LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301660002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 7, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Latin America
Review 25X1
The results of the legislative and municipal elections of 31 March
present El Salvador with an unprecedented opportunity to further
democratization, address major economic and social problems, and
seek an end to the civil war.
The attention paid to the visit of Algerian President Benjedid
demonstrates the high priority Havana places on retaining ties to
Algeria. For its part, Algiers will pay lipservice to Cuban interests
while looking for ways to deemphasize the relationship.
Trinidad and Tobago is becoming an increasingly important
transshipment point for narcotics destined for North American and
European markets. At the same time, marijuana and cocaine use
has markedly increased in the country.
We have evidence, mainly from open sources, that a little over a
year ago, Sendero Luminoso insurgents established their first formal
international ties by joining a fledgling Maoist organization, the
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret
ALA LAR 85-012
7 June 1985
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El Salvador:
Assessing the Elections
The results of the legislative and municipal elections
of 31 March present El Salvador with an
unprecedented opportunity to further
democratization, address major economic and social
problems, and seek an end to the civil war. The degree
to which these goals are feasible, however, depends
heavily on a major commitment from all sectors
toward conciliation and compromise. President
Duarte and the ruling Christian Democrats will have
to move cautiously with their progressive agenda. In
our view, their election did not so much reflect a
reformist shift in the country as it did popular
recognition of government authority and the
opposition's lack of an effective campaign.F-~
Election Results
The scope of the Christian Democratic victory is
underscored by its contrast with the 1982 legislative
elections. In 1982, the Christian Democrats garnered
only 40 percent of the vote and 24 of 60 Assembly
seats. This year's balloting provided them with a 53-
to 47-percent margin of victory over the conservative
opposition, and 33 Assembly seats. They also
captured 153 of the country's 262 municipalities and
11 of 14 department capitals
some
Christian Democrats claim that the election reflects a
shift of historic political dimensions. They argue that
this shift has been latent at least since the 1972
election fraud, in which the slim plurality of then
presidential candidate Duarte was reversed by the
Central Elections Council in favor of the military
candidate, and that subsequent conservative voting
patterns largely stemmed from rightist intimidation.
These spokesmen suggest that only after Duarte was
elected president last year and the armed forces
proved they could serve impartially did the citizenry
become convinced that real socioec
political change was being offered.
While we believe the 1985 election was an important
part of El Salvador's transition to democracy, it does
not appear to represent a sea change in the body
politic. For one thing, the 66-percent voter turnout
was considerably lower than the 80 percent of the
eligible voters who cast ballots in the 1982 and 1984
elections. This was due in part to the success of the
guerrillas in interdicting the road system and
intimidating travelers from attempting to reach their
villages of birth in order to vote. The lower turnout
also reflected apathy toward this third electoral
contest in 11 months, which inconveniently took place
at the outset of the Easter holiday week and was
governed by a new electoral law that made voting a
"noncompulsory" exercise. Furthermore, a variety of
US Embassy sources indicates that moderate rightist
National Conciliation Party (PCN) constituents
throughout the country abstained from voting because
they rejected a coalition arrangement with Roberto
D'Aubuisson's extremist Nationalist Republican
Alliance (ARENA). In some areas of the east, for
example, abstentionism on the part of PCN
supporters was said to be as high as 30 percent, while
the Christian Democrats appeared to have suffered
only a 5-percent rate of "no shows."
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Nevertheless, in a system where low turnouts have
previously favored conservative parties, the Christian
Democrats did remarkably well, largely because they 25X1
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mobilized their rank and file. Moreover, US Embassy
reporting indicates that the Christian
Democrats benefited from their status as the party in
power, particularly in the countryside where voters
traditionally give the ruling party the benefit of the
doubt, regardless of its actual platform.
Opportunities and Challenges
Notwithstanding the factors that led to the Christian
Democratic triumph, the results hold important
implications. For the first time in the nation's history,
a popularly elected civilian president has a working
majority in the Assembly and a military
establishment that generally appears committed to
the constitutional process. Concurrently, the popular
strength of the extreme right and left has been further
undermined. A process of internal unraveling could
take place in these camps, especially if the Christian
Democrats forge a workable relationship with
moderate elements in the political and economic
sectors. Foreign diplomatic and material support to
the government could also increase, particularly if the
Duarte administration continues to make progress on
human rights issues and develops a coherent national
strategy for political and economic stability. To these
ends, a variety of US Embassy sources
indicates Duarte will seek some accommodation with
the moderate right and attempt to split the socialist
left from the Marxist-Leninist insurgency.
