LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301640002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 10, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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-1. Into iorare of
Intelligence 111,111K1W 1
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ALA LAR 85-010
10 May 1985
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Review
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President Castro gained some political capital and regional
legitimacy from the visit last month of Ecuadorean President
Febres-Cordero, but little of substance came'out of the three days of
meetings.
Venezuela: Leading Leftist Party Struggling To Regroup
In the wake of a major setback in the 1983 national elections,
Venezuela's largest leftwing party-Movement Toward Socialism-
is struggling for political survival.
Since the 1970s, Bogota has placed increasing importance on
expanding commercial and political ties to the Caribbean Basin
countries.
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After five years of relying on force, coercion, and intimidation to
eliminate political opposition in Suriname, only organized labor
remains a potential challenger to the regime of Army Commander
Desire Bouterse.
Briefs
The country's deepening economic troubles and efforts by the ruling
People's National Movement to restrain wage increases are setting
the stage for more fractious relations between the government and
influential trade unions.
Dominican Republic: Communist Paramilitary Training 25
Cuba-Zaire: Cautious Relations) 25
St. Lucia: Problems for the Left 26
St. Vincent: Labor Party in Trouble 26
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Cuba-Ecuador:
President Febres-Cordero's
Visit
Cuban President Castro gained some political capital
and regional legitimacy from the visit last month of
Ecuadorean President Febres-Cordero, but little of
substance came out of the three days of meetings. The
Ecuadorean President apparently tried hard to
minimize publicity surrounding his trip, and refused
to issue a joint communique or attend a press
conference with Castro at the conclusion of the visit.
Febres-Cordero successfully avoided being drawn into
statements that implicitly agreed with Cuban policy
on Central America or Castro's prescriptions for
Latin America's debt problem. Nonetheless, we
believe the conservative Ecuadorean President's
willingness to fraternize with Castro may ease the
apprehensions of other Latin American leaders about
role in Latin America, the coverage of Febres-
Cordero's activities were juxtaposed with stories on
the Colombian Foreign Minister's recent visit to
Havana and the renewal of trade ties between Cuba
and Uruguay.
Febres-Cordero's Response
Febres-Cordero's refusal to issue a joint communique
or to join Castro for a press conference at the end of
the visit was largely responsible for Castro's failure to
get broad coverage of the visit in the international
media. Castro told the press conference that the two
leaders fully supported the Contadora peace process,
and he reiterated his advocacy of nonpayment of
Latin America's debt.
expanding their ties to Cuba
Castro's Approach
As he has done with a host of recent European and
South American delegations visiting Cuba, Castro
tried hard to persuade Febres-Cordero of his sincerity
in facilitating a peaceful solution to Central
America's problems and to impress the Ecuadorean
leader with his pragmatic approach to issues such as
relations with the United States and regional
economic issues. Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Teran
told US Embassy officials in Quito that he was
impressed by Castro's soft-sell and moderate tone, as
well as by the warm welcome accorded Febres-
Cordero in Havana, which included a 21-gun salute
and a lavish reception at the Palace of the Revolution.
The Ecuadoreans apparently were even more
impressed with the turnout of some 70,000 Cubans to
welcome them to a provincial capital, where they
visited an oil refinery and the Soviet-built nuclear
power plant under construction.
The Cuban media made a concerted effort to
dramatize the importance of the Febres-Cordero visit
to Cuba, with front page, red-boxed coverage and
photos in the daily newspaper each day of the visit. In
an obvious attempt to demonstrate Cuba's growing
Castro's statement to the press that the two leaders
"exchanged views" on Central America and his
refusal to comment on President Reagan's peace
proposal for Nicaragua indicate that Febres-Cordero
strongly challenged the Cuban leader's views and
resisted any statements that Castro could publicly
construe as agreement with his Central America
policy. The Ecuadorean Foreign Minister publicly
reiterated Febres-Cordero's support for dialogue
between the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan
opposition soon after returning from Cuba. Moreover,
Castro's admission at the press conference that
considerable disagreement exists over measures to
address Latin America's debt problem suggests that
the Ecuadorean President found little merit in
Castro's formulas.
Castro's Gains Are Symbolic
Castro made few gains are in terms of substantive
agreements pointing toward increased Cuban-
Ecuadorean ties. Febres-Cordero signed a reciprocal
trade agreement and discussed possible areas of
limited trade in agricultural goods, such as sugar,
cattle, and health, where exchanges of aid and
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technical expertise might be pursued.
officials have told US Embassy personnel that nearly
all of Ecuador's petroleum production is already
committed to long-term contracts.
Nonetheless, despite Febres-Cordero's efforts to play
down the visit, the lack of substantive bilateral
agreements, and the apparent deep differences of
opinion between the two leaders on many issues,
Castro's standing in Latin America probably was
boosted by the visit. Moreover, Febres-Cordero's trip
may improve Castro's chances of increasing Cuba's
ties to several Latin American countries in the coming
months. The US Embassy in Bolivia, for example, has
noted that the Febres-Cordero visit did not go
unnoticed in Bolivia. Embassy officials believe that
leftists in President Siles's government may be able to
push the lameduck President into closer ties to Cuba
before a new administration takes over in La Paz.
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Venezuela: Leading Leftist
Party Struggling
To Regroup F_~
In the wake of a major setback in the 1983 national
elections, Venezuela's largest leftwing party-
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS)-is struggling
for political survival. The party's presidential
candidate remains discredited by his poor electoral
showing, and MAS has been without formal
leadership since the party's directorate resigned in
early 1984. The leader of the main radical faction is
seeking the position of secretary general at the long-
overdue party convention now scheduled for June, but
new delegate selection rules and a deep schism
between radical and moderate wings will complicate
efforts to choose a unified leadership. Barring a major
economic crisis, the party's prospects for becoming a
more credible political force over the next few years
are dim, but MAS probably will avoid the kind of
open split that would relegate it to the radical fringe
Pompeyo Marquez (top) and
Theodoro Petkoff; founders of
Movement Toward Socialism.
with the other far-left parties.
The MAS Legacy
MAS was founded in January 1971 by Teodoro and
Luben Petkoff and Pompeyo Marquez, former
members of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV)
who had participated in the Castro-inspired armed
struggle of the 1960s. Like many other Venezuelan
leftists, the Petkoff brothers and Marquez came out of
political hiding following President Caldera's amnesty
decree in 1969. By that time, however, the failed
insurrection, the demise of the PCV as a credible
political party, and the fallout from the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia set the stage for a
breakaway movement. Although still committed to
radical socialism, the leaders of MAS now advocated
independence from Moscow and peaceful social
reform rather than violent revolution.
