LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Review
Latin America
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
Copy 3 9 3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
secret
Latin America
Review 25X1
President Lusinchi has continued his predecessor's approach of
supporting moderate forces in Central America, but he has been
somewhat less active because of pressing domestic economic
difficulties.
Labor, which provided strong support for the President's election,
has been disillusioned by his economic austerity measures and his
perceived need to maintain cooperative relations with the private
sector, but he is working to retain its loyalty.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party has announced it will hold its
oft-postponed National Congress in late August, suggesting that
party leaders have reconciled their differences over how best to
restructure and revitalize party operations.
Since 1973, the four-man military junta had acted as little more
than a rubberstamp for President Pinochet's initiatives, but with the
onset of massive protests against the regime last year, it began to
take a more active role in governmental decisionmaking.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
St. Lucia: Opposition Searches for Leadership
The leader of the opposition St. Lucia Labor Party is stepping down,
but he has no clear-cut successor and none of the challengers seems
likely to be able to end intraparty squabbling or bring splinter
groups back to the fold.
Chile: Emergency Powers Confirm
The Bahamas: Opposition Protests
17 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff. Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Secret
Central America
Venezuelan Policy Toward
Since taking office last February, President Lusinchi
has continued his predecessor's approach of
supporting moderate forces in Central America, but
he has been somewhat less active because of pressing
domestic economic difficulties. Committed to
promoting pluralist democracy in the region and
concerned with the spread of Cuban and Soviet
influence, Lusinchi generally sympathizes with US
policy objectives. He has avoided public identification
with the United States on Central American issues,
however, because of domestic political considerations
and a desire not to compromise Venezuela's position
in the Contadora Group.
Lusinchi's belief that Nicaragua's Sandinistas are
confirmed Marxist-Leninists has caused him to
maintain cool relations with Managua and to offer
some assistance to the regime's civilian political
opponents. In El Salvador, Venezuela probably will
proceed cautiously in aiding President Duarte, but
Lusinchi may prove helpful by urging social
democrats aligned with the guerrilla coalition to be
more flexible in seeking a rapprochement with the
government
Influences on Lusinchi's Foreign Policy
Lusinchi is a moderate social democrat whose views
on foreign policy-like those of other members of the
ruling Democratic Action (AD) party's orthodox
wing--were profoundly influenced by the challenges
that the party faced during its early years. Lusinchi's
antipathy for rightwing authoritarianism grew out of
the party's long struggle against former dictator Perez
Jimenez. His deep skepticism of Castro's motives
stems from the effort by Cuban-supported guerrillas
in the 1960s to topple Venezuela's fledgling
democracy. The ability of the Venezuelan political
system to withstand the threat from Marxist
insurgents, and subsequently to absorb many former
guerrilla leaders, reinforced Lusinchi's commitment
to democratic politics. The experience also imbued
him with a far less romantic view of Marxist
revolutionary movements than that embraced, for
example, by many senior Mexican officials.
Mindful of the close cooperation with the United
States that has prevailed under previous Democratic
Action governments, Lusinchi emphasized from the
outset that he would place a high priority on good
relations with Washington. This tendency has been
reinforced by a desire for US backing as he deals with
his government's major concern-renegotiating its
foreign debt. During his inauguration, Lusinchi
demonstrated his refusal to be stampeded by regional
pressures by declining to join seven other Latin
American leaders in signing the Declaration of
Caracas because of its implied criticism of US policy
toward Nicaragua.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
In shaping Venezuelan foreign policy, Lusinchi has
had to bear in mind that many members of his party
would prefer a more nonaligned approach oriented
toward the Third World. His efforts to maintain party
unity on Central American policy have been greatly
complicated by the fact that former President Carlos
Andres Perez, still the party's most charismatic
figure, has used his international stature and his
position as a regional vice president of the Socialist
International to conduct his own foreign policy.
Lusinchi has refused to yield to pressure from Perez,
however, and his administration occasionally has
adjusted its public position to emphasize that the
former President does not speak for the government.
