NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301420002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence MASTER FItE COPY I Top See
oil MARIA ell
New East and
South Asia Review
12 Apeii 1955
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Near East and
South Asia Review
With Libyan aid, Iran has developed a surface-to-surface missile
capability that it has used against Iraq and could use to threaten US
allies in the Persian Gulf to reduce their support for Iraq as well as
their ties to the United States.
Iran: Relations With West Germany
West Germany is Iran's principal source of civilian goods, primarily
supplying heavy machinery and vehicles. However, despite its strong
economic ties with Iran, Bonn has permitted virtually no arms sales
to Tehran since the war with Iraq began
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India: Tilting Against Sikh Extremists Overseas) 7
New Delhi has made cooperation on the Sikh issue a central
question in its relations with Pakistan and the West, but, even if
these countries meet New Delhi's demands, Sikh discontent in India
will continue to fuel extremism, and Gandhi's efforts to improve ties
with these countries will be impeded.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
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The Iranian Missile Threat
Although Iran fired nine long-range missiles at Iraqi
cities between mid-March and early April and has
threatened to launch more, Baghdad has not been
deterred from attacking Iranian cities or shipping in
the Persian Gulf. Libya apparently has sent as many
as 30 missiles and two launchers to Iran since last
November and probably will continue to provide
support for equipment in Iran.
The Iraqis may request more sophisticated
weapons from the Soviets-such as the long-range
SS-12 missile-that they could use against Iran.F_
Iran's new missile capability increases its ability to
strike oil facilities in the Arab Gulf states. Although
Iran probably would not have enough missiles to
destroy such facilities, it could use the threat of an
attack to exert pressure on the Gulf governments. To
avoid a confrontation with the United States, Iran
would not deliberately launch missiles against US
facilities. Tehran, however, probably would launch
such attacks in retaliation for US air or naval attacks
on Iran.
Iranian Attacks
Iran launched its first surface-to-surface missile
against Iraq on 12 March, hitting the city of Kirkuk.
Over the next three weeks, Tehran fired eight more
against Baghdad.
Defense Command confirms that missiles launched
from near the Iranian city of Kermanshah hit
Baghdad on 16 and 25 March. Reports from
the US Embassy in Baghdad suggest that
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the nine attacks probably have caused about 100
casualties.
Iranian officials claim that the missile attacks are in
retaliation for Iraqi raids on Iranian cities and
Baghdad's disregard of the UN call for an end to
attacks on civilian targets. Tehran has warned that it
will launch more missiles if the Iraqis continue to use
chemical weapons, attack ships in the Persian Gulf, or
shoot down civilian aircraft over Iran.
Iran wants the attacks
on cities to stop so that Iran can concentrate on
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fighting the ground war. Tehran also probably is 25X1
eager to stop the attacks on its cities to prevent
Iranian civilian morale from worsening
Iran with the missiles used to attack Iraq. We believe
that Tripoli so far has sent Tehran two mobile Scud
launcher vehicles, associated equipment, and as many
as 30 missiles.
Libya has supplied 25X1
So far, however, the
Iranians have fired only one missile in each attack.
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NESA NESAR 85-009J
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Libya is capable of providing Tehran with additional
launchers, missiles, and the personnel to operate the
system without significantly reducing Libyan military
capability. Libya has six operational Scud brigades,
each equipped with nine launchers; at least 18
launchers remain in storage. Libya has at least six
missiles allotted for each launcher in operational
units, or an estimated total of over 300 missiles. We
estimate that Libya could supply Iran with as least 15
more missiles and another three launchers.
We believe that Libyan personnel are servicing the
missile equipment and may have fired the missiles
from Iran.
the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard may have been training in Libya on Scuds last
summer. We estimate, however, that they would not
have had time to acquire the skill to operate the Scud
system without assistance from the Libyans.
Iranian missile attacks so far have not deterred the
Iraqis from continuing air attacks on major Iranian
cities or shipping in the Persian Gulf. On 19 March
Baghdad declared an exclusionary zone over Iranian
airspace and warned that civilian aircraft flying over
Iran might be shot down. Iraq attacked six ships in
the Gulf during March. Iraqi officials also have tried
to increase pressure on Iran by warning the citizens of
Ahvaz to leave the city, suggesting that Iraq plans to
launch attacks on the area. Baghdad probably will not
agree to end the attacks on Iranian cities unless such a
cease-fire was linked to an overall settlement of the
war.