Marquez and Teodoro Petkoff, although in basic
ideological agreement, were personally at odds almost
from the beginning. Marquez became party Secretary
General, a position he held continuously until early
last year. When Petkoff sought party approval to
make his own presidential bid in 1978, Marquez
opposed him, favoring Jose Vincente Rangel instead.
Marquez prevailed, but the party's decision to back
Rangel, who had never formally joined MAS,
backfired when Rangel received even fewer votes than
MAS that year. Rangel's poor showing was a blow to
Marquez and helped pave the way for another Petkoff
run in 1983-this time with the party's imprimatur.
The Impact of the 1983 Election
With economic conditions in 1983 seemingly ripe for
a protest vote against the two major parties, MAS
expected to break out of the leftist ghetto by
outpolling the discredited incumbent Social
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Christians (COPEI). Petkoff confidently predicted
that MAS would no longer be confined to "the
shoulder of a huge highway" previously monopolized
by COPEI and Democratic Action (AD). The US
Embassy---echoing survey results--expected MAS at
least to double its 1978 vote of 6 percent and emerge
with a solid block of congressional seats
The election was a test not only of the charismatic
Petkoff's appeal as candidate but also of his thesis
that by remaining aloof from coalitions with other
far-left parties MAS could finally escape the stigma
of leftwing extremism and establish itself as an
attractive socialist alternative. The election results,
however, were devastating. MAS obtained only 5
percent of the vote and Petkoff lost considerable
prestige within the party. His defeat left the door open
for a new party leadership as the entire MAS
executive committee took the unprecedented step of
resigning en masse in late January 1984. Since then,
factional chieftains have struggled for control in a
battle that involves ideology, policy, and personalities
as well as strategy and tactics.
Factional Strife
The differences between the party's two main factions
reflect a basic disagreement over the nature and
functions of MAS as a political organization. Many
radicals, intent on preserving their ideological purity
at all costs, are apparently content to have MAS
function more as a pressure group than a party. The
fact that MAS has traditionally not run its own
presidential candidate reinforces this impression. In
contrast, moderates want MAS to become a
mainstream Venezuelan party-broad based, center
leaning, reformist, and, above all, electorally
successful.
Freddy Munoz currently heads the largest hardline
faction, known as the halcones (falcons), but other
hardliners owe allegiance to either Pompeyo Marquez
or Rafael Thielen. All of the radicals---including
Petkoff--agree fundamentally that Venezuela's
economy should be brought under state control. In
foreign policy, they support the Sandinista revolution,
sympathize with the Salvadoran insurgents, and favor
MAS moderates, known as tucanes (toucans), are
headed by Bayardo Sardi, Juvencio Pulgar, and
Carlos Raul Hernandez. This group, which reportedly
comprises slightly less than one-third of party
members, embraces social democratic principles,
strongly distrusts Moscow and Havana, and criticizes
the Sandinistas for being irretrievably committed to
Cuban and Soviet models. They supported Petkoff's
presidential bid in 1983 because their desire to move
the party toward the center dovetailed with his efforts
to heal internal divisions and establish MAS as
Venezuela's populist party of the future. As Petkoff's
campaign manager, Sardi was blamed-notably by
Munoz-for the 1983 electoral reversal. Recently,
Pulgar, the chief of MAS's parliamentary faction,
called for an end to postelection recriminations by the
radicals, but it remains to be seen whether they will
heed his appeal.
a large bloc of party
members rejects affiliation with either the radical or
moderate factions. This nonaligned "center"
reportedly is an amalgam of Marxists and reformists
whose principal goal is the survival of the party. In
our view, however, these so-called independents lack
both cohesion and direction and do not constitute a
distinct faction.
open split.
The Coming Party Showdown
The absence of formal party leadership for more than
a year attests to MAS's deep internal divisions. A
party convention scheduled for the fall of 1984 was
quietly postponed, presumably in an effort to avert an
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Recently, as if to acknowledge the crisis MAS is
facing, party leaders agreed to a new formula for
selecting delegates to the national convention now set
for June. For the first time in its history, MAS will
choose more than 1,000 delegates in open primary
elections. At the convention, these representatives will
select-by an absolute majority-a general secretary
and president. The new rules appear to throw the
internal election process wide open and give rise to a
variety of intriguing possibilities.
The radicals reportedly have gained the upper hand
within the party and it is probable that Munoz will be
elected general secretary, although perhaps not on the
first ballot. Marquez is also a candidate, but his
support has eroded considerably
Nevertheless, his stature as founder and
party leader make him a good bet to become MAS's
new president-an ill-defined, largely ceremonial post
created in 1980 and originally occupied by Petkoff.
Because of the innovative nature of the delegate
selection process, however, predictions regarding the
convention's outcome are hazardous. For example, it
is possible that Munoz will be forced to cut a deal
with the moderates in order to gain their support on a
second or subsequent ballot. If so, he may agree to
support Bayardo Sardi for president as his part of a
trade-off. Whatever the outcome, the June gathering
will be an excellent barometer of the rank-and-file
mood and current power balance within MAS. F_
It seems likely that the desire of most factional
leaders to hold the party together will triumph and
that the radicals will avoid pushing their advantage to
the limit. A complete victory for the radicals on party
offices and platform would probably further
marginalize the party. Too vigorously advocating
friendly ties with Castro, for example, would rekindle
memories of Cuban subversion in the 1960s. Also, the
moderates might bolt the party if the radicals refuse
to compromise.
Outlook
Even if the divisions are papered over at the
convention, agreeing on party strategy for the
presidential campaign in 1988 will remain a potential
time bomb. Petkoff, at 53, remains energetic and
ambitious and likely will seek a second chance to run
as MAS's presidential candidate. In pursuing this
goal, however, he is apparently swimming against the
tide of party opinion. We believe the unrealistic
expectations and dashed hopes associated with
Petkoff's effort in 1983 militates against a replay of
his candidacy.
all factions reportedly
agree that, if MAS is to make a comeback in 1988, it
must support one of the major-party candidates. But
the agreement ends here. The radicals, reportedly
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with Castro's blessings, favor former president Carlos
Andres Perez-who heads Democratic Action's
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would provide the best opportunity to strengthen the
radical left and reduce Venezuela's support of US 25X1
policies in Central America. The moderates, however,
reject Perez as corrupt and too sympathetic to Cuba.
They prefer COPEI Secretary General Eduardo 25X1
Fernandez, arguing that the historic trend of
alternating AD and COPEI administrations favors
Fernandez and that his election with MAS support
would enhance public trust in the left and move the
party toward the political mainstream.
