NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
Directorate of gill,
Intelligence
I:.Opy
fill Al
4
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
26 April 1985
NESA NESAR 85-OIOJX
16 April 1985
Copy 257
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
lop secret
Near East and
South Asia Review
26 April 1985
Articles Saudi Arabia-Egypt: Dragging Feet on Diplomatic Ties
1 25X1
Saudi Arabia remains reluctant to expand or normaliz ties with
Egypt, despite the gradual Egyptian reintegration into he Arab
world, as the Saudis fear that renewed relations with Egypt would
further isolate and anger Syria as well as shatter already slim
prospects for an Arab consensus on key regional issues.
Afghanistan: Soviet Efforts To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration_7 7
Changes in Soviet forces, equipment, and tactics probably will cause
increasing difficulties for guerrillas resupplying their forces in
Afghanistan over the coming months, but, without a dramatic
increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan and an end to Pakistani and
Iranian aid to the insurgents, heavy cross-border flows will continue.
Afghanistan in March
The insurgents demonstrated a high level of proficiency in
operations against the Soviets in March, but Soviet and regime
forces continued to press the insurgents in the Kabul area and in the
eastern provinces
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a sipgle analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comment may be directed to the
authors,
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-OIOJX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
'l'op secret
25X1
Saudi Arabia-Egypt:
Dragging Feet on
Diplomatic Ties
Saudi Arabia remains reluctant to expand or
normalize ties with Egypt, despite the gradual
Egyptian reintegration into the Arab world. The
Saudis fear that renewed relations with Egypt would
further isolate and anger Syria as well as shatter
already slim prospects for an Arab consensus on key
regional issues. Riyadh insists that the Arab League
must move first to reinstate Egypt, but the Saudis are
pessimistic that an Arab League summit will be
convened any time soon.
Riyadh acknowledges the importance of a stable pro-
Western government in Cairo and has felt the loss of
Egypt as a moderate participant in the Arab dialogue.
In addition, the Saudis are more comfortable with
President Mubarak, after their troubled relations with
Presidents Nasir and Sadat. The two governments
maintain high-level but low-key contacts, and US
officials judge that Riyadh gradually has taken a
warmer approach toward Cairo
Historical Irritants
The Saudi view of Egypt traditionally has been
marked by leadership rivalry, political and cultural
differences, and even personal hostility. Riyadh has
long recognized Egypt's military and political weight
in the region but resents Cairo's often dismissive
attitude toward Saudi concerns.
the Egyptians make no secret of their
contempt for perceived Saudi weakness and
indecisiveness, while Riyadh has long been frustrated
by what it sees as insufficient Egyptian gratitude for
Saudi aid as well as Egypt's inefficiency and waste.
Egypt's independent and highly visible foreign policy,
especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saudi leaders,
who had distrusted Nasiil, found that relations with
Sadat steadily worsened 4s he pursued a separate
peace with Israel and publicly berated the Saudis for
their lack of support. Th$ Saudis believed that his
rapprochement with Israel would impede an overall
settlement and damage Arab interests
Tensions eased significantly after Mubarak became
President and began to adopt a more conciliatory
attitude, according to Enpbassy reporting. Riyadh
continues to believe, however, that Cairo will go its
own way. The Saudis probably recognize that
Mubarak will not back al vay from the Camp David
accords and will make nO significant concessions to
win reentry to the Arab League. 25X1
Riyadh's ties to Egypt, moreover, have complicated its
longstanding relationship with Syria. The Saudis have
been unable to ease the hostility between these two
major Arab powers and are reluctant to anger Syria.
The Saudis recognize that they have limited influence
with both countries and do not want to choose sides.
Shared Concerns
Despite what Riyadh often sees as a troubled
relationship, the Saudis recognize their foreign policy
goals are similar to thos$ of Egypt. Both have close
ties to Washington-which link them closely but can
occasionally intensify their rivalry. Both countries
have actively supported Iraq in the war with Iran, and
More important, US officials believe that the cautious
Saudis, who are more comfortable operating behind
the scenes and within a regional consensus, dislike
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-OIOJX
26 April 1985
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
they are groping for ways to strengthen political
stability in Sudan and Somalia. Both have supported
Yasir Arafat and moderate elements in the PLO.
Riyadh also shares Egypt's hostility to Libyan
President Qadhafi, as well as distaste for Syrian
hardline radicalism and fear of Iranian-style Islamic
fundamentalism.
