AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200930001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 25X1
Africa Review
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ALA AR 85-006
8 March 1985
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Africa Review I 25X1
Articles Ethiopia and Sudan: Political Ramifications of Emergency Aid I I 1
Donor nations and relief agencies that are providing humanitarian
aid for drought-afflicted people in Ethiopia and Sudan are
demanding a commitment of resources from the Ethiopian and
Sudanese Governments that the two countries sometimes believe is
not in their best interests or is impossible to deliver.
Mozambique: Tensions Within FRELIMO
Divisions within the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
apparently have become more pronounced since the signing of the
Nkomati nonagression pact with South Africa one year ago.
Economic belt-tightening caused by declining oil prices and slack
demand for Angolan crude threatens to force Luanda to press its
socialist allies for increased economic aid, undercut its ability to pay
for Soviet and Cuban military support, and undermine the regime's
popular support.
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Cuban Aid Programs in Africa: Incompetent Internationalism I 111
Cuba's civilian and technical aid programs have backfired in several
cases when the assistance has been provided without sufficient
planning or regard for the needs of the recipient country.
Nigeria: Expanded Libyan Presence) 15
Lagos's agreement to allow Libya to open an Islamic religious
studies center in northern Nigeria will afford Tripoli better
opportunities to establish a more effective foothold among Nigeria's
Muslim community.
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Congo: Limited Move Wes
tward I
17
Growing economic problem
development aid have caus
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Cameroon: Ethnic Discontent
21
Uganda: Fallout From US Human Rights Report
22
Angola: Way Cleared To Sign Lome Conventio
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22
Tanzania: Salim Liberalizes Detention Act
22
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis, telephone
Secret ii
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Ethiopia and Sudan:
Political Ramifications
of Emergency Aid
Humanitarian aid for drought-afflicted people in
Ethiopia and Sudan is linked with complex political
considerations for the governments of those countries,
aid donor nations, and international and
nongovernmental relief organizations. Donors and
relief agencies demand a commitment of resources
from Ethiopia and Sudan that those countries
sometimes believe is not in their best interest or is
impossible to deliver. In the current crisis atmosphere,
where communications between the numerous players
range between difficult and nonexistent, competing
national directives and interests have caused stressful
and divisive exchanges between the parties in spite of
a mutually held goal of staving off starvation for
millions of people.
Dimensions of the Tragedy
An estimated 7.5 million to possibly 9 million people
are threatened by famine in Ethiopia, of which some 2
to 3 million are out of reach of most aid donors in the
contested northern provinces. An additional 525,000
to 575,000 Ethiopian drought victims are refugees in
eastern Sudan, according to estimates by the US
Embassy in Khartoum. Observers projected early in
1985 that 250,000 to 300,000 more refugees would
cross the Sudanese border by July; by late February
some were speculating that the numbers could be as
high as 500,000 or more.
At the same time that Ethiopians are seeking refuge
in Sudan, drought there also has reached crisis
proportions, with the possibility that 4 million
Sudanese will be affected by next summer, according
to a January report from the US Embassy in
Khartoum. Large numbers of Sudanese already have
left their traditional homes and grazing areas, some
entering the refugee camps along with the Ethiopians
in the east and the Chadian refugees in western
Sudan, others clustered around population centers
looking for food. Near the end of January, relief
workers estimated that there already were 300,000 to
400,000 homeless and needy people in western Sudan
alone, of whom about 80 percent were Sudanese and
20 percent were Chadian refugees.
As more people are engulfed in the growing crisis,
estimates of food deficits undoubtedly will be
reassessed and revised upward. Currently, the
estimated Ethiopian food shortfall for December 1984
to December 1985 is 1.2 million metric tons of grain
and 100,000 metric tons of supplementary foods,
according to an FAO assessment. The Sudanese
foodgrain deficit is between 1.4 million and 2 million
metric tons, as assessed by a multidonor mission and
by USAID officials. An additional 160,000 metric
tons is required at a minimum to support the refugee
population in Sudan.
