NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301320001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
1 February 1985
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1 February 19 7-004C 25X1
C
opy 2 61
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Libya: Meddling in Central America and the Caribbean
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Qadhafi's willingness to put his most radical advisers in charge of
Libyan activities in Central America and the Caribbean almost
certainly presages a more aggressive Libyan effort to undermine US
interests there, but Libya's ineptitude in implementing its policies
and constraints imposed by geographic distance and rivalry with
Cuba will limit its success.
Egypt: Mubarak's Perspective on Arab-Israeli Reconciliation
President Mubarak has concentrated Egypt's diplomatic energies in
recent months on advancing the prospects for Arab-Israeli
negotiations, focusing on rekindling international interest in the
talks and gaining acceptance for a PLO role in them.
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Jordanian-Iraqi military cooperation has grown steadily since the
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and will probably continue to
grow despite problems such as the serious deterioration of Jordanian
roads and unpaid Iraqi bills, as both sides have common enemies
and common fears if their neighbor is defeated
And a Spawning Ground for a Military Coup
The elite Republican Guard and Special Forces units are the most
aggressive, competent, and disciplined elements of the Iraqi armed
forces, but, if the war with Iran escalates and these forces face the
prospects of heavy casualties, elements in the elite formations might
consider ways of removing Saddam Husayn rather than have their
units decimated.
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004C
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Iran's efforts to cobble together an effective force of pliable Iraqi
Shia dissident groups has left them more weakened and divided than
ever, and, even if a widely respected Iraqi Shia leader were to
emerge, Iran would probably undermine his influence.
Iraq: Barzani Asserts Himself ~ 21
Within the past year Masud Barzani has fought his way back from
virtual isolation within the Kurdish resistance movement, but, even
though he will be able to increase his activities in Iraq, he will not
become strong enough to challenge the government's control over
key cities or the oil-producing area in the north.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
authors,
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Libya:
Meddling in Central America
and the Caribbean
Qadhafi's willingness to put his most radical advisers
in charge of Libyan activities in Central America and
the Caribbean almost certainly presages a more
aggressive Libyan effort to undermine US interests
there. Libya will try mixing tactics, including
economic and military aid and intimidation, to
strengthen regional radicals under US pressure,
promote militant anti-US actions, and build
capability for terrorist operations. Libya's ineptitude
in implementing its policies, however, and constraints
imposed on Tripoli by geographic distance and rivalry
with Cuba limit its prospects for success.
Tripoli has sent Managua four SF-260 light strike
aircraft, two to four MI-2 helicopters, a Boeing 720
VIP aircraft, antiaircraft guns, SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and miscellaneous
small arms. Five Libyan L-39s that were shipped to
Bulgaria several months ago probably are intended
for Nicaragua in fulfillment of a promise by Qadhafi
to supply such equipment, although there are signs
that Sofia is reluctant to ship these on Libya's behalf.
We estimate that Libya has at least 50 military
instructors and technicians in Nicaragua.
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Qadhafi highlighted his determination to expand
support for Central American and Caribbean leftists
during festivities in Tripoli on 1 September
commemorating the 15th anniversary of his takeover.
The festivities were preceded by a "Conference for
International Solidarity With the Libyan People"
attended by Latin American leftist representatives
from St. Lucia, Dominica, and Nicaragua. We believe
Qadhafi's strong public indictments of US foreign
policies during the ceremonies were intended to
promote anti-US activities by regional leftists. F
supplemented this aid with probably over $350 million
in cash, oil, and other forms of economic assistance.
Although sources of the US Embassy in Managua
report that Libya threatened to curtail economic
cooperation because of Managua's misuse of funds,
press announcements that Libya and Nicaragua have
recently concluded a new trade agreement suggest
they have resolved their differences.
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Central America: The Nicaragua Connection
Nicaragua, in our view, is the linchpin of Libyan
efforts to undermine US influence in Central
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004C
1 February 1985
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Qadhafi is
trying to use aid and intimidation to press Caribbean
leftists to increase their militancy. Libyan officials
last year made clear they were angry with leaders of
at least one leftist group for diverting Libyan aid
intended to strengthen subversive capabilities. Tripoli
demanded that leftist leaders from St. Lucia,
Dominica, and Guyana demonstrate their radical
credentials by sending members of their organizations
to Libya for paramilitary training and indoctrination.
Libyan
Libyans are arguing that a regime fashioned after
Qadhafi's instead of Castro's would have lessened
political tensions on the island and removed
Washington's pretext for invading. In Panama,
competition for influence between Cuban- and
Libyan-backed groups has badly divided the leftist
community
Qadhafi
has made only limited progress in expanding his
influence despite his greatly increased cultivation of
Latin American leftists in recent years. We expect
Qadhafi's difficulties to continue. Libya's generally
heavyhanded efforts to spread Qadhafi's radical
ideology continue to antagonize potential supporters.
Tripoli, in our view, also is hampered by geographic
distance, cultural unfamiliarity with the region, lack
of intelligence assets, and a reputation for not
fulfilling its promises of aid. Moreover, we believe
militant Libyan policies will conflict with Cuban
advice to regional leftists to pursue moderation, which
is intended to help strengthen their popular support.
officials last year began urging Caribbean leftists to
use violence in pursuit of their political objectives.
