LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301580002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence ),~
i. pr
tv u: r
1 March 1985
1 March 1985
COPY 3 8 V
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Latin America
Review
Peronism has been adrift since the death of its founder, President
Juan Peron, in 1974. The movement has recently split into two rival
factions, each divided within itself, and prospects for reunification
are poor
Dominican Republic: The Future of the Left 7
Discontent over falling standards of living is providing the
Dominican left with an unprecedented opportunity to broaden its
popular appeal.
Deeply divided and faced with strong antileftist sentiment in
Grenada, leftists probably realize that their ability to regain much
local support depends largely on how the newly elected government
of Prime Minister Blaize manages the country's pressing economic
problems)
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Costa Rica: The Refugee Problem I 17 25X1
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The presence of more than 200,000 foreigners-mostly
impoverished-in a country of only 2.7 million has strained the
troubled economy, generated social tensions, and complicated
already tense relations with Nicaragua
Organized labor-which probably embraces fewer than half of
Brazil's approximately 55 million workers-hopes to exploit the
return of civilian rule to bolster its flagging fortunes
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Venezuela: Growing Divisions Within the Ruling Partyl 23
doubts over US policy in Central America.
Factional pressures within the ruling Democratic Action Party are
mounting as a result of early maneuvering in the party for the
presidential nomination in 1988, continued economic recession, and
Venezuela-Guyana: Border Talks
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Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Argentina: Peronist Feuding
The election of Radical party leader Raul Alfonsin as
President of Argentina in October 1983 marked the
first electoral defeat for Peronism since the
movement's inception in 1945. Nevertheless,
Peronism retained a powerful position in Argentine
politics: it polled 40 percent of the popular vote,
elected governors in half of the 22 provinces,
controlled the largest bloc of legislators in the federal
Senate, and continued to dominate the powerful labor
movement. Since then, however, the Peronists have
frittered away their strengths and failed to provide
forceful democratic opposition to Alfonsin. The
movement has splintered into two rival factions, each
divided within itself, and prospects for reunification
are poor. Unless the party can put its house in order
before the congressional elections in November 1985,
it is likely to face a crushing defeat at the polls and an
even more uncertain future.
A Movement Without a Leader
Peronism ' has been adrift since the death of its
founder, President Juan Peron, in 1974. Peron's
charisma and political savvy had held together a
disparate coalition that ranged from the neofascist
right to the Marxist left. The party's ideology, a
hodgepodge of ultranationalist and vaguely populist
assertions, could not compensate for the loss of the
leader. Although formal unity held up until late last
year, the Peronists have spent most of the past decade
in party infighting and sometimes violent squabbles.
The movement's major contenders for power include:
? Organized labor. The General Confederation of
Workers (CGT)-Argentina's main labor
' Although referred to here as the Peronist movement or party,
Peronism's formal name is the Partido Justicialista-the Justice
Party.F__~
federation-has been a traditional bastion of
Peronism. Until recently the CGT was dominated
by a faction of conservative unionists led by
Lorenzo Miguel, a former vice president of the
party. Miguel's heavily bureaucratic and rigidly
hierarchical group has been challenged in recent
years by at least two Peronist CGT factions that
claim to represent a more progressive and flexible
approach to both labor and party affairs. According
to the press, the anti-Miguel forces may seize
control of the confederation when it holds its
national congress in April or May.
? Followers of Herminio Iglesias. The flamboyant
party boss in Buenos Aires province controls the
largest grassroots Peronist organization. According
to the US Embassy, Iglesias is an extreme rightist
whose devotion to democracy is at best questionable.
Because of his dictatorial methods and proletarian
style, Iglesias is anathema to the middle class and to
self-described "respectable" elements of Peronism.
? Provincial governors and senators. These leaders
represent the party outside Buenos Aires province
and are mostly political moderates who seek to
modernize Peronism and prevent its domination by
organized labor. They derive much of their prestige
from their electoral successes in 1983, which
contrasted sharply with the Peronist defeats in areas
where the traditional labor faction held sway.
? The Peronist left. Organized around Senator
Vicente Saadi's Intransigence and Mobilization
faction, this group seeks to shift Peronism toward
the revolutionary left. The press reports that Saadi
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The "official" Peronist leadership: Lorenzo Miguel (standing on
the right), Jose Maria Vernet (seated on the left), and Herminio
Dissident Peronist leaders at
their congress. Oraldo Britos is
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has support in the party's youth section, but we
believe that his influence within the movement as a
whole is limited.
? Independents. This is a group of diverse, but
generally centrist leaders, who have avoided
identification with any party faction. It includes
respected politicians such as Italo Luder, the
Peronist presidential candidate in 1983, and many
prestigious technocrats and professionals.
The Movement Splits
Although virtually all Peronist leaders publicly vowed
after their 1983 defeat to reform the movement, little
has been accomplished. This, in our view, was
partially due to an ill-fated effort by Isabel Peron-
the party's titular president and widow of Juan
Peron-to assert authority through a committee of
generally obscure rightwing politicians loyal to her.
Her refusal to return permanently to Argentina from
Spain and her growing isolation from party affairs
eventually undercut the committee's authority.
Bickering over its role hindered postelection efforts to
reorganize the party.
By early 1984 the party was held together almost
solely by its opposition to Alfonsin's proposed labor
laws, which threatened to weaken Peronism's base in
the trade unions by introducing strong minority
representation in elected union councils. The assault
on Peronist hegemony in organized labor was defeated
in congress in March, and the movement returned to
its habitual squabbling. At least three rival factions
held rallies on 17 October, the party's "loyalty day."
Moreover, the Peronists failed to formulate a coherent
response to Alfonsin's referendum in November on
the Beagle Channel Treaty with Chile, with some
leaders favoring the accord, others opposing it, and
most advocating abstention. The Alfonsin
government's overwhelming victory in the
referendum-nearly 80 percent of the voters
supported the treaty and the voter participation rate
was over 70 percent-was widely interpreted as a
debacle for the Peronist opposition.
The quarreling within the party culminated at a
national congress held in December. Reform- minded
Peronists-mainly the provincial and independent
leaders-had, according to the US Embassy,
envisioned the meeting as an opportunity to
democratize the movement, clarify its ideology, and
restructure it as a modern political party. These
efforts were blocked by an alliance of Iglesias' Buenos
Aires party machine and Miguel's labor followers.
According to the press, the Iglesias-Miguel faction
used physical intimidation and heavyhanded
parliamentary procedures to elect new leaders
beholden to the labor bureaucracy and the Peronist
far right. The would-be reformers walked out of the
congress in protest, publicly declared the new
leadership illegitimate, and vowed to hold a
countercongress in February 1985.
The Chasm Widens
The antagonism between the two factions deepened
between December and February. Both sides rejected
conciliation efforts by neutral party figures and the
courts. The quarrel also turned violent, according to
press reports. Several anti-Iglesias militants were
assaulted and the home of the Buenos Aires party
boss was firebombed.