De Facto Diplomacy
Despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, Riyadh and
Cairo maintain close, high-level contacts. We believe
that King Fahd and Mubarak communicate
frequently through trusted intermediaries. Embassy
officials speculate that the two may talk directly on
The two countries maintain interest sections in both
capitals
High-level visits are rare, however, and the Saudis
have avoided linking them to bilateral relations.
Mubarak attended the funeral of King Khalid in June
1982,
Saudi Defense Minister Prince
Sultan met Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazala
in Paris in mid-1983. Petroleum Minister Yamani
visited Egypt in October 1984-the only Cabinet-
level minister to visit since the Camp David accords-
but publicly cautioned that he was there only on
Tight Pursestrings
Once generous Saudi aid to Egypt-approximately
$1 billion annually before the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty-remains largely cut off. Indirect financial
assistance continues-principally through funding for
Egyptian weapons sales to Iraq and Somalia. Wealthy
Saudis continue to keep money in Egyptian banks,
and more than 500,000 Egyptian workers in Saudi
Arabia are a source of valuable remittances. Mubarak
probably has appealed to the Saudis for financial
assistance, but we have no evidence that the Saudis
have provided government-to-government aid. F__1
The Saudis may be willing to provide increased aid-
although not at pre-Camp David levels, given their
reduced oil revenues and sizable aid commitments to
Iraq and Syria-if large-scale US aid is significantly
Little Diplomatic Support
Riyadh has provided little open diplomatic support to
Cairo, but Saudi officials have played a behind-the-
scenes role in trying to reduce gradually Egypt's
isolation without worsening inter-Arab rivalries.
Saudi leaders have probed repeatedly and
unsuccessfully for some way to convene the long-
postponed Arab League summit, which could consider
Egyptian reentry into the Arab fold. In December,
Saudi Arabia abstained on the vote challenging
Egypt's earlier readmission to the Islamic Conference
Organization, defending its vote as a way to avoid
further angering and isolating Syria.
The Saudis only mildly criticized Jordan for acting
outside the Arab League framework when it renewed
ties with Egypt in September 1984, according to
Embassy reporting.
King a told officials in
October 1984 that he was in fact urging Iraq to
normalize ties with Egypt.
The Saudis, however, have opposed Egyptian moves
that would position Cairo to pursue a more aggressive
diplomacy. They have privately criticized Mubarak's
recent efforts to push the Israeli-Jordanian dialogue,
to the exasperation of Cairo, according to US
officials. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud told US
officials in mid-March that Mubarak's efforts were
an embarrassment. The Saudis also opposed initially
Egypt's efforts to win a seat on the UN Security
Council in fall 1983, only backing off under pressure
from other delegates, including the United States,
according to US officials.
Prospects
Saudi willingness to renew formal ties with Egypt will
depend largely on Riyadh's ability to resolve major
disagreements with Cairo over Egypt's relations with
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
Top Secret
Israel. The Saudis continue to believe that the Camp
David accords are an inadequate basis for a
comprehensive peace. They argue that Egypt has
failed to win more flexible Israeli or US approaches
on key issues like the occupied territories or the
Palestine Liberation Organization. They point to
Lebanon as an example of how bilateral dealings with
Israel are nonproductive. They were sharply critical of
Egypt's failure to influence Israel during the collapse
of Lebanon and its unwillingness to offer more
support to displaced PLO fighters. More important,
they see little prospect that Egypt's tactics can mute
Syrian opposition to the peace process, which the
Saudis judge as the major obstacle to a comprehensive
settlement.
According to US officials, both the Saudis and
Egyptians believe that Riyadh holds the key to
Egypt's reintegration into the Arab world. Until the
Saudis are assured that reintegration can take place
without disrupting the fragile balance between Arab
radicals and moderates or further isolating Syria, we
judge Riyadh will be willing to live with the status
quo.