Tripoli is broadening its search for clients among
regional leftists.
The Cuban Angle
Libyan activities in the region almost certainly are
being closely monitored by Cuban leader Fidel
Castro. Although some Libyan economic cooperation
with Cuba continues-the two countries signed a
limited economic and technical agreement last July-
Qadhafi and Castro have never developed close
personal ties because of equally inflated egos and
competing revolutionary philosophies.
Tripoli blames Cuban
These constraints still leave Qadhafi with several
options that he will pursue despite their mixed
prospects for success:
? He will mix intimidation and aid to urge regional
leftists to undertake militant anti-US activities.
Most Caribbean leftist organizations are unlikely to
go beyond demonstrations and propaganda,
however, because of their concern that violent
actions would damage their domestic political
standing and risk government retaliation. For their
part we believe most Caribbean governments are
suspicious of Libyan intentions and are likely to
keep Qadhafi at arm's length.
? Qadhafi also will do what he can to strengthen his
position with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua
including pushing ahead with delivery of additional
weaponry and economic aid to ensure a continuing
Libyan role in reducing Managua's vulnerability to
US pressure.
meddling for destabilizing Grenada before the US
intervention in 1983.
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? Qadhafi will increase military and financial aid to
promote opposition to political settlements between
Central American insurgents and pro-US regimes,
although such assistance is unlikely to affect the
balance between insurgents and government forces
on the battlefield
Libya will become even more aggressive in the region
if Qadhafi believes Libya is coming under greater US
military or economic pressure. He asserted in a policy
speech several months ago that Libyan involvement in
Latin America is in retaliation for US naval
operations in the central Mediterranean that threaten
Libya. The threat of Libyan-backed terrorism against
US interests in Central America and the Caribbean
will grow if Qadhafi continues to develop his relations
with radical fringe groups.
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Top Secret
Egypt: Mubarak's Perspective
on Arab-Israeli Reconciliation
Since Jordan resumed formal relations with Egypt
last September, President Mubarak has concentrated
his government's diplomatic energies on advancing
the prospects for Arab-Israeli negotiations. Cairo's
efforts have focused on rekindling international
interest in the talks and gaining acceptance for a PLO
role in them.
Mubarak's Motivation
Mubarak sees an Egyptian drive to advance the
prospects for negotiations between the moderate
Arabs and Israel as an effective means to promote and
reconcile several of his key goals, including:
? Rapprochement with the Arab world. Mubarak
believes that championing the Palestinian cause will
restore Egypt's Arab credentials despite its peace
treaty with Israel. Mubarak may be resigned to
waiting for some action by the Arab League
reversing its diplomatic boycott of Egypt before
additional Arab states restore formal ties. He
probably hopes, however, that his efforts on behalf
of the Palestinians will encourage early action by
the league.
? Maintaining the flow of US economic and military
aid. Mubarak will press for increased funds and
greater flexibility in their use when he visits
Washington in March. He probably believes that
Egypt's firm commitment both to Camp David and
to pushing for Arab-Israeli reconciliation, combined
with recent conciliatory gestures toward Tel Aviv,
will enhance Egypt's image with the US Congress.
Even so, concern about domestic and Arab opinion
makes him reluctant to return an Egyptian
ambassador to Tel Aviv.
? Neutralizing domestic criticism. Mubarak is
mindful of his vocal political opponents, almost all
of whom criticize Egypt's close ties with the United
States. They also insist that Egypt abrogate its
peace treaty with Israel, claiming that the Israelis
themselves have broken it by not seeking to resolve
Arab-Israeli problems through peaceful means. A
renewal of Egypt's leadership in achieving Arab
aims against the perceived opposition of the United
States and Israel is one way to counter such
criticism.
Encouraging International Involvement
The Egyptians are concerned that the United States,
Europe, and even the Arab world no longer feel any
urgency to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, and they
evidently saw in the restoration of ties with Jordan an
opportunity to begin public and private efforts to
Mubarak believes that the appearance of action is
preferable to no action and that discussion may
eventually generate movement. For example, the
Egyptians have asserted that a PLO peace initiative
would force the United States and Israel to respond.
Mubarak's frank criticism of the Arabs' lack of
solidarity on Arab-Israeli issues is also designed to
stimulate discussion.
The Egyptians are not looking for a new initiative
from the Europeans but are encouraging the
European Community to facilitate Arab-Israeli
negotiations based on common elements of existing
plans. Mubarak urged renewed European involvement
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004C
e ruary
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during a trip to Paris and Bonn in late October and
early November and again during Italian Prime
Minister Craxi's visit to Cairo later in November.
Egyptian officials voiced approval when the EC,
following its summit meeting in December,
reaffirmed its belief that the PLO must be associated
with the peace negotiations and declared its readiness
to assist "in any way open to them in attempts to
identify common ground between the parties."