Nevertheless, as austerity measures erode Lusinchi's
popular support, he will have to be more careful not to
get too far out of step with party sentiment on Central
America. Moreover, some of Lusinchi's senior foreign
policy advisers have views similar to those of Perez,
and they will continue to look for opportunities to
push for a more leftist cours
Policy Toward Nicaragua
Lusinchi told US officials soon after his election that
he believed the Sandinista leaders were Marxist-
Leninists and that he would press them to live up to
their promises to establish a pluralist democracy. In
February, Lusinchi set the tone for his dealings with
Managua by informing the Sandinistas that he was
continuing his predecessor's policy of refusing to
resume oil shipments to Nicaragua until past
deliveries were paid for. He reportedly angered
Sandinista Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega-
~by making
further economic assistance contingent upon the
holding of free elections.
In May, the administration toughened its position by
having a senior party official publicly excoriate the
Sandinistas for their treatment of the church and
their failure to fulfill minimum conditions necessary
for conducting a democratic election. Sources of the
US Embassy reported that this statement was
prompted by Lusinchi's disapproval of the soft line on
Nicaragua adopted at the Socialist International
meeting in Copenhagen. It was also motivated by a
desire to emphasize that Carlos Andres Perez's praise
for the Sandinista electoral process did not reflect
official party policy.
A second aspect of the Lusinchi government's attempt
to promote pluralist democracy in Nicaragua is its
support of the nonviolent internal opposition.
Lusinchi had offered financial help to the small Social
Democratic Party.
Democratic Party, however, subsequently expressed
disappointment at the failure of AD leaders to agree
on a strategy for pressing the Sandinistas. His
complaint underscores the domestic constraints on
ruling party leaders and the relative lack of priority
they assign to the Nicaraguan issue.
Adolfo Calero and other civilian leaders of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force have made several
trips to Caracas to meet with senior AD leaders.
Venezuelan assistance to this group seems to be
confined to advice on how to increase the
organization's public appeal. Nevertheless, the
willingness of AD officials to host such meetings
indicates, in our view, their tacit recognition that
military pressure is an important element in trying to
promote pluralism in Nicaragua.
The arrival in Caracas in June of anti-Sandinista
guerrilla leader Eden Pastora for medical treatment
caused the Sandinistas temporarily to recall their
ambassador. But, by permitting former President
Perez to accept the responsibility for having invited
him, the Lusinchi administration attempted to
prevent Managua from challenging its integrity as a
Contadora Group member. Perez used Pastora's
presence to try to form a coalition of anti-Sandinista
groups centered around the former revolutionary
hero, Perez apparently
hoped that by persuading Pastora to eschew the
armed struggle against his former compatriots he
would strengthen the coalition's appeal to social
democrats in Europe and elsewhere. This, in turn,
would give Perez new influence in pressing the
Sandinistas to moderate their policies. Although
Perez's efforts have contributed to improved anti-
Sandinista unity, Pastora is vacillating in his
willingness to renounce insurgent activities.
9 X11
25X1
25X1I
25X1 j
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
OULA cc
Dealing With El Salvador
Lusinchi deferred a decision on policy toward El
Salvador until after the runoff presidential election
there in May, then told US officials that he would
support President Duarte. Although AD leaders view
Duarte as far preferable to his rightist challengers,
they have been slow to warm to him because of his
strong ideological ties to Venezuela's Social Christian
Party, their chief domestic rival. An additional
impediment is the obligation ruling party leaders feel
toward Salvadoran opposition leader Guillermo Ungo
as a result of their shared social democratic
Nicaraguan aggression. Nevertheless, Venezuela's
influence in Contadora has been weakened because
senior foreign policy officials of the Lusinchi
administration were slow to master the intricacies of
Contadora diplomacy and are pessimistic about the
Group's likely impact.
Venezuela is especially committed to protecting Costa
Rica because of shared democratic traditions and the
close personal ties between Lusinchi and President
Monge. According to US Embassy sources,
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Morales Paul was
instrumental in backing President Monge's request
for a Contadora observer commission to monitor
incidents along Costa Rica's border with Nicaragua.