There is ample precedent for MAS support of a non-
MAS presidential candidate-indeed, the 1983
election was the first time MAS had ever run a
candidate of its own. If the party can unite behind a
winning major-party candidate in 1988-which in
itself would be a first-it might at last get on the road
to becoming a viable force.
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Another possibility would be for MAS and other
leftist parties to merge with the left wing of
Democratic Action in a new populist coalition. Carlos
Andres Perez, who already is actively seeking the AD
nomination for a second presidential term, has wide
voter appeal, but powerful forces within the party-
including President Jaime Lusinchi and other
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former President were to be denied the nomination, he
might join forces with MAS to form a new leftist
electoral coalition that would back his candidacy.
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Such a party realignment appears unlikely at this
juncture, but steadily deteriorating social and
economic conditions over the next few years would
make it more plausible. Under those conditions, a
radicalized electorate might well cast about for an
alternative to the two major parties, and with Perez to
give it respectability a leftist coalition might become a
formidable political instrument.
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Colombia and the
Caribbean Basin
Initiative
Since the 1970s, Bogota has placed increasing
importance on expanding commercial and political
ties to the Caribbean Basin countries. President
Betancur, committed to supporting stability in the
region, has drawn up bold plans to provide aid to the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiaries. While
Bogota is moving to implement trade and assistance
agreements, we believe Betancur will lack the
financial resources and domestic political support to
increase direct aid to the CBI in the year and a half
remaining in his term in office. Despite Betancur's
interest in contributing to regional stability, we
believe Colombian businesses will increasingly seek to
use the CBI to facilitate entry into the US market.
Colombia Turns to the Caribbean
Bogota's historical identification of Colombia as an
Andean nation began to change during the 1970s,
when the political leadership rediscovered its
forgotten Atlantic coast. The renewed interest was
spurred by the rapid growth in illegal economic
activities-such as cattle smuggling to Venezuela and
marijuana growing and trafficking-and the
exploration and discovery of sizable natural gas, coal,
and nickel deposits. The region's potential as a source
of economic riches and political dispute kept Bogota's
interest in the Caribbean Basin high. Former Foreign
Minister Lemos in July 1982 affirmed that
Colombia's more activist policy in the Caribbean was
a natural consequence of the dynamic growth of its
Atlantic region.
After reviewing US Embassy reports, we conclude
Colombia was motivated by four basic considerations
in developing a Caribbean policy: the political need to
assert itself as a regional power; the economic need to
penetrate new markets for noncoffee exports, given
poor sales prospects in traditional OECD markets; the
need to develop allies in the event of territorial
disputes with Venezuela and Nicaragua; and the
desire to promote stability to counter a growth of
leftist movements in the Caribbean.
Colombia's commercial relations with the Caribbean
expanded greatly during 1978-82 under the
administration of former President Turbay Ayala.
With the saturation of markets for Colombian
products in Europe, the Andean Group, the United
States, and Japan, Bogota increasingly viewed the
Caribbean Basin as an attractive alternative. With 38
million inhabitants, the Caribbean countries buy $25
billion in goods. Colombian trade with Central
America and the Caribbean rose from $245 million in
1978 to $559 million in 1980. In 1982, Turbay
announced Colombia would increase by $5 million its
contribution to the special fund of the Caribbean
Development Bank, to raise its total contribution to
$21 million.
Joining the CBI
Neither rich enough to be included as a donor nation
nor poor enough to be considered a potential recipient,
Colombia was left out of the original plans for the
Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1981. Unhappy with
this exclusion, the Turbay government feared a
preferential treatment given to Caribbean and
Central American competitors in the US market
would undermine Colombia's nontraditional exports.
The government also resented its exclusion from the
meeting of regional political powers convened in
Nassau in July 1981 to coordinate aid programs in the
Caribbean. After several months of dogged
complaints and behind-the-scenes maneuvering,
Colombia was admitted to the coordinating group in
March 1982.
The Turbay government responded with a major
development assistance program for the Caribbean
Basin. Bogota offered $50 million in direct aid, a
small amount compared to $2.3 billion pledged by the
United States, Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico, but
an unprecedented financial commitment by a
Colombian government to project its influence into
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the region. Colombia's $50 million would help finance
technical programs, workers' training, and
cooperative development in the region. Bogota also
made available $240 million in trade credit. Central
American and Caribbean nations would each have a
standing $10 million line of credit to finance
Colombian imports, according to US Embassy
reports.
Policies Under Betancur
Bold Plans. President Betancur took office in August
1982 with plans to continue Turbay's policy of
promoting relations with the Caribbean.
he endorsed an ambitious program to
expand Colombia's contribution to the CBI
multilateral development effort. The program
included export credits, central bank deposits, and
new technical assistance programs, particularly in
agriculture. Over the past two years, Betancur has
favored the expansion of maritime transport to
various Caribbean countries and has given serious
consideration to creating cultural institutions and
universities that would act as focal points for
strengthening cooperation with the Caribbean. For
example, Betancur advocated the creation, with UN
support, of a "University of the Caribbean" at
Cartagena.
Bogota has proposed the creation of a regional finance
corporation, aimed at helping Colombian businesses
extend their activities into Central America and the
Caribbean area. The corporation would assist business
interests in the region in making purchases in
Colombia; aid Colombian exporters of goods and
services; help Colombian builders expand into the
Caribbean area; and facilitate the purchasing of
property in the region by Colombians. It would also
provide leasing and factoring services to assist trade
and help Colombian direct investors expand in the
Basin.
Signs of Progress. Betancur has been unable to
achieve most of his goals largely because of domestic
economic priorities, such as the ailing economy and
the faltering peace truce, that demand his attention.
Bogota nevertheless has begun to implement some
initiatives. Between 1981 and 1983 Colombia doubled
its commercial credit and financial investment in
several Caribbean Basin countries. Proexpo, the
export promotion agency, has approved new subsidies
for exporters that sell goods to Caribbean countries.
Some Central American countries have benefited
from Colombian trade credit lines. El Salvador, for
example, has imported agricultural goods and
machinery and construction material and equipment
from Colombia, according to the US Embassy. Other
countries, however, have encountered difficulties
using these credit lines because commercial bankers
are reluctant to do the necessary paperwork for small
transactions of meager profitability.
Bogota currently is working on several commercial
deals with CBI beneficiaries, according to press and
Embassy reports. A $5 million line of credit is being
extended to Jamaica to finance Colombian exports,
and similar agreements are being studied for
Barbados, Guyana, Suriname, and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines. Coal sales to Jamaica and the
Dominican Republic are being negotiated. In
addition, press reports indicate that Colombia will
help construct a proposed center for the performing
arts, promote two-way investment projects, and assist
technical training in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
The US Embassy says that last November Panama
and Colombia signed a memorandum of
understanding that would permit planning for an
electrical transmission line between the Urra II
hydroelectric project in Panama City by the early
1990s.
