
Tierra y Libertad-Socialist Ideology
Tierra y Libertad (TyL), founded in 1971 in
Monterrey, is one of the earliest, and for a while, the
most effective of the radical squatter groups. TyL was
the name taken by a bloc of virtually autonomous
squatter colonias, or neighborhoods, within the
metropolitan Monterrey area. The leaders, many of
them college educated, preached a radical socialist
ideology and promised protection and basic services to
the squatter population. The leadership maintained
complete control over the inhabitants through
"peoples committees," which regulated everything
from services and law enforcement to new admissions
integration was rewarded with a visit by President de
la Madrid in 1984 to dedicate a new road through the
community and to grant to the residents full legal title
to the land. In June the faction seeking autonomy
staged a poorly attended and unenthusiastic
demonstration at the US Consulate in Monterrey,
suggesting that support for the group is waning.
Committee for Popular Defense-Student Origins
In 1973 students at the University of Chihuahua
founded an organization called the Committee for
Secret
ALA LAR 85-017
2 August 1985
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Monterrey Metropolitan Area
Built-up area
FOMERREY
(state-established
housing area)
Road
0
Kilometers
Popular Defense (CDP) to campaign for student rights
at the University. The CDP leaders, however, found a
receptive audience among the city's poor, and were
soon leading land invasions and establishing squatter
neighborhoods on the fringes of Chihuahua and later
in Ciudad Juarez. The CDP colonias grew rapidly
and the leaders became more skilled in making
demands on the system. In Ciudad Juarez the CDP
has even become adept at using the US media to gain
attention. Much of the CDP's support there is
attributed to the leadership's success in intimidating
the local government into providing virtually free
services to CDP neighborhoods, many of which are on
illegally occupied land
\
Apodaca
Guadalupe
the CDP is involved in a
variety of illicit activities, but authorities do not
believe the group is much of a threat to order
CDP was stockpiling weapons to prevent police from
patrolling CDP-controlled colonias in Ciudad Juarez.
drug trafficking through
CDP areas into the United States is a major source of
revenue for the group. Government officials claim to
have good sources within the group, and, according to
the Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, they have responded
to the public outcry over lawlessness in the CDP
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Secret
Major Radical Slumdweller Groups
Group and City
Established
Population
Tierra y Libertad
Monterrey
1971
40,000-100,000
Mazatlan
1974
2,400-3,000
Committee for
Popular Defense
Chihuahua
1973
13,000-50,000
Juarez
1976
12,000-50,000
Torreon
Unknown
20,000
Camargo
Unknown
500
neighborhoods by patrolling the formerly off-limits
areas. The tactics apparently are working and the
government is exercising much greater control over
the colonias.
There is little evidence of foreign involvement in the
CDP. Last year there were suggestions that senior
leaders, who often use Marxist rhetoric, received
limited financial aid from Cuba.
the government has put
some of these same leaders on its payroll, probably to
co-opt and gain control over the group.
CDP views toward the electoral process, which it had
condemned as corrupt, have changed. The group's
leaders decided to join forces with the Trotskyite
Revolutionary Workers Party, and it put forward six
candidates in the federal deputy elections in July in
Chihuahua. Participation by the CDP in the elections
was stormy; one of the candidates was slightly
wounded in an election-related scuffle, and a
preelection rally at the international bridge in Ciudad
Juarez got out of control and was broken up by the
police. None of the CDP candidates won, but the
group is considering running one of its leaders for
mayor of Ciudad Juarez in 1986.
CONAMUP-Diverse Grouping
Although not truly national in scope, the National
Coordinator of Popular Urban Movements
(CONAMUP) is a loose coalition of diverse groups
representing slumdwellers in many parts of Mexico.
The origin and leadership of CONAMUP is not well
established, but the group has met annually since
1979. CONAMUP has affiliated slum organizations
in the states of Guerrero, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca,
Chihuahua, and Chiapas, but has been most active in
the poor colonial in and around the Federal District.