Mubarak will pursue the subject in forthcoming
contacts with Europeans, including a visit to Cairo by
the Italian President in mid-February and Mubarak's
own stops in London and Paris in conjunction with his
trip to the United States next month.
Cairo is seeking to exploit its extensive informal ties
with several Arab states in addition to capitalizing on
the windfall presented by its restored formal ties with
Recently improved relations with Algeria present an
opportunity for informal cooperation with Algiers in
advancing Arab and Arab-Israeli reconciliation,
particularly in Algeria's efforts to dissuade Syria from
trying to control the PLO.
Senior Egyptian officials have called for Syrian
participation in any peace negotiations, largely
because they believe Damascus would obstruct any
talks in which it was not included. Cairo has
adamantly denied any intention to form a Cairo-
Amman-PLO axis to counter Syrian influence. F_
For similar reasons, the Egyptians also believe that
Soviet participation is essential for eventually
resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the near term,
however, they probably believe that Moscow has little
to contribute except in helping moderate Syrian policy
toward the PLO. Cairo privately welcomed the
announcement of renewed exchanges between
Washington and Moscow on the Middle East, and
shortly thereafter Mubarak discussed prospects for
furthering Arab-Israeli reconciliation with the visiting
Emphasis on PLO Participation
Cairo has made clear that it will not resume the
Palestinian autonomy talks with Israel in the format
outlined in the Camp David accords. The Egyptians
do not want to incur renewed Arab criticism that they
are usurping the PLO's role. They may also believe
that there are already enough irritants in Egyptian-
Israeli relations. Although renewed discussion on
Palestinian autonomy would be initially viewed by the
Israelis as a major concession, continued divergence in
the definition of autonomy would lead to renewed
frustration.
In early November, Mubarak publicly called upon the
PLO to "correct the picture of Palestinian objectives"
and present its own peace initiative, apparently in the
belief that this would help establish it as a legitimate
political entity.
Mubarak welcomed Hussein's proposal, presented at
the Palestine National Council meeting in Amman in
November, to develop a joint PLO-Jordanian
negotiating position based on UN Resolution 242 and
the concept of "land for peace." In the joint
communique on the occasion of Hussein's visit to
Cairo in early December, Mubarak publicly endorsed
the need for an international conference based on
Resolution 242.
US Embassy reporting indicates, however, that the
Egyptians believe US and Israeli opposition will
prevent such a conference from convening. They are
also aware that even moderates in the PLO reject any
peace position based on Resolution 242 because it
only refers to the Palestinians as refugees and ignores
their right to self-determination
Mubarak's three meetings with Hussein since the
restoration of formal relations have been aimed at
encouraging PLO-Jordanian collaboration and at
keeping informed on its progress. He may also have
encouraged Rome and Athens, during surprise visits
to these capitals in mid-January, to support PLO
moderates by meeting publicly with PLO chief
Arafat. According to reporting from the US Embassy
in Cairo, Greece and Italy are the only EC members
that have not refused to consider this suggestion.
East German Foreign Minister.
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Outlook
Mubarak wants to come to Washington backed by at
least a partial Arab consensus on how to proceed with
peace negotiations with Israel. He probably is
optimistic that he will be able to report some progress.
He will continue to encourage Jordanian-PLO
negotiations on a joint peace position by maintaining
close contacts with King Hussein. An additional
meeting between the two is likely before March. The
Egyptians also will continue their efforts to persuade
Arafat that Resolution 242, because it condemns the
seizure of land by force, is an appropriate basis for
negotiations.
Mubarak will continue trying to bolster Arafat's
position and that of moderates in the PLO. His efforts
probably will be restricted to diplomacy and public
statements of support. He almost certainly remains
too concerned about the political volatility of the PLO
to permit Arafat to relocate elements of his
organization to Egypt. He may, however, agree to a
summit meeting with Arafat and Hussein outside of
Egypt.
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Jordan-Iraq:
Closer Military Cooperation
Jordanian-Iraqi military cooperation has grown
steadily since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in
1980, a dramatic contrast with the countries' strained
relations in earlier years. This cooperation has taken
many forms, including exchanges of military
delegations, the temporary deployment of Jordanian
troops to Iraq, the positioning of Iraqi radars in
Jordan, and the transshipment of Iraqi-bound military
materiel through Jordan's only port, Al Agabah.F-
Military cooperation between the two countries has
expanded despite their limited resources. Until the
demands of its war with Iran became financially
draining, Baghdad provided generous financial
assistance to Jordan. Even now, Baghdad continues to
provide limited financial aid to Amman. In the
interest of expediting military-related transshipments,
Iraq also has funded expansion of port facilities at Al
Aqabah and improvement of Jordanian roads. For its
part, Jordan has allowed Iraq to use a major portion
of the Al Aqabah facilities, despite competing
domestic requirements.
Hussein's Hopes
King Hussein has been the primary impetus behind
Jordan's better relations with Baghdad. He hopes that
cooperation will establish a basis for cordial postwar
ties with the traditionally radical Ba'thist regime of
Saddam Husayn and fears the repercussions that an
Iranian victory would have on Jordan and the Middle
East. The King also believes he could count on at least
limited Iraqi support in the event Jordan became
involved in hostilities with Syria.