If the Arab League convenes and approves Egypt's
return, the Saudis are likely to reestablish diplomatic
relations with Egypt and to cede to Cairo a major
leadership role among Arab moderates. They remain
opposed, however, to bilateral negotiations with Israel
outside a comprehensive peace settlement, and Cairo's
ties to Tel Aviv as well as its independent approach to
the peace process will continue to bedevil Saudi-
Egyptian relations.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
Afghanistan: Soviet Efforts
To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration
Changes in Soviet forces, equipment, and tactics
probably will cause increasing difficulties for
guerrillas resupplying their forces in Afghanistan over
the coming months. The Soviets have attempted since
their invasion in 1979 to curtail insurgent infiltration
of men and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan
and Iran. They stepped up pressure on resistance
supply lines in 1984, in part because Moscow realizes
that resistance activity inside Afghanistan depends on
arms flows across the borders. So far, Soviet and
Afghan operations have generally been unsuccessful
in reducing cross-border traffic, and the Soviets'
reluctance to dramatically increase their forces in
Afghanistan and the likelihood that Pakistan and Iran
will continue to help the insurgents point to continued
heavy cross-border flow
Early Efforts
Soviet 40th Army officials realized as early as 1980
that sealing the borders would require many times the
number of forces Moscow was willing to commit to
the war. Still they engaged in large block-and-sweep
operations and in the eastern provinces extensively
mined border areas and used explosives to seal some
In the first two years following the invasion, the
Soviets conducted most border security duties because
Afghan border forces could not function effectively.
By 1982, however, the Soviets were attempting to
reorganize and improve the performance of the
regime's border forces and to share more of the
These and other Soviet e~forts have failed. Guerrilla
infiltration of men and supplies has declined only
temporarily following large military operations and
during periods of bad weather, although Soviet
measures have made thelprocess more difficult.
If at First You Don't Su4ceed ...
Rather than dramatic changes,
however, the Soviets an Afghans seem to be making
gradual adjustments in t eir capabilities in border
areas. They probably hoe that a combination of
small improvements in t eir forces and increased
political pressure on Pakistan and Iran will produce
slow progress in curtailing infiltration
Tactical Changes
The Soviets and Afghan are implementing various
tactical changes to improve their effectiveness in the
border regions. They continue to try to stem
infiltration into Afghanistan mainly with large block-
and-sweep operations, bit they are conducting them
more frequently. The Soviets also are increasing their
use of small-unit tactics and heliborne assaults to trap
insurgent caravans:
? Unlike in the past when Soviet and Afghan attacks
dropped sharply in thej winter, fighting has
continued in border ar as with little interruption
since last summer. A sweep around Ali Khel in
Paktia Province late last year-one of the largest
operations of the war io a border area-briefly
hindered the insurgent' ability to use one of their
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-OIOJX
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
Top Secret
major infiltration routes and probably forced them
to switch to alternative trails. After Soviet forces
left the area, however, the guerrillas resumed their
normal traffic patterns.
Soviet heliborne
assaults and ambushes of insurgent caravans have
increased over the past year.
(Soviet Spetsnaz
operations-many which ged at night to
catch the guerrillas off balance-have proved
the Soviets
began using mobile ambush teams in southwestern
Afghanistan in late 1983. Helicopter-supplied teams
of some 30 troops operate for two to 20 days to
monitor insurgent movements and conduct
ambushes in a given area. The teams are well
concealed and change locations frequently to
maintain the advantage of surprise.
these measures have made travel
through the southwest much more hazardous than
before and forced the resistance to switch from
using trucks and trails to traveling by camel across
stretches of desert.
Force Augmentations
Recent increases in Soviet manpower in border
provinces will improve their capabilities against
insurgent infiltration, but the number of forces is still
far too small to significantly improve border security.
Equipment Improvements
The Soviets probably hope new equipment will also
improve their capabilitie the Soviets
have positioned BM-27 multiple rocket minchers in
some areas of high infiltration
addition to helicopters-will greatly enhance the
Soviets' ability to quickly sow antipersonnel mines in
areas of suspected insurgent infiltration from long
range. The Soviets, however, will be unable to mine
all insurgent trails, and the guerrillas probably will
devise tactics to avoid the mines. Self-propelled
artillery brought into Afghanistan over approximately
the past 18 months also will improve the Soviets'
maneuverability in sweep operations in the border
areas
? Late last year Afghan units renewed their efforts to
halt guerrilla traffic on roads into Afghanistan by
garrisoning a series of posts and temporary camps in
the eastern provinces.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
Pressure on Pakistan and Iran
Concern about increasing flows of resistance arms
supplies into Afghanistan probably is prompting
Moscow to intensify political and military pressure on
Pakistan and Iran to modify their Afghan policies.
Over the past year Soviet and Afghan press reports
have heightened their criticism of Iranian and
Soviet and Regime Problems
Despite recent improvements, Soviet and Afghan
forces are frequently unable to effectively implement
their efforts to curtail infiltration:
The geography of Afghanistan's borders remains a
major disadvantage to Soviet and regime forces.