Disarray in the far right ARENA party, which lost
big in the March election, will provide the Christian
Democrats with an opportunity to win support from
the moderate right. According to the US Embassy,
ARENA pragmatists led by party cofounder Hugo
Barrera plan to announce soon the formation of a new
conservative party that will attempt to absorb
moderate rightists while isolating the hardliners led
by D'Aubuisson. Meanwhile, the conservative PCN,
as a result of its ill-fated election coalition with
ARENA, has ousted Secretary General
Raul Molina and replaced him with the more
progressive Hugo Carillo, who favors cooperation with
the Christian Democrats.
Duarte's handling of his rightist opposition will
determine in part his relationship with the private
sector and the prospects for economic recovery. In the
aftermath of the March election, conservative
businessmen are concerned about the government's
economic strategy, and probably will continue their
wait-and-see approach toward investment in the hope
that Duarte will allow for private-sector input into
economic decision making.
Planning Minister Chavez Mena is
working behind-the-scenes to effect new economic
policies that will address the concerns of domestic
businessmen and foreign investors. Vice President
Castillo Claramount is pressing his boss to dedicate
more time to safeguarding private-sector interests.
Duarte's recent announcement of relaxed government
regulations of the coffee industry was heavily favored
by the President's economic advisers.
On the left, Duarte believes the election represented a
popular mandate to search for a peaceful solution to
the war, but he also knows that he must do so without
allowing the insurgents to manipulate the dialogue
process, which would give the right an issue to use
against him. He is therefore seeking preliminary
private discussions with insurgent representatives to
determine a basic agenda for a third round of talks.
Press reports indicate that President Duarte is
communicating with the guerrillas through church
intermediaries to urge "humanization" of the war, a
reference to curtailing terrorism and attacks on
civilian and economic targets.
We believe pursuit of dialogue reflects Duarte's hope
that non-Marxist political elements can be split from
the Marxist majority in the insurgent alliance.
Although highly unlikely in the near term, prospects
for such a separation have been improved by signs of
growing dissension within guerrilla ranks in the wake
of the elections
=non-Marxist insurgent spokesman Guillermo
Ungo believes the hardline guerrilla leadership has
erred in attempting to negate the Salvadoran election
and deride its results.
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apparently feels that the Christian Democratic victory
at the polls will allow Duarte to deal more flexibly
with the guerrillas in future talks.
Nevertheless, guerrilla hardliners recognize that
whatever political leverage they have flows from their
capabilities to use violence. To this end, they
reportedly intend to escalate harassment operations in
the cities in the hope of pressuring Duarte back to the
peace table. They currently are engaged in a
campaign of threats and kidnaping against Christian
Democratic mayors, particularly in the east
Outlook
The landslide victory of the Christian Democrats
suggests both opportunities and pitfalls for El
Salvador's fledgling democracy. President Duarte and
his party can legitimately claim they have received a
popular mandate to end the civil war and revitalize
the economy. Beyond that, the nation remains deeply
divided as to the means to achieve these goals. The
vote for the Christian Democrats does not, in our
view, reflect a groundswell of grassroots support for a
specific reformist agenda. Indeed, the Christian
Democrats have yet to develop a comprehensive
strategy to address the fundamental problems facing
the country. In effect, the ruling party is likely to
continue dealing with national issues on a largely ad
hoc basis, as it determines to what degree it will
accommodate the priorities of the conservative
opposition, the private sector, and the armed forces in
order to stay in power.
With economic issues becoming increasingly critical,
we judge that Duarte's pragmatic side will dominate
the idealistic, at least in the near term. Social welfare
programs probably will remain underfinanced and
poorly managed, and dialogue with the guerrillas is
unlikely to spawn any major breakthroughs. At the
same time, however, firebrand reformists within
Christian Democratic ranks, labor organizations, and
the church are likely to resist any perceived
backsliding by Duarte from election results they feel
justify more radical socioeconomic and political
change
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Cuba-Algeria:
Deteriorating Relations?