The King's senior military officers and the Jordanian
populace do not always share his convictions
regarding the benefits of closer ties with Iraq. They
worry that the King may eventually involve Jordan in
the war, associate Jordan too closely with the war's
possible loser, or pave the way for hostile Iraqi
Ba'thists to undermine Jordan's Hashemite
monarchy.
Amman in 1976
Memories of tense relations between the two countries
before 1978 persist among many Jordanians. The
King himself harbored resentment against Iraq
because of the assassination of his Hashemite
relatives in Iraq during the Ba'thist Revolution of
1958. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Iraq
sponsored subversive activities by Ba'thist
sympathizers in Jordan, smuggled arms and
ammunition into Jordan, and provided terrorist
training to groups such as Black June which
conducted an attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in
Early Cooperation
The Arab League Summit in 1978-called to
establish an Arab consensus against Egypt and the
Camp David accords-almost immediately led to
improved relations between Jordan and Iraq.
Although initially reluctant to attend, the King left
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004C
1 February 1985 25X1
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Baghdad very impressed with Saddam Husayn, then
vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command
Council At the
summit, Iraq pledged to pay Amman an annual
subsidy of $186 million, which it paid until 1983 when
the costs of its war with Iran forced Iraq to conserve
its financial resources.
Efforts to improve joint air defense cooperation began
soon after the summit meeting. These included the
stationing of Iraqi radars near an Iraqi-built airfield
Iraqis surprised the King by asking him, in the fall of
1982, to withdraw the volunteer force.
The Chinese Connection
Jordan's role as a conduit for arms going to Iraq
began in 1981 when, at Iraq's request, Amman
concluded a $300 million deal with China. Iraq
wanted the arms because of a temporary Soviet
embargo on weapons deliveries, andF-
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King Hussein declared his support for Iraq at the
outset of the Iran-Iraq war, but much of this early
support was logistic in nature and did not feature
arms transshipments that have since become common.
He provided safehaven for Iraqi civil and transport
aircraft in Jordan and training on some of the US
military equipment that Iraq had captured from Iran.
The Yarmuk Brigade
King Hussein wanted to increase Jordanian assistance
to Iraq in early 1982 but could not because of
Jordan's own shortages and supplier sensitivities. The
King instead called for volunteers to form an
expeditionary force-the ill-fated Yarmuk Brigade.
Approximately 2,000 volunteers eventually went to
Iraq, but most had little previous military training.
Many joined because of the promise of generous pay
and became disgruntled when this pay did not
materialize.
Chinese arms deliveries to Iraq increased
dramatically in 1982. On Iraq's behalf, Jordan
concluded a second arms deal with China-a $355
million contract calling for unspecified military
Iraq bought 80 F-7 fighter aircraft (the Chinese
version of the Soviet-made MIG-21) as part of the
second deal,
The Yarmuk
Brigade became such an embarrassment that the
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Jordan allowed Iraq to increase its use of Al Aqabah
for transshipments of combat equipment last year.
East Germany shipped military trucks to Iraq through
A] Aqabah in early 1984. A Soviet shipment of 50
BMP armored personnel carriers was delivered to Al
Aqabah last August, for example. A second shipment
of BMPs was delivered to the port last October.F_
Outlook
Cooperation between the Jordanian and Iraqi armed
forces probably will continue to grow, despite
problems such as the serious deterioration of
Jordanian roads and unpaid Iraqi bills. They almost
certainly will continue developing more efficient and
more secure communications links to provide warning
of Israeli overflights. In its role as an intermediary for
Iraqi arms acquisitions, Jordan may deal with
increasingly diverse arms suppliers. The two countries
probably will continue to exchange military
delegations that will provide briefings on military
equipment and tactics of mutual interest
With memories of the Yarmuk Brigade still fresh,
closer cooperation between the two countries almost
certainly will not lead to the dispatch of Jordanian
troops to Iraq.
If Iraq appeared to be in serious
danger of losing the war with Iran, however, King
Hussein probably would try to provide Iraq with
whatever military assistance he could muster,
including troops if Iraq requested them.F-7
aircraft.
Iraq probably would feel obliged to offer at least
token military assistance to Jordan in the event of a
Syrian-Jordanian conflict or a broader Arab-Israeli
war. This assistance would be limited because Iraq
probably will have to keep the bulk of its military
assets along its Iranian border for years. Iraqi military
assistance during a crisis might feature temporary
deployment to Jordan of additional radars, a brigade-
size troop contingent, and older Iraqi MIG-21
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Iraq's Elite Military Forces:
Key Assets for Saddam Husayn-
And a Spawning Ground for a
Military Coup
The elite Republican Guard and Special Forces units
are the most aggressive, competent, and disciplined
elements of the Iraqi armed forces. Since their
inception these forces have helped ensure the survival
of Saddam Husayn's regime, both on and off the
battlefield. These units, however, are also potential
spawning grounds for a military coup.