Ethiopia and the Famine Relief Situation
The Ethiopians have insisted for many months, and
restated recently in briefings to states friendly to
them, that they are distributing as much emergency
food assistance as possible to alleviate immediate
starvation, and are moving ahead with a resettlement
program designed to move people from the drought-
stricken north to southern areas that offer the
possibility of immediate agricultural production.
Although all agree that the first priority is to deliver
food to the starving, there is widespread concern
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among donors that Ethiopia is not reaching all
possible recipients with relief goods. Many charge
that the government is as much an impediment to
successful food distribution as are the physical
constraints of insufficient port capacity, poor
transport, and difficult terrain. Ethiopia, according to
reporting from the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, has
boarded at least three ships in its ports and seized
relief shipments destined for the cross-border effort in
Sudan; it has given priority to the unloading of arms
from Soviet ships over the unloading of foodstuffs;
and it has held up in-country travel permits for
bilateral and international relief staffs, making it
difficult to monitor food distributions and to assess
growing needs.
The issue of perhaps most pressing concern is the
inability of either the Ethiopian Government or relief
organizations to deliver the quantity of food needed
by the 2 to 3 million people at risk in the contested
areas of the north. Not nearly enough food and relief
assistance are available in regions outside government
control to stop the spread of starvation, as attested to
by the increasing flow of severely malnourished
refugees to Sudan. Inside Ethiopia, the needy either
must depend on the relatively small amounts of food
that are distributed from Sudan through the cross-
border feeding programs or go to the government
feeding centers in major towns and along main roads
in government-controlled areas. So far, both donor
countries and the United Nations have been unable
either to arrange safe passage for scheduled relief
convoys and flights to the north or to assure the safety
of refugee movements. Ethiopian officials have
insisted to various international relief officials that
they are delivering enough food to feed the needy in
the north and that they will not negotiate safe passage
or allow relief organizations to operate in contested
areas. The Ethiopians fear such actions would tacitly
recognize the legitimacy of the rebels and strengthen
the insurgency.
In February, a US official observing conditions in
Eritrea was told by Ethiopian relief agency spokesmen
that, out of a population of 2.6 million, about one-half
are drought affected, nearly half a million more
persons than that agency reported as drought affected
last December. Furthermore, the Ethiopians said that
almost all wells in the region were dry, and that local
foods were almost nonexistent. While feeding and
food distribution at the 25 government food centers
appeared to be adequate, US officials believe that the
extensive areas not under government control are
receiving little aid.
Feeding operations across the border from Sudan are
one of the few options available to increase food
supplies in contested areas, according to US officials.
While an integral part of the present US program,
some donors, citing the increasingly vehement
objections of the Ethiopians, believe the risks in
increasing this effort are too high for Sudan, donors,
relief organizations, and for the refugees. Given the
enormity of the overall problem, these donors believe
reaching even some 80 percent of the needy
population in the north, which they say can be done
without cross-border feeding, may be an acceptable
goal at this time. An international organization active
in the cross-border endeavor estimates that in the face
of difficult logistic problems only about 500,000 can
be helped by cross-border feeding-but, without the
program, hundreds of thousands might not receive
any aid at all.
A further stress on the relief effort is the Ethiopian
resettlement policy, which is proving to be highly
divisive in the donor community. Ethiopia
characterizes resettlement as moving people away
from overpopulated, unproductive, desertified land,
and settling them in sparsely populated, fertile areas
that offer the possiblity of immediate agricultural
development. We believe, however, that the
government also views resettlement as a means to
undercut the dissident support base and advance
agricultural collectivization. Addis Ababa, with
Soviet assistance, has met its initial goal of resettling
several hundred thousand persons in the south and has
publicly announced plans to resettle a total of 1.5
million this year. The Australians and some European
donors, according to US Embassy reporting, are
inclined to support resettlement, seeing it as one
possible answer to Ethiopia's seemingly intractable
agricultural problems. Moreover, if resettlement goes
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forward, they recognize that humanitarian assistance
will be required until the settlements become
productive. The United States has told other donors
and the Ethiopians that it will not assist resettlement
efforts as part of the drought crisis effort, believing
the program siphons off governmental energies that
should be devoted to ameliorating starvation. It also
charges that the program is politically motivated and
that it is not voluntary.