Lusinchi repeatedly has insisted that he will not
tolerate another Marxist-Leninist government in
Central America. At the same time, however, US
Embassy sources report that he believes political
stability in El Salvador probably can come only
through discussions between the government and
elements of the guerrilla coalition. Influenced by
Venezuela's earlier experience in overcoming a
guerrilla challenge, he apparently holds out some hope
that Duarte can take advantage of differences within
the Salvadoran revolutionary movement to persuade
some groups to accept a solution that stops short of
power sharing. Toward this end, Lusinchi has urged
Duarte to use his electoral mandate to pursue a
Policy Toward Contadora
During the Herrera administration, Venezuela played
a key role in the Contadora Group by balancing the
pro-Sandinista tilt of Mexico. Under Lusinchi,
Venezuela remains the Group's strongest proponent of
linking internal democracy with the resolution of
international security issues
the Venezuelans remain
committed to a regional solution that would protect
the other Central American countries from
Venezuela has been more reserved in supporting
Honduras. In April, Morales Paul signed a Contadora
foreign ministers' communique sharply critical of
Honduras's role in contributing to tensions with
Nicaragua. The US Embassy has reported, however,
that Venezuela took this action in exchange for
Mexico's willingness to accept language sharply
critical of the Nicaraguans, and the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister subsequently told his Honduran
counterpart that Venezuela fully supported
Honduras's stand against the Sandinistas.
Nevertheless, the communique, together with Morales
Paul's more recent endorsement of the concept of a
Contadora commission to monitor the Honduran-
Nicaraguan border-an idea long opposed by
Tegucigalpa-underscores Venezuela's susceptibility
to being outmaneuvered by the Mexicans in matters
relating to Honduras.
In April the mining of Nicaragua's harbors raised
concerns in Caracas that US support for Contadora
might be flagging, and Morales Paul was sent to
Washington to express his government's unease.
Venezuela's decision to remain silent during the UN
Security Council debate on Nicaragua that same
month probably was also intended as a signal of
Venezuelan unhappiness. Soon thereafter, however,
Lusinchi told a senior US official that he was
reassured by what he labeled a "new opening" in US
policy toward Contadora. He emphasized that
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Venezuela would remain a voice of realism in the
Contadora Group and would never go along with a
treaty partial to Nicaragua.
Nevertheless, Venezuela seems increasingly
committed to reaching quick agreement on a treaty.
Morales Paul's recent criticism of Honduras and El
Salvador for employing "dilatory" tactics underscores
the danger that Caracas will diverge from
Washington in protecting the interests of pro-US
governments in Central America.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Secret
Venezuela: President Faces
Tough Sledding in Relations
With Labor
President Lusinchi was elected with strong support
from labor, but he has disappointed those who
expected him to be a forceful advocate of working-
class interests. Lusinchi's need to implement economic
adjustment measures and to maintain cooperative
relations with the private sector have forced labor to
assume a larger share of the austerity burden than it
had anticipated. The relationship has been further
strained by rivalries within the ruling Democratic
Action Party (AD), where a populist wing led by
former President Carlos Andres Perez is trying to
capitalize on Lusinchi's worsening ties with labor. We
believe the President, who is sensitive to this
challenge, probably can make sufficient concessions to
labor to retain the loyalty of a majority of the working
class.
The Ruling Party's Alliance With Labor
The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, the
country's largest and most powerful labor
organization, traditionally has been a major element
of AD's power base. Representing more than 1 million
workers and concentrated in the key oil,
transportation, and construction industries, its
hierarchy is dominated by AD members, who hold
half of the Confederation's leadership posts. By
comparison, the Social Christians, Venezuela's other
major political party, control only 20 percent of these
positions. In addition, trade union leaders are
represented in the ruling party through Democratic
Action's Labor Bureau.
Conscious of the need for labor's support to secure the
presidential nomination in 1981, Lusinchi struck a
deal with leaders of the Labor Bureau. He agreed to
name Manuel Penalver-the head of the
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers-as party
secretary general and to submit his economic
programs for labor's approval. Lusinchi also promised
that labor's voice would be heard through a new
"social pact," an amorphous program that envisioned
discussions among important business, labor, and
government figures in the formulation of key
economic policies. Through his election last
December, this alliance paid large dividends by
allowing Lusinchi's moderate faction to defeat a
challenge from a candidate backed by former
President Perez, the most prominent spokesman for
the party's populist wing.
sacrifices.