CONAMUP has restricted its activities to relatively
nonviolent protests against deteriorating economic
conditions. For example, it has seized milk trucks and
distributed the contents in poor neighborhoods and
has organized marches and rallies with various 25X1
affiliated groups. CONAMUP also took part in
organizing a national work stoppage in mid-1984 that
attracted little support. Like the CDP, which has
loose ties to CONAMUP, the Revolutionary Workers
Party has made overtures to CONAMUP to join in a
leftwing coalition. 25X1
Outlook
The split in TyL and the involvement of the CDP in
the recent elections are classic examples of co-
optation by the Mexican system. The TyL faction
supporting local autonomy will continue to
demonstrate, but the offer of land titles and services
to the residents will probably prove effective and
essentially end the movement. The CDP, which had
established itself as a force to be reckoned with in the
state of Chihuahua, will probably become enmeshed
in local politics to serve the ends of its university-
educated leadership.
Organizations such as CONAMUP, which seek to
unify diverse local groups into a broad coalition of
urban poor, will not have a great deal of success
because of the disparate interests and goals of the
local leaders. CONAMUP, like the local groups that
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it is based on, will probably find itself allied with one
party or another in Mexico's shifting leftist political
movement. Although demonstrations and other
activities are likely to continue, it is unlikely that the
leaders of CONAMUP or other groups representing
the urban poor will find organized large-scale violence
a viable course of action.
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Secret
Venezuela: Perez's Precampaign
Maneuvers
ler President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela's
ng center-leftist politician, is pursuing an
ecedented second presidential term beginning in
1, but he faces determined opposition from
mbent President Lusinchi and other leaders of the
iocratic Action (AD) party's Orthodox faction.' In
I to broaden his base in the party, Perez has
crated his stand on some foreign policy issues. On
lomestic front, he has avoided attacking
nchi's economic austerity program but is now
icly intimating that the time has come for strong
rnsionary measures. Perez's prospects have been
inced by a recent domestic scandal that the US
rassy believes probably has eliminated his leading
1 as a viable candidate. Most party leaders are
)nvinced by Perez's tactical shifts, however, and
casting about for another candidate capable of
sating the former president's bid for the party's
tical Maneuvering on Foreign Policy
Venezuelan Constitution stipulates that past
;idents must wait at least 10 years before running
a second term. This rule has kept Perez, who left
;e in 1979, out of the presidential palace but not
of the public eye. Carefully avoiding
frontations with Lusinchi, he has thus far
centrated on public relations gambits. Earlier this
amer he completed a multicontinental road show
t took him to Algeria, China, and Japan. The trip
red the dual purpose of providing Perez with a
-ign policy platform outside of Venezuela and
finding the electorate that, even out of office, he is
'idely respected international figure.
president, Perez played an important role in
ping the Sandinistas come to power, but he has
ie Democratic Action party is made up of three factions of
.tively equal strength-the Orthodox faction associated with
sident Lusinchi, the labor faction led by party Secretary
feral Manuel Penalver, and the populist faction identified with
?los Andres Perez. The alliance between Orthodox and labor
iers within the party's National Executive Committee (CEN)
auently places the populist faction in a minority position on
increasingly distanced himself from the Ortega
government in recent months. Last summer he
arranged for the hospitalization in Venezuela of
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance leader Eden
Pastora and encouraged Pastora's press declarations.
In January, he declined to attend Daniel Ortega's
inauguration and instead dispatched a letter to
Managua that sharply criticized the Nicaraguan
elections. In April, Perez publicly supported President
Reagan's Central America peace initiative as the only
way to end the conflict in Nicaragua and return the
Sandinista revolution to its original objectives.