Constraints
Although Bogota views the economic development of
the Caribbean Basin as desirable, external financial
difficulties will probably continue to restrict its ability
to increase aid flows to the CBI beneficiaries.
Colombia's payments position will remain under
stress because of export revenue fluctuations for its
key legal revenue earners-coffee, sugar, and
bananas. Moreover, new foreign credit has been
reduced to a trickle because of Betancur's resistance
to sign a formal agreement with the IMF, which has
heightened bankers' reluctance to increase their
exposure in Colombia without IMF monitoring. Over
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the past year, foreign exchange reserves-including
gold-dropped 40 percent to about $1.8 billion, and
they continue to drop, according to US Embassy
reports. As Bogota battles a cash-flow crisis with self-
imposed austerity, we doubt that Betancur will be in a
position to increase direct aid to the CBI.
Domestic criticism of government assistance to
Caribbean countries could intensify during Betancur's
remaining year and a half in office. Colombian
businessmen are publicly expressing concern that
many US businesses prefer to invest in the Caribbean
Basin rather than Colombia. Instead of providing
economic assistance and trade preferences to their
competitors, these businessmen may press the
government to redirect financial support to Colombia
to revitalize their own industries. For example, some
Colombian businessmen want assistance in developing
San Andres as a window to increase sales of
Colombian products to Central America. They also
want the government to bolster incentives to
exporters.
Implications for the United States
Despite Bentancur's interest in promoting regional
stability, we believe Colombia's private sector will
increasingly seek to use the CBI to facilitate entry
into the US market, especially to avoid US quotas,
tariffs, and restrictions. Colombian trade officials,
whose support for the CBI has been, at best,
lukewarm during the Betancur administration, may
tacitly encourage businesses to explore this option as
Colombia's own economic predicament worsens. With
growing numbers of countervailing duty cases against
Colombian exports, Colombian products could offset
some competitive disadvantages by rerouting
shipments through the CBI countries.
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Suriname: The Labor
Challenge to Bouterse
After five years of relying on force, coercion, and
intimidation to eliminate political opposition in
Suriname, only organized labor remains a potential
challenger to the regime of Army Commander Desire
Bouterse. The leaders of the country's four labor
federations have been the most vocal advocates of
democratization, but their ability to influence military
policies has been uncertain over the past two years.
Bouterse had been willing to give organized labor-
which represents more than half of the country's work
force-a voice in the government in exchange for its
support because he fears that Suriname's
deteriorating economy would provoke widespread
labor unrest. Last month, however, labor's refusal to
accept needed belt-tightening and the opposition of
the leaders of the C-47, Moederbond, and Civil
Servant Organization (CLO) to Bouterse's Minister of
Labor led to the expulsion of their representatives
from the coalition government.
We believe-based on Embassy reporting-
that the country's economic decline and Bouterse's
toughening posture toward the unions are likely to
further erode labor's leverage with the military. The
US Embassy reports that military leaders view labor's
opposition, and particularly the recalcitrant stance of
C-47 leader Fred Derby, as a direct challenge to their
authority. The military's decisive response reiterates
Bouterse's refusal to share power and his willingness
to permit only those groups to participate in
government that play by his rules.
Labor's Initial Leverage
The regime's hardened position toward the unions
contrasts with its reluctance to crack down on labor
last year. A six-week wildcat strike in the country's
vital bauxite sector in early 1984 demonstrated
labor's ability to challenge the regime. Unaccustomed
to the economic deterioration that has beset the
country since the Dutch suspended aid in 1982,
Surinamese workers took an unprecedented stand
against the military in December 1983 by refusing to
accept proposed tax increases. Fearful that the strike
would escalate into political protests, Bouterse
compromised to avoid a military confrontation with
the workers. The regime suspended the proposed
taxes, discharged the civilian Prime Minister and his
Cabinet, and offered labor and business a voice in
government to help solve the country's growing
financial problems. In February 1984, a coalition
government of military, labor, and business
representatives was formed and mandated to propose
a new political and economic structure for the
country. 25X1
A number of factors contributed to the military's
restrained response and also helped to embolden the
workers to oppose the military-backed government.
According to US officials in Paramaribo, the US-led
intervention in Grenada in October 1983 encouraged
many Surinamers to believe that Bouterse would not
dare to use force against the strikers. For their part,
Suriname's military rulers reportedly worried that
violence against the workers would provide
Washington with a pretext to invade the country. In
addition, US officials have commented that Bouterse
was unprepared for the high political costs the regime
paid for executing 15 democratic opponents in 1982.
The military's brutal tactics alienated the Surinamese
people and isolated the country internationally.
Unable to force a solution to the labor crisis, the
military was dependent on bauxite union leader Fred
Derby to rein in workers. Embassy
reporting suggested that Bouterse had come to realize
that he needed the cooperation of the unions and
businesses to ensure the survival of his regime.F_
The growth of labor's leverage with the military was
based on two factors-Bouterse's fear that labor
unrest could pose a serious threat to his regime and
the desire of the military to co-opt labor support.
Within this atmosphere, labor leaders have been able
to wield considerable influence in forestalling a
decline in workers' standards of living and in
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Name
Leadership
Estimated
Membership,
1984 a
Central-47
(C-47)
Fred Derby
13,000 members,
21 unions b
Federation of
Civil Servant
Organizations
(CLO)
Hendrik
Sylvester
13,000 members,
15 unions
Confederation of
Trade Unions in
Suriname ("De
Moederbond")
Fred Van Russel
9,000 members,
34 unions
Progressive
Workers Organi-
zation (PWO)
Ramon Cruden
5,000 members,
11 unions
International
Affiliation
No foreign affiliation, but unoffi-
cial contacts with foreign trade
unions; US Embassy reports fre-
quent contacts between union offi-
cials and Soviet diplomats in Para-
maribo.
None
AIFLD; Caribbean Congress of
Labor; International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions
Confederation of Latin American
Trade Unions (CLAT); World Con-
federation of Labor (WCL)
a The US Embassy reports that more than half of Suriname's labor
force of approximately 120,000 is represented by a union and about
30 percent-some 40,000 workers-are members of 81 individual
unions and at least nine independent unions,
b Number of affiliated unions based on 1977 data from the US
Embassy.
Proleftist and most politically
active; allied with the left-leaning
Nationalistic Republic Party,
which was outlawed in 1980; repre-
sents influential bauxite and agri-
cultural workers; 3,500 bauxite
workers are the best organized
group of Surinamese workers.