The Republican Guard and Special Forces comprise
only a small percentage of the Iraqi Army, but they
are the best trained and best equipped combat forces
under Saddam Husayn's command. The Republican
Guard division consists of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Republican Guard Brigades; the 10th Armored
The Republican Guards
Before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the existing
Republican Guard brigade, supported by the 10th
Armored Division, was responsible for the defense of
Baghdad and for protecting the President. The war
has led to a significant increase in the size of the
Republican Guards and to an important change in
their primary mission,
In the early years of the conflict the
Republican Guards were used as a strategic reserve.
Their primary mission remained the defense of
Baghdad and the regime, but elements of the brigade
were frequently dispatched to the frontlines for
crucial battles such as at Khorramshahr in October
1980.
The Republican Guards now have the dual role of 25X1
providing armored and mechanized support to critical
battlefield situations and, on a rotating basis,
furnishing the battalion-size guard force at the
Presidential Palace in Baghdad. As part of the overall
expansion of the Iraqi Army since the war began,
Republican Guard forces have been increased to at
least five brigades under a division-level command
structure. The division is equipped with the latest
Soviet weaponry, including T-72 tanks and improved
BMP-1 armored personnel carriers. Each brigade
normally has three or four maneuver battalions
consisting of between 400 and 600 men.
Special Forces
The Special Forces are considered the elite fighting
force of the regular Iraqi Army. Traditionally, these
units have sought to recruit, train, and maintain only
Top Secret
February
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As long as the conflict with Iran remains a low-
intensity war of attrition, Republican Guard and
Special Forces units probably will retain their present
missions. They will be held in strategic reserve, ready
to support other units engaged in battle, and will be
used for frontline reconnaissance and patrol duties.
Under these conditions, the combat preparedness of
the elite units will improve further as they hone
fighting skills. In all likelihood, their morale will
remain high.
If the war escalates, however, elite forces will again
face the prospect of heavy casualties as they are
deployed to the most important and dangerous
situations. Should this occur, we believe that elements
in the elite forces might consider ways of removing
Saddam Husayn rather than have their units
Over the last two years most of the Special Forces
units have been brought back to full strength,
reequipped, and restored to full operational capacity.
Along with the rest of the Iraqi Army, the Special
Forces also have expanded.
Implications for the War
In our view, the elite forces of the Iraqi Army have
fully recovered from the losses they sustained during
the early years of the war with Iran. They have been
expanded and, more important, over the past two
years have acquired valuable combat experience. Iraqi
elite units, we believe, are now manned by a corps of
battle-hardened veterans]
decimated.
Elite Forces-Spawning Ground for a Coup?
Despite his proven ability to ensure military loyalty,
Saddam Husayn's regime remains vulnerable to a
military coup. Although we believe prospects for a
military coup are slim, renewed fighting on the order
of the early years of the war would increase the risk of
a coup attempt. Moreover, we believe Iraq's elite
forces, which thus far have been among the principal
guarantors of Saddam's power, would pose the
greatest potential threat to him. If Republican Guard
and Special Forces units remain loyal to Saddam, a
coup probably would not succeed. If, however, elite
units support a coup attempt, its likelihood for success
would be greatly enhanced.
Saddam in the early years of the war.
Too great an emphasis on political loyalty in the
appointment of key military officers proved costly for
issued by the High Command in Baghdad were
unrealistic and frequently resulted in lost
opportunities or costly battlefield defeats. Should
these conditions recur, we believe they would provide
the impetus and justification for a coup led or
supported by professional Army officers in elite units.
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Overly centralized decisionmaking was another
significant weakness hampering Iraqi field
commanders during the initial stages of the war.
In our view, elite units again faced
with a similar situation would be more inclined either
to initiate a military coup or support one instigated by
other professional Army officers.
Recently Saddam agreed that tactical decisions up to
brigade level can be made by field commanders,
Although this
may alleviate some dissatisfaction among professional
military men, especially in elite units, decentralization
also will weaken Saddam's control over the military.
This could potentially enhance the prospects of a
and position essential to a successful coup
Finally, Saddam's use of elite units as shock troops at
the front and the expansion of these units during the
last few years have created an opportunity for
opposition elements to acquire the military expertise
there is a large
percentage of Mosul-origin Bath Party members
within the Republican Guards. Although we see no
evidence of disloyalty among these personnel, the
officers are thought to be a close-knit group and, like
many other Iraqis, may resent the dominance of
Saddam Husayn and his fellow townsmen from
Tikrit. In our view, a resumption of full-scale, yet
indecisive, warfare with Iran could encourage coup
plotting among a Mosul clique within the Palace
Guard itself
successful coup attempt.
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Iraq: Shia Dissidents
Remain Weak
Iran's efforts to cobble together an effective force of
pliable Iraqi Shia dissident groups have left them
more weakened and divided than ever. Iraqi Shias
have largely resisted Tehran's attempts at domination
but are split over ideological, leadership, and strategy
issues. Even if a widely respected Iraqi Shia leader
were to emerge, Iran probably would undermine his
influence
Tehran is partly to blame for dividing and weakening
the opposition by demanding subservience to its
concepts and authority. Iraqi Shia dissidents are split
over the velayat-efaqih concept, which holds that
Ayatollah Khomeini is the supreme guide of all Shias
worldwide. Of the four most important Iraqi Shia
dissident groupings, the Iraqi Mujahidin accepts both
the concept and Iranian control. The Islamic Action
Organization also accepts some control from Iran.