The presentation to visiting Algerian President
Bendjedid of the Order of Jose Marti-the highest
award Cuba gives to a foreigner-signals Havana's
intensified courting of one of its traditionally most
valued allies. Cuban and Algerian ties date back to
1963 when President Castro sent combat troops to
Algeria to demonstrate solidarity in that country's
border dispute with Morocco. Throughout the years
Havana has closely identified with Algeria's radical
positions on numerous Third World issues. At the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Algiers in
1973 Algeria played an important role in helping
Cuba to gain influence in the organization and paved
the way for Castro's chairmanship of the movement
from 1979 to 1983. F___1
Since Algerian President Bendjedid came to power in
1979, however, Algeria has resisted Havana's efforts
to gain support for Cuban political objectives and to
increase economic ties. Throughout Castro's
chairmanship of the NAM, the Algerians attempted
to check Castro's efforts to define the movement in
pro-Soviet terms. More recently, Havana has suffered
diplomatic snubs by the Algerians as well.
the Cuban Prensa Latina
staff in Algiers has been asked to vacate its residence
so it can be turned into an Algerian official's
residence. Algeria also announced its intention to
replace Cuban medical personnel in Algeria with
Chinese medics, charging that the Cuban doctors
lacked even rudimentary medical skills. Such
incidents, coupled with Algiers' recent warming to the
United States, have worried Havana.
Cuba's uncharacteristic tolerance of these slights
demonstrates the high priority Havana places on
retaining ties to Algeria. Termination of relations
would cause Havana to lose an important political
link to the Arab world and a strong ally in the UN.
Algeria's move Westward would also be seen in
Havana as a major loss for the Nonaligned
Movement, inasmuch as Algiers historically had been
one of the most radical members of that organization.
For these reasons Cuba has so far swallowed its
Algerian President Bendjedid speaks with
President Castro after being awarded Cuba's
political pride and concentrated on reinvigorating
relations and gaining support for Cuban political
goals during the recent Bendjedid visit to Cuba.F-
Playing on Algeria's Socialist Credentials
Castro reportedly encouraged Algeria to become more
involved in Central American issues, perhaps hoping
that appeals to Algiers' anti-imperialist traditions
may help redirect what Havana sees as a tilt to the
West.
Havana hoped
to persuade Bendjedid to include Nicaragua in his trip
this September to various Latin American countries
to show Algeria's socialist bloc allies that he is
resisting US pressure not to go there. Havana
reportedly also attempted to interest Bendjedid in an
agreement in which Algerian security personnel
would gradually replace withdrawn Cuban security
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7 June 1985
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advisers in Nicaragua. Although we do not yet know
whether such a pitch was made,
Bendjedid rejected the idea of military support to the
Nicaraguan Government.
According to press reports, however, the Cubans did
succeed in having Bendjedid meet in Havana with
Nicaraguan National Directorate member Bayardo
Arce and agree to host a Nicaraguan delegation to
discuss combating the US trade embargo. In addition,
increased Algerian economic aid to Nicaragua was
not rejected.
Cuban officials also probed the visiting delegation on
Algeria's commitment to the Polisario Front, which
has been carrying on a guerrilla campaign for several
years against Morocco for control of the disputed
Western Sahara region.
the Cubans, who have provided
medical assistance, political support, and paramilitary
training to the Polisario since the 1970s, indicated
willingness again to send arms and advisers to assist
the Polisario. The offer was rejected by
Bendjedid.
Stalled Economic Programs
The Cubans probably pressed Bendjedid to move on a
variety of stalled bilateral economic agreements to
gain much-needed hard currency and expand the
Cuban presence in Algeria.
In this regard, Algerian officials deflected Cuban
requests for increased purchases of Cuban
agricultural products in the absence of increased
purchases of Algerian petroleum products. Havana
has been negotiating, without success thus far, to
establish a joint shipping line and to cooperate in
producing canned vegetables. Cuba also is concerned
about a suspended agreement that allowed Cubans to
work in Algeria in the animal husbandry field and
reportedly would like to revive negotiations on
improving Algeria's Biskra Airport and on disputed
financing for construction of 800 housing units in Bou
Saada. Moreover, it is anxious to increase the number
of Cubans working on foreign projects and for foreign
companies in Algeria.
Havana is faced with pressure from the Soviets to get
its economic house in order, and it probably is
frustrated that more than 20 years of relations with
Algeria have failed to produce significant economic
benefits. The reported establishment of a Cuban-
Algerian bank indicates nonetheless that Havana still
desires to accelerate economic activity between the
two nations.