Mainly civil servants and teachers;
generally pro-West and
democratic.
Close ties with Dutch labor unions;
apolitical; traditional democratic
structure; leader Cyrill Daal exe-
cuted along with 14 others by the
military in December 1982; prefers
to work cautiously with regime to
establish democratic framework.
Represents retail, office, hotel, and
light industry workers; no political
affiliation, but leader willing to
work with Bouterse.
moderating many of the regime's policies. The US
Embassy reports that, for most of the past year, the
regime protected the workers' interests, often to the
detriment of businessmen and the country's economic
health. Labor peace apparently was more important
to Bouterse than solving Suriname's economic
problems.
In the regime's search for Western aid, labor has been
a linchpin in the military's efforts to create a
democratic image, according to Embassy
sources. US officials in Paramaribo report that
Bouterse frequently has pointed to labor and business
participation in government as evidence that his
regime is establishing a democratic framework. In
addition, Bouterse views
the establishment of democratic structures as the way
to expand the regime's narrow base of support and to
quiet domestic and international critics. In their
recent confrontation with the military over the
Minister of Labor and a planned wage freeze,
however, we believe union leaders may have
overestimated Bouterse's commitment to
democratization and the extent of their influence with
him. Reporting from the Embassy
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primary concern had become the growing political
challenge posed by the antagonistic and unpredictable
Derby.
The Military's Hardening Tactics
Embassy reports indicate that in recent months the
country's weakening economy, the regime's failure to
procure substantial foreign funds, and the dim outlook
for recovery have combined to harden the military's
stance against the labor unions. We believe-based on
US Embassy that the temporary
closure of ALCOA's alumina refinery in Jamaica
earlier this year heightened Bouterse's concerns about
the future of ALCOA's SURALCO subsidiary in
by workers during ongoing contract renegotiations
might prompt SURALCO to close its operation,
which provides nearly half of Suriname's foreign
exchange earnings. According to Embassy officials,
SURALCO has warned the Surinamese Government
that another prolonged strike would cause the firm to
close
US Embassy I lindicates that
Suriname's military rulers are taking steps to gain
control over the unions.
political policies. Embassy
reports indicate, for example, that Derby
became obsessed with trying to oust the Labor
Minister after the minister fired an employee who had
been serving as an informant for Derby. In our
judgment, Derby may have reacted desperately to
what he perceived as the military's efforts to displace
his influence in the government.
Bouterse's
expulsion of labor from the government was designed
to isolate Derby. Bouterse has
since invited the leaders of the CLO and Moederbond
to rejoin the government. Embassy officials comment
that Derby's actions have played into Bouterse's
hands by affording him an opportunity to split the
labor movement. The Embassy indicates that CLO
and Moederbond leaders generally appear to have
concluded that some influence with the military is
better than none and are willing to work under
Bouterse's ground rules. In addition, many of the
rank-and-file members of Derby's unions, concerned
about losing their jobs should SURALCO close,
probably are beginning to recognize that they will
have to make some concessions.
Outlook
Although tensions between workers and the regime
are likely to grow as the government tightens
labor movement as a potential opponent, at least for
the near term. By isolating Derby and co-opting the
support of other labor leaders, Bouterse has succeeded
in dividing the unions. Although union leaders appear
to have little leverage to use to continue opposing
austerity, the military appears to have neutralized the 25X1
J By placing
in key
government ministries, Bouterse probably hopes to
weaken labor's ability to mount another challenge to
his regime.
Internal problems also have limited the effectiveness
of the unions in lobbying for political change. The
four federations occasionally have cooperated on
economic issues but rarely on political matters.
Fearing retaliation by Bouterse's security forces, most
unionists have hesitated to adopt a political agenda.
According to the US Embassy, only C-47 leader
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government policies, they probably will try to cushion 25X1
the fall in living standards by lobbying for wage
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estrangement with workers that would undercut his
efforts to broaden support. Bouterse's willingness to
compromise, however, is changeable. Unless the
regime secures adequate foreign assistance to alleviate 25X1
the country's fiscal problems, the regime is likely to
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face renewed labor unrest over the longer term.
Surinamese workers have shown a propensity to react
spontaneously and, as Bouterse's options for peaceful
solutions narrow, the possibilities for violence are
likely to grow
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k flA Vt
Trinidad and Tobago:
Fragile Labor-Government
Relations
Trinidad and Tobago's deepening economic troubles
and efforts by the ruling People's National Movement
(PNM) to restrain wage increases are setting the stage
for more fractious relations between the government
and the country's influential trade unions. The
outcome of wage negotiations between the
government and the important Oilfield Workers'
Trade Union (OWTU) will be a key indicator of labor
militancy in the coming months. Leftist elements have
so far not had much success in obtaining support in
the labor movement, particularly in the OWTU, for
aggressive actions. This lack of progress in part
reflects the unwillingness of rank-and-file unionists to
risk losing their jobs in the face of rising
unemployment. Nevertheless, we believe labor unrest
is likely to grow next year because of the need by then
for much tighter austerity measures.
Background
Unlike most Eastern Caribbean political leaders,
PNM founder Eric Williams, who headed the
government from 1956 until his death in 1981, never
held union office and led a party with no official trade
union links. Nevertheless, until the early 1980s, the
PNM enjoyed considerable support from, and control
over, those unions that had predominantly black
membership and feared any growth of East Indian
influence in politics. To help maintain control and
support of the country's labor movement, Williams
made a practice of appointing labor leaders to the
Senate.
Most unions belong to one of two competing labor
federations, the moderate Trindad and Tobago Labor
Congress (TTLC) or the smaller and more radical
Council of Progressive Trade Unions (CPTU).
Neither the TTLC nor its member unions endorse
political candidates, but TTLC unionists traditionally
have voted for the People's National Movement. The
CPTU unions generally have been more politically
active, and most of their members have voted for
opposition political parties. In keeping with this
opposition inclination, CPTU union leaders have been
more prone than their TTLC counterparts to call
strikes and stage demonstrations to gain concessions
in negotiations with the government and industry, and
to frequently accuse foreign multinational firms of
exploitation, according to the US Embassy.
The mainstay of the CPTU is the OWTU-founded
in 1937 and the oldest and most powerful union in
Trinidad. Although the union represents workers in a
variety of industries, its membership is based in the oil
industry and is largely composed of workers from the
country's two government-owned refineries. George
Weekes-who has dominated the union for 22
years-over most of his career has pursued a
militantly antigovernment line, prompted by a strong
personal animosity toward the late Prime Minister
Williams. The election in 1982 of several leftists to
leadership positions in the union further radicalized 25X1
union policies. Because of the OWTU's activist
leadership and the vital importance of the oil sector to
the country's economy-its sales contribute 75
percent of export earnings and half of GDP-the
OWTU was able to win generous wage increases,
ranging between 80 and 130 percent, during the oil
boom of the 1970s and early 1980s.
