LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301590002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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~E~~~~eti~~ a~irecwra~c ~a
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Latin America
Review
15 March 1985
ALA LAR 85-007
I S March 1985
3~9
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Review
Articles Argentina: Austerity and the Military
The country's economic crisis is forcing deep cutbacks in personnel
benefits, training, and acquisition and maintenance of equipment.
Further cuts in funding are likely, accelerating the decline in
military capabilities and morale
A reexamination of indicators of prospective insurgent victory shows
that the government's situation has generally improved since we first
applied the indicators in March 1983.
The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party is likely to face its
stiffest competition in elections this summer in the northwestern
border state of Sonora, where the opposition National Action Party
is running a highly popular candidate for the governorship
Growing popular anxiety and military dissatisfaction with President
Barletta's performance increase the likelihood that Defense Forces
Chief Noriega may force a change in government.
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in the Andean Region
Over the past decade, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and
Venezuela have developed relatively small, but modern navies
featuring antiship cruise missile weapon systems.
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ALA LAR 85-007
1 S March 1985
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Venezuela: Scandal Strains Civil-Military Relations n
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Brazil: Congress Elects Officers ~~
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Ecuador: French Helicopter Deal
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Cuba: Drought
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Dominica: Shaky Opposition Alliances
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The Bahamas: Changing Opposition Tacti
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Cuba Cbronolo
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within
CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to t
he Chief;
Production StctfJ; Office of'African and Latin American Analysis,
0
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Articles
Argentina: Austerity and
the Military
Argentina's armed forces are feeling the pinch of the
country's economic crisis. The scarcity of funds is
forcing deep cutbacks in personnel benefits, training,
and acquisition and maintenance of equipment. Thus,
many careerists have chosen to leave the military, and
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resigned in
early March in protest against budget reductions.
Further cuts in funding are likely, accelerating the
decline in military capabilities and morale. ~~
The Transition From Military Rule
After Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict in
1982, the armed forces, anticipating that the military
would soon be yielding control of the government to
civilians, moved quickly to purchase as much foreign
military equipment and technology as possible before
giving up power. When President Alfonsin took office
in late 1983, his administration was faced with a long
list of weapons contracts made by the military
government. Alfonsin considered canceling many of
these, but provisions for penalties made this an
unattractive option. He decided instead to delay
deliveries of equipment and extend payment deadlines
as much as possible.
Cutbacks in defense funding and the declining La Nacion
status of the military in Argentina are causinz
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pay increases have not kept pace with inflation, now
running at an annual rate of 800 percent. Moreover,
the government is often
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late in making wage and pension payments. The
purchasing power of militar ersonnel is now at its
2tiy~
lowest point in 10 years
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government, and Alfonsin concluded that more The cuts in pay and other benefits, together with the
drastic military belt-tightening was required. For post-Falklands decline in the social status of the
1984, he ordered a 50-percent cut in the defense military have prompted an exodus of personnel from
budget and called a halt to acquisition of foreign all three services. Junior and noncommissioned
weapons. His 1985 budget envisages an additional
These economizing measures were not enough, given
the acute financial squeeze confronting the new
reduction of 10 percent.
Reduced Benefits Spur Manpower Exodus
Alfonsin's spending reductions have had a sharp
impact on military wages and other benefits. Military
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ALA LAR 85-007
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ARGENTINA:
COST OF LJVING AND SHRINKING SALARIES
BASE 1980=100
tiE9 19x1 19BI 196J
Shrinking salaries are at their lowest level in 10
years. The curve shows the decline in purchasing
officers are leaving in growing numbers to seek jobs in
private industry. The well-publicized plight of
military personnel has also caused enrollment in
military academies to fall off sharply in the past year.
Ten percent of the Army's noncommissioned officers
resigned or requested early retirement in 1984, an
attrition rate far above any previous year
the main cause was the decline
in real wages. Of those who stayed on, many did so
only because other jobs are scarce,
The Navy lost a third of its noncommissioned officers
and about one-fourth of its officer corps in 1984,
according to naval officials. Many enlisted
technicians also departed. Morale among those still in
the Navy is extremely low and resignations are likely
personnel suspect the civilian government is seeking to
dismantle the armed forces by withholding funds and
thereby compelling people to resign.
ARGENTINA:
MILITARY RETIREMENTS AND RELEASES
___IBEO I9lI 19lI 19lJ
Military personnel are leaving the service in
growing numbers. Retirements and resignations
The Air Force is coping with the funding cutbacks
more successfully than the other two services and has
not yet experienced the same massive personnel losses.
however, that this
may change abruptly in the coming months as a result
of low wages and declining morale. Although most
career Air Force officers with 15 to 20 years'
experience reportedly do not consider themselves
adequately trained for civilian employment, many
officers in the 24 to 27 age bracket feel they are still
young enough to separate from the service, acquire
university degrees, and find civilian jobs. The defense
attache believes that, even if only a small number of
these young officers are able to make the transition
successfully, others will be encouraged to follow.
forces also seek civilian jobs
Some commanders
re ease personne rom eir duties to pursue such
work. In the Air Force, moreover, many servicemen
request advance notice of transfers so that they can
seek outside employment in the area of the new
assignment.
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Declining Capabilities
The budget cuts have also had a severe impact on
operational readiness. The three services have
suffered setbacks in a variety of areas, including
training, maintenance of equipment, and logistics.
Army. The Army, which has received about 40
percent of the national defense budget in recent years,
has been allocated only 30 percent under Alfonsin's
1985 budget proposal. the
remaining 10 percent will be given to the Navy to help
pay its debts for past purchases of foreign equipment.)
In addition,
government has limited the Army's conscriptions in
1985 to 35,000-about half the annual number of
draftees in recent years. The administration
reportedly has also shortened the normal one-year
conscript tour to four months.
These reductions have severely weakened the Army,
Many Army posts have been closed down, and, at
those that have remained open, NCOs and officers
perform duties normally reserved for conscripts.
Equipment maintenance has declined alarmingly
because of the growing shortage of technical
personnel, Army officers
are concerned that the deterioration of equipment will
accelerate during the coming winter.
Army logistics also appear to be breaking down. In
early January, suppliers cut off deliveries of foodstuffs
because of the Army's failure to pay its bills.
Deliveries were resumed after the Ministry of Defense
guaranteed payment, but press reports indicate that
the government reneged and supplies were suspended
again later in the month, forcing many units to draw
on emergency rations. Supplies of uniforms and fuel
are low, and, in some units, electricity and gas are cut
off at night to reduce utility bills. Finally, ammunition
stockpiles are seriously depleted, which has restricted
training
Navy. The Navy also has been forced to make
dramatic cuts to stay within the constraints of the
reduced budget. Because of a slowdown ordered by
the Navy Chief of Staff in at-sea exercises from
December 1984 through February 1985, for example,
two-thirds of the fleet was out of operation at any
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given time during this period. Moreover, naval ships
sailed an average of only 10 days in 1984; they require
at least 60 days per year at sea to maintain
proficiency, With further
funding cuts likely in 1985, most of the Navy's ships
probably will lack the fuel and trained personnel to
carry out exercises at sea.