Sudanese Drought and Refugee Crisis
While Ethiopian famine was the focus of initial
attention from the media and aid donors, Sudan's
food and refugee conditions have emerged as an
equally serious problem. Early this year the Sudanese
Government declared the needs of drought-afflicted
Sudanese in the western provinces as its first priority
and solicited US and other donor support. US
emergency food currently is being distributed in the
west both to Sudanese displaced populations and
Chadian refugees alike. According to relief officials,
the needy populations are frequently found in very
remote areas that are inaccessible by most roads or by
air. The delivery of relief supplies is complicated
further by the great distance of these areas from the
ports of entry of relief goods and by the limited
transportation and communications networks.
Coordination among donors is extremely difficult and
increasingly inefficient as the crisis grows on Sudan's
western and eastern borders.
Contributions to fill Sudan's food deficit of 1.4 million
metric tons estimated by a multidonor assessment
team under UN auspices are underpledged by
601,000 metric tons. By early February the United
States had committed 748,000 metric tons; and other
donors, 76,000 metric tons of the total need. A good
share of the food will have to be pre-positioned near
the at-risk population concentrations before May
rains make the roads impassable. The need for water,
shelter, health care, and sanitation provisions in
addition to food aid is straining the capabilities of
already overburdened and harassed donors.
Sudan is further beset by the presence of well over
half a million Ethiopian refugees, serious economic
problems, and an insurgency-factors the US
Embassy in Khartoum believes puts the Ethiopian
refugee problem low on Sudan's list of priorities.
Sudan has indicated, according to the Embassy and
UN observers, that its responsibility for the Ethiopian
refugees is discharged by allowing entry to Sudan and
providing some relief coordination through the
Sudanese national relief agency. Beyond that,
according to the Sudanese, refugee care should be
financed by the international donor community and
managed so as to minimize any negative impact on
Sudanese living standards and to preclude
antagonisms between the Sudanese and the refugees.
While sympathetic to the Sudanese dilemma, donors
have urged a more efficient and quick response from
the Sudanese relief managers.
Despite the risk of further tensions in bilateral
relations with Ethiopia, the Sudanese have supported
cross-border feeding operations into northern Ethiopia
in an effort at least to slow the refugee flow into
Sudan. The Ethiopian Government argues that these
operations benefit the insurgents and has threatened
to attack cross-border relief efforts into rebel-held
areas. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan are
increasingly tense, according to the US Embassy in
Khartoum.
Outlook
The magnitude of the drought-induced disaster, in our
judgment, is just emerging. The Ethiopian refugees
are not likely to leave the comparative safety of the 25X1
Sudanese camps without some assurance that crops
can be planted in Ethiopia; that they will be sustained
in their home areas with food, implements, and seeds;
and that they will not be threatened by civil disorder
or government retaliation. For both Ethiopians and
displaced Sudanese, the rains in April and May in
their home areas will determine the start of any
movement to leave the camps. The Embassy reports
that the Sudanese Government expects most of the
refugees to stay in the camps through 1985, or at least
until any crops that might be planted this spring show
promise of an adequate harvest late next fall.
Therefore, their presence in Sudan probably will 25X1
require the continued efforts of the aid donor groups
at present or higher levels at least through 1985. Only
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a skillful handling of food and water shortages within
Sudan will maintain a semblance of stability in the
relationships between the refugees and the indigenous
population.
We expect the donor nations and organizations to
improve coordination of relief efforts. Experience
gleaned from working their way through these first
chaotic months of emergency operations should help
to put in place a more efficient operation in both
Ethiopia and Sudan. The scope of the disaster is only
now being perceived, however, and a heightened effort
in health care, shelter, and a larger and more varied
food ration for what almost certainly will be a larger
refugee population will stretch the economic and
physical limits of all donors
Allegations that emergency humanitarian programs
are being used for political goals already strain
relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, and
differences are likely to worsen as the crisis grows.