Labor's Reactions to Austerity
Over the past year, OWTU leaders have encountered
little success in planning a strategy with other
Trinidadian unions to deal with the country's
deteriorating economic situation and industrial
relations climate,
A strike against
several foreign firms last May quickly fizzled when 95
percent of the striking OWTU members returned to
work voluntarily rather than risk losing their jobs.
According to press reports, 2,000 public-sector
workers demonstrated outside the Prime Minister's
office in March until they were dispersed by police,
but the demonstration leaders failed to get an
appointment to discuss their grievances. In contrast, a
similar demonstration staged last year resulted in the
government acceding to workers' demands.
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Trinidad and Tobago Labor Congress
National Union of Government
Federated Workers (NUGFW)
Nathaniel Crichlow
38,000
Public Services International
Seaman and Waterfront Workers'
Trade Union (SWWTU)
Vernon Glean
8,000
International Transport Workers' Federa-
tion (London); International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions; International Metal
Workers' Federation
Public Services Association
Arnim Greaves
25,000
Caribbean Congress of Labor; Public
Services International; International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions
Trinidad and Tobago Teachers'
Union (TTTU)
Frederick Powder
300
World Council of Teaching Profession;
International Federation of Free Teachers'
Union; Caribbean Union of Teachers
All Trinidad Sugar General Workers
Trade Union (ATSGWTU)
Basdeo Panday
15,000
Amalgamated Workers Union (AWU)
Cyril Lopez
6,000
International Union of Foods and Allied
Workers Association; International Feder-
ation of Industrial Organization and Gen-
eral Workers Union; Caribbean Congress
of Labor
The Brotherhood of Construction and
Industrial Workers Union (BCIWU)
William Rampersad
5,000
None
Communications Workers Union
(CWU)
Ian Clarke
3,000
Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph
International
Contractors and General Workers
Trade Union (CGWTU)
Owen C. Hinds
2,900
Federated Tourist Taxicab Union
(FTTU)
Archie Daniel
300
Union of Commercial and Industrial
Workers (UCIW)
Kelvin Gonzales
4,200
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions; International Federation of Com-
mercial, Clerical, and Technical
Employees
Bank and General Workers' Union
(BGWU)
Michael Als
900
Islandwide Cane Farmers Trade
Union (ICFTU)
Raffique Shah
3,000
Transport and Industrial Workers'
Union (TIWU)
Clive Nunez
7,000
Oilfield Workers' Trade Unions
(OWTU)
George Weekes
17,000
International Federation of Chemical En-
ergy and General Workers' Union
Not affiliated with either federation
Trinidad and Tobago Unified
Teachers' Association (TTUTA)
Anthony Garcia
12,000
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Union leaders find themselves in an increasingly
difficult position. With the economic downturn,
employers are retrenching and targeting hardcore
OWTU leader Weekes-once considered the most
radical labor leader in the country-has adopted a
more conservative approach in recent years.
Nonetheless, his frequent absences from the country
have left much of the day-to-day decisionmaking in
the hands of leftist Errol McLeod, Weekes's deputy
and head of the union's militant faction. McLeod
expected to succeed Weekes as OWTU leader when
the latter announced his plans to retire in January.
Weekes reversed his decision, however, and in March
was reelected for another three-year term. We believe
that Weekes's rethinking probably was motivated in
part by pressure from union moderates concerned by
McLeod's radical policies.
former Minister of Labor Errol Mahabir
reportedly urged Weekes to seek reelection, reflecting
the government's view that Weekes is more amenable
to negotiation than McLeod. Weekes reportedly
agreed to discuss wage cuts with the government in
exchange for its promise not to reduce the work force
In recent months, OWTU unionists have not actively
pursued a new wage and benefit package because
union leaders have been awaiting the outcome of the
government's purchase of the Texaco refinery at
Pointe a Pierre. The government signed an agreement
in March to buy all of Texaco's land-based assets in
Trinidad for $189 million. The Texaco refinery and
the government-owned Trintoc refinery have been
overstaffed and underutilized since 1982; both
refineries last year operated at less than 25 percent of
refining operations and make the industry more
viable, the government tentatively plans to close the
Trintoc refinery, a move that would eliminate as
many as 2,600 jobs.
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Outlook
We believe Prime Minister Chambers can keep the lid
on labor dissidence through 1985. The popularity of
the government's purchase of Texaco's assets
probably will enable it to stall on wage and benefit
negotiations while it prepares for elections, which,
will be held in December. The
government is aware that, assuming it wins the
election, it will have to deal with a three-year accord
with the OWTU that is likely to set the guidelines for
other unions. Facing a serious challenge from an
increasingly unified opposition, the Chambers
government also is likely to stall on reducing jobs at
the Trintoc refinery-it is located in a PNM
stronghold-and elsewhere in the public sector.
After the election period, we believe the potential for
unrest will increase as austerity measures take full
effect. ruling
party planners believe the 1986 budget will include a
currency devaluation, increased taxes, and massive
cuts in government subsidies and other expenditures
needed to gain IMF support. We believe an IMF
accord would require the government to try to cap
wage increases. The closure of the Trintoc refinery
would be a particularly volatile issue, which could
prompt the OWTU to reconsider its pledge earlier
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this year not to strike should the government take over
the Texaco refinery. The government is aware that
these actions probably would trigger strikes or
demonstrations by public-sector employees, the
OWTU, and possibly other CPTU unions. The
appointment in February of ruling party hardliner
John Donaldson as Labor Minister after nine years as
Minister of National Security, in our view, is a clear
message from the government to the unions that it 25X1
intends to take a tough position. As Labor Minister,
Donaldson-considered a strong minister because of 25X1
his long association with the security services and
loyalty to the PNM-will be responsible for 25X1
maintaining control over wage negotiationsF__-]
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Latin America
Briefs
Communist Paramilitary Training) 25X1
Leftist groups in the Dominican Republic have been increasing efforts to improve
their paramilitary capabilities. about 350 25X1
leftists-mostly members of parties affiliated with the Communist-dominated
Dominican Leftist Front-received military training in Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Libya during 1983 and 1984. In addition, 20 to 30 members of the Dominican
Communist Party have served with insurgent forces in El Salvador since 1983.
members of Juan Bosch's Dominican 25X1
Liberation Party have received military instruction in Nicaragua since 1981.