The "official" faction-as the Iglesias-Miguel group
calls itself-and the dissident "renovators" held
competing congresses in February. The official
congress attracted only 306 of the 719 party delegates
who had attended the original conclave in December,
revealing the Iglesias-Miguel grouping's minority
status. The congress reaffirmed Isabel Peron as the
party's titular president and ratified both Miguel and
Iglesias in top leadership slots. Jose Maria Vernet, the
Governor of Santa Fe province, was elected first vice
president. According to Argentine commentators,
Vernet is a noncontroversial figurehead who is being
exploited by Iglesias and Miguel in an attempt to
project an image of flexibility and openness to other
segments of the party.
The Vernet ploy failed to persuade the dissidents that
Iglesias and Miguel were serious about reform and
democratization. The rival congress was attended by
all the Peronist provincial governors except Vernet,
most of the party's senators, and 413 of the original
719 delegates. The "renovators" also gained support
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from Saadi's leftist faction and many independent-
minded leaders. According to the US Embassy,
moreover, the dissidents are supported by the anti-
Miguel forces within the CGT. As part of their effort
to compete with the official faction, the renovators
have stressed traditional symbols and themes of
Peronism: they proclaimed Isabel Peron as titular
party head 2 (while conferring real authority on
Senator Oraldo Britos, a prominent provincial leader),
and they emphasized their nationalism by opposing
the Beagle Channel Treaty with Chile.
Prospects for Unity
We believe that the Peronists will be hard-pressed to
control their squabbling before the November 1985
congressional elections. Both factions claim to
represent the "authentic" party, and each demands
that the other recognize its legitimacy prior to
discussing unification. Although some party leaders
have publicly warned of dire consequences for
Peronism should two or more rival organizations
contest the elections, the differences between the
factions are deep and will not, in our view, be quickly
papered over. They involve geography (the interior
versus Buenos Aires), class (the middle class versus
blue-collar workers), party structure (the traditional
bureaucracy versus the new authority of Peronist
governors and senators), as well as the personal
antagonisms that have long plagued the movement.
Moreover, both factions-especially the dissidents-
are loose coalitions that are as preoccupied with
maintaining internal unity as with seeking a wider
Peronist consensus.
Nevertheless, there is at least one possible way out of
the present impasse, in our view. The dissidents have
publicly affirmed that they will have no dealings with
Iglesias, who has come to represent all they detest in
old-style Peronism. Many of the dissidents have
stated, however, that they are willing to cut a deal
with Miguel and Vernet. Both of these men recognize
that their political clout may be sharply curtailed if,
as the press has speculated, pro-dissident labor forces
seize control of the CGT at its congress this spring.
We believe, therefore, that Miguel and Vernet might
' Isabel Peron resigned as party president shortly after the rival
Peronist congresses were held. The first vice presidents of each
faction (Vernet and Britos) took over as de facto presidents. F-
desert Iglesias before the congress, in hopes of
retaining some influence within Peronist labor and
political circles.
Although such a development would isolate Iglesias, it
would not ensure Peronist unity. Iglesias could
continue to dominate the Buenos Aires provincial
party machine and control a sizable bloc of deputies
in the national legislature. Moreover, the dissidents
would still face the formidable challenge of
democratizing Peronism and restructuring it around a
coherent ideology and elected leaders. The task would
be eased if a respected independent leader such as
Italo Luder-who has sided with neither faction but is
reported to sympathize with the dissidents-acted as
at least a symbol of unity during the process. But even
under optimal conditions, it will be an uphill battle to
reunify and refurbish Peronism before the elections in
November.
Implications for Political Stability
We believe that Peronist factionalism will help
Alfonsin maintain his political standing, even in the
face of a faltering economy. He already has
capitalized on the opposition's disarray by authorizing
independent and dissident Peronist candidates to run
under his Radical party banner in the coming
elections. The decay of Peronism also would favor
several small parties on both the left and the right
that until now have been hindered by the electoral
polarization between the Radicals and the Peronists.
In the short run this probably would produce a more
fragmented party system in which Alfonsin's Radicals
would stand out as the sole democratic force capable
of governing the country.
The longer term consequences of a Peronist collapse,
however, would not enhance political stability, in our
view. A proliferation of small, narrowly ideological
parties probably would impede the consolidation of a
democratic alternative to the Radicals. Furthermore,
disgruntled Peronists might seek refuge in the Radical
party. While bolstering Alfonsin in the short term,
absorbing new militants and responding to new
pressures would strain the Radicals' already fragile
unity. Such a development could well convert the
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Radical party into an unwieldy coalition spanning the
political spectrum, in many ways reminiscent of
Peronism. In our view, Argentine political stability
would be better served by the emergence of a
streamlined and democratized Peronism capable of
alternating in power with the Radicals.
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Dominican Republic: The Future
of the Left
Discontent over falling standards of living is providing
the Dominican left with an unprecedented
opportunity to broaden its popular appeal. Although a
leftist-led nationwide work stoppage in mid-February
was more successful than the government expected,
persistent ideological, tactical, and personal
differences among leftist leaders continue to undercut
the left's effectiveness. President Jorge Blanco's
demonstrated willingness to use force to contain
potential troublemakers also has hampered leftist
attempts to mobilize antigovernment sentiment.
Nevertheless, the momentum generated by recent
successes probably will facilitate leftist gains in
national elections next year.
The Leftist Mosaic
The Dominican left has long been highly fragmented.
The US Embassy indicates that it consists of more
than 15 parties and front groups covering a wide
range of ideologies, from Moscow-line Marxists to
pro-Chinese Maoists. Although the left touted the
formation in mid-1983 of the Dominican Leftist Front
(FID) as the first step toward its longstanding goal of
building a broad-based political party, unity efforts
have faltered. According to US Embassy sources,
affiliates of the group elect their own leaders, hold
separate party congresses, and sponsor competing
organizations. Several members have split away to
form separate parties.
Opposition to government belt-tightening has
heightened the left's sense of purpose, but
longstanding personal differences among leftist
leaders continue to hamper cooperation and hurt
efforts to persuade the populace that the left is a
viable political force. The founder of the Dominican
Liberation Party, for example, refuses to join the
Communist-dominated FID in large part because of
animosity between him and the leader of the
Communist Party. According to US Embassy reports,
conflicts between the two leaders have led to a major
power struggle for control of the administration of the
National University and fostered splits in the
leadership of the major leftist labor confederation.
Struggling to Broaden Appeal
According to US Embassy reports, opposition
groups-left and right-see the country's worsening
economic situation as playing into their hands. They
reportedly anticipate making hefty gains among those
dissatisfied with Jorge Blanco's management of the
economy, particularly the hard-hit middle class. The
President's difficulty in maintaining a working
relationship with powerful ruling party chieftains,
particularly Senator Jacobo Majluta, has hurt party
discipline and presented further opportunities for
Jorge Blanco's opponents.