Outlook
Despite efforts focused on Bendjedid, the lack of
media information on the visit suggests that few of
Castro's goals were achieved. Granma's banner
headlines of Bendjedid's imminent arrival and daily
activities were followed by neither a joint
communique nor any announcement of signed
agreements. It appears that, at best, relations will
remain in their current state while Havana maneuvers
for greater influence. Algeria's appearance as a
political ally and potential economic partner means
Havana will endure brushoffs while looking for other
ways to influence Algeria's policy trend. F_~
Cuba may resort to techniques it has used successfully
with other recalcitrant countries-third party
leverage or cultivation of an ally in the Algerian
Government to promote Havana's interests. Cuba
might also try to bring its reluctant ally back into the
socialist camp by using disinformation to discredit the
United States in the eyes of the Algerians. Castro
probably would find this option particularly appealing
because it could check Algeria's Westward moves
while publicly reducing US political stature.
Regardless of the backdoor approaches taken, Cuba
probably will continue to express solidarity with
Algeria and intensify diplomatic overtures in the
hopes of tangible economic and political rewards.
Havana is unlikely to risk a public schism with such
an important ally.
For its part, the Bendjedid government will continue
to pay lipservice to Cuban interests while looking for
ways to deemphasize the relationship. Algiers
probably believes that the appearance of good
relations with Havana will placate Moscow's growing
concern that Algeria is drifting too close to the West.
Algeria, however, has made a commitment to ease its
dependence on Soviet military equipment as well as to
acquire more Western economic assistance. To this
end, Algiers is trying to expand bilateral trade with
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the United States and Latin America, and has
probably assessed that a close identification with
Cuban policy, especially in Nicaragua, would not
serve its interests in this respect
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Trinidad and Tobago:
Growing Narcotics
Trafficking and Use F
Trinidad and Tobago is becoming an increasingly
important transshipment point for narcotics destined
for North American and European markets. At the
same time, the use of marijuana and cocaine has
markedly increased in the country. The government
apparently wants to curb the drug problem but is
hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency and a shortage
of police manpower. We believe that the worsening
economy and the proliferation of trafficking networks
are major causes of the narcotics activity and that the
problem will grow worse unless the government
develops the capacity for more effective eradication
and interdiction operations.
Transit Routes and Traffickers
According to a US State Department study, cocaine
entering Trinidad originates mainly in Colombia and
transits the country through Venezuelan ports located
along the Orinoco River and the Gulf of Paria. Some
marijuana reportedly may also be coming from
Jamaica. Commercial and private aircraft and ships
are the major means of transshipment, according to
the US Embassy. The Embassy indicates that the
towns of Carupano and Macuro in northern
Venezuela are the most likely sources for waterborne
narcotics traffic. Trinidadian customs officials have
told Embassy officials that freight containers have
been equipped with false walls to accommodate
The Narcotics Threat
Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in the
international drug scene has increased sharply in the
past few years. US Embassy and DEA officials in the
region report that the two-island nation has become
particularly important as a transshipment point for
cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe. We believe several factors have
escalated the country's role as a drug transshipper,
supplier, and market:
? US and Colombian interdiction efforts in the
Windward Passage between Jamaica and Cuba
have prompted traffickers to shift to new transit
areas from South America.
? The country's inadequate law enforcement,
abundance of secluded harbors, and location
between the major suppliers to the south and
markets to the north have encouraged traffickers to
use Trinidad as a drug transshipment center or
refueling stop.
? The favorable climate and availability of secluded
growing sites facilitate marijuana production.
? The four-year-old recession in Trinidad's oil-based
economy has increased the attractiveness of illegal
drug operations to some Trinidadians.
narcotics contraband.
some vessels
carrying marijuana and cocaine sail from Colombia to
Trinidad. The boats then proceed north into the
Atlantic Ocean along the Antillean chain or transfer
their cargo to "motherships" for the trip north. The
US Embassy in Guyana has indicated that Jamaican
marijuana traffickers may be using an indirect route
from Jamaica to Trinidad via Guyana because ships
and aircraft traveling directly between Jamaica and
Trinidad are suspected of drug smuggling.
Piarco International Airport, Trinidad's only such
facility, provides a major intermediate point for drug
transshipments, especially cocaine from South
America, according to the Embassy. Trinidadian
officials have indicated that traffickers posing as
businessmen or tourists traveling on commercial
airlines are smuggling cocaine and small amounts of
marijuana through the airport, near Port of Spain.