Combat systems aboard naval vessels are
deteriorating rapidly,
rgentina's British-built
Type 42 destroyers seem to be in the worst shape. The
United Kingdom's continuing ban on military
equipment sales to Argentina has left the Navy
without spare parts for these destroyers.~~
Naval flight training has also suffered major
the country's naval pilots require
a minimum of 300 hours per year to maintain
proficiency. Flight hours reportedly were cut well
below this level in 1984 for almost all units. Moreover,
no naval air units met the required number of hours
for night flying.
the Navy has
p ace at east t ree o its 1 uper Etendard fighter
aircraft in long-term inactive status because of a lack
of funds to fly and maintain them. Only a small
number of the best Super Etendard pilots are
maintaining their proficiency; the rest are attending
various military schools.
Lack of funding is beginning to affect the Navy's
performance and participation in joint exercises with
foreign navies. For example, Argentina's performance
last year in "Operation Fraterno," a joint exercise
with Brazil's Navy, showed the effects of financial
stringencies and loss of trained personnel. According
to press reports, Brazilian sailors were able for the
first time to outperform the Argentines with regard to
speed and precision in weapons use-an
embarrassment for Argentina, given the historical
rivalry between the two services. The Argentines, out
of resentment over the pro-British stance of the
United States during the Falklands conflict, have not
participated in the joint US-South American
UNITAS naval exercises since the war.
however, that funds that were
to have been available for Argentine participation in
the exercises in 1985 had been reallocated to
financially strapped naval maintenance accounts.
Air Force. Argentina's Air Force has sharply cut its
flight training. Flying time for Mirage fighter aircraft
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is now limited to ei ht hours er month c m
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Air Force has also reduced flying time for its 25X1
number of pilots is able to maintain proficiency.
Skyhawk fighters. Some A-4 squadrons, however, are
limiting total flight hours as ordered, but increasing
the number of flights to ensure that the maximum
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Force about maintenance.
~in late 1984 some personnel were refusing to fly,
fearing that the danger of malfunctions was
increasing due to maintenance cutbacks.
Lack of funds is forcing the Air Force to reduce
spending in several other areas
Air Force representation at military attache
offices overseas has been substantially reduced. The
Air Force is also canceling participation in training
programs abroad. Older aircraft are increasingly
cannibalized for parts because of the lack of funds for
spares. According to Argentine press reports, Air
Force firing exercises have been sharply reduced
because of shortages of ammunition, and Air Force
officials have ordered drastic reductions in electricity,
gas, and paper usage.
Impact on Arms Acquisitions
The Alfonsin government is looking for new ways to
generate income to help cover military costs. These
include increased emphasis on finding export markets
for Argentine-manufactured weapons and efforts to
sell off old equipment as well as some of the newer
weapon systems acquired in the 1970s. The Air Force
has put Mirage III aircraft on the international
market, and its offers to sell Argentine-made Pucara
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aircraft include those already in its inventory. The
Navy is trying to sell at least some of its four new
Meko-class frigates and possibly its two recently
acquired West German-built TR-1700 submarines.
Two British-built destroyers and two West
German--customers can be found. In addition, state-
owned shipyards have begun seeking construction
contracts abroad.
In 1982, Argentina contracted to purchase from Israel
a number of A-4 fighter-bombers, which are subject
to US reexport restrictions. The United States,
responding to a request from the British Government
to halt military sales to Argentina as a result of the
Falklands conflict, has refused to permit delivery of
the aircraft. Argentina, which has paid for the A-4s
and says it cannot recoup the funds from Israel, has
pressed Washington for release. As the effects of
additional budget cuts are felt in 1985 and arms
acquisitions remain suspended, Argentina is likely to
step up its efforts to obtain these aircraft.
Outlook
In our view, the military budget squeeze will continue
for the next two years at least. Although leaders of the
armed forces are likely to continue criticizing the
budget cuts, Alfonsin is determined to rein in military
spending as part of his overall austerity program.
Military manpower levels probably will continue to
decline as low salaries and depressed living and
working conditions encourage more retirements and
discourage new enlistments. Equipment maintenance
will continue to deteriorate, further reducing
operational capabilities. The proficiency levels of
pilots and other skilled personnel will suffer further as
more training restrictions are implemented.
we do not
believe that budget cuts alone will lead them to
confront Alfonsin any time soon. The armed forces
remain widely discredited by their performance in
office, past human rights violations, and the Falklands
debacle in 1982. Many of Alfonsin's potential military
challengers have been forced out of the service, and
others are divided and demoralized. In the coming
months there may be small-scale mutinies within
military garrisons, but they are unlikely to threaten
the government. We believe, however, that the danger
of a military move against the administration will
grow over time if protracted military belt-tightening
is accompanied by further deterioration of the
Argentine economy, widespread labor unrest, and
renewed terrorism that the civilian administration is
unable to contain
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El Salvador: Insurgency
Indicators
On the basis of a reapplication of the late-stage
indicators to the Salvadoran insurgency, we believe
the government's situation has generally improved
since we first applied the indicators in March 1983.
The progress of the Magana and Duarte
administrations has been slow but steady in three of
the four major categories used to measure insurgent
success. Evidence of improved government
performance has resulted in increased confidence in
government capabilities with respect to nine of the 14
indicators we examined. Two indicators-lack of
sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency
and the recent coup plotting by some military
elements-give the extreme left some opportunities;
nevertheless, this is down from four indicators in
1983.
The guerrillas, however, remain a formidable enemy.
Despite continuing ideological disagreements,
personalistic differences among their leaders, and
frequent lapses in tactical coordination, the five
armed guerrilla factions are still able to mount fairly
large military operations and continue to dictate the
terms of most insurgent-government military
confrontations. Furthermore, guerrilla leaders have to
be encouraged by President Duarte's recent collisions
with the armed forces and the Constituent Assembly,
which underscore the fragility of his whole
administration. Nevertheless, the positive changes
over nearly two years lend credence to the view that
time is increasingly on the side of the government.
the
government gained in popular support under both
Magana and Duarte, while support for the guerrillas
may now be at an alltime low. Evidence for this
judgment has been considerable during the past year.
we concur with US
Embassy estimates of last summer indicating that a
political party representing the guerrillas or acting as
Late-Stage Indicators of insurgent Success
An analysis of historical cases indicates that a
common pattern of behavior and events characterizes
the defeat of a government battling an insurgency.
This pattern comprises four categories of
developments:
? Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government.
? Progressive withdrawal of international support for
the government.
? Progressive loss of government control over
population and territory.
? Progressive loss of government coercive power.