Since taking office early this year, however, Lusinchi
has been confronted with the need to regenerate the
economy. To do so, he has had to implement austerity
measures and secure private-sector support while
maintaining a tenuous balance between the competing
demands of various interest groups. In labor's case,
the President has succeeded by providing a financial
cushion that partially offsets required economic
For example, when workers faced increased prices for
basic necessities, Lusinchi pushed through Congress
provisions for food and transport subsidies. Similarly,
cutbacks in public corporations may be offset by
proposed make-work programs and a government-
mandated 10-percent increase in private-sector jobs
that together could stabilize unemployment around
the current 15-percent level. Finally, while there is
little likelihood that workers will receive wage
increases in the near future, labor won a partial
victory with the passage of a law that creates a
tripartite commission of representatives from labor,
the private sector, and government to advise the
President on wage and price levels. The Confederation
of Venezuelan Workers views the commission as an
institutionalization of the "social pact" concept, even
though the government will have majority
membership and the President retains ultimate
authority.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
At the same time, the President has had to deal with a
challenge from former President Perez, who is trying
to bolster his unofficial drive for the 1988 presidential
nomination. Toward that end, Perez attempted to
replace Lusinchi-appointee Penalver as party
secretary general with a more neutral figure-but one
who was still viewed favorably by the labor rank and
file. Although Lusinchi's party faction defeated this
initiative, we believe over the next three years Perez
will continue trying to improve his position. He is
especially interested in supplanting Lusinchi as AD
chief labor advocate, and the growing impact of
austerity on workers may make them more susceptible
to Perez's overtures.
Outlook
Despite Lusinchi's success in maintaining the
workers' support, his hold on their loyalty remains
tenuous and his task will become increasingly difficult
in the months ahead. With inflation expected to reach
20 percent by yearend, workers face a continued
decline in purchasing power, and Lusinchi's
maneuvering room will be circumscribed by the need
to adhere to the economic program that the IMF has
informally endorsed. Over the next several months, he
may try to squeeze through by expanding the current
compensatory programs. We do not rule out the
possibility, however, that he will resort to more leftist-
oriented rhetoric on debt and other foreign policy
issues if he senses a decisive loss of labor's support
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
secret
Ruling Party
Mexico: Strengthening the
Leaders of Mexico's ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party recently announced that the
party will hold its national congress from 23 to 25
August. The meeting was postponed several times,
apparently because of disputes over how best to
restructure and revitalize party operations.
1. Reform and Renovation
Officials recognize that, before campaigning begins in
earnest, extensive reforms are necessary to head off
opposition gains in local strongholds and to improve
the ruling party's appeal to the middle class. Although
the party has controlled every state governorship since
its founding in 1929, leaders were shaken by center-
right National Action Party victories in several
important local elections in northern industrial states
in 1982 and 1983. Next year nine state governorships,
400 federal congressional seats, and a number of local
posts will be at stake.
As a part of the reform effort, the party's right wing is
demanding that business groups be given a more
formal role in party matters and that the national
government reduce its management role in the
economy. The country's powerful labor chief opposes
such a move, however, and his continued support is
crucial if President de la Madrid is to enforce tough
austerity.
The congress is likely to endorse changes extending
primaries to more state and local party contests.
Earlier this year, an experimental system of party
primaries was introduced in the state of Nayarit,
where members selected candidates by secret ballot.
In the past, the president and senior officials generally
chose standard bearers, often on the basis of personal
connections.
More generally, the reform effort probably will lead
to only modest adjustments designed to help burnish
the party's image and to underscore de la Madrid's
oft-stated commitment to "moral renovation" in
Mexico. Fearful of opposition inroads, Mexico's
present leaders are not likely to depart greatly from
past political practices.
II. Governor Sacked
By forcing the resignation of Enrique Velazco Ibarra,
the unpopular Governor of Guanajuato, President de
la Madrid has helped improve the ruling party's
image in a state where it faces tough competition in
the next election. Party bosses have been dissatisfied
with the Governor's performance for some time.
Embassy sources indicate that his business orientation
had alienated workers and peasants, the bulwarks of
the ruling party's electoral machine.
Embassy sources indicate that ruling party leaders see
the Guanajuato governor's race next year as one of
the hardest they will face. Guanajuato, an important
state in central Mexico, is a traditional center of
rightist sympathy. The ruling party lost control of the
mayoralty of the state capital in 1982, partly because
of public discontent with the party's economic
mismanagement. The new Governor, Agustin Tellez
Cruces, should benefit from the good will created by
Velazco Ibarra's departure, but his political expertise
is unproven. The US Embassy reports that Tellez
Cruces, although currently a federal senator, has
spent the bulk of his career in the judiciary.