Future Iranian Attacks
If Iran has received additional missiles from Libya, it
probably will use them to seek revenge and try to
deter further Iraqi attacks. Long-range surface-to-
surface missiles offer Tehran the means to strike the
enemy capital without risking Iran's few remaining
operational fighter aircraft. Tehran also probably
hopes that such attacks will help undermine Iraqi
morale and public support for the Saddam Husayn
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regime. Reports from US diplomats in Baghdad,
however, say that Iraqi morale is high because of the
recent victory over Iran in the marshes northwest of
cities-particularly Tehran-in retaliation for
additional Iranian attacks.
Baghdad will keep pressing Libya and the Soviet
Union to prevent the transfer of more weapons to
Iran. Iraq's ability to influence Libya is limited,
although the Iraqis might threaten to increase support
for Libyan dissidents if Tripoli sent more missiles to
Iran. Baghdad is likely to ask Moscow for further
safeguards and assurances that Libya will not be
permitted to transfer weapons to other countries. The
Iraqis probably will put additional pressure on the
Soviets for more sophisticated weapons-such as the
SU-24 fighter-bomber or SS-12 missiles with a 925-
kilometer range-which Iraq can use to retaliate
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Al Basrah.
We believe the Iranians will use their limited supply
of missiles to attack large area targets such as cities to
gain maximum publicity from their efforts. The
Scud's poor accuracy-about 1 kilometer at two-
thirds of its maximum range-suggests that Iran
probably could not target specific buildings with
reasonable hope of hitting them with a single missile.
Although a chance hit on an Iraqi military base would
be costly, Iranian missile attacks do not threaten to
reduce Iraq's overall military superiority over Iran. If
Iran acquired a large number of missiles, however, it
might consider launching several rockets at a facility,
such as a chemical weapons plant, in hopes that one
missile would find the target
Tehran is likely to make strong efforts to acquire even
more missiles and launchers, especially from Libya.
We expect the Soviets-as they did last December-
to warn Qadhafi about the need to gain Moscow's
approval before transferring military equipment to
third countries. Qadhafi is likely to continue to
provide maintenance assistance for the equipment
already in Iranian hands. Libya may also risk
increasing Moscow's wrath by providing as many as
15 more missiles and one to three launchers to Iran.
Qadhafi would deny the transfer to the Soviets, while
claiming credit for the recent willingness by Tehran to
talk to Moscow.
Prospects for Iraq
The Iraqis are likely to take strong military measures
to prevent Iran from launching more missiles or to
punish Tehran for future attacks.
Iraqi missile
attacks on Kermanshah in early April suggest the
Iraqis may have already tried to eliminate the Iranian
rockets. They may attempt to shoot down transport
aircraft carrying additional missiles, support
equipment, or personnel to Iran. Iraq also will
increase its own missile and air strikes against Iranian
against Iran.
Qadhafi probably would be willing to discontinue
Scud support to Iran in exchange for an Iraqi 25X1
commitment to abandon support of Libyan dissidents.
A good-faith gesture by Baghdad, such as turning a
dissident over to Tripoli, would be needed to seal the
bargain. The Iraqis, however, do not trust Qadhafi
and are unlikely to damage prospects for cooperation
with the dissidents for a mere promise.
Implications for the United States
Iran's new surface-to-surface missile capability
increases Tehran's capability to threaten US allies in
the Persian Gulf. The Scud's 300-kilometer range
gives it the capability to reach major oil-producing or
exporting facilities along the Gulf in Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Iranian 25X1
Revolutionary Guard crews will eventually learn how
to launch the missiles, and Tehran might be tempted
to attack such targets in response to increasing Iraqi
attacks against Iranian oil export operations.
Although Iran probably would not have a sufficient
number of missiles to destroy or even seriously
damage such facilities, Tehran could conduct limited
attacks to press the Arab Gulf states to reduce their
support for Iraq or their ties to the United States.
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Tehran wishes to avoid military confrontations with
the United States and is unlikely to strike US
facilities deliberately. Nonetheless, rockets launched
against targets in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could
harm US personnel in these countries. If the United
States should launch an air or naval attack on Iran,
Tehran probably would launch surface-to-surface
missiles against US facilities in retaliation. Primary
targets would probably include US embassy
compounds or housing blocks, construction projects,
and the headquarters facilities of the Commander
Middle East Force in Manama, Bahrain.