These categories include a total of 14 interrelated
and mutually reinforcing indicators of prospective
insurgent victory. Historically, the indicators have
not appeared in any single order. Moreover, while no
single indicator can be considered conclusive evidence
of insurgent victory, all indicators need not be present
,for a government defeat to be in progress. While the
indicators are designed to identify a progression of
events typical of the final stages of a successful
insurgency, this progression is not inevitable.
Effective government countermeasures can block the
evolution of an insurgency and shift its momentum.
Government countermeasures, combined with some
important insurgent failures, are precisely what we
believe have happened in El Salvador since we last
applied these late stage indicators in 1983.
their front in a national election probably would
garner only 5 to 10 percent of the vote. This view was
supported by three nationwide polls (conducted in
May-June 1983, September-October 1983, and
January-February 1984) that found substantially
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more sympathizers for the Army-about 75 percent
on average-than the guerrillas who averaged less
than 10 percent. Some 10 to 15 percent of the
population ventured no opinion.
We believe several government efforts have
contributed to the increase in domestic support:
? The government, along with the military, has
worked hard to build on the socioeconomic reforms
of 1980 and continues to demonstrate its
commitment to the democratic process. The 1982
electoral repudiation of the insurgents was repeated
again in 1984 when more than 80 percent of the
electorate risked guerrilla harassment and sabotage
to cast ballots. Overt political support for the
guerrillas has almost disappeared because of several
factors, including guerrilla tactical reversals and the
improved human rights situation.
? The government has demonstrated its willingness to
take risks and instigate bold initiatives to increase
its popular appeal. The olive branch offered the
guerrillas by opening a dialogue with the guerrillas
is one example.
? Although the payoff has been gradual, nearly
600,000 campesinos have benefited from agrarian
reform. Moreover, programs like the National
Campaign Plan-although only a partial success-
and the new Civil Defense Corps have begun to
stimulate local community spirit.
We also believe the government, in the past year, has
benefited significantly from the insurgents' increasing
reliance on intimidation and economic targeting.
Large numbers of rural poor continue to be the daily
victims of roving bands of guerrillas. "War taxes" are
collected at gunpoint along the major highways, while
numerous small towns and farms have been attacked
or overrun and foodstuffs and other basic necessities
expropriated. Popular discontent with the insurgents
may have reached its height last year when, according
to US Embassy and Salvadoran officials, guerrillas
forcibly recruited nearly 3,000 people, including a
large number of schoolchildren.
Recent insurgent claims of progress in regaining
popular support are not corroborated by any of our
key reporting channels. Defector reports show that
guerrilla leaders from all five insurgent factions agree
they must make a concerted effort in the coming year
to win back sympathizers in both the major cities and
in, heretofore, relatively stable departments in the
western part of the country. How they plan to
accomplish this task remains unclear.
International Support for the Government
The government's standing in the international
community has also improved.
he 1984 presidential election, coupled
with Duarte's solid diplomatic performance during his
travels to Europe, the United States, and South
America, has resulted in a significant drop in levels of
political and financial aid to the insurgency from
several international donors, particularly in Western
Europe. Captured documents indicate that the
insurgents are concerned by the government's growing
international legitimacy and are frustrated by their
inability to reverse these gains. We believe a
heightened guerrilla propaganda campaign for much
of 1984-designed to undermine international support
for the government-accomplished little, while a
more mobile and more aggressive Salvadoran military
was able to blunt or turn back a number of large- and
intermediate-sized insurgent attacks.
Cuba and Nicaragua remain the principal supporters
and conduits of resupply to the guerrillas.'
eriodic
lapses in the Havana-Managua pipeline which, in
addition to more aggressive government operations,
help explain the relatively limited insurgent
operations of the past year.
On the basis of arms transfers and
insurgent logistic activity, as well as to ulations of government
weapons lost in combat, we estimate that roughly three-fourths of
all guerrilla ammunition needs and substantial amounts of basic
necessities are funneled through the Havana-Managua pipeline.
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Government Control Over Population and Territory
During the past year, the government has made the
most progress in the area of political-military control
over the population and territory. In part, we believe,
this improvement has been a result of the insurgents'
inability to provide security for the population in areas
they occupy and their failure to offer viable
alternatives to the government's economic and social
programs. The government, however, has become
increasingly active and is responsible for many of its
own gains:
? Increasingly aggressive military tactics no longer
concede any base areas to the guerrillas. For
example, the traditional insurgent stronghold north
of the Torola River was attacked and occupied by
government troops on several occasions during 1984
and early 1985.
? Duarte has placed considerable emphasis on human
rights. Strict new bombing guidelines for the
Salvadoran Air Force and a major restructuring of
the public security force have, in the words of one of
the country's leading intellectuals, "markedly
decreased the climate of repression."
? Peace has returned to the country's universities,
former centers of leftist organizing. The country's
largest-the University of El Salvador-reopened
in September after afour-year closure. There are
recent signs, however, of renewed unrest.
? The government has eased the burden of some
500,000 people internally displaced by the war.
About 75 percent of all displaced persons receive at
least some food, clothing, and medical assistance
from a national government commission, while the
remainder receive comparable benefits from private
voluntary organizations like the Catholic Church
and the International Red Cross.
? The government has tried its hand-with limited
success-at rebuilding in several war-torn areas. In
San Vicente and Usulutan, where the National
Campaign is under way, several towns have been
rebuilt, numerous roads resurfaced, and a large
number of schools and medical facilities reopened.
landscape of destroyed and vacant villages.
In the last election, insurgent forces prevented
voting in 53 towns-approximately 20 percent of
the national municipalities. However, in 10 of the 53
towns people were able to take advantage of
alternate voting facilities in neighboring villages.
Most of the other towns-traditional "backwaters"
virtually devoid of the country's major cash crops or
other strategic resources-had largely been
abandoned. In Chalatenango and northern
Morazan, where about three-fifths of the nonvoting
towns are located, aerial photography confirms a
The guerrillas' ability to attack the country's
economic infrastructure remains a potent weapon.
Only heavy infusions of US aid have kept the
economy from deteriorating further. From the
government's perspective, however, there may be
some hope. Following a 25-percent decline in the
first three years of the insurgency, GDP has
remained constant for the past two years.
Government Coercive Power
Our estimates of total guerrilla strength have
remained in the 9,000 to 11,000 range for several
years. The insurgents attempted to bolster their
estimate of well-armed, well-trained, combat-
experienced guerrillas from 4,000-6,000 to 6,000-
8,000. Defector reports and captured documents
indicated this
increase was a result of the integration by the
guerrillas of militia into combat units. We have seen
no evidence, however, that would lead us to
similarly revise our estimate of overall guerrilla
strength.
At the same time, the Salvadoran military and
security forces have grown dramatically, from
approximately 32,000 in mid-1983 to about 45,000
today. Increasingly aggressive tactics by the
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UGI.I GL
Salvadoran Army, including psychological operations
and closer coordination between air and ground units,
have kept the insurgents largely on the defensive since
mid-1983. Some of these issues were addressed in
mid-January by Guillermo L1ngo, head of the
Revolutionary Democratic Front, the overt political
arm of the insurgency.