Dawa and Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, on the other hand,
reject both the concept of velayat-efaqih and Iranian
control. factions
of Dawa also adamantly oppose Iran's plans to
establish an Iranian-controlled state in southern Iraq.
Despite their differences with Iran, all the groups
including Dawa continue to accept support from
Tehran.
The Iranians created SAIRI in 1982 to serve as an
umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of
Iraqi Shia dissidents and some non-Shia oppositionists
such as Kurds and to enhance Iranian influence over
Dawa-The Primary Recalcitrant
Dawa (Islamic Call Party) is probably the oldest,
largest, and most prestigious Iraqi Shia dissident
group. Dawa was
formed essentially as a -political party in the late
1950s and went underground in 1980 after the
Iranian revolution. Dawa estimated that its ranks had
swelled to 30,000 to 40,000 inside Iraq by 1980, but
repression by Iraq's ruthless
security services during the past several years has
decimated the party inside Iraq. The creation of
SAIRI and Iran's efforts to dominate the Iraqi
opposition movement have reduced the influence of
Dawa's principal leaders in exile.
Dawa appears to be led by a coalition of leaders
including Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi and Murtada
al-Askari, both Iranians. It favors the establishment
of a democratic and secular Iraqi government guided
by Islamic principles in which Sunni Arabs and Kurds
would participate.
Rabitat AN al-Bayt (League of the Followers of the
Prophet) is another Shia group that is reluctant to
accept orders from Tehran. It brings together factions
from SAIRI, Dawa, and other groups not resident in
Iran. Mahdi al-Hakim, elder brother of SAIRI's
leader, founded the organization in August 1983 in
London,
Mahdi formerly was closely identified with Dawa,
and his organization appears to engage largely in
propaganda efforts similar to those of Dawa. We have
no estimates on its size, but its weekly newspaper Al-
Tayyar Al-Jadid has a circulation of 70,000. We
in Tehran.
believe that the group's independence gives it more 25X1
appeal in Iraq than rival organizations headquartered
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 85-004C
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Pro-Iranian or Leaning Toward Iranian Control
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq:
? Leader: Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, Iranian origin, official
title, spokesman.
? Other officials: Twenty-five, elected every six months, including:
-Mahmud Hashemi, Iranian from Shahrud, formerly in
Jama'at al-Ulema al-Iraqiyin (Community of Iraqi Ulema), a
small but apparently influential grouping of clerics, chairman.
-Ali Hairi, Iranian from Yazd.
-Sadri Qobbanchi, Iraqi, chief assistant to Hakim.
-Muhammad Baqr Muhri, Iraqi, formerly in Jama'at al-
Ulema al-Iragiyin, treasurer.
-Shaykh All Kurani, Lebanese, formerly of Dawa.
-Morteza Shariati, Iranian, head of the Assembly's Cultural
Committee for Iraqi Prisoners.
-Javad Khalesi, Iraqi.
-Fnu Bashiri, Iraqi, from Dawa.
-Muhammad Hadi al-Modarasi, Iranian, chief of the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and brother of
Muhammad Taqi al-Modarasi, head of the Islamic Action
Organization.
Also includes representatives from the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic
Party, a secular group of Sunni Kurds seeking autonomy in Iraq.
Iranian leaders pressed Hakim to drop his objections to the
KDP's inclusion following the KDP's help during the Haj Umran
offensive.
? Subsidiary organizations: The Iraqi Mujahidin and Hezbollahis,
headed by Sadri Qobbanchi. Assigned to intelligence and
paramilitary operations inside Iraq. The Foundation of the
Martyr Sadr conducts missionary work among Iraqi prisoners of
war.
? Publications: Al-Jihad (The Struggle), Ash-Shahada (The
At-Taqrir As-Siyasi (The Political Report).
Iraqi Mujahidin (Iraqi Strugglers):
? Leader: Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Iranian origin, about 28,
youngest of the three Hakim brothers.
? Activities: Military arm of SAIRI. Has conducted 25 known
terrorist attacks inside and outside Iraq. Relatively inactive since
April 1983. Cooperates with the Kurdish Democratic Party led
by Iraqi dissidents Masud and Idris Barzani. Hakim also
directs Iraqi Shia prisoners of war who have been formed into the
Islamic Iraqi Army tofight with Iranian troops at the front.
F_
Islamic Action Organization (also known as Amal)
? Leader: Muhammad Taqi al-Modarasi
? Shia support: Composed largely of low-level Iranians who lived
in Iraq for some time before Iraq deported them to Iran for their
political activity.
? Activities: Pursues terrorism inside and outside Iraq that belies
its small size. SAIRI has given Modarasi responsibility for the
training and operations of Shia terrorist groups.
Jund al-Imam (The Army of the Imam):
? Leaders: Abdullah Shirazi and his son Muhammad Ali Shirazi.
? Activities: Small group. We believe it concentrates on securing
Independent Organizations
Dawa (Islamic Call Party..