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Iran: Relations With
West Germany
West Germany is Iran's principal source of civilian
goods, primarily supplying heavy machinery and
vehicles. Iran is upset over the large trade deficit it is
running with West Germany, but it is unlikely to
restrict trade. Instead, Tehran is likely to use threats
to turn to other suppliers as well as steep oil discounts
to entice West German firms to accept barter deals.
Despite West Germany's strong economic ties with
Iran, Bonn has permitted virtually no arms sales to
Tehran since the war with Iraq began. Private West
German firms, however, have helped Iran complete
construction of a rocket factory begun under the
Shah. Iran is using its position as a lucrative export
market for German goods to press for sales of military
equipment, but Bonn almost certainly will not
sanction official sales. Tehran, however, may succeed
in some gray market deals with private firms for
ammunition, radars, and communications gear
Economic and Political Ties
West Germany has become the principal exporter of
civilian goods to Iran since the Islamic revolution in
1979. During 1983 and 1984, Iran imported almost
$5.5 billion worth of goods from West Germany,
roughly 15 percent of Iran's imports. Heavy
machinery, technology, and civilian vehicles make up
the bulk of imports from West Germany.
West German firms have been able to gain a large
share of the Iranian market in part because Tehran
has terminated virtually all trade with the United
States and France. West Germany also has avoided
alienating Iran by refusing to sell arms to Iraq.
Cultural ties also favor the Germans since several top
postrevolutionary Iranian officials-such as the late
Chief Justice Beheshti and current Minister of
Islamic Guidance Khatami-were educated in West
Germany.
Minister Genscher's visit to Iran last year was the
most significant by a West European official since the
Islamic revolution. In addition to valuing Iran as a
lucrative export market, West Germany believes its
political and economic ties with Tehran serve larger
Western interests. Bonn hopes to reduce Iran's need
to turn to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for
goods and to strengthen moderate forces in Tehran.
Bonn does not condone the excesses of the Khomeini
regime, however, and does not want to be closely
identified with them. Therefore, we expect no major
steps by West Germany to upgrade or intensify
political relations any time soon. Iran, on the other
hand, views its relationship with West Germany as
proof that Tehran is not politically isolated. Iranian
moderates argue that it is important to build ties with
such countries as West Germany and Japan to
preserve Iran's independence from the superpowers.
Arms Trade
Before the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran
maintained a small arms trade with West Germany,
primarily in the military services and construction
fields. West German military sales to Iran in 1974-79
totaled less than $300 million. Over 80 percent of
West German military trade with Iran was in the 25X1
form of technical assistance and machinery for arms
manufacturing plants. Military equipment sold before
1979 consisted mainly of nonlethal items such as
trucks, uniforms, and field radios.
Since the revolution, West German firms have helped
Iran finish building a production plant for antitank
rockets (RPG-7) begun under the Shah. An artillery
and ammunition facility, on which West German
firms began construction in 1975, was still not
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West Germany's political ties with Iran are the best of
any West European country. West German Foreign
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NESA 9J
12 April 1985
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information. Firm figures are unavailable, but we
believe the rocket production plant is producing tens
of thousands of RPGs annually. Both plants are
hampered by a lack of raw materials, skilled
technicians, and managerial personnel
Since 1979, West Germany has authorized only one
arms deal with Tehran-the sale in 1983 of $20
million in military communications equipment.
Private arms dealers, however, have sold Tehran an
estimated $30 million worth of ammunition through
gray market transactions. There is little evidence that
West German firms have served as middlemen in
arranging Iranian arms deals with third countries.
West German firms, hurt by the slumping global
arms market, have unsuccessfully lobbied Bonn to
approve more transfers to Iran as part of an overall
relaxation of its arms sales policy. An example is
Iran's attempt to purchase six 209-class submarines
from a West German firm. The contract for the
submarines, which originated under the Shah's
regime, was outstanding when Khomeini took power
in 1979. The new regime canceled the contract, but in
1982 it began discussions with the firm to try to
acquire the submarines. Despite Iranian threats to
take legal action, the firm refuses to start construction
because Bonn will not consider approving their
delivery until the Iran-Iraq war ends. We believe that
Bonn would accede to US requests to suspend
indefinitely future submarine deliveries.