Both countries suspect that refugee populations have
been infiltrated with subversives, that camps are used
as rebel sanctuaries, and that relief goods are used to
further antiregime activities.
The cross-border feeding program is at the center of
the controversy and is likely to remain so. Ethiopia
accuses Sudan and the aid donors, especially the
United States, of violating its territorial integrity and
of delivering aid to antiregime factions in the north.
Donors counter that the operation is humanitarian
and would not be attempted if aid could reach
northern Ethiopians in any other way. In the face of
Ethiopia's insistence that the program be discontinued
and the belief by donors that hundreds of thousands
will die if it were stopped or curtailed, the cross-
border program-among the many that are under the
international aid umbrella-is potentially the most
dangerous for all participating parties. Based on
Mengistu's public statements and numerous
diplomatic demarches, we believe that Ethiopia is
prepared to use military force to disrupt the flow of
supplies into the northern provinces, endangering the
lives of the international relief corps as well as
Ethiopian recipients.
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Mozambique: Tensions Within
FRELIMO
Declining economic prospects, the RENAMO
insurgency, and the Nkomati nonaggression pact with
South Africa signed one year ago probably have
intensified dissension within the senior levels of the
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
(FRELIMO),' the ruling party in Mozambique since
the country gained independence from Portugal in
1975.2 Although our knowledge of FRELIMO is
sketchy, studies by academics and journalists and US
Embassy reporting indicate that fissures in the
Politburo and Central Committee, which first
appeared at the Fourth Party Congress in early 1983,
have become more pronounced since the signing of the
Nkomati accord. While most evidence indicates that
President Machel continues to command the support
of the Army and security services,
the 12 Politburo members probably do not support his
economic and security policies.
The greatest danger to Machel's hold on
Mozambique, however, may not come from
disaffected members of the party leadership.
middle-grade Army officers, frustrated with
FRELIMO's inability to cope with the insurgency,
may present a greater danger to Machel and his
supporters
Origins of Divisions
The leadership of FRELIMO remained stable from
the First Party Congress in 1970 until 1983. Analysis
of the FRELIMO leadership shows that, while the
' FRELIMO, a vanguard Marxist-Leninist Party, has a
membership of approximately 120,000. According to party statute,
the 128-man Central Committee is the de jure ruling body, but in
reality the 12-man Politburo is the senior decisionmaking forum
FRELIMO, like other Marxist-Leninist parties, guards its
internal politics zealously. The state-controlled media contains little
about divisions within the party, and only a few academics have
made an effort at Mozambican "Kremlinology." While Embassy
reporting is generally good, access of Embassy officers to many
ruling party has avoided the bloody purges that
marred the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), the price of political stability has
been the isolation of the ruling elite. On several
occasions since 1981, Machel has publicly commented
on the party's isolation, noting that many leaders of
the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese have lost
contact with their roots.
The facade of a united FRELIMO leadership
shattered at the Fourth Party Congress in March
1983. The expanding RENAMO insurgency and the
collapse of the agricultural sector prompted Machel to
make the first significant changes in the state and
party apparatus since independence, according to US
Embassy reporting.
In his speeches to the congress, Machel singled out for
blame ideologues who supported a Soviet-style
collectivization policy ("big project line") at the
expense of the peasant farmer, claiming that this had
led to a decline in food production and a loss of
support for FRELIMO in the countryside. Following
the conference, the two senior advocates of
collectivization-Politburo members dos Santos and
Machungo-were relieved of their responsibilities and
made provincial governors.
In the year following the Fourth Party Congress,
Machel apparently moved to strengthen the hold of
pro-Western technocrats within the party. Jacinto
Veloso was made a member of the Politburo and
Minister of State for Economic Affairs for the
Presidency-effectively making him the country's
economic czar. It appears likely that Machel's
inability to attract additional economic assistance
during his visits to Eastern Europe in late 1983 may
have further convinced him to isolate party ideologues
like dos Santos and Machungo who favored Soviet-
style economic policies.