We have no credible evidence that Trinidad's drug
dealers or traffickers control large, sophisticated
operations. Instead, we believe Trinidadians act as
middlemen or local distributors for the South
American-controlled narcotics rings. For example,
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the US Embassy in Port of Spain indicated in 1983
that a Venezuelan drug ring may be smuggling
cocaine into the United States through Trinidad.
recent US State Department study concluded that
increased interdiction efforts along traditional routes
over the past year have prompted Colombian
traffickers to find new routes. Consequently, we
believe that Trinidad is increasingly being viewed by
some traffickers as a safer alternative to traditional
routes.
Domestic Production
An Embassy source reports that marijuana-the only
narcotic substance produced in Trinidad and
Tobago-traditionally has been cultivated in central
Trinidad between the towns of Biche and Rio Claro.
This remote region, thinly populated and sheltered by
dense forests and steep hills, makes detection difficult.
Recent eradication efforts have encouraged a shift in
some production to Trinidad's north coast, where
dense forests and rugged terrain facilitate cultivation.
The same source reports that individual growers
rather than organized trafficking rings are responsible
for most cultivation.
Despite police crackdowns, production remains high.
Police claim to have seized 1.1 metric tons of cured
marijuana and to have destroyed 7.4 million
marijuana plants early in 1984, but the Embassy
reports that bumper harvests this year have lowered
street prices. According to Embassy reporting, a
Trinidadian police source has described marijuana
plots as typically less than one-quarter acre in size.
Police narcotics officers have told Embassy officials
that marijuana cultivation on Trinidad alone
encompasses a maximum of 800 acres producing two
crops a year.
Drug Abuse
The domestic drug problem seems to be a relatively
recent phenomenon. Virtually all marijuana produced
locally is consumed there, according to US officials in
the country. According to Embassy reporting, sales
are clustered around Port of Spain, San Fernando,
Arima, and Rio Claro, but marijuana can be
on addiction rates.
purchased easily throughout the country. Although
the use of drugs has grown rapidly since the early
1980s, according to Embassy and US Defense
Department reports, no official statistics are available
however, that 30 to 40 percent of Trinidadian youth
currently use marijuana and that, more alarmingly,
10 to 20 percent use cocaine. The US Embassy
composite of police and health official data indicates
that the country consumed 100,000 pounds of
marijuana and 300 pounds of cocaine in 1984, but we
believe these estimates are low. Marijuana and
cocaine appear to be the only narcotics substances
abused on a large scale, although
heroin and angel dust (PCP)
Government Response
Sensitive to its international image, the government of
Prime Minister George Chambers over the past year
has become increasingly concerned about the rise in
drug activity. According to the US Embassy, this
attention stems in part from extensive publicity about
drug trafficking activities elsewhere in the region-
particularly in The Bahamas, where involvement by
officials in narcotics trafficking has led to widespread
public criticism of the Pindling government. The
Trinidadian Government reportedly is keenly aware
that the small Caribbean islands are ideally suited as
transit points for illegal trade and that many officials
can be easily tempted to augment their incomes by
some degree of participation.
Despite the government's concern, numerous
obstacles have slowed progress in curbing the drug
problem. The United States since 1976 has been the
only foreign country providing narcotics control
training to Trinidadian officials. According to the US
Embassy, Trinidadian participation in US training
programs has been poor because of the inefficiency
that has long typified the local bureaucracy.
Administrative delays and lack of coordination among
the various ministries have hindered other government
efforts to deal with the problem. Of the four agencies
contributing to narcotics control in Trinidad and
Tobago, the police, immigration, and coast guard are
responsible to the Minister of National Security;
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customs answers to the Ministry of Finance and
Planning. Coordination between customs and the
other agencies reportedly is poor because of jealousy
and mistrust between the two ministries. Lax customs
and immigration procedures at airports and seaports
have further hindered progress. Moreover, no official
treatment programs for addicts currently exist in the
country.
A special police narcotics squad is responsible for
directing arrests for narcotics possession and
trafficking. When the squad was formed in 1977, its
primary activities consisted of periodic forays into the
countryside to destroy marijuana plants and
occasional visits to public schools to conduct drug
education. In response to the rise in drug activity, the
12-man squad was upgraded in late 1983 and put
under the direction of an assistant superintendent and
an inspector. Raids on traffickers and growers last
year resulted in large seizures of marijuana and
cocaine that have helped to focus the attention of the
government and populace on the narcotics problem.