Velazco Ibarra's removal, following on the heels of de
la Madrid's decision to oust Yucatan's incompetent
state governor, probably will enhance the President's
reputation as a forceful and effective politician. The
favorable reaction to the President's action in
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Yucatan suggests that other unpopular or
incompetent governors will be forced out of office in
coming months. Those in San Luis Potosi, Sonora,
and Chiapas appear to be on the weakest footing. De
la Madrid, however, will have to balance his desire to
revitalize the ruling party by removing corrupt or
inefficient officials with the need to avoid alienating
party stalwarts who oppose rapid change.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Secret
Chile: Pinochet Versus the Junta
Under the 1980 Constitution, President Pinochet (who
is also Army commander in chief) governs with a
military junta composed of the heads of the Navy, Air
Force, National Police (Carabineros), and the deputy
chief of the Army. On paper, the Junta possesses a
variety of legislative powers, including authority to
approve treaties, propose and sanction legislation, and
call plebiscites. Pinochet, however, generally has
treated it as little more than a rubberstamp. With the
onset of massive protests against the regime last year,
the Junta began to play a more active role in
governmental decisionmaking. The trend has
continued through the first half of 1984, with the
Junta moderating several of the President's hardline
legislative proposals
We believe that the Junta will continue to assert
itself, but without challenging Pinochet's authority.
Over the next two years, it probably will work to
restrain the President's authoritarian predilections
and push for a partial return to civilian rule before the
constitutional target of 1989. If successful, the Junta
could contribute to overall stability in Chile by
reducing political polarization and the chances for
renewed violent protests
The Military's Political Role
Chile's military government does not fit the classic
pattern of collegial decisionmaking by a highly
politicized officer corps. Instead, Pinochet has forged
a personalist regime that relies heavily on civilian
advisers and draws support from numerous sources-
including the business community and rightist
parties-in addition to the armed forces. Direct
military participation in the government is largely
restricted to the Junta members]
The Junta itself has been anxious not to identify the
military institution with the Pinochet regime. For
example, earlier this year Defense Minister Carvajal,
a retired admiral, implied that some of the
administration's political proposals enjoyed the
support of the armed forces. He was publicly
castigated by Admiral Merino, the Navy's Junta
member, for claiming to speak for the military. 25X1
Merino reaffirmed the apolitical and purely
professional role of the military while asserting that
Junta members alone were involved in politics.F_~
Two other factors minimize the extent of military
participation in politics below the Junta level. The
Chilean armed forces possess a strong tradition of
discipline and hierarchy that allows political activity
in the highest echelons, but offers junior officers only
the choice of obeying their superiors or leaving the
service. In addition, the officer corps is a closed,
inbred group with a very narrow range of political 25X1
views, which are readily understood and acted upon
by the Junta members. The strong influence of these
factors is attested to by the lack of clamor in the
military over the past decade for a wider role in the
government.
The Junta Flexes Its Muscles
The Junta began to assert itself during the
demonstrations last year, generally taking a more
flexible line than Pinochet.
the Junta dissuaded the President
from imposing a state of siege before the June 1983
25X1
25X1
day of protest. the 25X1
Junta also successfully pressed for the appointment of
former conservative leader Sergio Jarpa as Interior
Minister in August to facilitate negotiations with the
opposition.
This year, the Junta has continued to question
presidential initiatives. One was a proposal to alter the
Constitution to permit Pinochet to call plebiscites 25X1
without the Junta's approval and to install a
congress-either elected or appointed-in 1987.
both Merino 25X1
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
secret
and Air Force Commander Matthei strongly opposed
this scheme, arguing that it ceded too much power to
the president. only
General Benavides, the Army Junta member,
supported Pinochet on this matter, while Carabinero
Chief Mendoza remained noncommittal. As a result
of these objections, the President withdrew the plan.
The Junta also had considerable impact on a major
antiterrorist bill. Although the military leadership
fully supported a tough stance against terrorists, the
commanders of the Navy and the Air Force had
serious reservations over Pinochet's proposal.
According to the press, they believed the bill shifted
too much responsibility for prosecuting terrorists to
military courts and gave too much free reign to the
National Information Center, the regime's secret
The Junta's Motives
We believe there are two main reasons for the Junta's
drive toward increased independence. The most
fundamental is an overriding concern for the interests
of the armed forces and the integrity of the
institution. The Junta wants to make certain that the
military does not become overly identified with the
regime through its role as the guarantor of order. The
Junta rejected the original antiterrorist bill because it
could have involved the military in repression of the
regime's opponents. In addition, the Junta apparently
has concluded that the best way to avoid having to
repress a resurgent protest movement is to implement
a somewhat faster pace of democratization than
envisioned by the President and the 1980
Constitution. We believe this view accounts for
Merino's open contacts with the civilian right.)