? Leaders:
-Muhammad Mahdi al-Asifi, Iranian, originally sought only to
protect Shia rights from encroachment by Sunnis.
-Shaykh Kasim al-Hairi, Iranian.
-Murtada al-Askari, Iranian, described as Dawa's faqih or guide.
Askari leads a faction of older Shias who want to restrain
ideological excesses of other factions that consist largely of
young persons. Wants to restore the modus vivendi that
previously existed with the Sunnis.
? Other senior personalities:
-Shaykh Ali Kurani, ethnic Lebanese and fanatic Shia, advocates
the supremacy of Shias over Sunnis.
-Shaykh Baqr al Nasari, Iraqi, believes Iraqi opposition groups
should make independent decisions if Iran occupies southern
Iraq.
-Dr. Abu Ali Muwaffaq Al-Rabi, Iraqi, resident in London.
-Bashir al-Nassiri.
-Mahmud al-Hashimi.
-Muhammad Husayn bin Hamad Sadr, head of the Beirut
branch.
? Shia support: Principally from the urban middle class.
Particularly well organized in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Basra.
Open to non-Shias.
? Activities: Began primarily as a political party but has acquired
a military wing, including a token presence on Iraq's Majnoon
Islands, which are partly occupied by Iran. Has tried to
assassinate Saddam several times; the last reported attempt was
on 8 July 1982. Despite use of terrorism, advocates political
organizing as principal means to gain power. Has links with the
Kurdish Democratic Party stemming from forced resettlement of
Iraqi Kurds to Shia territory in the mid-1960s.
? Subsidiary organizations: The Islamic Union of Iraqi Students
and the Islamic Union of Iraqi Engineers, in Tehran and Qom.
? Publications: Monthly and weekly Arabic and Kurdish
magazines, both named Al-Jihad (The Struggle).
? Finances: wealthy Shia merchants in
Bahrain and Kuwait are the main contributors. They provide
funds stemming from religious and social obligations. F_~
Rabitat AN al-Bayt (League of the Followers of the Prophet):
Leaders:
-Mahdi al-Hakim, eldest of the Hakim brothers.
-Muhammad Baqr al-Ulum, deputy.
-Akbar Ghadawi, Iraqi Shia cleric residing in Pakistan,
secretary.
? Shia support: Elements from various Shia groups, including
Dawa, the Jama'at al-Ulema, and SAIRI. Nonleftist Iraqi exiles
in the West, including writers, doctors, lawyers, and students
opposed to Saddam. Appeals to Iraqi Shia dissidents outside
Iran, most of whom resent Iranian domination of SAIRI.
? Publications: Weekly Arabic and English newspaper At-Tayyar
Al-Jadid (The New Current), published in London.
? Activities: Engages primarily in propaganda and solicitation of
funds. Mahdi has close connections with Iraqi Kurdish
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The Iraqi Mujahidin (The Iraqi Stugglers)
The Mujahidin appears to be SAIRI's primary
military wing. It was established in 1979 and is led by
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, younger brother of SAIRI
leader Muhammad al-Hakim.
Mujahidin is based in
Haj Umran, the Iraqi salient occupied by Iran in mid-
1983, where it is supposed to cooperate with Iraqi
Kurdish dissident leader Masud Barzani. The
Mujahidin is composed at least partly of Iraqi
prisoners of war and expelled Iraqi refugees of Iranian
The Islamic Action Organization
The Iranians also appear to have considerable control
over the Islamic Action Organization (IAO). The
group is also known as the Islamic Work Organization
or Amal but is distinct from the terrorist Amal group
in Lebanon. The IAO, an offshoot and rival of Dawa,
is headed by Muhammad Taqi al-Modarasi, an
Iranian who has close ties to Ayatollah Khomeini.
The IAO has conducted terrorist operations inside
and outside Iraq, but none is known to have been
directed at US interests.
Organization. Middle-class Iraqis, however, favor 25X1
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US diplomats in Baghdad report that, even though
Iraqi Shia religious leaders desire the overthrow of
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, they are concerned
that thousands of Iranians would flood into Iraqi
cities containing some of Shia Islam's most revered
shrines. They also are worried that Iranian religious
leaders would demand precedence over their less
numerous Iraqi counterparts.
We see little chance of an effective Shia dissident
movement emerging from the badly splintered rebels.
The chasms between them appear too numerous and
too wide to be easily bridged. The emergence of a
native Iraqi Shia leader with widespread popular
support among Iraq's Shias would improve the rebels'
prospects, but Iran probably would view him as a
challenge to its authority and undermine his
influence.
Prospects
Iraqi Shia dissidents face a dilemma. Without Iranian
backing and a presence in Iran, independent groups
would be too weak and too distant to build an
effective movement inside Iraq. The acceptance of
Iranian backing and control, however, antagonizes
many Iraqi Shia leaders and taints the groups, in the
eyes of Iraq's Arab Shias who hold a deep-rooted
animosity against the Persians.