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25X1
Nevertheless, Perez remains considerably to the left
of Lusinchi on most major international issues. For
example, he advocates the normalization of
Venezuelan-Cuban relations and the creation of a
Latin American debtors' cartel, and is a strong
supporter of Guillermo Ungo, a leader of the
Salvadoran guerrillas' political front group. In a
meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone in
June, he asserted that US-Soviet confrontation over
Nicaragua, along with Latin America's accumulating
external debts, could endanger democracy in the
region, according to the US Embassy. This statement
is characteristic of Perez's present posture: blaming
both superpowers for Central America's problems but
implying that Latin America's creditors-above all,
the United States-are the main culprits.F---] 25X1
A senior AD official has told the US Embassy that
leaders of the party's Orthodox wing are concerned
over cooperation between Perez and Peruvian
President-elect Alan Garcia on a variety of issues,
including regional cooperation on Latin debt. These
leaders reportedly fear that, if Venezuela's oil
revenues fall sharply, the new foreign debt repayment
schedule would be jeopardized and populists within
the party, led by Perez, would gain support for
Venezuelan participation in a debtors' cartel.)
Secret
ALA LAR 85-017
2 August 1985
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Perez has also been mentioned as the key figure in a
proposed new Contadora-type group for Chile. In
addition to Venezuela, the group reportedly would
include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay.
In the unlikely event that such a group were to be
formed, Perez would not only have a limelight-
stealing diplomatic coup to his credit, but would also
enhance his image as a major Latin American
statesman.
Pushing Domestic Populism
On domestic matters, Perez appears through his
public pronouncements to be trying to nudge the
austerity-minded Lusinchi toward an expansionary
economic program and setting the stage for a populist
campaign that will focus on pocketbook issues. In
May, Perez publicly urged the government to show
"audacity" in its economic policies. He blamed the
previous Social Christian (COPEI) government of
Herrera Campins for the "monstrous" foreign debt
Lusinchi inherited, but said the country is ripe for an
economic resurgence.
Perez probably calculates that he is well positioned to
capitalize on the politics of optimism and progress. In
contrast to the recessionary gloom of recent years,
many Venezuelans probably remember the Perez
years from 1974 to 1979 as an era of unparalleled
prosperity. The US Embassy reports that Lusinchi,
meanwhile, seems determined to stick to his economic
game plan for a gradual recovery that will not
jeopardize Venezuela's international debt-
restructuring agreement, risk runaway inflation, or
discourage new investment. Given the likelihood that
Venezuela's economy will remain sluggish in 1986
and Perez's penchant for political expediency, he
probably will increase his populist rhetoric. Whether
he will directly criticize Lusinchi's economic policies
is unclear, but such a move almost certainly would
stiffen the President's resolve to prevent Perez's
nomination]
Opposition to Perez
Until recently Interior Minister Octavio Lepage, a
member of AD's Orthodox faction, appeared likely to
be Perez's strongest challenger for the party's
nomination. Lepage is a Lusinchi confidant, but party
leftists strongly distrust him and he lacks broad
popular appeal. In June Lepage was accused by a
leader of the major opposition party of illegally
accepting funds from Juan Vincente Perez Sandoval,
the former president of the Banco de Comercio, which
the Lusinchi government has recently placed in
receivership amid allegations of banking irregularities
and kickback payments to public officials. The US
Embassy believes that this episode has effectively
killed Lepage's presidential ambitions and that the
Orthodox faction will use the scandal to justify
seeking another candidate.
party Secretary General
Manuel Penalver has the inside track at this point to
secure the backing of the Orthodox faction. As
Venezuela's preeminent labor leader, he is one of the
few AD figures who might be able to hold his own
against Perez. Organized labor appears particularly
concerned that a Perez presidency would increase the
influence of the business elite at the expense of blue-
collar workers, and members of the country's largest
workers' confederation doubtless would
enthusiastically support Penalver's candidacy. The
leaders of the Orthodox faction are persuaded,
that a second Perez
presidency would be as corrupt as the first and that
the former president would destroy the power balance
among existing leaders and factions. They probably
would rally behind Penalver if he can demonstrate
broad voter appeal. Two prominent "ortodoxos," AD
President Gonzalo Barrios and Minister Secretary of
the Presidency Carmelo Lauria, have reportedly been
weighing the possibility of backing Penalver's
candidacy.