A second reason for the Junta's growing assertiveness
is its desire not to cede any of its power to Pinochet
under current circumstances. In our view, the top
military leaders believe that the President and the
police.
by May the entire Junta had accepted this view,
forcing Pinochet to accept vesting most prosecutorial
power in civilian courts and relegating the secret
police to a cooperative investigatory role.
The Junta also disputed an initiative by Pinochet on a
proposed political parties law. The original version of
this bill required 20,000 members to legalize a party.
Pinochet, however, upped the figure to 150,000 and,
in the process, incurred condemnation from almost all
political groups.
Merino was "enraged" at
what he saw as a delaying tactic on the part of
Pinochet, and subsequently told the press that he
favored a minimum of roughly 30,000 members to
form a legal party. The issue is still unresolved, but we
suspect Pinochet will have to accept important
alterations]
Perhaps the most striking illustration of the Junta's
evolving independence has been Admiral Merino's
public meetings with independent conservative
political leaders to discuss their proposal to hold
congressional elections in 1986. In our view, this is a
clear indication of the Junta's determination to take a
major role in the transition process. At the same time,
it underscores the Chilean right's view that the Junta
is an autonomous branch of the government.
25X1
25X1
armed forces took power together and should 25X1
relinquish it together. This explains their rejection of
Pinochet's proposal to call plebiscites and replace the
Junta with a congress.
Admiral Merino-supported by the
Air Force and the Carabinero chiefs-was willing to
yield some Junta powers, but only as part of a
25X1
25X1
constitutional realignment that would redefine 25X1
Pinochet's authority and conserve a role for the Junta 25X1
after the installation of a congress. 25X1
In many respects, of course, the motives and views of
the Junta and Pinochet still coincide. For example,
both accept the legitimacy of the 1980 Constitution
and want to ensure that conservative anti-Marxist
forces dominate any future civilian government.
Moreover, while the Junta has shown greater
flexibility than the President regarding constitutional
reform and has deflected some of his more
authoritarian impulses, it in no sense has attempted to
usurp his right to rule. Instead, the service chiefs have
responded to initiatives from Pinochet or the
opposition rather than formulating their own
proposals concerning the transition.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
Furthermore, most Junta opposition to the President's
initiatives has emanated from the Navy and Air Force
commanders. Chile's principal powerbroker, however,
is the Army, which consistently has backed Pinochet.
A vivid example occurred last May when the
President, implicated in a land
scandal, was able to orchestrate a public declaration
of support from 33 Army generals. We believe that, as
long as the Army remains solidly in Pinochet's camp,
the President will be able to cope with dissidence from
the other services.
Outlook
We believe that the Junta will continue to assert itself
over the near term without threatening Pinochet's
authority. This probably will continue, resulting in a
tempering of Pinochet's hardline stances, and may
help assure that he does not rescind the political
liberalization measures enacted to date. Over the
long-term, however, both Pinochet and the Junta may
agree to devolve some powers on a congress-either
elected or appointed-installed before 1989.
Two events, in our view, could cause the Junta and the
armed forces to split with Pinochet and, if he refused
to alter his policies, lead to his removal from office.
First, if Pinochet were to forgo changes in the
Constitution and crack down on the entire political
opposition, the government could become politically
isolated. Secondly, the same could occur in the event
of massive and continuing riots and demonstrations-
stimulated either by the crackdown or a rapid
economic slide. We believe that, in such
circumstances, the armed forces would not allow
themselves to be used by Pinochet to restore order by
force. Instead, the Junta-fearing the prospect of
eventual Argentine-like trials of top military
leaders-would press Pinochet to change his policies.
In our view, Pinochet could not survive a direct
showdown with the Junta, especially since even his
Army support probably would be jeopardized by
intransigence toward political reform.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
7Cll Gl
St. Lucia: Opposition
Searches for Leadership
The opposition St. Lucia Labor Party will hold a
convention in early August to select a replacement for
its president, Neville Cenac, who has decided not to
seek a second term. Cenac is discouraged by his
failure to strengthen the party, which is still suffering
from internecine battles that resulted in a party split
in 1980. Primary contenders for his position are
chairman Peter Josie, a former party president, and
the vice chairman, Julian Hunte, who enjoy about
equal support. Former interim Prime Minister Mikey
Pilgrim appears to be contemplating a return to the
party, however, and may challenge them for the party
leadership.