Ungo believes that the Salvadoran
Army is substantially improved over past years and
that there is almost no chance of a short-term
insurgent victory. He also noted that guerrilla combat
units had suffered some important breakdowns in
leadership and morale, and that some members are
currently considering leaving the armed struggle.
Nevertheless, we believe the transition of the
Salvadoran military into an effective
counterinsurgency force is still under way and
remains dependent on cortir~ued improvement in
leadership capabilities and on obtaining the force
levels needed to saturate the countryside.
The military appears to have grown accustomed, if
not comfortable, with its new relationship with
civilian authority. We base this judgment on the
general pattern of behavior within the defense
establishment over several years
that we believe reflects the thinking of many
key senior officers. Several uncharacteristic
miscalculations by Duarte at the close of 1984,
however, have underscored the president's strained
relations with the military. His abortive intervention
in the promotion process, in particular, reinforced
fears among the top brass that he will try-if not
checked-to usurp institutional prerogatives. There is
also discontent among several top field commanders,
who feel that the president's consultations with them
since the first two rounds of the peace talks have been
inadequate.
Duarte's current position with civilian authorities is
also strained. Angered legislators challenged Duarte's
efforts to exercise a partial veto of the electoral law
and appear to be supported by the majority of the
cabinet who,
refused to endorse the revised bill and termed
the process "unconstitutional." This judgment
recently was upheld by the Supreme Court, which
found the veto unconstitutional but not Duarte's
action in casting it.
Despite recent challenges to Duarte's authority, we
believe there is little immediate threat of a coup.
Nevertheless, extremist and moderate forces on the
right, both civilian and military, have found some
important issues to rally around. As a result, Duarte
will have to move cautiously and avoid provoking his
many critics throughout his administration
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in Sonora
In July, Mexico will hold elections for seven
governorships, all seats in the lower house of the
congress, and many local offices. Nowhere will the
ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) face
stiffer competition, in our judgment, than in the
northwestern border state of Sonora. The opposition
National Action Party (PAN) gubernatorial
candidate, Adalberto Rosas Lopez, is well known
throughout the state and highly popular, according to
a variety of sources. In contrast, the ruling party
candidate for governor, Rodolfo Felix Valdes, has not
lived in the state since 1941 and does not command
the support of a united party organization. Although
Rosas probably would win a fair election, we expect
the ruling party to take whatever measures are
necessary to retain control of Sonora's statehouse. As
a result, civil disturbances are likely, and the
government probably will have to call upon local
security forces and the Army to maintain order.
An Atypical State
Sonora, which borders Arizona, is Mexico's second-
largest state, encompassing almost 10 percent of the
country's land area. It is sparsely populated, however,
containing approximately 1.7 million of Mexico's 78
million people. Known for its sprawling ranches and
farms, the state has an economy largely based on
cattle raising, crop production on irrigated lands,
mineral extraction, shrimp fishing, and tourism.
The state also has a reputation for having an
independent-minded citizenry. Sonorans reportedly
are proud the Mexican Revolution began in their state
and that four of the country's Presidents-Huerta,
Obregon, Rodriguez, and Calles-were Sonorans. In
addition, President Plutarco Elias Calles founded the
PRI in 1929.
cities: Hermosillo, which is the capital, San Luis
Colorado, and Agua Prieta. We believe, on the basis
of a variety of reports, that the PAN would have
captured additional municipalities had honest
elections been held in 1983, when Sonorans last went
to the polls.
Ruling Party Disarray
The division of the ruling party i.n Sonora into two
antagonistic factions detracts from Felix's electoral
prospects. The contending blocs-the Grupo
Revolucionario Cardenista and the Grupo
Revolucionario Soronense-have long had
personalistic and other differences and have been
unable to work together effectively. Moreover, both
appear unenthusiastic about the Felix candidacy,
fearing that if elected he will replace the present party
leadership with his own followers, according to the US
Embassy.
The ruling party also has been hurt by its declining
popularity in Sonora during the past several years.
The dissatisfaction has been caused by rising
inflation, the reduced purchasing power of the peso,
and shortages of some consumer goods. Even though
Sonorans generally have fared better than most
Mexicans during the country's economic crisis, many
reportedly judge their well-being in relation to
conditions in the United States.
President de la Madrid's selection of an outsider as a
candidate for governor last November also has
undercut support for the ruling party. The President's
choice apparently was based on his belief there was no
leader in the state who could unite the party. Felix, a
62-year-old engineer, was then serving in Mexico City
as Minister of Communications and Transport. De la
Madrid probably was aware of Felix's reputation for 25X1
Although the ruling party has long dominated
Sonoran politics, the center-right PAN in recent years
has made significant inroads. It now controls three
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being a shrewd middle-of-the-road politician
Nevertheless, the perception of Felix as a
carpetbagger has prevented his campaign from
catching fire, according to the Embassy. Although he
has few political enemies in the state, he also has few
friends and lacks the enthusiastic support of either
state party leaders or the electorate. When on the
stump, he reportedly often addresses audiences as
"You Sonorans," suggesting he too views himself as
an outsider.
Rosas, the
PAN gubernatorial candidate, is widely respected in
Sonora and has the strong support of the state party
organization. Rosas, who is 42 and an agronomist by
vocation, formerly was the PAN mayor of the state's
second-largest city, Ciudad Obregon. He is said to be
an electrifying public speaker with a charismatic
personality
Rosas has been actively campaigning for the past 18
months; he has walked and jogged 750 miles across
the state to meet voters and draw attention to his
candidacy. Rosas directs his appeal primarily to
young professionals, business people, and urban
workers, but appears to have broader support. In his
speeches, he is supportive of free enterprise and favors
freer trade with the United States.
Election Tactics
The ruling party will use a variety of tactics in an
effort to win a resounding victory in Sonora. Felix is
likely to run swell-financed campaign, with much of
the money coming from Mexico City,
Shortly after his return to the state
late. last year, numerous highway billboards were
erected extolling the achievements of the ruling party,
and additional funds became available to transport
voters to,party rallies around the state
The incumbent party also will increase efforts to
discredit the PAN by portraying it as a tool of big
business and the United States. As in the past, the
official Mexican press will denounce meetings of US
diplomats and PAN leaders as evidence of US
collusion with the opposition. Ruling party officials
also are likely to fan rumors the government would
cut funds to Sonora if PAN were to occupy the
statehouse. They will remind voters that Felix, as a
former Cabinet member, has better access to Mexico
City and is in a superior position to lobby for public
works projects.
In addition, the ruling party will use its control of the
state government to advantage. It can count on the
legislature to reject petitions from opposition groups
complaining of election fraud. The legislature already
has granted a waiver allowing Felix, who until last
December was a nonresident, to run for office. Two
years ago, it charged Rosas with contempt for alleged
irregularities he committed while mayor of Ciudad
Obregon. The quasi-independent Mexican judiciary,
however, last month overturned his conviction and 31-
month prison sentence. The decision, which would
have barred him from running for office had it gone
the other way, appears to remove any legal
impediment to his seeking the governorship.