Outlook
Perez's anti-US orientation is well established and is
unlikely to change. His public remonstrations with the
Sandinistas-whether sincere or not-may bolster his
credibility among some party members. With internal
party elections scheduled for the end of the year, we
believe Perez will continue to strike moderate poses on
most foreign policy issues
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Secret
For their part, Lusinchi and his supporters-mindful
of Perez's popular appeal-probably will prepare for
party elections by maneuvering to retain key positions
in the party machine and its labor and peasant
affiliates. Down the road, however, they may face a
quandary, particularly if Penalver or another
moderate candidate fails to gain electoral momentum.
If the moderates insist on trying to block Perez's
nomination, we believe they risk splitting the party,
losing leverage over the left, and ultimately
jeopardizing AD's chances of retaining control of the
government in the next election. By acquiescing in
Perez's candidacy, however, they probably ensure
losing effective control of the party. In this context,
moderate ruling party stalwarts probably fear that, as
a second-term president, Perez might be able to
accomplish in a second term what he failed to do in
the first-remold the party in his own image.
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Panamanian Defense Forces Personnel
1968 1976 1983 1985 1990* 2000*
YEARS
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secret
Panama: Onward Panamanian
Soldiers
The Panamanian military has been modernizing its
forces ostensibly to prepare for defense of the Panama
Canal in the year 2000, when the US relinquishes
responsibility for it. More current and compelling
concerns include frontier security, support for Costa
Rica in the event of Nicaraguan aggression, a
potential influx of refugees, and drug trafficking. The
Defense Forces, however, have encountered opposition
to their upgrade as the new civilian government
struggles with escalating economic difficulties and
seeks to establish a preeminent position in
Panamanian politics.
Military Reorganization
In September 1983 the rubber-stamp Legislative
Council authorized the reorganization of the National
Guard into the Defense Forces of the Republic of
Panama (PDF). The restructuring was designed to
convert the Guard into a conventional military
institution better able to undertake defense of the
canal as stipulated in the Torrijos-Carter Treaties of
1977.
To provide the framework for its expanded
responsibilities, the new organization combined the
former Guard, its Air Force and Navy, a canal
defense force, and law enforcement units. Ground
units provide national defense, the Navy patrols
territorial waters to interdict drug smugglers and
illegal immigrants, and the Air Force is equipped for
observation and reconnaissance. The National Guard
retains its police and security functions, and other
departments handle investigatory and immigration
Although the title of supreme commander was legally
ascribed to the President, former chief of the Guard
Manuel Noriega immediately consolidated his power
as Commander in Chief at the head of the unified
force. He tried to identify himself with force
improvements in order to bolster his stature, and he
assigned loyal officers to key commands. Moreover, in
an effort to influence voters to elect the military's
handpicked presidential candidate in 1984, he
increased PDF civic action programs, including road
repairs, school construction, and other high-visibility
projects
Further Rationale for Military Preparedness
Although the canal treaties provided the initial
justification for the modernization of the PDF, the
deteriorating regional security situation has recently 25X1
given the effort added emphasis. For example,
Panama's intention to defend Costa Rica against
attack has taken on new meaning in light of
Nicaragua's military buildup and continuing
Sandinista border incursions. In late 1983,
more units and better training would be needed to
enable Panama to help defend Costa Rica. Noriega's
trips to confer with officials in San Jose, his visits to
the border, and the basing of the Army's newest
battalion along the Panamanian-Costa Rican 25X1
border-rather than in Colon as planned-reflect his
growing concern over Costa Rican security.
Concern over a future influx of refugees as a result of
the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua has
reinforced the military's mandate to enforce
immigration regulations and prevent illegal entry.
Officials are attempting to increase control over
foreign nationals entering the country because the
number already there are having an adverse impact
on employment and housing opportunities, according
to US defense attache reporting.
As Panama becomes more desirable as a transfer
point for narcotics moving from South America to the
United States and Europe, the military has been
challenged to do better in interdiction and drug
enforcement. Emphasis on drug smuggling by the
local media focuses further attention on the PDF. In a
Secret
ALA LAR 85-017
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briefing last winter for Colombian military officers,
Noriega pledged Panama would intensify its land, sea,
and air border patrols.