Problems
The major economic issue between the two countries
is the large West German trade surplus-in 1983 and
1984 it amounted to almost $4 billion.
In addition, Tehran is trying to use its economic
leverage to press Bonn to curb the activities of Iranian
opposition groups in West Germany. In 1982 Iran
closed its Embassy in Bonn for 12 days to protest
West Germany's expulsion of pro-Khomeini activists
charged with attacking anti-Khomeini demonstrators
at the University of Mainz.
Outlook
Despite Tehran's concern over its trade deficit with
Bonn, Iran is likely to continue relying on West
German firms for the bulk of its manufactured goods
and transport vehicles. Iran will try to reduce the
deficit by approaching individual West German firms,
by threatening to find other suppliers, and by offering
oil barter deals involving price discounts-reportedly
as high as 20 percent
Iran also will continue efforts to obtain West German
military equipment, probably without much success.
West Germany has stated it
will not change its opposition to major sales while the
war lasts. Iran may have some success in tapping the
gray arms market and in finding West German firms
willing to sell small arms, but these firms will have
problems circumventing West German restrictions.
West
Germany imported as much as 18 percent of its oil
from Iran in the 1970s, but this has fallen to only 3.5
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India: Tilting Against Sikh
Extremists Overseas
We believe New Delhi's determination to curtail
foreign-based support for Sikh extremism risks
undercutting other foreign policy objectives without
significantly reducing dissidence at home. New Delhi
has made cooperation on the Sikh issue a central
question in its relations with Pakistan, the United
Kingdom, and, to a lesser degree, the United States
and other Western states. In our view, even if these
countries meet New Delhi's demands, Sikh discontent
in India will continue to fuel extremism, while India's
knee-jerk response to Sikh activities abroad probably
will impede the closer ties Gandhi seeks with Pakistan
and the West and perhaps even provide the Soviets
with the means to draw India closer to MoscowF_
New Delhi: Fearful and Embarrassed
The events of the past year have reinforced New
Delhi's fear that support for Sikh dissidence from
abroad threatens stability at home. When Army
troops stormed extremist strongholds in Punjab last
summer, they discovered large caches of Pakistani-,
Chinese-, and US-manufactured weapons, according
to the Indian press. Although the Indian
Government's White Paper on Punjab avoided
charging any specific country with supporting
extremists, the stockpiles fueled speculation in India
about foreign funding and orchestration of extremist
activities. The local press carried allegations by
unnamed Indian officials of US, Chinese, and
Pakistani intelligence involvement in Punjab.
Indira Gandhi's assassination by her Sikh bodyguards
sparked fresh investigations of suspected foreign
complicity, according to the Indian media. The
official investigation, however, has so far shown the
plot to have been entirely homegrown, according to
the Indian media.
Rajiv Gandhi-like his mother-probably believes
New Delhi could control Sikh extremism but for
support from abroad. According to US diplomats,
New Delhi is convinced that Sikhs in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada comprise
the main support for both "Khalistan"-the separate
Sikh state demanded by extremists-and dissidence
in Punjab. The shadow government of Khalistan is
We believe New Delhi's moves to curb the activities 25X1
of Sikhs abroad are also prompted by embarrassment
and by concern for the safety of Indian officials
overseas. Disgruntled Sikhs have attempted to bring
India's alleged human rights violations before the
United Nations as well as national legislatures in their
host countries,
Khalistan supporters in the United Kingdom, Canada,
the United States, West Germany, Malaysia, and
elsewhere have demonstrated publicly against New
Delhi, in several instances attacking Indian
Government-owned facilities abroad, according to
press reports. The Indians have expressed
apprehension over possible assassination attempts
against Indian Government personnel abroad,
particularly since Kashmiri separatists murdered an
Indian diplomat in the United Kingdom last year.
Crackdown on Overseas Links
We believe that New Delhi's preoccupation with the
"foreign hand" is evident in the magnitude of its
efforts since last June to isolate Sikh extremists at
home from their sympathizers abroad. The
government's new measures have included:
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91YF..SA 85-009J
12 April 1985
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? Controlling access to India from overseas by
requiring that citizens of the United Kingdom and
Canada-long privileged as fellow Commonwealth
members-as well as nationals of Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and
Iceland secure entry visas before traveling to India,
rather than applying for landing permits upon
arrival.