Prospects
We lack reliable poll or other data that would indicate
the present strength of the ruling art the PAN or
other opposition forces in Sonora.
most ruling party
officials in the state as of last January expected the
PAN to receive a majority of the votes cast. We
believe that as of now the PAN would win at least a
plurality.
Nonetheless, we think it unlikely the ruling party will
surrender the statehouse in Sonora or in any other
state in 1985. Since 1929, the ruling party has never
lost a governorship,
Mexico's leaders have decided all
measures must be taken to assure the PRI retains
control of all statehouses in 1985. Even PAN leaders
concede they would have to win by a landslide for the
government to acknowledge their victory.
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The fact that there is considerable PAN sentiment in
Sonora and that Sonorans have a history of political
activism suggests there is a strong likelihood of civil
disturbances in the period surrounding the elections.
In our judgment, violence probably will erupt
spontaneously in association with campaign rallies,
incidents at polling places, seizures of public
buildings, or the blockading of highways and bridges.
We expect civilian security forces and the Army to be
able to contain any disorders so long as they remain
localized.
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Future
The fate of Barletta, a technocrat elected without a
strong popular or party constituency of his own, rests
in large part with the military. Defense Forces Chief
Noriega handpicked Barletta and appears reluctant to
remove him at present, but his tenure is far from
secure. If dissatisfaction with the economic and
political malaise again leads to substantial civil or
military unrest, Noriega may feel that he can force
Barletta out with little political backlash. The
loyalists by ignoring their role in his election when he
appointed technocrats and confidants to his Cabinet
in their stead. Furthermore, with the assistance of
only a few close advisers, he designed a new tax on
services and maneuvered its passage in mid-
November through the lameduck Legislative Council.
Barletta subsequently was forced to withdraw the tax
following large public protests
Opposition Multiplies
out a 13-vote margin o victory. Barletta's
exert substantial influence over him.
absence from Panama for five years while serving
with the World Bank left him without significant
political allies save for Noriega, who presumably
selected Barletta in part because he believed he could
25X6 Barletta alienated PRD
led to the rise of a new political
opposition group and an intensification of opposition
activities across the board. The National Civic
Coordinating Committee (COCINA), an umbrella
group of middle-class professionals, organized two
large demonstrations and a series of work stoppages in
December. The opposition parties, including the
major Panamenista Party and the Christian
Democrats, have begun to make common cause with
COCINA by sending party leaders to its rallies.
Opposition to Barletta spread within the PRD, and by
February the party had stolen the President's
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initiative on new tax legislation.
party members worked
together to resolve budget demands and coordinate a
strategy to pass the final plan.
October, Noriega publicly promised to take a "rear
guard" position behind the new civilian government,
and recent news articles tell of continuing military
efforts to disassociate itself from Barletta's mistakes.
Noriega also encouraged the PRD to organize a
progovernment demonstration and has used the
progovernment press to increase popular support by
publicizing the benefits gained from the military's
civic action projects in rural areas. To divert attention
from the size of the military budget, he has agreed to
Noriega appears to be biding his time,
Outlook
Although the Barletta government still faces financial
difficulties, we believe the President probably will be
able to muddle through at least the next few months.
he has ruled out a military
COCINA led the assault on the military but has been
quickly joined by others. Leaders of the opposition
political coalition regard the country's central
problem as the Defense Forces and their stranglehold
on political power, according to US Embassy
reporting. COCINA has threatened the government
with further civil unrest if it fails to eliminate waste
and corruption, recover embezzled public property,
and reduce the military budget.
Limited Options for the Military
With criticism of the Defense Forces growing,
military support for Barletta has declined. Military
officers have held a series of meetings recently and
have begun to express their dissatisfaction to Noriega.
Noriega has tried-although with little success-to
distance the Defense Forces from criticism resulting
from actions taken by the President he selected. Last
takeover for the time being. Moreover, consensus on a
method and individual to replace Barletta without
further damaging the military's image has yet to
emerge. The Defense Chief is likely to weigh the
importance of protecting Panama's international
banking establishment and the US commitment to
President Barletta against a new government whose
prospects for success may be no greater.
For its part, the political opposition, despite its
numbers, is without swell-defined strategy for
achieving its goals, according to the US Embassy.
Public enthusiasm for a new round of protests is likely
to be weak in the near term because the lengthy
public debate may increase the reluctance of the
middle class to repeat last fall's strikes.
Nevertheless, growing popular anxiety and military
dissatisfaction, coupled with Noriega's own
pessimistic view of economic prospects, increase the
likelihood that the Defense Chief may force a change
in the government.
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In addition, if the military as an institution or his own
position in the Defense Forces is threatened by the
President's continued ineptitude, Noriega probably
will seek his removal. Similarly, if demands for his
ouster lead to widespread civil unrest, the Defense
Chief probably will act. Because Barletta has resigned
twice from Cabinet-level positions in the past when
his advice was ignored, it is possible he may step down
in the face of continuing frustration and impotence.
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South America: Trends in
Naval Modernization in
the Andean Region
Over the past decade, Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
Colombia, and Venezuela have developed relatively
small, but modern navies featuring antiship cruise
missile weapon systems. These forces efficiently
perform their coastal defense mission and cooperate
effectively with the US Navy for hemispheric defense.
Before the development of miniaturized onboard
guidance systems, guns were the decisive factor in
naval surface warfare. Combat effectiveness was
directly proportional to the size of guns, and thus
naval power lay with big ships and with nations
possessing the technology and economic strength to
build and support large fleets.
In recent years, however, the combination of modern
technology and West European manufacturers in
search of markets has enabled even financially
strapped countries in Andean South America to
develop relatively potent navies. Rather than purchase
large warships, these countries have opted for smaller
vessels such as destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and fast-
attack craft to meet their coastal defense
requirements. Only Peru, which owns two cruisers,
maintains large warships. Through the acquisition of
antiship cruise missiles and Shipborne helicopters,
these navies have achieved significant destructive
power.
Cruise Missiles and Helicopters
The navies of all five countries have purchased either
Exocet or Otomat antiship surface-to-surface cruise
missiles (SSMs). These so-called fire and forget
missiles are fast moving, sea-skimming, and are
equipped with guidance systems that enable them to
home on the target without continous monitoring.'
This allows the launching craft to engage several
targets simultaneously or to take evasive action. Chile
and Ecuador also rely on the less advanced Mk.l and
Mk.2 versions of the Israeli-made Gabriel missile.
Shipborne helicopters are a valuable addition to the
Andean countries' missile-equipped vessels because of
their utility in patrolling and scouting coastal areas.