Communist leader Isa Conde also has reportedly obtained a training
commitment-probably modest-from the Vietnamese. 25X1
the Caribbean scene.
Although we lack details on the location or duration of the military training, we
believe that Cuba trains the largest number. Havana not only has traditionally
close ties with Dominican leftists, but, more important, has the facilities to provide
them with a broad range of instruction-including ideological and organizational
training-tailored to their specific needs. Those training in Nicaragua almost
certainly outnumber those receiving instruction in Libya, a relative newcomer on
Despite the training, none of the principal Dominican leftist organizations is
pushing for immediate revolutionary activity. US Embassy reports indicate that
Juan Bosch-bolstered by recent public opinion polls showing an increase in
popular support for his party-continues to emphasize the electoral path.
there is strong opposition within the
Communist Party to armed action. The existence of a well-trained cadre, however,
provides leftist leaders with the means to take more aggressive steps should public
discontent with falling standards of living dramatically increase in the coming
Zaire exploit its natural resources, specifically timber and zinc.
Havana offered Zairian personnel t
ie chancery
the Cuban
Embassy in Kinshasa is trying to foster commercial relations by offering to help
and residences free of c arge.
Relations between Cuba and Zaire may be improved by a Zairian-proposed
meeting in July of a joint commission to set up cooperation accords and by
Havana's invitation to the Zairian Foreign Minister to visit Cuba. Recent Cuban
efforts have helped keep the Zairian Embassy in Havana openj -1
Secret
ALA LAR 85-010
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will continue to be cautious in its dealings with Havana.
Zairian President Mobutu may see improved relations with Cuba as a way to bring
about a political solution in Angola which includes UNITA, and improve his
regional image with radical black African states. Nonetheless, Kinshasa probably
Mobutu has been wary of Cuban overtures. He recently
these goals, and through them hopes to curb Zairian support to UNITA.
closed a Cuban cultural exhibition because of the pressure tactics used by Cuban
officials in obtaining authorization for the display. Mobutu, however, may permit
Foreign Minister Mokolo to visit Cuba in the next few months to initiate dialogue
on Angola and to discuss possible economic cooperation. Havana probably shares
Pilgrim's departure, on top of the recent exodus of other party leaders, could spell
the collapse of the four-year-old Progressive Labor Party-a splinter group of the
St. Lucia Labor Party. In an effort to retain the party's viability, Odlum has
shown interest in trying to forge an alliance with the Hunte's party. Both sides
Party, led by Julian Hunte.
George Odlum's difficulties in trying to salvage his leftist Progressive Labor Party
are likely to strengthen the moderate political opposition in St. Lucia. US Embassy
reports indicate that Michael "Mikey" Pilgrim, former interim Prime Minister
and deputy leader of the party, intends to rejoin the moderate St. Lucia Labor
reportedly have held private talks since February.
Hunte might string Odlum along in
rebuilding the Progressive Labor Party
negotiations until the 1987 elections in order to prevent him from concentrating on
The St. Vincent Labor Party, which was overwhelmingly defeated in the 1984
elections, has yet to show signs of making a comeback-ensuring relatively clear
sailing for the 10-month-old government of Prime Minister Mitchell. Party
members, aware that the dramatic loss resulted from voters' dissatisfaction with
the government's handling of the country's economy, are still badly demoralized,
(Party leader Hudson Tannis reportedly
will not profit anytime soon.
has said that public support for the Labor Party continues to decline, noting that
the party's defeat in a recent byelection caused the collapse of the organization's
recovery plans. In addition, the loss of financial backing by businessmen has forced
the shutdown of the party's newspaper. We believe the coming trial of former
Labor Party Foreign Minister Arthur Williams on corruption charges will further
damage the party's image. Although economic conditions have yet to improve
under Mitchell's tutelage, the majority of the population blames the country's
deterioration on the incompetence of the Labor Party administration. As a result,
even if the Mitchell government loses popular support, the Labor Party probably
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11-
Cuba Chronology
1 March The leader of the Uruguayan Broad Front, retired Gen. Liber Seregni, meets in
Montevideo with Flavio Bravo.
Flavio Bravo tells Seregni of Castro's hope for the consolidation of the democratic
process in Uruguay and other countries of the continent and of an effort to solve
problems affecting Latin America.
In an interview at his reception in Havana, Mexican Foreign Secretary Sepulveda
says the outlook for cooperation between Cuba and Mexico in all areas is vast.
Fidel Castro meets with Ryoichi Kawai, president of the Japanese-Cuban
economic conference. Castro underscores the economic measures adopted in Cuba
in the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.
In a statement to Prensa Latina, Flavio Bravo says the inauguration of Uruguayan
President Sanguinetti was a transcendental event because it is a reaffirmation of
continental solidarity.
Granma reports that Fidel Castro met with Oscar Alende, president of the
Argentine Intransigent Party, who visited Cuba at the invitation of the Communist
Party of Cuba.
The government issues a statement of support for the measures announced on 27
February by Nicaraguan authorities for a political solution to the Central
American conflict.
The Fourth Federation of Cuban Women Congress STET opens in Havana. Fidel
Castro, Jesus Montane, and others attend the opening ceremony.
The fifth session of the Yugoslavian-Cuban joint commission for economic,
scientific-technical cooperation is held in Havana.
6 March Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Isidoro Malmierca discuss bilateral relations with
Mito Pejovski, member of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council.
Spain's President Felipe Gonzalez says in Montevideo that his country's relations
with Cuba are very good.
27 Secret
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Soviet Construction Minister Georgiy A. Karavayev arrives in Cuba at the
invitation of Jose Lopez Moreno, Minister of Construction. They will tour
Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba.
The Ministry of Light Industry's union for refining and distributing petroleum
plans to extract 800,000 tons of domestic crude oil this year.
Cuban Ambassador Carlos Lechuga condemns violations of basic human rights in
El Salvador and Guatemala at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.
Fidel Castro presents awards to Vilma Espin, who is confirmed as president of the
FMC, and others, and holds a reception for delegates to the Fourth FMC
Congress.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko holds talks in Moscow with government
representatives from Cuba and Angola.
Levi Farah discusses bilateral relations and ways to promote cooperation in all
fields with the Secretary of the People's Committee for the Foreign Liaison
Bureau of Libya.
Yasir Arafat sends a message to Fidel Castro dealing with recent developments in
the Middle East, particularly regarding the Palestine question and the Nonaligned
Movement.
Fidel Castro and Spanish labor leader Nicolas Redondo discuss Spain's ties with
NATO and Latin America's foreign debt during a meeting in Havana.