? Restricting access to Punjab by foreign citizens-
including those of Indian birth.
We believe New Delhi's recently announced policy of
confiscating the properties in India of those involved
in "antinational activities" abroad is also designed
primarily to end overseas support for Khalistan. The
new legislation, which covers foreign citizens of
Indian origin as well as Indian citizens residing
abroad, doubtless will also be applied with vigor to
Kashmiri separatists residing in the United Kingdom.
New Delhi may even hope that the ambiguity of
"antinational activities" will deter other Indians
abroad from voicing opposition to Indian Government
policies.
Warnings to Pakistan
New Delhi's public criticism last month of Pakistan's
"uncooperative attitude" regarding the Sikhs was
clearly intended as a warning to Islamabad. The
Indians, in our view, have correctly surmised that Zia
is even more eager than they to pursue bilateral
normalization, in part because he believes the military
balance strongly favors India. By restarting
normalization talks with Islamabad only after Zia
agreed to try two groups of Sikhs who had hijacked
Indian airliners to Pakistan in 1981 and 1984, Gandhi
signaled that New Delhi will continue to link progress
toward normalization with Islamabad's stance on the
Sikh issue. Indira Gandhi last summer broke off the
talks at least partly to protest Pakistan's handling of
another Sikh hijacking and its media treatment of
Indian Government actions in Punjab. Rajiv will
probably do likewise if he decides Islamabad's actions
toward or statements on the Sikhs threaten his
domestic management of the problem
farmers
The Indians are not relying solely on diplomatic
pressure to forestall Pakistani involvement. Besides
the well-publicized increase in paramilitary and
military patrolling along the Indo-Pakistani border,
the US defense attache has reported that New Delhi
is considering creation of a 600-kilometer-long buffer
zone in Indian Punjab to seal the border against
movements of persons and weapons. The buffer zone
would be costly because the government would have
to purchase choice agricultural land from local
Pressures on the United Kingdom and Other West
European Nations
India has focused much of its attention in Western
Europe on Sikh activism in the United Kingdom. New
Delhi last month publicly expressed frustration over
London's failure to limit the activities of its resident
Sikh separatists, notably Jagjit Chauhan, self-
proclaimed leader of the Khalistan Council. Last June
the Indians protested a British Broadcasting
Corporation interview with Chauhan,
New Delhi's perception that London has been lax in
curbing the activities of militant Sikh residents-and
Kashmiri separatists-led to a chill in bilateral
relations for several months. Despite Indian interest in
British military supplies and technology, the Indians
since Indira Gandhi's assassination have indefinitely
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delayed trips by UK Defense Secretary Heseltine and
a senior official from the Department of Trade and
Industry and postponed scheduled visits by two
British ships
Delhi's planned purchase of British Westland
helicopters valued at 100 million pounds also is on
hold, as is the expected signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding governing the transfer of British
technology to India. Relations have improved
somewhat, however, since London refused entry to
three Sikhs identified by New Delhi as extremists,
according to US diplomats in New Delhi.
Rajiv has shown new willingness to press for
cooperation elsewhere in Western Europe. US
diplomats have reported discussions with West
German counterparts regarding Indian pressures on
Bonn to contain the activities of its resident militant
activities of pro-Khalistan groups in New York and
Washington, if necessary by deporting resident aliens.
The leader of the Washington group-a US citizen-
has expressed solidarity with Khalistan leader Jagjit 25X1
Chauhan, and press reports indicate that the World
Sikh Organization in New York is planning a meeting
to coincide with Rajiv's expected visit to the United
States in June-a potential embarrassment New
Delhi certainly hopes Washington will try to avoid.
We expect New Delhi to
The Sikh Factor in Relations
With Washington and Ottawa
Rajiv Gandhi, unlike his mother, has so far avoided
implying that the United States supports Sikh
separatism, but Indian concerns about US-based Sikh
activism have the potential to become a significant
irritant in Indo-US relations. US press reports
indicate that, since last June, an activist minority of
the estimated 250,000 Sikhs in the country has
protested New Delhi's policies and lobbied state and
federal officials for support. New Delhi objects both
to critical statements by US officials and to legislative
hearings on the status of Sikhs in India as interference
New Delhi will welcome Washington's assurances
that it is investigating the propriety of Sikh political
activities but is likely to press for concrete results.
the Indian Government
continue pressing Washington and Ottawa to monitor
the movements and activities of suspected Khalistan
sympathizers in North America even after Rajiv
The likely focus of New Delhi's near-term concerns in
North America will be Sikh attempts against Rajiv
Gandhi's life during his four-day visit to the United
returns home.