Improved Capabilities
As a key part of its reorganization, the military has
begun to increase its total strength in order to improve
tactical capabilities. By 2000, the PDF expects to
have 20,000 soldiers in uniform, according to US
Army Intelligence. Current strength is 12,500. The
plan includes using four combat battalions to protect
the canal and to increase patrols in border regions.
The first, a 600-man combined weapons battalion
staffed by skilled professionals, was established in
1984 and the formation of the second is anticipated in
September.
In addition, the military is developing combined
services operations for future defense responsibilities.
The US defense attache reports that in February the
PDF demonstrated its capability to conduct large-
scale military exercises without US assistance.
Coordinating operations in all 11 military zones, it
planned and executed amphibious and airborne
assaults and other tactical operations.
Force expansion has led to a dramatic increase in new
equipment and the formation of specialized units. The
military is setting up a maintenance battalion to work
on the growing inventory of heavy- and light-wheeled
vehicles. In recent years,
Panama has received military hardware
from not only the United States but also from the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Israel, and Brazil.
Although Panama does not produce military
equipment, it has been experimenting with the
manufacture of a light reconnaissance vehicle,
according to US Army Intelligence
Development of a professional military has also
entailed specialized training. The PDF is conducting
courses on military intelligence, radio
communications, and paramedic skills at the former
US Army School of the Americas. Our defense
attache reports that high-level officers have also been
studying ways of improving training for female
soldiers. Although Panama does not operate a
military academy, the PDF has been taking
advantage of military scholarships provided by Latin
American neighbors to develop officers. Military
maneuvers are practiced in annual joint US-Panama
Canal defense exercises to improve PDF logistic and
defense capabilities and reinforce frontier units. In
addition, training in combat techniques,
antiterrorism, commando tactics, and psychological
warfare is being provided by Israel, Peru, Venezuela,
Argentina, and Brazil, according to the US Embassy.
Political Fallout
Modernization and buildup of the Defense Forces
have continued despite the deteriorating economy,
austerity requirements, opposition outrage, and
civilian resentment. Noriega, however, has taken steps
to deflate the negative groundswell. Government
newspapers played up the PDF's first attempt to
combine sea, land, and air forces in military exercises
without US assistance to illustrate PDF readiness to
defend the canal. Similarly, an aggressive civic action
program has been undertaken to help stem
antimilitary sentiments. Partly as a result, Noriega
managed to ease the military budget request
successfully through the legislature amid popular
protest and even got a significant increase-12
percent for 1985. The PDF has pushed ahead with
major equipment purchases-including an Italian
patrol boat and a French helicopter-in spite of
stagnating economic growth and lenders' calls for
decreased public spending.
Outlook
Despite public disapproval, the buildup probably will 25X1
continue. The Defense Forces hold the power and
have influential supporters. Some civilian elements
probably also believe that the military can be
sufficiently distracted from political gamesmanship if
allowed the resources to professionalize. Moreover,
the military will be able to play on lingering fears of
increasing regional instability and the potential for
this instability to spill over into Panama at least in the
form of increasing refugees. In addition, opposition
elements are still too fragmented and disorganized to
deter Noriega from his plans.F____1 25X1
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Secret
Uruguay: The Return of the
Tupamaros
The far-left Movement for National Liberation,
generally known as the Tupamaros, has been
reorganizing since jailed members were freed by a
presidential amnesty shortly after Uruguay returned
to civilian rule in March. Some Tupamaros say they
now intend to pursue their goals within the framework
of the country's newly restored democratic political
system, but others remain committed to a return to
guerrilla violence,
Although they currently appear too weak in
numbers and organization to mount a major threat to
law and order, the Tupamaros could gain wider
backing if the new government is unable to halt
Uruguay's continuing economic decline. A resurgence
of Tupamaro violence could eventually lead the armed
forces to intervene again in the political arena
Background
The Tupamaros, named for an 18th-century Inca
Indian rebel, emerged as an urban guerrilla
organization in the 1960s. Their activities progressed
from Robin Hood-style bank robberies, purportedly
for the benefit of the poor, to kidnapings and murders
designed to undermine the democratic political system
and pave the way for creation of a radically socialist
society. By the early 1970s, the Tupamaros'
numerical strength had reached between 500 and
1,000, with an additional 2,000 to 5,000 collaborators,
according to open sources. When the civilian
government proved unable to combat the movement,
the armed forces assumed power in 1973 and cracked
down harshly. Most of the Tupamaros were either
killed, jailed, or driven into exile
Shortly after civilian rule was restored this March,
the new government of President Julio Sanguinetti
granted amnesty to all of Uruguay's approximately
300 political prisoners. Those released included
around 80 Tupamaros, according to US Embassy
reporting. Since then, members of the movement have
been holding meetings, planning strategy, and trying
to recruit new adherents.