The Special Counselor of the Netherlands State Secretary of Foreign Trade,
Dominique Dick, discusses developing trade relations with Foreign Trade Minister
Ricardo Cabrizas in Havana.
A Cuban parliamentary delegation ends a visit to Colombia. The delegation met
with government and political leaders, businessmen, and members of congress.
Foreign Trade Minister Cabrizas and Mito Pejovski sign a protocol and a draft
agreement between the Cuban National Bank and the Yugoslav Bank for
International Collaboration.
Foreign Trade Minister Cabrizas and Mexico's Secretary for Commerce and
Industrial Development, Hector Hernandez Cervantes, sign a trade accord. More
than 20 Cuban products will enter Mexico.
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The Council of State issues a decree declaring official mourning until 13 March on
the death of Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee of the Soviet Union.
Raul Castro, Jorge Risquet, and Lionel Soto depart for Moscow to attend the
funeral of Konstantin Chernenko.
A condolence book on the death of Konstantin Chernenko is opened at the Soviet
Embassy in Havana. Foreign Minister Malmierca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and
Blas Roca sign the book.
The 13th Congress of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain is held in Cuba.
About 90 delegates and 21 countries will attend the first congress of this union to
be held in Cuba.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives the credentials of Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, the
new Ecuadorean Ambassador to Cuba, and of Victor Bolojan, the new Romanian
Ambassador.
Fidel Castro sends a message of condolence to Mikhail Gorbachev, General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the death of Konstantin
Chernenko.
Raul Castro is received by Ethiopian Head of State Mengistu in Moscow. They
discuss the international situation, especially the Horn of Africa, and bilateral
relations.
Raul Castro and Angolan leader Jose dos Santos meet in Moscow to exchange
views on current international issues, especially southern Africa and bilateral
relations.
Politburo alternate member Jesus Montane receives Carlos Galliza, Secretary
General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, to discuss party relations.
In his interview with CBS correspondent Dan Rather, Fidel Castro strongly denies
any involvement by his government in drug trafficking. He says there is neither
consumption of drugs nor trafficking in Cuba.
Three members of the Cuban parliament make up the first parliamentary
delegation to visit Bonn. They are received by Minister of State Moellemann to
discuss bilateral relations.
Ecuador's special envoy Jaime Nebot Velasco arrives in Havana. Velasco and
Acting Minister President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation
Melendez discuss developing trade relations.
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In a CBS news interview, Fidel Castro does not rule out an effort to improve
relations with Washington; he says he would not sacrifice his ties with other
nations to please the United States.
Castro denies that souring diplomatic relations had kept him from attending the
funeral of Soviet leader Chernenko.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Havana with West German politician Wolf
Brandendorf. They discuss ties between Latin America and Europe.
Raul Castro meets in Moscow with Sam Nujoma, president of the South-West
Africa People's Organization. Raul reiterates Cuba's unconditional support for
Namibia's independence.
17 March Levi Farah, Minister Without Portfolio, arrives in Baghdad to discuss
strengthening economic and trade cooperation with Iraqi officials.
Flavio Bravo meets in Tokyo with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Shintaro
Abe. Abe says his people are friendly toward Cuba because of its efforts in support
of peace in Central America.
At a press conference in Havana, Ecuador's special envoy Velasco says the
government of Leon Febres-Cordero is practicing a new philosophy in its
cooperation with other countries.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and
Konstantin Rusakov meet with Raul Castro, Jorge Risquet, and Lionel Soto to
discuss deepening and perfecting relations.
Cuba and Ecuador sign a trade agreement in Havana. Ecuador's special envoy
Velasco says the cooperation sets forth the relationship between the Bank of
Ecuador and the National Bank of Cuba.
In Tokyo, Flavio Bravo denies speculation that relations between Cuba and the
Soviet Union have deteriorated. He says Soviet-Cuban ties are at their best.
Cuba and Ecuador end one week of trade talks in Havana. Ecuador's special envoy
Jaime Velasco, Isidoro Malmierca, and Ricardo Cabrizas discuss various economic
issues.
Cuba and Sweden sign a note extending the trade agreement between the two
countries. Ambassador Jan Stahl and Vice Minister of Culture Humberto Castello
sign the agreement.
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The National Bank of Cuba reports that tougher Soviet trade demands will force
Cuba to buy $100 million in sugar on the world market. A similar purchase was
made last year to meet commitments to Moscow.
At a meeting of the Association of Chiefs of Latin American Diplomatic missions
in Japan, Flavio Bravo stresses the current difficult circumstances of Latin
America's $350 billion foreign debt.
Aleksey Antonov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of
Ministers, receives Marcos Lage to discuss Soviet cooperation in the development
of the machine-building industry in Cuba.
23 March Politburo member Armando Hart arrives in Berlin on a stopover on his way to
Budapest to attend the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party's 13th Congress.
24 March In a Paris Afrique-Asie interview, Vice Foreign Minister Raul Viera says the
USSR would support Cuba in case of open conflict with the United States.
The ninth meeting of public health coordinators from countries of the Nonaligned
Movement begins in Havana. Minister of Public Health del Valle says health aid
to Africa should be quick and free.
Havana officially announces the removal of Nivaldo Herrera from his position as
president of the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television and his replacement by
Ismael Gonzalez.
A delegation from the Federation of Cuban Women, headed by Solia Herrera and
Elena Perez, ends a visit to Western Sahara. They met with President `Abd al-
`Aziz.
27 March Raul Castro and Vilma Espin pay homage to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad
in a brief visit to Volgograd.
Politburo member Jorge Risquet meets with Congolese Minister of Forestry Henri
Djombo, member of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party.
28 March Two technical banking agreements are signed in Havana regulating the lines of
credit to the National Bank of Cuba by the Spanish Official Credit Institute.
Armando Hart meets in Budapest with Pak Song-chol, member of the Politburo of
the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee and Maxime Grometz, member of
the Secretariat of the French Communist Party.
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Prensa Latina reports in an interview with Excelsior that Fidel Castro said Latin
America's foreign debt is an economic, political, and moral impossibility.
The Foreign Relations Committee of the Brazilian Congress unanimously
approves a bill recommending that diplomatic relations be reestablished with
Cuba.
At the Cuban Embassy in Moscow, Raul Castro presents The Orders of Anna
Betancourt awards to leaders of women's organizations in Bulgaria, East
Germany, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.
30 March Fidel Castro receives delegation of the Argentine Communist Party headed by
Secretary General Athos Fava.
In an interview in Excelsior, Fidel Castro says the Soviet Union cannot provide
military protection for Nicaragua in case of direct intervention from the United
States.
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