LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200970001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Yx~~el~i~~~aa.~
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Review
Latin America
ALA LAR 84-008
I1 May 1984
Copy.
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~ia~~llr[d ~A~E'~'fl~~
T ~E~A~~v~~ 25X1
~rticle~ xC1~iRee ~,l~~e ~'olftic~.l ~?~~ ?~' ~rg~ni~ed ~,~k~~~~
C~rganir?;d labor has resumed tlxe role of vanguard of the protest
inovemcxit against the Finochet regime, which it played during the
first half of l_9~3, and is likely to continue as a key political factor at
least for the next six months or so.~
~incc late 1~~~, i~lavana has intensified its prolonged campaign to
in~px?ovc ties with the west, a drive motivated by both economic
in~xpcratives and a hope of overcoming recexxt setbacks to Cuban
prestige,~~
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Brasilia has taken a largely neutral position on the Central
l~n3cricaxx conflict, refusing to be drawn into an active diplomatic
5.?ole and limiting official comx~exats to endorsements of
nc~ninterven9:ion and self~determination,~~
'The Castro z?egime has set. in motion a tvvo~pronged counteroffensive
in the p:xxglish-speaking Caribbeang expanding diplomatic and
commercial ties and increasing covert activities designed to
str~;ngthen regional leftists. []
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support for laominica's ruling Freedom Marty has weakened, largely
because of economic difficulties, but the opposition will not be able
to take full advantage of its opportunity because of factionalism. and
pcx?sonalii;y conflicts.)
.~t. Fitts-Nevis: elections f,ikely~~ ~1 25X1
f~cx u: Cabin?;t Changes[]
~~e~~t
ALA LAR 94-009
11 ~Qy 1984
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Continents and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Stc~1.f, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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s~`l4'O;Il 6;:4
~~il~uli~a `N"~~, 1"~~fl~n~~aN ~'ice~~~ ~~'
~D~~~~n~e~^,~i~. 1L,~~~~~~r~~~
`~incc lass: ~ ~c~~rnbE;r?, o~?ga?izcd labor hay ro~umod tl~o
4~ole; ~~~~ vang~~tard of ih~? ~~?otfst rxrovomont against tho
9~inoch~~i: rc;t~i~~~c that it t>laycd for thy, f~Y?~t half ?f
~9~~. During these six. i,aonths, %ho unions, taking
advantage; of th~;ir str~ong~:r org~a~zization and partial
1cgaJ status, ovcx?shadowcc~ the ~~?oscrib~d political
parties within the; irrote?~~_ n~ov~;mc~r~t. ~,ahor initiai~;d
vs~idc;~pread op~rosition accivify in 1~a~1 193 by oa:lling
for a scrips of "I~lational l'~a.y~ o.i ~1?otost~~ that
attaeaccd i:hc govcrnzncnt's cconornic policios. ~'hcso
:,oon mushroomed into a }-;cne,rEal d~mancl foi? political
libet~alir;atiosz. 1~fte?r a hastily callod g~noral striko
Failed in Junc, howcve s?, ilic parties displaced the labor
enovenic.nt as the driving f'orc~ bchi~rd the prot~s%~
ainci; ~thc turn of th.c ye;ai?~ biclee;ring among thy,
~sartics and f:he;ir. l~~c~ of ~3rry coherox~9: strat?gy to
s;oniront the govcrn~nc,~t- -l,z c ontrast. to labor's
impr~ovcd organi_caiiom a~~_d clcai? aim of ~;ventually
calling a general strike;- haves contribui:ud to labor's
resurzlption of its earlier role. '_l'kzc ~atior~al poi?lc~is
~'o~rinrand, ~, broad~~based unioix council to ~oox?dinai;u
prote;sf: activity, c:o~avcned ihc; day of protest in l~iarch.
~c be?lieve that labor wiL conf.inuc to play a crucial
poli9ica.l role in ~arilc ovc, the nc~t sip months and
that the unions' actions e;o~~ld determine whether
1'ino~;he;t ~?idcs out thy: political turb~~lcncc or is f?rcod
co concede transitiol~ to dcmocra~ic rule before his
constiitxtional tcrn~ expires in 1990.