Solid information on the current size of the movement
is lacking. we believe there
are no more than 300 members at present.
Factionalism
Differences between those Tupamaros who want to
work within Uruguay's political system for now and
those who advocate early resumption of the armed
struggle are impeding efforts to reinvigorate the
movement.
members of two factions-known as the Six Points
group and the 26th of March group-favor resuming
the armed struggle as soon as possible. It is unclear
whether these two groups are
completely separate or have overlapping
memberships.
he Six Points faction is led by Tupamaro
exiles living in Sweden, but some of its members have
returned to Uruguay.
In May, top Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic and some
of his colleagues issued a public statement
disassociating themselves from the more radical
factions
Sendic intends to concentrate for the
present on rebuilding the Tupamaros organization,
leaving armed struggle for sometime in the future.
the majority of the
Tupamaros believe the movement should join the
leftist Broad Front coalition, one of Uruguay's three
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main political parties.
while they were in prison many Tupamaros came
under the influence of the pro-Soviet Communist
Party, which participates in the Broad Front.
members of the Six Points
faction have had contact with a leader of the center-
left Blanco Party, Senator Juan Raul Ferreira, and
may have obtained Swedish financial assistance
through him
Organizational and Recruiting Efforts
Sendic and other Tupamaro leaders have taken a
number of steps to rebuild the movement. Shortly
after their release from prison, they called on
members to organize committees in neighborhoods
and workplaces and to begin preparing for a
Tupamaro "national convention" later this year. A
number of organizational and planning meetings have
already taken place,
Some of the emphasis evidently has
been on economic issues. According to press
reporting, the movement is calling for renunciation of
Uruguay's foreign debt, as advocated by Cuban
President Castro for all Latin American debtor
countries; nationalization of the banking system; and
expropriation of large landholdings.
The Tupamaros have also launched a recruiting
campaign, aimed primarily at younger people residing
in the interior of the country.
Tupamaro leaders believe that
discontent over Uruguay's economic troubles-
particularly over continuing inflation-is creating
opportunities for recruitment in a number of interior
areas.
Uruguayan
military officers are disturbed by the reemergence of
the Tupamaros, whom they regard as subversives.
some officers fear the Tupamaros will take violent
action against selected military personnel for human
rights abuses committed when the armed forces were
in power. Sendic has said he will seek prosecution and
punishment of all officers who were involved in the
military regime's antisubversive campaign,
Military leaders have generally supported Uruguay's
transition to civilian rule, and they do not appear
inclined to take any independent action soon against
either the Tupamaros or the Sanguinetti government
itself. This could change, however, in the event of a
resurgence of Tupamaro violence. The Army
Commander, General Medina, has stated publicly
that, while the military has no intention of staging
another takeover, neither will it permit the forces of
democracy to be overwhelmed by "enemies of the
state."
Outlook
The Tupamaros, in our judgment, currently lack the
popular support they would need to pose a serious
threat to Uruguayan stability. We also believe that
the factions favoring an early return to armed
struggle lack the capability to do so anytime soon.