Leftists, recognizing their lack of support among the
middle class, are trying to bridge the gap by forming
neighborhood organizations, the so-called popular
struggle committees. According to US Embassy F--]
the committees-which probably
number several hundred-recruit from a cross section
of Dominican society: housewives, students, and
teachers and other workers. By playing down the
leftist affiliations of the committees, organizers
reportedly hope to attract support for committee
activities from democratic groups. US Embassy
sources indicate that the committees have played a
key role in organizing recent strikes-including a one-
day nationwide work stoppage in mid-February. We
believe leftist leaders may try to use them to
spearhead additional protests
Despite these activities, we have no credible evidence
that pro-leftist sentiment among the people has
increased much. Although the populace remains
dissatisfied over the nation's economic problems, this
discontent has not been translated into a shift of
support for the left. Public apathy to leftist.calls. for
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Table 1
Significant Leftist Political Groups
Leadership
Estimated Member-
ship
Dominican Liberation Party
(PLD) 1973
Juan Bosch
16,000 to 20,000
Dominican Leftist Front
(FID) 1983 a
No single leader, but Com-
munist Party Secretary
General Aris Narciso Isa
Conde is best known.
6,000 to 8,000
Communist Labor Party
(PCT) 1979
The Communist Party of
the Dominican Republic
(PACOREDO)
Movement for Socialism
(MPS)
Fidel Despradel b
Roberto Duverge b
75
Socialist Workers Organi-
zation (OST)
Francisco Malagon
Enrique de Leon
Small
a The FID is an umbrella group originally composed of the
Dominican Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Movement, the
Movement for Socialism, the Anti-Imperialistic Patriotic Union,
the Communist Workers Nucleus, the Socialist Party, the Socialist
Workers Movement, the Revolutionary Communist League, the
Socialist Workers Organization, and the United Leftist Movement.
b Each heads a faction of the party.
protest marches last fall,
most
Dominicans still believe leftist programs to remedy
the country's economic ills are superficial.
even leftist leaders
are disappointed at their inability to generate much
popular backing. Moreover, we believe ongoing
sectarian squabbles have done little to reverse the
public's perception of the left as an assortment of
individualistic political amateurs.
Jorge Blanco's dual-track policy has substantially
undercut leftist efforts to generate antigovernment
sentiment. We believe his well-orchestrated
educational campaign is helping to persuade the
population that the country must live within its
Largest and best organized leftist party. Controls
seven seats in national congress. Operates within
the system but has not discarded armed struggle
as an alternative. Has close links with labor
through General Central of Labor (CGT).
Plagued by internal splits. Pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet.
Loosely organized. Ideologically disparate. Most
member parties tiny. Some endorse armed action.
Has links with labor through CGT and Commu-
nist-controlled United Workers Confederation
(CUT). Strong support at National University.
Pro-Albanian, Maoist-oriented. Critical of FID.
Supported ruling party in 1982 national
elections .a
Composed primarily of intellectuals. Internally
divided. Both factions left FID.
Trotskyite. Dropped out of FID in 1984.
means. Recent moves to soften the blow of recent
steep increases in fuel and food prices-including
promises to increase the minimum wage by 20
percent, to continue subsidizing some food and
medicine, and to provide a new health plan for
teachers-have stolen much of the left's thunder. We
also suspect that his willingness to allow the
Dominican Liberation Party to hold peaceful rallies
while keeping a tighter reign on Communist Party
activities has intensified the left's chronic divisiveness
and reinforced the benefits to be gained by the left in
playing by the rules.
The President also has used force effectively against
troublemakers. Despite his willingness to tolerate a
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Since the centrist Dominican Revolutionary Party
came to power in 1978, the left has enjoyed
considerable freedom of action. Leftist newspapers
and magazines circulate widely, especially in Santo
Domingo, and leftist protests are common. On the
electoral front, leftist parties won slightly over 10
percent of the vote in the 1982 national elections and,
consequently, have their first voice in the National
Congress. They also are represented on several
municipal councils.
Reflecting in part the dominance of intellectuals
among the left's leadership, leftist sentiment is
particularly strong among students. The large
Autonomous University of Santo Domingo is a
traditional stronghold. According to the US
Embassy, several leftist parties exist only on the
university's campus. Press and Embassy reports
indicate that Communist-dominated student groups
have been active in recent antigovernment
demonstrations. Because of the narrowness of
university issues, however, we believe that the left
has failed to maintain the support of educated
Dominicans after they leave school
In our opinion, leftists have made their greatest
organizational strides in recent years within the
country's fledgling labor movement. The General
vocal opposition left as part of his effort to broaden
political participation, security forces have increased
their monitoring of leftist activities. Police armed with
riot gear were called out to handle violent student
protests in December. To keep violence-prone groups
under control and minimize potentially disruptive
demonstrations, the government has detained
Communist political and labor leaders. Periodic
warnings by the military that it will not tolerate leftist
efforts to upset the legally established order also have
added muscle to the President's measures.
The Potential for Violence
Growing concern that economic hardships might
prompt the government to take more repressive
Central of Labor-the country's second-largest union
organization, with control of about 50,000 workers-
is the left's major union organization. It is strong
among teachers, one of the Dominican Republic's
most militant groups, as well as among workers in
the manufacturing and communications sectors. Still,
the political clout of the left among labor unionists
remains weak; only 12 percent of the country's total
labor force of 2 million is unionized, and non-
Communist unions control most of these workers.
Rising unemployment and leftist squabbles over
union leadership also have hurt leftist influence
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Although their strength is predominantly
concentrated in urban areas, leftists are trying to
mobilize support among peasant groups. An affiliate
of one large umbrella organization has set up a front
group, the Independent Peasant Movement, to
Based on a US Embassy report that the group has
mounted only a handful of small demonstrations
during the past year, its claim of 50,000 members
seems exaggerated.
measures to control the left apparently has motivated
several leftist groups to improve their paramilitary
capabilities:
leaders
of the Dominican Liberation Party endorsed
military preparations for party members, including
training in light arms and guerrilla techniques.
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of combat-experienced members.
members of the Dominican Communist Party have
served with insurgent forces in El Salvador for the
past two years in order to build up the party's cadre
we estimate some 10 to 20
violent anti-IMF protests. Moreover,
party leaders have threatened to expel members
participating in unofficial protests, and the US
Embassy recently reported that the party opposes any
military countermeasures.
We agree with US Embassy assessments that such
preparations generally are defensive. Leaders of the
Dominican Liberation Party consistently have
rejected calls by radicals to take to the streets, in large
part because they believe such moves would hurt their
chances of improving their support in national
elections scheduled for next year and raise the risk of
the Communists have
action
only a handful of small arms at their disposal and that
second-tier Communist Party officials reject armed
use terrorist-type tactics on a small scale to try to
Because some leftists apparently are convinced that
the country is on the verge of a revolutionary
explosion, there is some chance that extremists might
bombing government facilities.
a small terrorist
relatively inactive
group-the Trinitarios-may be rearming. US
Embassy reports had indicated the group was
Prospects for Foreign Meddling
We believe that Cuba and to a lesser extent the Soviet
Union have played major roles-short of supplying
arms and ammunition-in the left's recent efforts to
Isa Conde-Secretary General
of the Dominican Communist
Party. F--]
eve believe Havana provides
the Dominicans with transportation-presumably
through Nicaragua. The Soviets reportedly helped to
fund the first group of Dominican Communists sent to
El Salvador in 1983.