A~lthoug;h opposition to ~'inocl~ct has cr?atcd a unity
of pr,-rposc an~ong~ union leaders anal has lid to the
t'oi?n~aatiofl of the l~lational ~@7~7orlcc~?~ ~f:ommand (CIV ~'),
labor remains divided along organiea.tional, political,
and ideological lin?;~. In l~pril 19~~ the 1J~ embassy
estimated that roughly 4d;+ pcrce;xlt of labor leaders
1,he ,F'inochei regime has long been away?e of the
thr?eat posed by labor. ~"hilean unior2s, which have ~
history of intense politicization and militancy,
coni~rolled over QO percent of ~'hr,'Cea,n wor?ker's in
1972, the highest r?ate in ~~outh America. ~'he
l;ommunist~dominated ~Inited T~orlcer?s
~'onfedcration helped discredit the ~hr'istian
,democratic government of ~'duar?do Frei (196~m70),
and the independent trucker's' union played a key role
in harassing ~~'alvador Allende's 1~ar?xist regime
(197Q--7~~). 7"he.iirst serious opposition to the ~inochet 25X1
dictatorship g~'ter the 197 coup camefr'om the
powerful copper miners' union-not from the
political parties'
Y~ecograizing the unions' political clout, the
gover?nment has tried to weaken and depoliticize
labor'. ~,he 1979 labor' plan severely limited the right
to strike, r?estricted collective bar?gaining~ to the plant
level, and deprived sectoral and regional union
federations of all but the most innocuous functions.
~'he government also has used force. ,~'or example, in
p'ebruary 198? a char?ismatic labor leader, whose
campaign for? worker unity threatened to mobilize
7AY1%nY1.6' (X P"QIY2.S2 [~ln 3'C~P"1 YD~P. wlX.C FYL ZlydP.rPd.
enrollment in unions dr?opped from 37 percent of the
labor force in 1976 to 12 percent in 19~.~. but such
critical sector~s~ as mining, petroleum, transport, and
service (electricity, gas, and telephone) remain over? ~0
per?cent unionized, and labor's overall political
militancy remains unbroken
~~~~~~
AI.,4 E,4R X34-008
11 May 19fJ~
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The National Workers Command (CNT)
union of Democratic tiVorkers (UDT)
National Syndical Coordinating Board
(CNS)
Confederation of Copper Workers
(CTC)
Confederation of Private Employees
(CEPCH)
lliverse; Christian Democrats in Rodolfo Seguel (also CNT
majority president)
Diverse; non-Communists Federico Mujica
predominate
owed allegiance to the Christian Democrats, 20
percent were progovernment, 20 percent were
Communist, 10 percent were affiliated with leftist
parties such as the Socialists and Radicals, and 10
percent were politically independent.n
We suspect that actual Communist influence is
somewhat greater than these figures suggest. Many
Communist unionists camouflage their party loyalty,
while independent, Socialist, or Christian Democratic
union presidents often front for largely Communist-
dominated organizations. Certainly the Communists'
weight within the National Workers Command,
which excludes most progovernment and some
independent unions, is considerable. At a CNT
congress in February 1984, the press estimated that
140 of the 315 representatives were Communistsn
Labor's organizational divisions, however, do not
directly correspond to its partisan alignment.
Communist and democratic syndicalists frequently
collaborate in the same unions, and labor leaders from
the same party can be found in competing worker
organizations. The most important entities are the five
federations that comprise the National Workers
Command.'
' The CNT does not represent all labor, but unorganized workers
and independent unions have little political influence.