Nevertheless, the head of the narcotics squad has
complained to Embassy personnel of the ease with
which even those relatively few traffickers arrested
can obtain bail regardless of the charges against them
or their prior arrest records. He notes the difficulty in
obtaining strong criminal convictions against them
because Trinidad's bail regulations do not restrict
travel of those charged in drug-related activities. As a
result, local authorities are unable to halt flight to
avoid prosecution
According to the US Embassy, the courts are lenient
in their treatment of possession of illegal drugs,
particularly marijuana. Offenders are aided by the
heavy backlog of court cases and are generally fined
less than $200. Moreover, several policemen have
complained to Embassy officials that influence
peddling among judges and politicians makes
conviction of large-scale dealers nearly impossible.
According to the Embassy, however, no high-ranking
elected officials have been implicated in drug-related
activities.
The circumstances surrounding the removal of Police
Commissioner Randolph Burroughs from his post
earlier this year lend credence to growing charges of
corruption in the police force.
government investigation implicated Burroughs in
US officials report that the identities of several drug
traffickers in Trinidad are well known, and their
ability to operate without police interference has
prompted widespread suspicion of police protection,
particularly from Burroughs. Larger scale marijuana
growers and drug traffickers reportedly have paid as
much as 10 percent of their profits for police
protection, while well-publicized raids were conducted
against those refusing to pay. The chief of the
narcotics squad has told US Embassy officials that he
believes the allegations against Burroughs are true.
Outlook
We foresee little prospect that Trinidad and Tobago's
involvement in drug activities will be substantially
curtailed in the next few years. Major factors in our
analysis are the expected further downturn in the
Trinidadian economy and the demonstration effect of
existing trafficking networks that encourages
Trinidad to be used as an alternate path when
interdiction efforts intensify along more traditional
routes. According to press reports, Crown Point
Airport on Tobago is being upgraded from a small
airstrip to an international facility to promote
tourism. We believe the refurbished airport-
completion is scheduled in March 1986-is likely to
become an attractive alternative point for narcotics
traffickers. Moreover, the government's insufficent
manpower and material resources are likely to
continue to handicap eradication efforts. This is
reflected by the failure so far this year to implement a
vigorous marijuana eradication program. According
to the Embassy, only isolated raids are likely to occur.
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Peru:
Incipient Foreign Support
for Sendero Luminoso
Since 1980 Sendero Luminoso (SL) has been waging
an insurgency in Peru without the benefit of
assistance from abroad in the form of arms, training,
or funding. Despite occasional allegations by Peruvian
officials and the foreign media that SL receives
support from the Soviet Bloc or Cuba, there is no
corroborative evidence. Indeed, Peruvian security
officials-including the Minister of War-have told
US officials privately that they have no evidence of
from open sources, that a little over a year ago, SL
established its first formal international ties by joining
a fledgling Maoist organization, the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement (RIM). RIM's member
parties are small, and it does not appear sufficiently
well funded at this point to be able to offer significant
financial assistance, but the relationship will bear
watching in the months ahead.
praising the conference communique and declaring its
intent to "join forces" with the "international
proletariat." By March 1984 SL formally affiliated
with RIM at its second international meeting held in
London, at which time the membership had grown to
at least 18 (see table).
By late last year, according to unclassified documents,
RIM members had helped form pro-SL support
groups in the United States, and France, and had
begun distributing propaganda published by SL and
RIM. The New York Police Department believes that
an SL support group almost certainly staged a
demonstration and attempted a break-in last month at
the Peruvian Consulate in New York, according to
the US Mission at the United Nations. This was the
first such action on behalf of SL outside Peru. Soon
thereafter, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry expressed
concern to US officials about a death threat by phone
to the Peruvian Consulate in Los Angeles, issued
apparently by the SL's North American ally in the
RIM, the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA. For
its part, SL has publicized the existence and
Evolution of Sendero's Ties to RIM
RIM was the outgrowth of an international
conference of 13 Maoist parties convened in the fall of
1980-probably in Paris-under the auspices of the
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, and the now
defunct Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile.
Reflecting the participants' Maoist orientation, the
conference communique attacked not only
"imperialist" Western governments but also the
"revisionist" Soviets, Vietnamese, and Cubans, as
well as the Albanians and Chinese. Soon after the
conference one of the two British groups that attended
began publishing an international journal, A World to
Win. In May 1982 the journal published a message
from the "Political Bureau, Regional Committee
Tupac Amaru of the Communist Party of Peru" '
' SL's full name is The Communist Party of Peru on the Shining
Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui's Thought. It is separate from the
pro-Moscow Peruvian Communist Party that has condemned SL's
use of violence. There is no evidence of a connection between the
Tupac Amaru Regional Committee of SL and the newly formed
objectives of RIM in Peru.