Although we believe the Dominican Republic's
economic difficulties have heightened Fidel Castro's
perception that the country is vulnerable to
revolutionary upheaval, we have few credible
indications that Havana-or Moscow-is pressing
hard for armed action. Reporting from the US
Embassy
suggests that Havana's major objective in the
Dominican Republic is to promote leftist unification.
Cuba reportedly promised increased aid in order to
encourage the formation of the Dominican Leftist
Front in mid-1983. At the same time, the Soviets
reportedly reduced their subsidy to the Dominican
Communist Party, presumably to spur cooperation
Although leftist leaders frequently travel to
Communist countries, other foreign powers remain
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Table 2
International Links of Leftist Parties
Dominican Libera- Cuba and USSR provide
tion Party advice and training.
Party members also
train in Nicaragua.
Dominican Commu- Cuba and USSR provide
nist Party advice and training.
Some party members
working in Nicaragua.
Communist Labor
Party
Socialist bloc Embassy reports leaders
travel to Cuba to study
labor, journalism, and
peasant affairs.
Receives funds from
Cuba and USSR. Cuba
provides 30 to 45 schol-
arships yearly for party
members. In 1981, the
Soviets began providing
scholarships.
Receives funds and 100
to 150 scholarships per
year from the USSR.
The BS is a front group within the FID. It is composed of the
Socialist Workers Movement, the Socialist Party, and the Commu-
nist Workers Nucleus.
Cuba and the Soviets
have provided military
training. Some members
now train in Nicaragua.
10 to 20 members have
served with insurgents in
El Salvador. Cuba and
USSR have provided
military training in the
past.
Operates Soviet press
(NOVOSTI) office in Santo
Domingo. Labor affiliate is
a member of Prague-based
World Federation of Trade
Unions.
In recent years, dis-
cussed possible weapons
training with Libya,
Vietnam, and the
Peoples' Liberation
Army of Colombia.
members receiving mi i-
tary training in Libya.
In the past, Cuba report-
edly has provided mili-
tary training.
secondary actors on the Dominican stage. In recent
months, however, Libya has demonstrated a
willingness to expand links with Dominican leftists,
probably as part of Qadhafi's efforts to undermine US
Outlook
The economic hardships we foresee over the next year
are likely to afford the left additional opportunities to
broaden its popular appeal. National and local
elections scheduled for May 1986 will provide a
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convenient yardstick to judge the left's progress and
we expect Juan Bosch's Dominican Liberation Party
to increase its congressional representation and
possibly win control of some municipalities. A sharp
split in the ruling party would, by intensifying
political polarization, significantly enhance the left's
prospects. Disruptive protests by radical leftists may
well pick up before the national elections, but the
prospects for large-scale, antigovernment violence are
likely to remain low. Over the longer run, unless
crippling internal squabbles are resolved, we believe
that the left probably will remain a peripheral force in
national politics.
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Grenada: Leftists Struggling
To Regroup
Since the violent demise of the regime of Maurice
Bishop in October 1983, Grenadian leftists have been
struggling to reorganize and improve their tarnished
image at home and abroad. Deeply divided into two
factions and faced with strong antileftist sentiment in
Grenada, leftists probably realize that their ability to
regain much local support depends largely on how the
newly elected government of Prime Minister Blaize
manages the country's pressing economic problems.
Meanwhile, Havana and Moscow are helping the left
to rebuild. Cuba has taken the lead in providing
funds, training, and political guidance to the more
moderate pro-Bishop faction and is urging unification
with the radicals. Despite the left's willingness to
work within Grenada's legal system, frustration in
trying to make a political comeback over time could
lead it to become more confrontational toward the
government.
The Splintered Left
The personal and ideological conflicts that divided the
New Jewel Movement (NJM) have formalized since
Bishop's death. The leaders of the party's radical
faction, Bernard Coard and his 17 collaborators, are
in jail awaiting trial for the murder of Bishop and
seven other government leaders. US Embassy officials
report that Coard supporters are touting the faction-
reorganizing under the banner of the NJM-as
Grenada's only true Marxist-Leninist party.
Meanwhile, moderate leftists who supported Bishop
have distanced themselves from the pro-Coard
militants. In May 1984, they formed the Maurice
Bishop Patriotic Movement, led by former
government ministers Kendrick Radix and George
Louison
The Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement. The
leaders of the Patriotic Movement have tried
unsuccessfully so far to muster popular support
through social, cultural, and political activities
designed to perpetuate Bishop's memory. Reporting
Kendrick Radix, leader of
Maurice Bishop Patriotic
George Louison, leader of
Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement.F___~
from the US Embassy and our review of documents
captured by US forces in Grenada indicate that many
.Grenadians sympathized with the NJM and the
revolution primarily out of personal support for
Bishop. Since Bishop's death, neither his friends nor
rivals in the party's hierarchy have been able to
Grenadians have spurned the Patriotic Movement
because of Radix's and Louison's perceived
opportunism in trying to capitalize on Bishop's
memory and their lack of political credentials.
Although the Patriotic Movement received some
2,000 votes, or 5 percent of those cast in the election
in December, the number of its active supporters is
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(Party leaders are focusing efforts on
cultivating support among Grenadian youths and
labor unions, in particular the 3,000-member Bank
and General Workers Union. During Bishop's time in
power, the union was run by the NJM, and Embassy
reporting indicates that some unionists remain
sympathetic to leftist politics.
Supporters of the slain Prime Minister will have
trouble building popular support, however, until they
consolidate the party's organization. According to a
US official in Grenada, Radix and Louison are
jockeying for power
the leaders have encountered
dissension from a few members who favor an
insurrectionary strategy. We believe-based on US
Embassy that Radix
and Louison will be able to persuade other members
that a confrontational approach would be
counterproductive in view of Grenada's current
political climate
The New Jewel Movement. This clique is supported
actively by about 100 party loyalists, mainly former
members of the People's Revolutionary Army,
Embassy officials report that for much of 1984
supporters of this radical group concentrated on
raising money and creating favorable publicity for
Coard and the other defendants. Grenadian officials
believe the trial, which is scheduled to resume soon,
will last at least two months. By raising a host of
technicalities and challenging the legality of the
Bernard Coard, imprisoned
leader of the New Jewel Move-
interim government and the courts, the defense has
succeeded in delaying the proceedings for several
months. We believe-based on Embassy reporting-
that their stalling tactics were designed to postpone
the trial until after the December election in hopes
that an elected moderate government might be more
sympathetic to Coard and the other defendants
NJM leaders have intensified efforts in recent months
to rebuild their political support. The US Embassy
says that the party began to reorganize last summer
after some leaders were released from jail for lack of
evidence directly linking them with Bishop's murder.
Although the party boycotted the election, claiming
that Grenada was under foreign military domination.,
we believe that NJM leaders judged that the party
was not ready to reenter politics.
expected later this year.
party workers have begun organizing support groups
in villages, possibly in preparation for local elections
Despite these moves, the NJM probably will
encounter strong obstacles in quickly implementing its
ambitious political plans. We believe the trial and
associated publicity will further damage the party's
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image and hamper its ability to mount a well-
organized campaign. Unless some key NJM leaders
are acquitted, the movement probably will not become
a viable party any time soon
established during the Bishop years-has maintained
close ties with supporters of the former Prime
Minister. Havana is the
primary source of funds for the Patriotic Movement.