Progovernment syndicalists have repeatedly failed to establish their
The National Syndical Coordinating Board
(Coordinadora), was founded in 1978 and is led by a
leftist Christian Democrat, Manuel Bustos. Below the
executive committee level, however, the Coordinadora
is dominated by Communists, who are especially
strong in the many affiliated front groups devoted to
such constituencies as women, youth, and
slumdwellers. This significant nonsyndical component
gives the Coordinadora a more overtly political slant
than other Chilean labor groups. Notwithstanding its
domination by Communists, the federation is
supported by the social democratic International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The
US Embassy believes that financial backing also
comes from East European sources, and we suspect
that Moscow contributes via the Chilean Communist
Party.~~
The Union of Democratic Workers is the
Coordinadora's chief labor antagonist. It was formed
in 1981 by moderate Christian Democrats, Radicals,
and independents who refused to follow Bustos in
collaborating with the Communists. Led by Christian
Democrat Eduardo Rios and dominated by that party,
the Union is the major source of non-Communist
labor opposition to Pinochet. The Union's relations
with the ICFTU are strained, but it enjoys
considerable support from the AFL-CIOJ~
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Caordinora President INanael Bustos
Bustos, 40, is a member of the "dinamicos," a
group of labor leaders who me highly critical of
the governrrrent's labor policies and favor a
return to civilian rule. Despite 10 mwtths of
forcer! exile during 1983 fnr attempting to hold
an unauthorized protest rally, he is apparently
undaunted. Under his lender?ship, the
Coordinating Board i.c sponsoring the "Mayo
Plan" for mobilizing wa?kers, students, and
others to strare against the Pinochet
government.
The Copper Workers Co~~federation is the largest
officially recognized labor organization in Chile. With
29,000 members, it accounts for the overwhelming
majority of workers in the crucial copper-mining
sector. The Confederation is politically diverse-
incorporating Communist, Socialist, and even
progovernment elements- -but the Christian
Democrats control eight of the 15 seats on the
organization's exe~ut even the now, more
expansionist-?minded economic team recently
appointed by Pinochet will probably do little more
than reduce joblessness by 1 or 2 percentage points
ove~? the next half year. '-thus, in our view, Pinochet
will try to pacify the unions with piecemeal broad
and butter conoessions and reform of labor
regulations. such actions may buy the silence of a few
of the loss politicized unions, but we doubt that
narrow job-related concessions will signifioantly
dampen labor?'s political aspirations.
The I~lational ~Iorkers Command lies publicly vowed
to prose its antigovernment offensive by eventually
calling for a genefl?al strike. This is a high risk taotio:
the failure of a haphazardly mounted strike last Juno
led to the temporary eclipse of labo~? within the protest
movement and enabled the political parties to
dominate the opposition forces. l~Tevertheless, this
year labor is stronger, better organized, and more self
assured. ~e believe that the C1~1T has a good chanoe
of orohestrating a widespread one~day general strike,
although an open-ended work stoppage would
probably dissipate after a few days. The Communists
and other? radical leftists will almost certainly try to
provoke violence, but, in our view, the predominance
of the moderates and the effectiveness of government
controls will hold violence to a containable level.
A single general strike, no matter how massive, will
not topple the government. It is, nevertheless, a tactic
that Pinochet fears. ~TIe believe that if the CST Dells
for a strike it will pt?obably be broadly supported,
preceded by successful protests and followed by a
series of regular work stoppages. This would
substantially ino~?easo the pressure on the government.
~ueh strikes might cause sectors of the military and
the civilian right to press Pinochet to shorten
substantially the timetable for a return to democratic
rule--the ono concession that might mollify the
opposition and restore politioal tranquillity. Thus,
according to the U~ embassy, moderato labor leaders
are acutely aware ol? the Hoed to prepare carefully for
a national strike, and they are resisting pressure from
the Communists to act immediately.[]
?ther outcomes, although less p~?obable, could instead
damage the opposition;
An ineffective strike would enable the government
to argot that its plan for controlled democratization
enjoys the public's confidence. The protest
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movement would be hard pressed to reestablish its
momentum quickly after such an embarrassing
defeat.