Over the longer term, however, if Sanguinetti fails to
improve Uruguay's economic situation, we expect the
Tupamaros to gain wider support, become more
unified, and engage increasingly in the kinds of
violent activities that disrupted Uruguayan society in
the 1960s and early 1970s. Sanguinetti could
eventually feel compelled to crack down,
reimprisoning suspected Tupamaros and limiting
Uruguayans' political and civil liberties. If the civilian
government proved unable to deal effectively with a
growing Tupamaro threat, the military would be
tempted to seize power again.
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Secret
Latin America
Briefs
Argentina-United British Trade Ban Lifted
Kingdom
The United Kingdom announced in early July that it was unilaterally lifting its
ban on imports from Argentina, imposed during the Falklands war three years
ago. British Foreign Secretary Howe, visiting Brazil at the time of the
announcement, said the move was intended to improve Argentine-UK relations
and urged Buenos Aires to respond in a "constructive spirit." In its reply, the
Argentine Government did not offer a reciprocal gesture on trade, according to US
Embassy and press reporting, but instead called on London to begin negotiations
that would address the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands. The Argentines
offered to end the "state of war" that still exists between the two countries if the
British would agree to such negotiations
Talks between British and Argentine representatives last year in Switzerland-the
first attempt at direct dialogue since the war-broke down over the issue of
sovereignty. The British, in our view, will not be prepared to negotiate on this
question until considerably more time has elapsed since Argentina's attempt in
1982 to settle the dispute by force. For its part, President Alfonsin's elected
civilian government in Buenos Aires cannot abandon its insistence on negotiations
on sovereignty without suffering political setbacks at home. The Argentines,
nonetheless, would probably be willing to accept a negotiating agenda that
deferred the sovereignty issue, so long as some provision was made for its eventual
inclusion.
Argentina Impact of Budget Cuts on Navy
Cuts in the military budget are continuing to take a toll on the Argentine Navy. Its
program for building conventional submarines has been particularly hard hit. I
We expect the negotiation of new
payment terms to delay delivery of this ship-already behind schedule-for as
much as another year. In addition, work at Argentine shipyards on three other
TR-1700s is being delayed because industry officials are unable to buy supplies or
pay the West Germans for technical assistance. Completion of the first of these
Argentine-built submarines, originally scheduled for this year,
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In addition, cost-saving measures necessitated by the budget cuts have severely
reduced the Navy's personnel training and equipment maintenance. Two exercise
slowdown periods this year have restricted at-sea and naval flight trainin to what
one naval officer has described as "token opportunities."
These problems already have rendered the aircraft carrier
incapable of operating for extended periods
Efforts by the Navy to offset its budget problems by selling some of its ships to
foreign buyers have been unsuccessful so far. In the past six months
Buenos Aires has engaged in negotiations with Libya, Iran, and
several Asian countries on possible sales of Argentine submarines or other ships,
but no agreements have been reached. Iran appears interested in purchasing
Argentine submarines and destroyers, but Buenos Aires is reluctant to conclude a
deal with Tehran because of US opposition. Given the scant prospects for revenue-
producing sales and the likelihood of additional budget cuts under the new
financial austerity program announced by President Alfonsin in June, we expect
the Navy's capabilities to erode further.
Argentina-Iraq Aircraft Sale Stalled
the deal appears to
be stalled. The contract provides for the sale of 20 Pucaras along with bombs and
spare parts, as well as training for Iraqi mechanics and flight personnel.
the contract was signed in April by Iraqi officials and
representatives of Argentina's government-owned Military Aircraft Factory
(FMA), but that it has not been approved by top levels of the Argentine
Government.
The Alfonsin administration is facing considerable pressure both for and against
the sale. Aircraft industry officials and their supporters within the government
argue that the sale would boost the industry's revenues at a time when financial
stringencies have forced the government to cut back purchases of military aircraft.
Baghdad has pressed Argentina to honor the contract, while Iran has officially
protested the sale and is threatening to reduce its substantial purchases of
nonmilitary goods from Argentina if the deal is completed.
President Alfonsin wants to avoid alienating Iran or Iraq and is
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