Havana reportedly has provided material support for
the party's advertising campaign and social activities
designed to commemorate the slain Bishop and spread
anti-US themes throughout the Eastern Caribbean.
Radix claims
that the NJM has formed an "elite band of
terrorists." Radix reportedly says that this group of
Coard loyalists numbers about 30 former Army
soldiers and is well armed and prone to violence. We
believe-based on reporting from the US Embassy
that Radix is
exaggerating. Such Coard supporters may exist, but
Radix's perception of their intentions is more likely
We suspect that Moscow, for its part, may have
provided money for the legal defense of the group's
leaders.
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Moscow also has offered scholarships
for rena ian students to be administered by a
representative of the Coard faction. According to the 25X1
US Embassy, about 10 Grenadian students remain in
the USSR and about 15 are in East Germany on
scholarships arranged by the Bishop government.
The Longer Term Threat
At this juncture, the left's only hope of regaining
popular support appears to be linked to a failure by
Prime Minister Blaize's government to meet popular
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In addition to these pressures, Blaize 2
faces the difficult tasks of rebuilding the government
bureaucracy and overseeing the establishment and
maintenance of a new police force. If Blaize's New
National Party fails to make much progress in these
areas, we believe popular discontent would provide an
opportunity for Grenadian leftists to foment unrest.
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The left's best chance eventually to make a political
comeback appears to rest with its ability to organize
scattered pockets of support and cultivate those
Grenadians under the age of 30, who make up two-
thirds of the population. Many of these are
unemployed and received political or military training
during the Bishop years. As members of the People's
Revolutionary Army, the militia, or the NJM, some
traveled to Soviet Bloc countries. As the standard
bearers of Bishop's revolution, these Grenadians
enjoyed a privileged status. The US Embassy reports
that after the US-led intervention, however, many
former Army and party members were ostracized by
the general population. Should their economic future
remain dim, we believe that these disaffected
Grenadians would be especially susceptible to leftist
politicking.
Both leftist factions seem resigned to bide their time.
We believe-based on US Embassy)
reporting-that fears of US military retaliation will
preclude any major internal subversion or use of
violence by either group for some time. Moreover, if
the Blaize government remains popular and meets its
economic and political challenges, any terrorist
activity by the left would be counterproductive.
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Costa Rica:
The Refugee Problem
The military conflict in Central America has sparked
a refugee flow that is compounding the political and
economic problems of President Monge's
administration. The presence of more than 200,000
foreigners-mostly impoverished-in a country of
only 2.7 million has strained the troubled economy,
generated social tensions, and complicated already
tense relations with Nicaragua. With few prospects
for an early end to the fighting in Nicaragua, we
expect the refugee exodus to continue, further taxing
Costa Rican resources and fanning tensions with
Managua.
Only a small percentage of the foreigners have legal
status and reside in three refugee camps, which
receive direct aid from the United Nations. According
to statistics released last August by the government's
National Commission on Refugees, the most crowded
camp, located at Tilaran in the north, orginally was
designed to accommodate 1,500, but instead houses
approximately 3,500 Nicaraguan peasants. A second
camp, in Limon on the Caribbean coast and designed
for 750, is near capacity with some 550 Nicaraguan
Miskito Indians, according to a US Embassy official.
Approximately 400 Salvadorans reside in a third
camp in Los Angeles, near San Jose.
In addition, some 11,000 urban refugees-most of
them in the San Jose area-have been receiving UN
aid from Costa Rican welfare agencies, according to
US Embassy reporting. Embassy officials estimate
that total expenditures for refugee care and
maintenance in 1984 were substantially higher than
the $5 million required in 1983.
Costa Rican Government officials and US Embassy
personnel agree that, in addition to the almost 16,000
legal refugees, several hundred thousand illegal
immigrants are living in the country. Of these,
approximately 80,000 to 90,000 are Nicaraguans.
Because they have no legal status, they do not qualify
for assistance and must depend on the economy for
their livelihood.
Some of the resentment stems from the inadequacy of
the local economy to provide sufficient jobs,
particularly among semiskilled and unskilled labor.
According to the US Embassy, unemployment-
currently 9.5 percent, according to official figures-is
calculated unofficially at 15 percent, with another 20
percent of the labor force underemployed.
Competition for jobs was reflected recently in
complaints by local merchants that prompted police to
seize the booths of unlicensed and nontaxpaying street
vendors, many of whom are refugees.
Landless peasants also have complained that the
government gives preferential treatment to the
refugees. According to US Embassy officials,
resentment of the Salvadoran settlement at Los
Angeles-a $2 million model facility that includes a
school, a church, cattle, and farmland-is particularly
strong.
The Costa Ricans also fear a deterioration in their
health and social welfare. US Embassy officials report
that most refugees arrive in poor physical condition
with a variety of infectious diseases. Although US
programs largely have brought medical problems
under control, Costa Ricans continue to complain of
health hazards posed by the refugees.
Secret
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Political Implications
With national elections scheduled for next year, the
administration probably fears the refugee problem
may dominate the campaign. The issue of Costa
Rican neutrality vis-a-vis Nicaragua has been a
sensitive topic within the administration and
frequently has spilled over into the public arena.
Monge recently has been pressured by public opinion
to take a harder line with Nicaragua over a
complicated asylum case and Sandinista incursions
into Costa Rican territory.
The influx of large numbers of Nicaraguan refugees
has exacerbated tensions between Managua and San
Jose Nicaragua
views Costa Rica's acceptance of these refugees as
complicity with anti-Sandinista insurgents and a
violation of Costa Rica's declared neutrality. The
Monge administration, for its part, is concerned that
subversives may infiltrate the camps and foment
unrest. According to US Embassy officials, rumors
have circulated that the Salvadoran camp at Los
Angeles has been used by Salvadoran guerrillas-
aided by the Sandinistas-as a rest and recreation
center, and that refugees are subjected to leftist
indoctrination. Costa Rican officials reportedly fear
that the country's largest hydroelectric plant, at Lake
Arenal near Tilaran, could become a target for
sabotage by Sandinista infiltrators posing as refugees.
The Government's Response
Despite its concern, Costa Rica has limited options. In
late 1983, San Jose declared a state of emergency to
allow rapid movement of funds to meet urgent needs
generated by the refugee problem. The government
lacks sufficient funds even for nonemergencies,
however, and has little money to spare for the
refugees.
Although San Jose has moved ahead with plans to
locate a new transit center near the northeastern
border, public outcry has delayed the establishment of
additional permanent campsites, according to the US
Embassy. The government's ideal long-range
solution-to establish a mixed camp of refugees and
landless Costa Ricans-probably will have to await
additional funds and a more receptive political
environment.
Outlook
The refugee problem almost certainly will worsen.
The growing insurgency in northern Nicaragua and
the Sandinista regime's program of forced military
recruitment probably will drive additional refugees
into Costa Rica, thereby increasing the government's
economic burden and fueling local resentment.