Resistance forces, however,iprobably use thousands of
conduct frequent air and ground patrols
small trails to enter the country, and they would
switch to alternative routes 'if the Soviets succeeded in
closing the main passes. Guerrilla movements across
the long Iranian frontier also are difficult to monitor
because the Soviets have tom few aircraft and troops to
The success of Moscow's interdiction efforts is also
limited by the insurgents' ability to adapt rapidly to
changes in Soviet and Afghan tactics:
? To avoid ambushes, the insurgents alter their routes
and travel in small groups.
? When a caravan is attacked, guerrillas usually
scatter, take defensive positions, and hold their fire
to avoid Soviet and Afghan counterfire.
? In Qandahar Province several insurgent leaders
have instructed their men to aggressively patrol
areas known to be favorite drop zones for Soviet
heliborne troops.
25X1
25X1
in some areas 25X1
? Many regime units in border areas are hard pressed
to hold their posts against guerrilla assaults, much
less to conduct the necessary patrolling that would
make them an effective forced
villagers provide the insurgents with information on
movements of Soviet and regime forces, enabling
the insurgents to deploy counterambush teams.
Outlook
Moscow's increased efforts to counter an increased
insurgent supply infiltration effort probably will lead
to heavier insurgent personnel and supply losses. But
with Moscow reluctant to dramatically increase its
forces and Iran and Pakistan unlikely to bend to
Soviet pressure to drastically reduce their support for
the resistance, we expect insurgent arms holdings to
increase over the next year,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
lop secret
Afghanistan in March
The insurgents demonstrated a high level of
proficiency in operations against the Soviets in
March, but Soviet and regime forces continued to
press the insurgents in the Kabul area and in the
eastern provinces. On the diplomatic front, senior
Pakistani officials said they expect Soviet leader
Gorbachev to pursue Moscow's current policy in
Afghanistan with more vigor.
The insurgents suffered a setback, however, when the
Pakistani border town of Teri Mangal was almost
totally destroyed by a fire in early March. The fire
broke out in a bazaar area and burned for several
days, destroying 300 shops and several insurgent
ammunition depots The
extent of insurgent losses cannot be determined, and
the cause of the fire is unknown; sabotage cannot be
Air activity in March at Kabul Airport was at its
highest level so far in 1985; on one day, more than 60
MI-24 helicopters flew missions, according to the US
Embassy. The Soviets also moved 24 SU-25 attack
planes from Qandahar to $agram Airbase to support
Soviet President Chernenkb's death.
their operations
Kabul continued to be generally quiet, with only a few
notable exceptions. Insurgent bombs exploded at the
Ministry of Agriculture, a IKHAD office, a
government newspaper, anki in the Soviet diplomatic
area, causing moderate danage and killing between
five and 10 people. The insurgents also fired several
rockets that caused little d~mage and casualties.
Soviet authorities tightener security somewhat after
Kabul's main bazaars continued to be well stocked
with food; fruit and vegeta les were trucked in from
Jalalabad, according to the US Embassy. Prices
remained stable thanks in tart to Soviet subsidies. No
fuel shortages or lines were visible at the city's 11 fuel
pumps. The electrical situation continued to improve,
although power outages still occurred regularly
The Afghan-Pakistani Borer Area
Soviet and Afghan forces conducted extensive 25X1
operations in the Konar Ri er valley between Asmar
ruled out.
Top Secret
5-010JX
26 April 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
Top Secret
and Barikowt to relieve Afghan outposts under siege.
airspace. Other Pakistani officials also expect more
Soviet meddling inside Pakistan-largely through
Several airstrikes against Pakistani territory probably
were in support of the operation to relieve the border
post at Barikowt.
Afghan Army troops initiated a brief firefight with
Pakistani border forces on 16 March after insurgents
seized three Afghan observation posts near the
Khyber Pass border crossing. A senior Pakistani
Army source told the US Embassy that the incident
ended after the insurgents withdrew. There were no
casualties.)
KHAD, the Afghan intelligence agency.
Outlook
We expect the level of fighting to increase during the
spring and early summer as both insurgents and
Soviets take advantage of the better weather. The
Soviets will probably step up operations in the eastern
provinces to block the increased flow of insurgent
arms and tighten security along the Salang highway.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
More Pressure on Pakistan
Senior Pakistani officials told US Under Secretary
Armacost they had concluded from the March
meeting between President Zia and General Secretary
Gorbachev that Gorbachev will pursue present Soviet
foreign policy lines with more vigor. They expect
increased military pressure along Pakistan's western
border and additional Soviet intrusions into Pakistani
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85T01184R000301440002-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3
'l'op Secret
25X1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/04: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000301440002-3