RIM's Value to SL
Several factors indicate that RIM's ability to assist
SL is limited. There is no evidence that either RIM or
its members receive support from any foreign
government, and its strident verbal assaults on
governments of virtually every political orientation
hardly invite such assistance. The evident smallness of
most RIM affiliates, the fact that leaders of several
are exiled from their native countries, and their
narrow ideological focus suggest they are unable to
mobilize significant material resources
Nevertheless, SL loses nothing by consorting with
these foreign friends and can benefit from whatever
support they provide. SL has acknowledged publicly
RIM's positive impact on the morale of its cadre, and
the incidents in New York and Los Angeles
Secret
ALA LAR 85-012
7 June 1985
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Groups Associated With Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement
Bangladesh Proletarian Party of
Purba Bangla
Ceylon Ceylon Communist N. Sanmugathasan,
Party General Secretary
China Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninist)
Chile Revolutionary Apparently living in
Communist Party Paris
of Chile
Colombia Communist Party of
Colombia
(Marxist-Leninist),
Mao Tsetung
Regional Committee
Revolutionary
Communist Group of
Colombia
Denmark Mao Tsetung
Kredsen
Dominican Revolutionary Wilberto Ventura
-Republic Communist Union
Signed Signed Comments
1980 Joint 1984 RIM
Communique Declaration
General Secretary participated in
March 1984 press conference in
London where formation of RIM
was discussed. Said he had visited
USSR three times. Publishes
Kamkarua (Worker).
A "clandestine document from the
Central Committee" was published
in the May 1981 issue of A World
to Win. The document defended
Mao's widow and attacked the pre-
sent Chinese regime.
Participated in drafting 1980 Joint
Communique, and contributed
strongly worded anti-Soviet article
"Some Particularities of Contem-
porary Pro-Soviet Revisionism" to
the May 1981 issue of A World to
Win. Not heard from since then.
Designation Mao Tsetung Regional
Committee indicates this party has
split off from the Communist Party
of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist),
which is the political arm of the
Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in-
surgent group. EPL and its political
arm are still friendly toward China
and Albania.
Publishes Alborada Comunista
(Communist Dawn), datelined Bo-
gota. Criticized EPL for being
"pro-Hoxha," that is, friendly to-
ward Albanian regime. Criticized
those Colombian insurgent groups
that agreed to truce with
government.
No other information available.
Formed in September 1980 as a
split from the Democratic Popular
Movement. US Embassy Santo Do-
mingo estimated its membership in
1982 as no more than 25 to 50.
Publishes newspaper La Chispa
Revolucionaria (Revolutionary
Spark).
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Groups Associated With Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement (continued)
For the Proletarian
International
Haitian Internation-
al Revolutionary
Group
Communist Party K. Chittaranjam
of India (Marxist- (also spelled Chittan-
Leninist), Central jam)
Revolutionary Narbhinder Singh
Community Party, Jagjit Cheema
India
Union of Iranian Ferhad Safinya
Communists
(Sarbedaran)
Proletarian Com
munist Organization
(Marxist-Leninist)
Communist Collec-
tive of Agit/Prop
Communist Com
mittee of Trento
Signed Signed
1980 Joint 1984 RIM
Communique Declaration
Contributed articles to the May
1981 and May 1982 issues of A
World to Win. The second, strongly
critical of Soviet policy toward Po-
land, was accompanied by a state-
ment indicating the group had
dissolved.
Published a French-language bro-
chure in mid-1984 criticizing the
orthodox, pro-Moscow Haitian
Communist Party for inactivity and
stressing its affiliation with the
RIM.
Committee formed in 1979. Its
newspaper is Mass Line. Chittar-
anjan denied entry to the United
Kingdom for March 1984 meeting
where RIM was formed.
March-April 1984 issue of its jour-
nal, The Communist View Point,
reprinted several RIM documents.
Statement submitted to RIM
harshly criticized "religious despo-
tism" of Khomeini regime, includ-
ing regime policies toward Kurdish
minority.
No. 1, 1985 issue of A World to
Win identifies this committee as a
member of RIM but it is not listed
in the 1984 RIM Declaration.
Party was scheduled to join the two
Indian member groups for a joint
demonstration in Delhi in May
1984.
Statement published in May 1982
issue of A World to Win repeatedly
uses first person singular-suggest-
ing group is minuscule.