Moreover, the refugees are likely to cause further
deterioration in relations with Nicaragua. The
presence of anti-Sandinista rebels in Costa Rican
camps has become a major irritant to Managua, and
Nicaraguan cross-border raids against them are
almost certain to continue.
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New Government
Organized labor in Brazil-which probably embraces
fewer than half of the country's approximately 55
million workers-hopes to exploit the return of
civilian rule to bolster its flagging fortunes. Moderate
and leftist trade union leaders both plan to demand
wage hikes and labor law reforms that would give the
unions greater autonomy from government controls
over their activities. Although the moderates have
voiced some dissatisfaction with the economic policies
President-elect Neves has enunciated, we believe they
will seek an accommodation with the new
administration. On the other hand, we expect union
militants, especially in the industrial centers of Sao
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, to challenge Neves with
strikes and harsh rhetoric early in his administration.
Both groups are likely to resist Neves's idea of a
"social pact" with business and government that
would include limits on wage demands. The political
left will also be looking for ways to exploit worker
restiveness.
While we expect disruptive strikes to increase, we
believe-as do US Embassy and most other
observers-that the labor movement as a whole will
exercise little leverage over Neves. Sharp ideological,
regional, and personal rivalries within the union
movement, the recent three-year economic recession,
and poor showings by prolabor candidates in the 1982
congressional and local elections have left the unions
on the fringes of the political process. Moreover, the
size and diversity of the labor force in Brazil impede
mobilization on a national scale.
We judge that Neves has both the will and the ability
to contain labor maneuvering.
he intends to take a tough posture
he intends to balance this
stance by intensifying efforts to win union support for
his economic policies and to prevent leftist inroads
into organized labor. We expect him, therefore, to
consult with labor leaders on economic and social
welfare issues and to make concessions aimed at
assuring continued cooperation, but he will probably
stop short of eliminating government controls over
union activities
Labor's Rise and Decline: 1978-84
A Brief Resurgence. The union movement was a chief
beneficiary of the military government's policy of
gradual political liberalization, initiated in the late
1970s. Although the regime retained its legal ban on
strikes and political activity by organized labor,' in
practice it became more tolerant of such activity.
During 1979 and 1980 labor tested the new limits,
increasing the pace and scope of strikes and winning
significant wage concessions. A prolonged strike in
1980 by the 200,000 metalworkers in Sao Paulo was
viewed by US and Brazilian observers as signaling a 25X1
resurgence of union power in Brazil.
The 1980 strike proved to be the zenith of labor's
influence, however. In the early 1980s, feuding within
the labor movement, reversion by the government to a
more repressive stance, and the impact of a severe
economic recession sharply diminished the unions'
ability to influence policy. The recession, which began
in 1981, sent unemployment soaring and devastated
union ranks, according to US Embassy reporting.
Declining union membership and poor leadership
severely hurt prolabor candidates in the 1982
elections, even in areas heavily populated by workers.
' Other government controls on union activity include limitations on
the information of labor organizations and tight control over union
financesF___1
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Problems in 1984. Labor's role in the 1984
presidential election campaign underscored its lack of
political strength. Union leaders lobbied hard but with
little success to win the candidates' support for wage
increases and union reform, according to US Embassy
and press reporting. The unions, moreover, strongly
supported the unsuccessful drive by opposition
political groups for a constitutional amendment to
replace the electoral college system with direct
presidential elections, calculating that direct balloting
would provide the best chance for a sympathetic
government. The US Embassy reports that the union
bosses proved much less effective than local political
bosses in turning out participants for rallies
The 1984 presidential campaign also exacerbated
internal rivalries between the two major-and still
illegal-national labor organizations, the militant
Unified Workers Central (CUT) and the more
moderate Conference of Workers (CONCLAT). Lula
da Silva, who has close ties with the CUT and heads
its political ally, the Workers' Party (PT), opposed the
indirect vote process and ordered the PT's few
delegates in the electoral college not to participate in
the January balloting. He also assailed Neves,
characterizing the future president's policies as a
continuation of those followed by the military
government. CONCLAT leaders, while disappointed
with the failure of the direct-election movement and
increasingly critical of Neves toward the end of the
campaign, sustained their centrist posture and
remained willing to cooperate with the new
administration, according to US Embassy and press
reporting.
Neves and the Unions
Wooing Labor. Neves, like most members of the
Brazilian political elite, has a low estimation of labor's
political clout, As part of
his consensus-building efforts, however, he tried to
court the unions during his campaign. At a meeting
with labor leaders in early January, for example,
Neves promised to seek their views on social and
economic issues and to name labor representatives to
subcommissions tasked with formulating policies for
his administration. He also said labor would be
represented on government boards that determine
wage and welfare policies. In addition, he publicly
emphasized the need to promote economic growth and
some degree of income redistribution-ideas favored
by labor. Some union chiefs, primarily from the
CONCLAT and officially recognized smaller
organizations, concluded that a victory by Neves
would benefit their political fortunes and backed him.
They also offered tentative support to his proposal for
a negotiated "social pact" among labor, business, and
the government to curb Brazil's rising inflation,
calculated in January at 215 percent annually.
A Tough Audience. Militants in the CUT and the
Workers' Party, however, came out early and strongly
against Neves and rejected the notion of a social pact.
The CUT, under the guidance of the Workers' Party,
called a series of highly effective strikes against auto
manufacturers in Sao Paulo. The US Consulate there
reported that the strikes were aimed more at
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demonstrating Workers' Party and CUT strength to
Neves than at winning concessions from management.
Even labor bosses loyal to Neves began to recognize
that he viewed them only as marginal political actors.
CONCLAT leader Joaquim Andrade told US
Consular officials in Sao Paulo in late December that
he considered the dialogue with Neves "illegitimate."
Neves, Andrade complained, was only interested in
containing unions, refused to discuss easing
government controls over labor, and seldom met with
union bosses during the campaign. Andrade also
accused Neves of seeking labor's rubberstamp
approval on most union-related issues, including
leftist governor of Rio de Janeiro, Leonel Brizola.
Neves reportedly calculated that such a shift would
bolster the political left and radical trade unionists,
weaken the new government's congressional support,
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selection of the new Minister of Labor.
The CONCLAT became more openly critical of
Neves as the election approached. Andrade began to
back away from his earlier promises that he would
unequivocally support Neves. He declared that any
CONCLAT support for a social pact would have to be
informal and based on Neves's response to labor
concerns. In early January, the US Embassy reported
that CONCLAT leaders had joined with their CUT
rivals in boycotting a major speech by Neves on labor-
related issues.
Neves-by then the
President-elect-had become concerned about his
ability to count on labor peace even during the
anticipated political honeymoon of his first months in
office. He concluded that he needed the support of
labor moderates through the social pact, in part to
avoid unsettling domestic and foreign investors and
lenders who were watching for signs of unrest that
might inhibit him from undertaking economic
austerity measures.