In an over-the-horizon attack, the helicopter scouts
for targets beyond visual and radar range and
transmits range and bearing data to the ship, which
can fire its missiles without exposing itself to the
enemy. The Teseo version of the Otomat missile-
used by Peru and Venezuela-has a midcourse
correction capability that enables a helicopter to
transmit updated targeting data to the missile while it
is in flight, thereby allowing engagement of enemy
ships at extended ranges.
Neither of Peru's cruisers is currently missile armed,
but one of the ships-the Aguirre-has been
converted to accommodate helicopters that are
capable of carrying Exocet missiles. The other cruiser,
the Almirante Grau, is scheduled to undergo two and
one-half years of extensive modernization in a Dutch
shipyard beginning this year. 25X1
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adding Otomat antiship cruise missiles and an Italian-
designed Albatros surface-to-air missile (SAM)
system.
Antiship Cruise Missile Defense
Because the antiship cruise missile is relatively
invulnerable to conventional antiaircraft guns and
missiles, all of the Andean navies have adopted new
' Western antiship cruise missiles have relatively small warheads;
consequently, multiple hits normally are required to sink large
ships. Single hits can, however, cause fires; knock out sensors,
weapons, controls, and communications equipment; or otherwise
incapacitate large ships. The cruise missile is aided in this mission
by its accuracy and by its capacity to be clustered in relatively large
numbers on small vessels.
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Table 1
Antisbip Cruise Missiles Deployed in Region
Exocet
France
MM-38
42
Mach 0.93
165
AM-39
50-75
Mach 0.93
165
MM-40
70
Mach 0.93
165
Otomat
France and Italy
Mk.l
60
Mach 0.82
210
Gabriel
Israel
approaches to counter it. Passive techniques such as
the use of chaff, decoys, and electronic jamming-
employed by Colombia and slated for use by Peru-
are designed to confuse the SSM's guidance system.
Automatic cannons or surface-to-air missiles are also
used by all the countries to try to shoot down the
SSM. Advanced fire-control radars that can track
sea-skimming cruise missiles are the heart of these
systems. The Albatros system provides cruise missile
defense for all the navies in the region except Chile,
which uses the older, British-designed Sea Slug and
Sea Cat surface-to-air missiles. The Albatros consists
of a multiple launcher for Aspide surface-to-air
missiles that can be coordinated with existing gunfire-
control systems.
150
150
Medium range, ship
launched
Medium range, air launched
Longer range, ship
launched, over-the-horizon
capability
Medium range, ship
launched
Long range, ship launched,
over the horizon; Teseo has
a midcourse correction
capability
Medium range, ship
launched
Outlook
The budgetary crunch throughout the Andean region
strengthens the likelihood that local navies will
emphasize their current small-ship strategy for the
rest of the decade. Western Europe probably will
remain the chief supplier of warships either through
direct sales or licensed production. The latter
approach is an especially attractive alternative for
Peru and Chile because they already have the
capability to build modern ships. Sophisticated
equipment such as sensors and propulsion systems will
probably continue to be obtained from Western
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Table Z
Antiship Cruise Missile-Equipped Vessels
Country
Class
Year Built
SSM
SAM
Helicopter
Capability
Chile
2 Destroyers
1970
4 Exocet MM-38
Sea Slug/Sea Cat
2
2 Destroyers
1960
4 Exocet MM-38
Sea Cat
None
2 Destroyers
1944
4 Exocet MM-38
2
2 Frigates
1974
2 Exocet MM-38
Sea Cat
2
2 Fast attack
1973/74
6 Gabriel
None
Colombia
4 Frigates
1983/84
8 Exocet MM-40
Albatros
4
Ecuador
___ _ __ ___ _
6 _Cor_vettes
1982/84__
6 Exocet MM-40
Albatros
6
3 Fast attack
1976/77
4 Exocet MM-38
None
3 Fast attack
1971
4 Gabriel
None
Peru
___ ___
1 Cruiser
__ _ __
1944
Can accommodate 3 of 9
Exocet-capable (AM-39) he-
licopters
I Cruiser
1950
Scheduled to be refitted
with Otomats by 1987
______
2 Destroyers
1953/54
8 Exocet MM-38
None
4 Frigates
1979/84
8 Otomat, Teseo
Albatros
4
suppliers. Navies in the Andean region probably also
will continue to rely on antiship cruise missiles as
their primary surface-to-surface weapons, particularly
in light of the success of Argentine Exocets against
British naval forces during the Falklands war. Finally,
the worldwide naval dominance of the major powers
probably will further erode as technologically
advanced weapons give relatively small navies the
capability for extended range strikes.
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Latin America
Briefs
Venezuela Scandal Strains Civil-Military Relations
The slaying last month of Juan Luis Ibarra Riverol, a lawyer investigating
allegations of high-level corruption involving three former defense ministers, has
aroused public indignation and threatened to strain relations between the military
and the government. President Lusinchi's skillful handling of the matter is
assuaging the military, but the scandal will further erode declining public respect
for Venezuela's judicial system
The US Embassy reports that the case is now receding from the front pages of
Venezuela's leading newspapers. The high command, however, feared that earlier
press speculation over possible military responsibility for the crime could damage
the military. The generals reportedly urged Lusinchi to protect the armed forces
from defamatory attacks and charges of corruption. The President promptly met
with representatives of the media and asked them to show restraint in covering the
judicial proceedings, In addition, other
senior leaders of the ruling Democratic Action party expressed strong public
support for the military
The government's apparently successful effort at damage limitation underscores
the mature relationship that exists between Venezuela's civilian and military
leaders. Nevertheless, the Ibarra killing-the third prominent lawyer involved in a
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government corruption case to be murdered in recent years-has shaken public
confidence in the judicial system and may diminish public respect for the armed
forces.
President-elect Tancredo Neves's Democratic Alliance secured most of the
leadership positions in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies when the two
bodies elected officers late last month. In the Senate, the Alliance's two component
parties-Neves's ideologically diverse Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
(PMDB) and the centrist Liberal Front-won six of seven contests. Internal
dissension, however, diluted the victory. Some Alliance senators defected and
helped elect the only noncoalition officer, a member of the military government's
Social Democratic Party (PDS). Moreover, a majority of PMDB senators rejected
the party leadership's choice for Senate president and substituted their own
candidate, who won the post by a vote of 38 to 29.
The Alliance leaders also encountered stiff resistance in the Chamber of Deputies
elections. The Liberal Front supported the candidate favored by Neves and other
PMDB leaders for president of the chamber, but the PMDB split. Reportedly
angered by Neves's failure to consult more extensively with rank-and-file PMDB
members on congressional matters, a sizable faction obtained support from several
small leftist parties for its own candidate. To counter the PMDB mavericks, the
party's leaders promised Social Democratic Party bosses several key posts in
return for their backing. Although PDS former presidential candidate Maluf
rejected this accord, it was supported by enough PDS members to enable Neves's
candidate-veteran PMDB leader Ulysses Guimaraes-to win by a margin of 245
votes to 210.