? If the strike is accompanied by excessive violence,
the middle and upper classes may rally around the
government as a bulwark of order. Moderate
opposition leaders would lose support by appearing
unable to control radical leftists, and credence
would be lent to Pinochet's assertion that
Communism is the only alternative to his ruler
Secret 6
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~~~~?~t
:~ince? lae i9~3, hTavana has intensified its prolonged
campaign i:o i_~nprove ties with ~cstern Europe. T'he
e~ubans arG probably motivated by foreign policy
impcraiives flowing; from the (Yrenada debacle, the
t'entral l~.mcrican crisis, and the growing LTS
chalie;nge to ~:uba itselz'. "ll`h~y apparently hope to
overcome these blows to C;uba's international imago
by scparating~ the United ~itates ffl?om its allies rASing
~~cnti~al l~.merican issues and ~J?lashington~s attitude
i.owa.rd Cuba. More; immec9iatcly, Cuban officials are
evooing ~7Jcstoi?n ~,nrot~~; to facilitate a second round of
debt reschcdulirzg in mid~~ 19~~~ and to increase trade
with several countries~~
'Che I~eploanatic k~'r?~nt
t~fficial exc;hangcs with virtually all of ~1t~estern
Furopo, plus Canada, have increased notably in recent:
;Months. ~/lorcovcr, Fidel Castro has sought personally
to influence numerous high-level visitors from these
areas. A h? press reported That he met three times with
Spanish Forc;ign Minister Moran, who visited Havana
in January, and had similar frequent contacts when
i.hc Canadian Minister of Fishes?ies visited to renew a
bilateral fishing accord. "Cho LJS Interests Section in
Ilavana believes C~,stro's behavior rez`7oots his
detez?mination, in the wake of Grenada, to appear
reasonable. C9nc clear purpose of the total effoi?t is to
Show that Cuban diplomacy is functioning normally
send that Havana's foreign policies are constructive,
especially conccrniait; Central Amerioa~
E:ubai~ offie;i~els also have sought out ~uY?opean leaders
in other international settings. At the inauguration of
/5 rgcntinc, President Alfonsin in December, foi?
example, Cuban t/ice President Carlos Rafael
l~odrigucz met twice with Spanish Prime Minister
Csonzalcz and also had bilaterals witl~i the leaders of
the olJier C%raropean delegations. Similarly, Cuban
officials attending the inauguration of ~Icnezuelan
president. L,iesinchi in Febz-nary had private meetings
with the Spanish P~~imc Minister, the head of the
~'renoh delegation, and others. Some of those Cuban
gestures received relatively heavy international media
play and, judging by comments of local officials to IJS
embassies in several countries, were viewed as
significant by some 1Jui?opoan officials. n
~li~e~~~~a9~ Me~s~g~
I-laving reviewed thei~? setback in (~~?onada, Cuban
policymakers by late 193 decided to adjust their
foreign policy, according to the 1rTS Interests Section.
?I'hey reportedly concluded that Central America
would i?crnain the focus of Cuban policy for the next
year or two at least, and that the greatest threat to 25X1
Cuban interests was the reelection of President
Reagan. Consequently, they decided that they should
try harder to sopa~?ato the prosont IJS administi?ation
from the Ames?ican public and from its allies,
p~?incipally in ~Iostorn ~uropo.n
"1 he first salvo aimed at ~Iestern Europe was fired by
~1ice President Rodriguez in December in an
interview with an Italian Communist Party daily. The
now approach was amplified and also directed at the
I,JS public in a I~Tewsweek interview given by Castro a
month lai.er. The main points expressed in both
interviews worn that the Reagan administration was
acting irrationally and was a major threat to world
peace. In contrast, the Cubans depicted themselves as
moderate; and prepared to compromise. Moreover,
while the Cuban leaders proclaimed their readiness to 25X1
negotiate with ~hlashington, they charged this was
precluded by the "ideological obstinacy" of the
prosont IJS administration.n
'I,he gist of those interviews has since been repeated
frequently by the Cuban media and other government
officials. Foreign Minister Malmierca provided the
latest statement at a news conference in Havana on 17
April, whoa ho said that recent US actions in
Basset
ALA LAR 84-008
I1 May 1984
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~~eu ~u.