Josie, who was Foreign Minister during the Labor
Party's 1979-82 term, bases his claim on previous
experience and his position as head of an influential
union. He admits that he regards his efforts to
strengthen his union support and to regain the party
presidency as steppingstones to the prime-
ministership. Some observers believe he is having
difficulties with the union, however, and may not last
long as its leader.
A popular cricketeer and businessman, Hunte has
been busy in recent months drumming up support in
the local constituency where he hopes to secure a
parliamentary seat in the next election. Although not
involved with organized labor, he enjoys the support
of the leader of St. Lucia's largest union
Pilgrim left the St. Lucia Labor Party with radical
George Odlum in 1980 and helped form the
Progressive Labor Party.
can bring seven members of the Progressive Labor
Party executive with him, should he decide to return.
Pilgrim also claims that he can count on the support
of 13 of the 19 members of the St. Lucia Labor Party
executive, including Vice Chairman Hunte.
The US Embassy believes that Pilgrim is more
concerned with his business interests than with
pursuing a political career. Nonetheless, Pilgrim,
reputed to be one of the most honest politicians in St.
Lucia, could be instrumental in reunifying the two
parties-a prospect that might appeal to him.
Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
Cenac's decision not to push for elections at this time
reflects the current unsettled state of the opposition. It
is unlikely that Josie or Hunte will be able to stop
intraparty squabbling or to draw Progressives back to
the fold. If Pilgrim returns before the convention,
however, he will have a good shot at the party
presidency and ultimately at bringing about a unified
opposition to challenge the United Worker's Party.
25X1
25X1
Meanwhile, Progressive Labor Party leader George
Odlum has become increasingly isolated as a political
force, and some party members already have defected
to the St. Lucia Labor Party. Odlum's popular
support began eroding after his defeat in the 1982
elections and was accelerated by his bungled attempt
to send St. Lucian students to Libya for terrorist
training last year. Moreover, his recent statement of
solidarity with striking British dockworkers-whose
refusal to unload eastern Caribbean bananas is
hurting St. Lucia's mainstay industry-has made him
extremely unpopular with the general populace and
probably destroyed any chance of an alliance with the
St. Lucia Labor Party.
Although elections are not constitutionally due until
1987, parliamentary opposition leader Cenac has
called on the ruling United Worker's Party to follow
the regional trend toward early elections. He is urging
a return to the polls to give the voters a say in efforts
to resolve the country's economic problems, especially
that of rising unemployment. Cenac told an Embassy
official, however, that he would not demand a vote of
no confidence on the issue.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
secret
Latin America
Briefs
The Chilean Supreme Court has confirmed the constitutionality of President
Pinochet's wide-ranging emergency powers, which enable him to suspend
constitutional guarantees and judicial appeals and to expel dissidents or banish
them to internal exile. The ruling overturned a lower court decision that found the
government had overstepped legal bounds in summarily expelling two Communist
activists from the country last April. The government also has exercised other
exceptional powers recently, including the prosecution of four Communists under a
special decree-virtually unused since the political liberalization initiated last
year-for illegal political association.
The decision, in our view, significantly strengthens the regime's legal authority
and may quash a recent trend toward greater independence by the lower courts.
Pinochet now will be able to move against the Communists with little fear of
interference by the judicial branch. The President, however, probably will continue
to restrict the application of emergency powers to the radical left. To exile or
prosecute leaders of the democratic parties, while technically legal, could provoke
a strong reaction and possibly provide the catalyst needed to spur opposition unity.
The moderate opposition Free National Movement boycotted the opening of
Parliament on 18 July and staged a march in Nassau to protest the Pindling
government's alleged corruption. According to press reports, about 5,000 people
were involved in the demonstration. Despite a police ban and threats of "strong
and appropriate action," no arrests were reported. Led by opposition politicians,
the crowd called for the resignations of the Prime Minister and a number of other
officials.
The Pindling government has been implicated in a government-appointed,
independent Commission of Inquiry investigation into narcotics and corruption.