The defections may foretell difficulties for Neves in dealing with Congress, even
though his coalition holds a majority of the seats in both houses. The US Embassy
reports that Alliance members have said they will not provide automatic support to
the new government as the PDS did for the military regime. The cooperation
between some PDS deputies and the leaders of the leftist parties raises the
prospect of left-right collaboration against the new president in the Chamber of
Deputies, although signs of discord among the leftists are probably encouraging to
Neves. Maluf's control of some 100 deputies makes him a force to be reckoned
with in the chamber, according to the Embassy. Neves will need to court not only
the non-Maluf PDS legislators but also his own coalition's members as well. He
will have to engage in considerable political manipulation and bargaining to avoid
legislative paralysis.
The purchase of 19 helicopters from France last month will increase the
Ecuadorean Army's helicopter force by 50 percent and make it one of the largest
and most modern in the Andean region. Senior Army officials may have been
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motivated by their reported concern that the Air Force could not provide tactical
air support to Army units. the deal 25X1
includes four Super Pumas for cargo and troop transport, three Ecureuils for
scouting and observation, and 12 Gazelle light utility models equipped with HOT
antitank missiles. The $45 million package also includes about 40 missiles and
provisions for maintenance and maintenance training-a capability Ecuador
currently lacks. The Army made a downpayment of 20 percent; the remaining 80
percent will be financed over aseven-year period to coincide with delivery
schedules. ~~ 25X1
Ecuador currently has 28 Gazelles, but limited seating restricts their use in air-
mobile operations. The Army probably would use Gazelles primarily in their
antitank role to thwart any Peruvian threat or as a gunship in support of
counterinsurgency operations. For the near term, however, a shortage of trained
pilots and lack of a. well-developed doctrine for helicopter operations probably will
restrict the Army's ability to use a helicopter force of this size effectively. ~~ 25X1
Reports in the Cuban press indicate that large areas of the island have been
suffering from a drought since last May. Havana received only 60 percent of its
normal rainfall last year, causing cutbacks in water supplies. In the rural areas,
reports indicate that water and food for livestock are in low supply, increasing the
risks of drought-induced diseases and blight. Residues from sugar and other crops
are being collected to feed some 170,000 head of cattle, and dams have been built
in streams at livestock enterprises. The drought has reduced the output of tubers,
tomatoes, and other foods, crimping Havana's ambitious new plan to produce more
than 33 million quintals of food and vegetables this year.
Dominica Shaky Opposition Alliance
Less than two months after its formation, the opposition Labor Party of
Dominica--comprised of members of the United Dominica Labor Party and the
Dominica Labor Party, as well as some independents-reportedly is experiencing
infighting and factionalism that could lead to an early demise of the merger. The
dispute has been simmering sirce late January, when Matthew Joseph
outmaneuvered Labor Party leader Michael Douglas for the position of
parliamentary leader of the opposition.
Labor Party executive committee responded by voting to expel Joseph from the
party, charging him with disloyalty. Douglas reportedly suspects deputy leader
Oliver Seraphine-his chief rival for control of the new opposition grouping--of
playing a key role in Joseph's victory.
We believe Seraphine's explosion from the party would signal the end of the
alliance and severely jeopardize the opposition's chances of defeating Prime
Minister Charles in the national election slated to be held in mid-1985. Seraphine
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still commands a loyal following among former members of the Dominica Labor
Party, which he headed for six years until the merger. His departure probably
would cause many of these supporters also to leave the new party, creating a
situation similar to the 1980 election when disunity and vote splitting led to the
opposition's overwhelming defeat. Dissolution of the unity grouping also would
terminate continued foreign campaign assistance from Cuba, North Korea,
Guyana, and Libya. Promises of such aid were contingent on the opposition's
maintaining a united front against the ruling Dominica Freedom Party. Although
the threat of an aid cutoff might keep the fledgling alliance intact until the
election is held, continued intraparty squabbling will weaken the party's ability to
cultivate popular support.
The Bahamas Changing Opposition Tactics
The opposition Free National Movement (FNM) has switched to more
confrontational tactics to force the ruling party to call an early general election,
The shift has been spearheaded by the so-called Action Group, a faction of
younger, more aggressive members of the FNM. Encouraged by the success of
several opposition-sponsored demonstrations against Prime Minister Pindling's
government in recent months, the Action Group organized a rally to protest the
levy of a toll to cross the Paradise Island Bridge and the $300,000 "finder's fee"
paid to the Prime Minister for the sale of the government-owned bridge. Some 300
demonstrators, led by Free National Movement head Kendal Isaacs and Action
Group leader George Wilson, temporarily blocked traffic on the bridge in late
January. At a rally held afterward, FNM leaders called on supporters to
participate in additional demonstrations.
There are signs that the party may adopt even more confrontational tactics in the
coming months. For example, plans by the Action Group to seize the government-
controlled radio station in Nassau~riginally slated for February,
-have been postponed until April or May
The group reportedly intends to broadcast its
political agenda and to denounce PindlingJ
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Cuba Chronology
1 February The Ministry of Basic Industry announces that production of goods has increased
7 percent compared to last year, and it has set 32 new production records.
2 February Cuba and the USSR sign a protocol in Havana on technical studies for the Havana
subway.
3 February In an interview in Havana with editors of The Washington Post, Fidel Castro says
"we are not impatient, nor are we anxious" for an improvement in relations with
the United States.
Castro reiterates his willingness to exchange views with the United States on any
topic.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets in Havana with Ruben Dario Souza, Secretary
General of the Panamanian Communist People's Party, to discuss international
events and matters of common interest.
At the opening of the 50th meeting of the General Organization of Cuban Trade
Unions, Roberto Veiga stresses the importance of making 1985 the year of
greatest economic accomplishment since the revolution.
Commenting on Castro's statements in The Washington Post of 3 February,
White House spokesman Larry Speakes says, "We want to see action from the
Cubans and so far we have only had words."
Central Committee member Eloy Valdes signs a protocol of cooperation with
Zambia during a visit to Lusaka.
Foreign Minister Malmierca arrives in Moscow. He meets with Andrey Gromyko,
First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Malmierca says he
discussed the situation in southern Africa with Gromyko and that "our viewpoints
of those questions coincide."
29 Secret
ALA LAR 85-007
15 March 1985
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A delegation of Italian workers, several of whom are militant members of the
Italian Communist Party, meets with members of Cuba's Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution.
The Argentine firm Forja will ship more than 600 tons of railroad couplers to
Cuba in the next few days, according to a report in the Havana press.
Representative William Alexander says Castro is willing to negotiate with the
United States on airline hijacking prevention, radio signal interference, marine
rescues, and fishing.
Politburo alternate member Jesus Montane attends the 25th Congress of the
French Communist Party.
Five Costa Rican legislators arrive in Havana. They will visit production centers,
historical sites, and recreational facilities and will meet with National Assembly
and party leaders.