Honduras and the mining of 1~icai?aguan ports typify
?J~Iashington's intent to avoid a political solution to the
Central f~xnorican conflici. 'Thcx?eforc, he added,
"Cuba will continue to mobilize international opinion
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t)n at least two occasions, Castx?o succeeded in
genez?ating substantial European media coverage of
his views. In a lcngilxy int?~rviow broadcast on Spanish
t.clcvision in .lamxaxy, coinciding with the ~~th
anniversary of the Cuban devolution, Castro reviewed
tuba's relations with the United States and Spain,
argued that Spanish accession to hTl~.`T? would
jeopardize Spain's special relationship with Latin
/1,merica, and refex?x?ed fondly to his ancestral roots in
C;alicia. lxx late March, a hrench television network
carried another lengthy Castx?o interview-his first
with French television since 1.917. Tho Cuban leader
claimed his fox?cign policy was moderate and
constructive, criticized US policy toward Central
~rucrica, alleged a sixnilax?ity of French and Cuban
views on the x?egion, and commended Fx?ance's
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I~t least some ~Icsi: European diplomats assigned to
tuba began to perc?;ive a g~x?eater Cuban disposition to
he accommodai:ing on Central f~mex?ica and in
Mastro was prepared to make concessions in Central
/'~merioa and that the Cuban loader would like to have
a dialogue with the United States
this is becar_xsc Castro respects strength
and scorns weakness in othez?s, fear?ing humiliatiorx
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/~Ithough the Cuban "message of moderation" may
not be persuasive to most of the European officials
exposed to it, I~avana undoubtedly views it as useful
ley:
ovetailing with Cuba's push to improve bilateral
relations with lccy South American governments,
which Havana almost certainly expects will be
influenced in their own responses by Cuba's
improved relations with ~Iestern Europe.
Strengthening px?ospcots for state visits by Castro to
several European countries this year or next.
S~~in ~nd1 lb'x?an~;~
Z'he most frequent and, from l3avana's perspective,
most promising recent exchanges have boon with
can advance its own objectives-in Latin f~mcrica
and ~hlestex?n Europa-by working in tandem with
Madrid
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Cuban leaders x?eportedly bees long believed that
Spain would be easiest of all European countries with
which to develop close ties because of the unique
historical relationship between the two countries.
`They had high hopes to achieve this goal when the 25X1
Socialists led by Felipe Gonzalez came to power and 25X1
wore encouraged by the warm reception accorded to
Foreign Minister Malmierca during his fix?st official
Travel to Madrid in 1~1larch 19i~3. 'The apparent
promise of Ding Juan Carlos to visit Cuba, Foreign 25X1
Minister Max?an's agreement to reciprocate 25X1
Malmierca's trip, and Madrid's continued receptivity
to an eventual visit by Castx?o increased Cuban
optimism. fn addition, I~avana was gratified by
Madrid's help in rescheduling Cuba's foreign debt
last year and in providing favorable trade credits
Castro's greatest personal coup was to persuade
Spanish authorities to permit him to stop over briefly
in Madrid on his return from the Andropov funeral in
February. Castro and his party, which included the
T~licaraguan delegation, held talks with Prime
Mxnxsto, Gonzalez on a "wide range of topics."
l~.ccording to Fox?eign Minister Moran, Castro
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~~~~ra~
;lai);ECd 1tc v~~orrlal like io ~t;~~r c)vF: t?c,i~ttio;,_~ with
~JV~cshinNiort I)tal is?t~t)i ills; li 1 )osit)~)~t `?t~cltc,~~.l a.td
t,nrrtovtnl. ' G' } jic'c? 1;y an
oflici,tl total thF RJ '~?tul) ),>;,+,~ ~ itni. ^,; 'sE~i:)'o 1t~=d aita.ires~d
:~ C('3?L211)t la,'f~iLli}Irl(`;/ ~l~i 1c,iA?ti,iltn]; )_lt l)0 `)Ja;Y 1oT' 1.`)
t'e'at?:, allfi that t~ is ` i1tt,V~I,;L?Ir' h(' L~~+~~ l3