Neves was
becoming worried that disenchantment with his
policies would make the unions fertile recruiting
grounds for leftists. Neves, according to
he US Embassy, was especially concerned that
Andrade might be persuaded to abandon the
President-elect's electoral coalition in favor of the PT
or the Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB) headed by the
and threaten its economic program.
the US Embassy have reported
that both the PTB and the PT plan to try to woo labor
moderates who still support Neves
Near-Term Outlook
We expect strike activity to increase in the months
ahead as labor militants continue to press for wage
concessions. CUT-controlled unions in the heavily
industrialized areas around Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro are likely to be the most active. The CUT is
the dominant labor group in key multinational
corporations and Brazilian companies producing for
export markets,
managers in many of these firms have
decided that quick settlements are less expensive than
long shutdowns.
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encourage labor unrest. Many of the strikes over the
past several months were not sanctioned by the union
leadership, and the US Embassy reports that some
labor leaders have admitted to difficulties in
controlling rank-and-file members. We expect union
leaders to become more strident and increasingly
willing to call strikes as they seek to regain control
over their members.
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The political left including the small Brazilian
Communist Party-is also likely to continue working
to increase its influence in the unions, and these
efforts will probably contribute to labor militancy.
Lula's small Workers' Party, for example, is trying to
expand into a national political power, and militant
defense of working class interests is the cornerstone of
his program. Brizola, for his part, is hoping that by
luring away Neves's moderate labor backers he can
spur the growth of his party into a major force for the
1986 elections.
Rural workers, only now organizing, are also likely to
become increasingly militant, especially in the citrus-
growing areas of the interior of Sao Paulo state. The
recent destructive frost in the southern United States
has boosted demand for the export of Brazilian
oranges and other crops. For example, laborers in Sao
Paulo, led by Joao de Fatima Soares, appear
determined to use this new leverage to improve wage
levels and working conditions. The PT and left-
leaning Catholic clergymen, according to the US
Embassy, have been fueling much of this unrest.
Although union activity is likely to increase, we do not
believe it will pose a major problem for Neves in the
near term. As noted, the debilitating effects of the
three-year recession on unions and the ideological, needs to protect his anti-inflation program and
personal, and regional divisions among labor make undercut his leftist rivals. Nevertheless, we believe he
mobilization on a national scale unlikely for the is unlikely to back reform of the labor code, an
foreseeable future. Instead, the more moderate labor important tool for controlling union militants, any
leaders and Neves will probably try to work together. time soon
The labor bosses want to avoid accusations that they
are destabilizing the new government, and Neves
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Venezuela: Growing Divisions
Within the Ruling Party
Factional pressures within the ruling Democratic
Action (AD) party are mounting as a result of early
maneuvering in the party for the presidential
nomination in 1988, continued economic recession,
and doubts over US policy in Central America. In the
months ahead, leaders of the dominant "orthodox"
faction will face increasing challenges to party unity
as persistent economic and social problems tempt
other faction heads and party mavericks to distance
themselves from the government.
Democratic Action Without Betancourt
The legacy of Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela's first
democratic president, continues to shape the party's
political orientation. Founded by Betancourt in 1941,
AD remains the dominant center-left party in
Venezuela and has preempted the emergence of a
successful party on the extreme left. Traditionally,
AD has favored rapid economic development, gradual
nationalization of the oil industry, generous welfare
policies, and close relations with Western
democracies. The party also has been committed to a
mixed economy, balanced industrial-agricultural
growth, and social reform within a framework of
constitutional democracy.
Since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship
in 1958, the party has survived three splits (all in the
1960s) and major electoral defeats in 1968 and 1978.
Betancourt was a major unifying and mediating force
within AD, and his death in 1981 left a potentially
serious void in the party leadership. Democratic
Action's impressive victories in 1983-84 and President
Lusinchi's subsequent emergence as a popular
national leader, however, attest to the party's
regenerative abilities and Lusinchi's appeal.
Lusinchi gained Democratic Action's nomination as a
compromise candidate who had no strong enemies.
When he took office in 1984, it was as first among
equals relative to the older party barons, not as AD's
preeminent leader. The President's stock rose sharply
during his first year in office-polls show that he
enjoys wide personal popularity despite plunging
approval ratings for his government. Nevertheless,
Lusinchi's stature as a party leader will be
increasingly measured by his ability to control party
factionalism.
The Orthodox Faction
The orthodox wing of Democratic Action is commonly
identified with Betancourt and includes Lusinchi,
party president Gonzalo Barrios, Senate president
Leandro Mora, and Interior Minister Octavio Lepage.
As the repository of party tradition, it exhibits a
strong distaste for rightwing authoritarianism that is
traceable to the struggle against Perez Jimenez in the
1950s. At the same time, the Cuban-supported
guerrilla threat in the 1960s has left the old guard
equally mistrustful of Marxist movements in Latin
America. This reflexive fear of the revolutionary left,
a shared belief in democracy, and compelling
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Democratic Action Secretary
General Manuel Penalver.F-
economic considerations have led the "ortodoxos" to
pursue good relations with the United States.
On contemporary issues, orthodox leaders back
Lusinchi's economic austerity program, criticize the
Sandinista regime for repressing the legal opposition,
and continue to view Cuba with suspicion. They have
tried, however, to avoid words and actions that would
damage Caracas's credibility as a member of the
Contadora group and have publicly opposed direct US
military action against Nicaragua.
Labor Faction
The labor faction, led by party Secretary General
Manuel Penalver, is the second most important
element in the party. Penalver, a lifelong labor leader,
reportedly made a deal with the "ortodoxos" to
support Lusinchi's nomination in exchange for the
number-two post in the party. Democratic Action
loyalists hold dominant positions in the country's
largest labor organization, the Venezuelan Labor
Confederation (CTV). Moreover, labor has long had a
powerful voice in party councils through the National
Labor Bureau, which consists of leaders of both AD
and the CTV. In addition to these organizational
links, labor benefits from the natural affinity of party
leaders for blue-collar causes.
Labor lost a vigorous defender of its positions in the
Cabinet when Planning Minister Matos Azocar
resigned in January. Matos was the government's
most outspoken advocate of expansionary economic
policies designed to benefit labor. Nevertheless,
Venezuelan Labor Confederation leaders Juan Jose
Delpino and Antonio Rios are powerful figures within
Democratic Action and have direct access to the
President on important issues.
The Populist Wing
Largely a reflection of the views and personality of
former President Carlos Andres Perez, the left-
leaning "Populist Wing" of the party is a more
amorphous group than the other two factions. Perez's
outspoken criticism of US policies in Central
America, preference for normalizing relations with
Cuba, and strident position on foreign debt and other
Third World issues find favor with a substantial
number of party members, particularly youth. To
increase support for his faction, Perez reportedly is
trying to persuade moderate members of the
Movement Toward Socialism, a Marxist organization,
and other small leftist groups to ally with him.
Leaders of the orthodox faction worry that Perez will
make headway in his efforts to proselytize among
labor rank and file, according to the US Embassy.
To date the populist faction has had little impact on
the President's policies. Lusinchi has resisted pressure
from Perez to resume oil shipments to Nicaragua,
upgrade diplomatic relations with Cuba, reduce
support for the Duarte government in El Salvador, or
take a hard line on Latin American debt questions.