Cuba and Guyana sign a new educational, scientific, and cultural agreement for
1985 on the 10th anniversary of collaboration between the two countries.
Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gutierrez confirms that a Cuban Government
envoy met with a Costa Rican official in an effort to resolve differences between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
8 February Havana press reports that the Ministry of Basic Industry produced exportable
goods equivalent to more than 370 million pesos last year. Its goal for 1985 is 440
million pesos.
9 February Costa Rican President Monge says conditions are not appropriate for
reestablishing diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.
Il February The joint Cuban-Guinea-Bissau committee for economic and scientific-technical
cooperation opens in Havana.
In an interview with Notimex, Cuba's Minister Without Portfolio Levi Farah says
the United States has used its economic power to block the Contadora efforts.
A high-ranking Cuban Foreign Ministry official denies in a report to Reuters that
Havana had asked Costa Rica to help ease tensions between Havana and
Washington.
In a press conference, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Amado Blanco says that
trade between Cuba and the Soviet Union will exceed 8 billion rubles in 1985.
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Havana International Service reports that Cuba will enter the atomic age when
the nuclear energy plant being built in Cienfuegos begins operating in 1990.
Isidoro Malmierca meets with Czechoslovakian Premier Lubomir Strougal in
Prague. Strougal stressed that Cuba's foreign policy is valued by all progressive
countries.
In an interview on the "MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour" shown on PBS, Fidel Castro
says that Cuba's relations with the Soviets are "better than ever." Castro says
President Reagan has shown some flexibility in foreign affairs since the election,
but blasts the United States for questioning Havana's right to aid Nicaragua. He
adds that closer US-Cuban ties would ease global tensions but "I will not change a
single one of my principles for a thousand relations with a thousand countries like
the United States." In the second part of his interview with PBS, Castro says he
will surrender power if he feels that old age or infirmity prevent him from carrying
out his duties. According to Castro, Cuba has tripled the weaponry of its armed
forces and "every citizen is armed" for defense since the US-led intervention in
Grenada.
12 February Alternate Politburo member Jesus Montane arrives in Lisbon to discuss
international matters and party relations with the Portuguese Communist Party.
Minister of Domestic Trade Manuel Vila Sosa attends the second meeting of the
Ghana-Cuba cooperation commission in Ghana. Cuba agrees to step up economic
assistance in housing and trade.
In statements to the Venezuelan newspaper El National, Uruguayan President-
elect Sanguinetti says Uruguay will soon reestablish relations with Cuba.
Congolese Labor Party delegation headed by Minister of Secondary and Higher
Education Daniel Abibi arrives in Havana. Central Committee member Carneado
greets visitors.
13 February Muhammad Milhim, member of the PLO Executive Committee, meets in Havana
with representatives of the national liberation movements in Latin and Central
America.
During talks in Bulgaria, Foreign Minister Malmierca and Petur Mladenov,
member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, discuss the
international situation, especially Central America and the Caribbean.
Jose Raul Viera and Minister of Public Health Alexander Nunes Correira of
Guinea-Bissau sign a cooperation protocol to increase cooperation in the fields of
education, science, and culture.
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In a statement at Barajas Airport in Spain, Isidoro Malmierca says the only way
to find a political and peaceful solution to the conflict in Central America is
through negotiations by Contadora.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives Jan Stejskal, President of the Czechoslovak
State Bank. They discuss the national economy and bilateral relations.
In an interview with EFE, Fidel Castro issues a dramatic warning to the
industrialized countries concerning the threat that Latin America's "unpayable"
foreign debt poses for world peace.
Labor leaders from the General Confederation of Workers of France, presided
over by Secretary General Henri Krasucki, Politburo member of the French
Communist Party, arrive in Havana.
19 February Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Jose de la Fuente and Jia Shi, China's Vice
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, sign a trade protocol for 1985
in Beijing.
Argentine press announces the forming of the Argentine-Cuban international
trade company Leverage.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Isidoro Malmierca speak at a Minrex meeting.
Malmierca stresses that Cuba has relations with 122 states, 120 at the
ambassadorial level and two with consular representations.
20 February Closing the Minrex meeting, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez says that Cuba's
contribution to the economic revolution should be to reduce imports from capitalist
and socialist countries.
Roberto Veiga accompanies Henri Krasucki and his delegation to Cienfuegos to
inspect the thermonuclear plant and the 5 September agro-industrial complex in
the town of Rodas.
21 February The inter-African coffee organization's secretariat in Abidjan announces that
Cuba has joined the 1983 international coffee organization as an exporting
member.
22 February Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Pelegrin Torras signs an agreement at the
Japanese Embassy in Cuba to renegotiate Cuba's official foreign debt.
Cuba and Algeria ratify an agreement signed in July 1979 creating a joint
intergovernmental commission for economic, scientific, technical, and cultural
cooperation.
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The first group of 23 Cubans who fled Cuba during the Mariel boatlift leave
Dobbins Air Force Base in Atlanta for Cuba.
23 February Cuban Institute of Radio and Television technicians install broadcasting studios
and master control units for radio stations in Uige, Mexico, Huila, and Namibe
provinces of Angola.
25 February At Jose Marti Airport, Ricardo Cabrizas greets the Japanese delegation attending
the eighth meeting of the Cuban-Japan Economic Conference. President of the
conference Rioichi Kawai heads the delegation.
The Energy Ministry in Managua says that Cuba has sent urgent fuel supplies to
Nicaragua to replace a shipment from Ecuador allegedly blocked by the United
States.
26 February Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Rioichi Kawai, president of Komatsu Limited
of Japan, to discuss Cuba's economic situation.
Lima press reports that President Ortega of Nicaragua says there are fewer than
1,000 Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua, 50 of whom will return home in May.
Isidoro Malmierca greets Mexican Foreign Secretary Sepulveda at Jose Marti
International Airport, and later in the day hosts a reception.
27 February Minister of Agriculture Adolfo Diaz reports that 1984 was a record year for sales
to the state, with the production of more than 20.3 million quintals of agricultural
goods.
Fidel Castro tells a Swedish journalist in Havana that a moratorium of 15 to 20
years is necessary for Third World countries to overcome their economic crisis.
Swedish journalist Peter Podgetson says that Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme
has invited Fidel Castro to visit Sweden.
President of the National Assembly Flavio Bravo and Ricardo Alarcon head a
delegation to attend the inauguration of Uruguayan President-elect Julio Maria
Sanguinetti in Montevideo.
During the opening ceremony of the Mexico-Cuba intergovernmental commission,
Mexican Foreign Secretary Sepulveda exhorts the United States and Nicaragua to
renew the Manzanillo talks.
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At the 14th plenum of the agricultural union's national committee, Politburo
alternate member Roberto Veiga says that nine agricultural production records
were set in 1984.
During a stopover in Peru, Flavio Bravo tells reporters that Cuba views with
pleasure the democratization process in Uruguay and Brazil which, when added to
Argentina, are important developments for Latin America.
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SecrrL
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