Although no direct evidence has confirmed the Prime Minister's involvement in
payoffs, some government and police officials are being charged. Pindling may call
for early elections if some of his ministers are found guilty, but he could simply
reshuffle the Cabinet. In either case, we believe Pindling himself will emerge
unscathed unless damaging evidence is introduced in the last sessions of the
Commission hearings, which have been extended through September. Although
the opposition has gained some strength in recent months, it remains weakened by
a leadership struggle and is unlikely to pose a significant electoral threat in the
near term.
19 Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
secret
Cuba Chronology
Angolan President dos Santos, in a meeting in Luanda with Zambian President
Kaunda, says the presence of Cuban troops in Angola plays a balancing role and
serves as a deterrent.
The Central Bank of Argentina grants a $600 million loan to the National Bank of
Cuba to purchase Argentine products. The loan has a 7.5-percent interest rate and
will be due in December 1986.
11 June Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Humberto Perez arrive in Moscow to attend the
CEMA meeting. Fidel Castro is the only head of state not to attend.
Isidoro Malmierca welcomes an Upper Voltan delegation, headed by Foreign
Minister Hama Arba Diallo, attending the first session of the joint commission for
cooperation between the two nations.
13 June Fidel Castro sends a message to Soviet leader Chernenko expressing full support
for the CEMA economic summit.
Cuban sources announce that Col. Pedro Tortolo and 42 other officers were
demoted to private and sent to Angola because of their cowardice during the US
intervention in Grenada.
Former Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo discusses the situation in Central
America with Fidel Castro during a three-hour meeting in Havana.
20 June A Bank of Cuba report says that last year Cuba resold $600 million of Soviet oil
imports to offset its loss of hard currency-a 57-percent increase over 1982.
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ryzhkov discusses Soviet-Cuban
economic cooperation with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
Cuba and Venezuela agree to another five-year extension of an agreement on the
hijacking of planes and ships, which was originally signed in July 1973 and
renewed in 1979.
21 Secret
ALA LAR 84-014
27 July 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Nicaraguan Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega meet
in Moscow to discuss bilateral questions and the situation in Central America.
In a press conference in Havana, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma condemns the
Reagan administration's attempts to link Namibia's independence with the
presence of Cuban troops in Angola.
Prensa Latina reports that Cuba's militia begins the first of a series of weekly
training exercises to prepare for "possible direct aggression" by the United States.
A US State Department spokesman says that Cuba is willing to hold talks on
migration after the Presidential elections in November.
Cuban poet Jorge Valls, arriving in Venezuela after 20 years in prison in Cuba,
says he will work to help others still held as political prisioners in Cuba.
All the persons who have been in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana for several
years leave the Embassy, with the exception of a 60-year-old man.
Politburo members Juan Almeida and Jorge Risquet bid farewell to SWAPO
leader Nujoma.
Presidential candidate Jesse Jackson arrives in Havana and is greeted by Fidel
Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Armando Hart, Flavio Bravo, and Jose Ramon
Fernandez at Jose Marti International Airport.
During a meeting with Jesse Jackson, Fidel Castro agrees to release 22 American
prisoners and an accused CIA agent, Andres Vargas Gomez, but not those in jail
for hijackings.
In a press conference, Fidel Castro expressed willingness to reestablish relations
with the United States, but only if Washington stops its policy of "domination and
force."
During the Jesse Jackson visit, Fidel Castro agrees to begin talks with the United
States on immigration in the near future rather than wait until after the US
elections in November.
Fidel Castro agrees to free 26 Cubans held for political crimes in response to pleas
from Jesse Jackson.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85T01184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
3ecrei
Fidel Castro and Jesse Jackson attend a religious ceremony dedicated to the
memory of US civil rights leader Martin Luther King. Fidel says Jackson is
bravest US politician he has met.
Visiting the University of Havana with Fidel Castro, Jesse Jackson speaks of
66Drearn of Today's Youth," paraphrasing in part the speech given 20 years a
the late Martin Luther King.
Jesse Jackson leaves for Nicaragua after a 46-hour visit to Cuba.
US officials say the Reagan administration has turned down Fidel Castro's
for normalized relations until Cuba gives clear evidence it will stop exporting
revolution.
Jesse Jackson returns to Cuba from Nicaragua to pick up political prisoners
including Vargas Gomez, and return to the United States.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000201040001-9