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Foreign Support for Sikh Extremism in Perspective
Despite New Delhi's contentions, even total
curtailment of overseas support for extremism
probably would not end Sikh dissidence in Punjab.
New Delhi, in our view, has minimized the extent of
indigenous support for extremism, probably in part to
deflect blame from the government. Sikh alienation
from and suspicion of government intentions remain
widespread, according to Embassy reporting. Violence
by extremists has continued despite New Delhi's
measures since last June to seal the border with 25X1
Pakistan and limit access to India from overseas.
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of the extremists to hit targets in virtually every
district of Punjab suggests that there is at least broad
tacit support for their activities among their
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Pakistan
We have no independent evidence to support Indian
charges-based on interrogation of Sikh extremists,
according to the Indian press-that Islamabad has
systematically trained, armed, and given sanctuary to
Sikh extremists or deliberately served as a conduit
? We believe it likely that local officials in Pakistan
allow Sikhs to cross the border at will, consistent
with plausible deniability for Islamabad.
? We do not doubt that Pakistani intelligence
officials have contacted visiting Sikhs or that local
officials have aided them, probably with
Islamabad's knowledge. Officials in Lahore, for
example, apparently provided Sikh hijackers with a
pistol last summer-a charge that Pakistan's
President Zia no longer denies.
The United States and Canada
We have no evidence that Sikhs in North America
have systematically supported terrorist activities
against the Indian Government. An Indian journalist
investigating Sikh dissidence in the United States and
Canada recently shared with US officials his
conclusion that Sikh alienation in the United States
had not translated into support for Khalistan. He
said he had found no hard evidence that the Sikh
community is funding the separatist movement or is
directly engaged in gun-running or other illicit
activities in support of extremists at home. Likewise,
US diplomats in Canada dismissed as disinformation
a June report in the Canadian press-replayed in the
Indian press-that a Sikh resident had accumulated
arms for use by extremists in Punjab. But last June
we had an isolated report from US diplomats in
Toronto that a Sikh approached them with an offer
to assassinate Indira Gandhi if they would provide
him with travel papers.
The United Kingdom and Western Europe
We cannot confirm that Khalistan activists-
particularly in the United Kingdom-have funded the
activities of the banned Dal Khalsa and All India
Sikh Students' Federation-as New Delhi has
charged in the past
Foreign Policy Implications
In our judgment, New Delhi is unlikely for several
reasons to secure the degree of cooperation it seeks
from foreign governments. The Western governments
involved have constitutional and legal limits on their
ability to restrict the speech of residents and to single
out citizens or residents of specified national origin.
Pakistan is likely to prove unwilling-as well as
unable-to halt the modest encouragement and aid
that its local officials may well be providing. The
"Punjab option" represents one of the few pressure
points currently available to Islamabad in dealing
with India. Moreover, Islamabad probably could not
altogether eradicate weapons smuggling into India,
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given the length of the border and the determination
of both sellers and buyers.F__-]
We believe New Delhi will nonetheless be quick to
blame any renewed violence in Punjab on Pakistan-
and perhaps also the United States and United
Kingdom-to the detriment of the improved relations
Rajiv has been seeking. The Indians probably would
cite recent reports-noted by US diplomats in New
Delhi-that Sikh extremists have rearmed themselves
for a new round of antigovernment operations with
weapons intended for the Afghan insurgents.
We believe that, as in the past, a major outbreak of
violence in Punjab probably would increase Soviet
disinformation aimed against Pakistan and the United
States and perhaps also New Delhi's susceptibility to
it. Following Indira Gandhi's assassination, the Indian
press replayed rumors-almost certainly of Soviet
origin-that her Sikh assassins had been trained at
CIA camps in Pakistan. Over the past two years,
TASS has harped endlessly on the theme of US
efforts to Balkanize India, beginning in Punjab.
Although Rajiv is less inclined than his mother to
react on the basis of weak evidence, the priority he
continues to accord Sikh connections abroad probably
will make him attentive to all allegations.
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Top Secret
TOP Secret
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