Perez recently moved closer toward Lusinchi's policy
on Central America by taking the Sandinistas
publicly to task for their failure to carry out their
initial democratization promises and by declining to
attend Daniel Ortega's inauguration in January.
Perez reportedly decided to temper his position and
allow fellow populist Carlos Canache Mata, who is
AD floor leader in the Chamber of Deputies, to be the
target of criticism by those favoring a more pro-US
foreign policy
says that Perez's moderation reflects a tactical
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Secret
decision not to jeopardize his chances to get the
party's presidential nomination in 1988 by
antagonizing senior AD members.
The Search for Unity
Early last fall the facade of unity between the
government and some elements in the party began to
crack. Opposition criticism of Lusinchi's policies,
posturing by aspirants for the 1988 presidential
nomination, and growing evidence of public
disenchantment with the government combined to
create an impression of disarray within the party. At a
special meeting in late October, Democratic Action's
national political committee-controlled by the
orthodox faction-decided to ban "premature"
campaigning for 1988 as well as public criticism of
the government by party leaders. The committee also
endorsed Lusinchi's economic policies, adopted a
tough anticorruption line, set a timetable for internal
elections, and created a new mechanism to facilitate
better two-way communication between national and
local party levels. To remove any doubt about whether
the new rules would be enforced, the party punished
two AD congressmen by removing both from
prestigious legislative committees and suspending one
of them from party activity for a year for persistently
criticizing the administration.
The 1988 Nomination
The party has succeeded in papering over differences,
but tensions will resurface in coming months,
particularly over the struggle for a party nominee to
replace Lusinchi in 1988. Carlos Andres Perez is a
strong early contender, but Lusinchi and other
orthodox faction leaders adamantly oppose his
candidacy for reasons that go beyond policy
differences. Lusinchi privately has labeled Perez an
opportunist. In addition, Perez's efforts to foster his
own popularity at the expense of the party and the
widespread perception that the former president is the
beneficiary of a growing generation gap within
Democratic Action have caused the old guard to
distrust his motives.
Minister of Interior Lepage appears to have
Lusinchi's provisional backing for the nomination at
this point. Lepage, however, does not have the
national reputation nor the public magnetism of
With 29 members, including the executive political
secretaries, the National Executive Committee (CEN)
is too large and diverse to function as an effective
political bureau. Instead, the cogollito, or inner circle
of senior party leaders, sets party policy on all
important issues. At present the cogollito consists
of eight regular members, including Lusinchi and
Lepage who are not on the CEN, plus several
prominent party leaders who are sometimes invited to
attend (see CEN chart). Even a key position on the
CEN does not ensure cogollito membership. For
example, the two top labor leaders in the CEN,
Manuel Penalver and Antonio Rios, are not part of
the inner circle.
Perez. Moreover, Matos Azocar reportedly claims
that Lepage would be unacceptable to the labor wing
of the party because it considers him too sympathetic
to private enterprise. Should Lepage stumble, there
will be no absence of eager aspirants, including
Penalver, Leandro Mora, and Federal District
Governor Carmelo Lauria.
Traditionally, the presidential campaign formally
begins after internal party elections are held. The
decision in October to put off the party congress at
which these elections will take place until late 1985 at
the earliest-combined with the ban on premature
campaigning-represented a significant victory for
Lusinchi. But it remains to be seen whether Perez and
others will play by these rules
an overwhelming majority of the voters want a new
face in 1988, and these results may rekindle the
former president's desire to get an early start in his
bid for a second term. In any event, because control of
the party machinery will be crucial in determining
which candidate gets the 1988 nomination, factional
strife will intensify as the party congress approaches.
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Secret
AD National Executive Committee (CEN)
Key Positions
Gonzalo Barrios a President
Reinaldo Leandro Mora a First Vice President
Juan Herrera Second Vice President
Manuel Penalver Secretary General
Luis Alfaro Ucero Organization Secretary
Antonio Rios Labor Secretary
Other Members
Jose Ramon Rengifo
Luis Manuel Penalver
Domingo Alberto Rangel
Homera Parra
Luis Pinerua Ordaz b
Carlos Andres Perez a
Executive Political
Secretaries
Jose Angel Ciliberto b
Alejandro Izaguirre a
David Morales Bello b
Carlos Canache Mata b
Humberto Celli b
Armando Gonzalez
Armando Sanchez Bueno b
Pedro Paris Montesinos
Cristobal Hernandez c
Hector Alonzo Lopez
Marco Tulio Bruni Celli
Lewis Perez Daboin
Paulina Gamus
Celestino Armas d
Teofana Camargo
Lilian Henriquez De
Gomez
Carlos Sthory
a Cogollito member.
b Sometimes attends cogollito meetings.
c Suspended from party activities for one year.
d Wields more influence on party matters than CEN members who
are not in key positions.
Dealing With Labor
Lusinchi's wide margin of victory in 1983 probably
raised workers' expectations and led labor to demand
immediate and tangible benefits.
Venezuelans believe they are worse off now than they
were a year ago. Workers probably will become
increasingly impatient for significant concessions in
coming months. Lusinchi is likely to try to mollify
labor by some combination of economic stimuli,
delays in price hikes, and relaxation of import
restrictions. His desire to keep the Perez faction in
check will give labor additional leverage.
Labor's willingness to continue cooperating with the
government was demonstrated recently when
Lusinchi announced a new minimum wage but
declined to grant the across-the-broad wage increase
labor had demanded. Rather than minimize the
government's concession and renew demands for
bigger benefits, Penalver publicly interpreted the
announcement as proof that labor's influence in the
government remains strong. If in the months ahead
Lusinchi delivers on his promise to pursue a
moderately expansionary policy and to alleviate the
impact of price increases on middle- and lower-
income groups, he probably will have labor's
continuing support, thereby complicating the task of
the populists in intraparty maneuvering.
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Secret
Latin America
Brief
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Morales Paul's visit to Guyana in early February
helped strengthen bilateral relations but did not improve prospects for an early
settlement of the Essequibo border dispute. Apparently at Georgetown's urging,
the two sides settled for a communique reiterating that the problem is under
consideration by the UN Secretary General and reaffirming their mutual interest
in implementing his decision. To bolster economic ties, however, Venezuela agreed
to purchase 250,000 tons of Guyanese bauxite that will be delivered later this year.
In recent months, the Venezuelans-increasingly concerned about preventing
Cuba and Soviet Bloc countries from establishing a presence in the Essequibo-
have demonstrated new flexibility regarding a border settlement. Shortly before
his departure for Guyana, Morales Paul hinted that Venezuela might give up its
claims to most, if not all, of the disputed territory-about two thirds of Guyana-
in exchange for an "autonomous outlet" to the Atlantic. Caracas also expressed
interest in an economic codevelopment scheme as part of an overall agreement.
Despite signs of willingness to moderate its position on the Essequibo, Guyana
reverted to its longstanding insistence on mediation by the United Nations,
according to the US Embassy in Georgetown. The Lusinchi government has
reason to proceed cautiously as well. The Venezuelan military and other domestic
nationalists strongly oppose territorial concessions in the Essequibo.
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