The Iraqi Shia oppositionists appear divided along
class and ethnic lines.
lower-class Iraqis and Iraqi Shias of
Iranian origin generally are willing to accept
Khomeini as their supreme guide and to back pro-
Iranian groups such as the Islamic Action
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Iraq:
Barzani Asserts Himself
Within the past year Masud Barzani has fought his
way back from virtual isolation within the Kurdish
resistance movement. The Iraqi guerrilla chief has
secured important pledges of support from Syria and
Libya. Barzani hopes that increased aid from these
states will enable him to expand his operations in
northern Iraq. At the same time there are strong
pressures from Turkey and Iran to restrain Barzani.
In our view, Barzani will be able to increase his
activities in Iraq but will not become strong enough to
challenge the government's control over key cities or
the oil-producing area in the north.
Background
At the outset of the Iran-Iraq war, Masud Barzani
lived in exile in Iran with several thousand of his
tribesmen. He had been driven there in 1975 after a
failed attempt by his father-the legendary Kurdish
guerrilla chief Mulla Mustafa Barzani-to overthrow
the government in Iraq. With the fall of the Shah,
Masud-who had taken control of the tribe on his
father's death-allied with Khomeini and agreed to
suppress an Iranian Kurdish revolt against the
Ayatollah's government. Barzani's move generally
was condemned by Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, who
viewed him as a traitor. Subsequently, the Iranian
Kurdish rebels, under the leadership of Abdur
Rahman Qasemlu, took control of most of northwest
Iran.
In 1983, Barzani's guerrillas spearheaded an Iranian
assault on Iraq at Haj Umran. Important Iraqi
Kurdish tribes resisted the invasion, fearing an
Iranian victory would deprive them of their tribal
lands. In addition, Jalal Talabani, leader of a major
Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla group and a longtime rival of
Barzani, sided with Baghdad. With Kurdish leaders
in Iran and Iraq united against him, Barzani was
virtually isolated within the Kurdish resistance
movement.
Fortune Smiles on Barzani
In the middle of last year, Barzani's fortunes began to
improve as those of his rivals declined. Iran mounted a
major offensive against Qasemlu. It pursued a
scorched-earth policy in the northwest and bribed and
coerced many Kurds to collaborate. The Iranian
Kurdish rebels were forced to give up important bases
and retreated to the mountains, from which they have
been staging attacks against Iranian garrisons. F_
At the same time, Talabani suffered a major setback.
His cooperation with Baghdad ended abruptly after
leading Iraqi political figures apparently pressed
Iraq's President Saddam Husayn to repudiate his
truce with the Kurds. Many of Talabani's followers
subsequently deserted him, according to diplomatic
sources in Baghdad.
Barzani now is one of the few remaining effective
leaders of the Kurdish resistance. His position is
stronger than either of his rivals-his guerrillas
carved out several secure bases in northern Iraq
during the Haj Umran assault which they have
managed to preserve.
Barzani Asserts Himself
Last August, Barzani opened negotiations in
Damascus with Syria's President Assad
Barzani claims
Assad pledged full support for the guerrillas, and the
President requested that Barzani join a front of Iraqi
opposition groups Syria was forming.
Barzani next traveled
to ripo i, where he met with Colonel Qadhafi, who
pledged as much arms, money, and support as Barzani
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needed, even tanks if they could be obtained.
Barzani believes the Syrians and Libyans plan a
second front against Iraq and want his guerrillas to Barzani almost certainly is correct in his claim that
launch the operation. Barzani has several thousand Tehran needs him. The defeat of his forces in
fighters who could pose a serious threat to the Iraqis if northern Iraq would represent a serious setback for
armed with sophisticated weapons. the Iranians. Iraq is embarrassed by its continued
Iran apparently is responding to Turkish pressures to
curb Barzani. Turkey-which has the largest Kurdish
population in the Middle East-is upset that radical
Turkish Kurds use Barzani's bases as safehavens and
recently have staged cross-border raids into Turkey,
attacking paramilitary posts
repelling Iran's forces.
inability to eliminate Barzani, and his presence in the
north requires Baghdad to garrison the area with
troops that might better be employed in the south
Outlook
We believe Tehran will continue limiting the number
and kinds of weapons Barzani receives. Tehran will
give him enough arms and ammunition to continue
harassing Iraq, but not enough to make him a free
agent. Iran's strategy against Barzani probably will
succeed in the short run. Barzani will take the
weapons Iran gives him since he has no other choice,
and it is not likely Syria can prevail on Tehran to
provide more sophisticated arms as long as the Turks
are opposed
producing area near Kirkuk.
As the war between Iran and Iraq drags on, however,
we believe Barzani's position will improve. A long war
will further erode Baghdad's control over the north,
with opportunities for Barzani to assert himself.
Barzani probably will not raise a popular revolt. He
will instead gradually encroach on territory held by
tribes loyal to Baghdad. Barzani maintains that most
of the land in the north rightfully is the property of his
tribe; the Iraqi Government seized it from the
Barzanis when they were driven into exile in 1975. If
Barzani is successful, he will emerge as the
paramount leader of Iraq's Kurds, a position he has
long coveted, but the government will remain in
control of the major cities in the north and the oil-
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