Nepal Communist
Party (Mashal)
New Zealand New Zealand Red
Flag Group
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Groups Associated With Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement (continued)
Peru Communist Party of Abimael Guzman
Peru (Sendero (Comrade Gonzalo)
Luminoso)
Senegal Marxist-Leninist
Group of Senegal
Spain Marxist-Leninist
Union of Struggle
Turkey Communist Party of Delal Kamaci
Turkey (Marxist-
Leninist)
United Nottingham Com-
Kingdom munist Group
Stockport Com-
munist Group
(?) Revolutionary
Communist Group
United Revolutionary Com- Bob Avakian
%aies munist Party, USA Carl Dix
Note: RIM is attempting to recruit other members, such as the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New
People's Army.
Signed
1980 Joint
Communique
Signed
1984 RIM
Declaration
Comments
Launched insurgency in May 1980.
Political Bureau of Sendero Lu-
minoso's Tupac Amaru Regional
Committee sent February 1981 let-
ter, published in May 1982 issue of
A World to Win, indicating solidar-
ity with international movement.
French media reported in Novem-
ber 1984 that SL representatives
had organized a support group in
France in early 1983. Support
groups appear to be functioning in
at least two US cities, Berkeley,
California, and New York City.
RCP, USA distributes SL propa-
ganda in at least 12 US locations.
No further information.
Formed in 1977. Used the name
Group for Defense of Marxism-
Leninism when it signed the 1980
Joint Communique. Its statement
published in May 1981 issue of A
World to Win endorsed national
self-determination for Basques,
Catalans, Galicians, and Canary
Islanders.
Represented party at March 1984
meeting where RIM was formed.
Biographic profile indicates she
was then 29, of Kurdish extraction,
and was "carrying out her revolu-
tionary work in West Germany"-
suggesting that the party's leader-
ship is also in exile.
Published May 1981 and May
1982 issues of A World to Win.
Used name Marxist-Leninist Col-
lective in signing 1980 Joint
Communique.
Uses same London mailing address
as RIM Information Bureau and
No. 1, 1985 issue of A World to
Win. However, its manifesto is pro-
Soviet, not Maoist.
Probably the main driving force
behind formation of RIM. Ex-
presses unconditional support for
SL. Avakian living in France since
1980. Dix represented party at
March 1984 London meeting
where RIM was formed.
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demonstrate that pro-SL groups may indirectly
further the insurgents' cause by harassing Peruvian
diplomatic missions and other officials in the United
States and elsewhere
Outlook
Over the longer term, RIM's potential for aiding
insurgencies in Peru or elsewhere depends on its
success in persuading groups already engaged in such
conflicts-groups with numerous supporters and
significant resources-that they stand to gain by
joining the movement and supporting its international
objectives. No present RIM member except SL fits
that category, but the movement is publicly
attempting to recruit some who do, including the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the New People's Army, with a
combined membership of about 60,000. The evident
ideological affinity between RIM members and the
CPP-for example, the CPP and SL each use the
same three Maoist texts for cadre training and their
party flags are identical--raises the possibility that
the Philippine group might formally join RIM or at
least develop bilateral relations with its most
important member, SL.
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Latin America
Brief
To reduce defense expenditures, the new civilian administration is canceling a
number of major equipment purchases and delaying others planned by the previous
military government. because of budget 25X1
cuts, the Navy Minister, Admiral Saboia, has canceled a contract to purchase 20
refitted M41 tanks for the Marines from a Brazilian firm. He has canceled the
acquisition of two river patrol boats from another Brazilian company, and
postponed the purchase of a third. Saboia also plans to call off the purchase of one
of five West German submarines, thereby saving $50 million. 25X1
The new government is reducing the operating budgets of the military services,
which has led to grumbling among some officers. 25X1
is being cut by 25 percent, and the Air Force's by 25X1
20 to 30 percent. Some research and development projects funded by the military
are being slashed or eliminated, High priority 25X1
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program, F___1are not being cut. F_ -1 25X1
In our judgment, the cuts that have occurred are unlikely to cause a sharp
deterioration in military-civilian relations or a major decline in Brazil's defense
capabilities. The need for spending cuts in a period of economic austerity is
generally recognized by the military. Moreover, the government's plans for going
ahead with selected development programs and acquisitions-for example, of
submarines and missiles-indicate that military modernization is not being
abandoned.
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ALA LAR 85-012
7 June 1985
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