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The Breach Widens
The next breach came only two months after the
signing of the Nkomati accord, in which each country
pledged noninterference in the other's internal affairs.
The suspension of official South African military
assistance to RENAMO did not halt the spread of the
insurgency, and Maputo's drastic counterinsurgency
measures, including summary executions and public
floggings, increased popular discontent and indirectly
benefited the insurgents.
In May 1984, Machel condemned Politburo members
responsible for the counterinsurgency operations and
replaced them with close associates. Speaking in
central Mozambique, Machel accused the security
services of greatly overstepping their authority. "In all
our cities," the President claimed, "the police are
worse than the colonial police." The next week, in a
public rally in Maputo, Machel condemned the three
Politburo members with security portfolios: Minister
of Interior Guebuza, Minister of Security Matsinhe,
and Deputy Minister of Defense Mabote. He said:
"This here is Guebuza. He is the one who arrests
many people and leaves them there. And this here is
Matsinhe. He detains many people and forgets them.
Mabote's men create secret prisons. They detain
people and don't know what to do with them."
diplomatic reporting, seven of the 12 Politburo
members support Machel's policy of accommodation
with Pretoria and his program of limited economic
reform. These include the two senior officers of the
armed forces, the Ministers of Security and Justice,
and the country's senior economic planner Jacinto
Veloso, a former Potuguese Air Force officer who has
been a close associate of Machel since the late 1960s.
Machel's potential opponents in the Politburo have
been removed from key positions in the defense and
security ministries. Three are serving as provincial
governors several hundred kilometers from Maputo.
We believe their authority has been diminished by
their distance from the political center.
Machel has taken steps, however, to mend fences with
some of his more influential opponents in the
FRELIMO hierarchy. Guebuza, castigated for
human rights abuses, was recently made Minister of
State in the president's office. Machel also has acted
to co-opt his old friend dos Santos, naming him last
November as chief of an intraprovincial committee to
combat the RENAMO insurgency in the key central
Provinces of Manica, Tete, Sofala, and Zambezia.
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Following his dismissal of Matsinhe and Guebuza,
Machel appointed Sergio Vieira as Minister of
Security and Oscar Monteiro as Minister of Justice,
thereby strenghtening his control over the police and
security services. (Both Vieira and Monteiro are
Goans of mixed Portuguese and Asian descent
without a political base in the country or the party,
who served on Machel's personal staff during the war
against the Portuguese.) Machel also appointed a
young officer, Lieutenant Colonel Honwana, as chief
of the civilian intelligence service.
Foreign Minister Chissano, a black with good
contacts with all factions, is the second-most
important figure in FRELIMO, in our view, and
would
at this time also selectively replaced the cadre of the
country's counterinsurgency school with military
subordinates personally close to him.
The Present Balance
We believe, that Machel
continues to control the Politburo as well as the armed
forces and security services. According to US
be the most likely successor to
succeed Machel. Machel has used Chissano for high-
level talks with both Western and Cuban delegations,
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Samora Machel
President of FRELIMO
President of Mozambique
Joaquim Chissano
Foreign Minister
Alberto Chipande
Governor of Cabo Delgado
Minister of Defense
Sebastiao Mabote
Deputy Minister of Defense
Shangan, southern
Jacinto Veloso
Minister of State for Economic
Affairs for the Presidency
White
Sergio Vieira
Minister of Security
and in late January it was Chissano that broached the
possibility of Cuban assistance for Mozambique
should the Nkomati accord collapse, according to US
diplomatic reporting. Chissano, who was Prime
Minister of the transitional government in 1974-75, is
extremely active in the party and many areas of the
government affairs, according to US Embassy
reporting.
Outlook
Machel has shown an ability to manage the Politburo
and Central Committee since assuming the leadership
of FRELIMO 15 years ago and to govern through
consensus since Mozambique gained its independence.
Even though Machel has castigated opponents
publicly, no member of the Politburo has been purged
from his party post since independence. We would
agree with US Embassy reporting that despite the
strains Machel is in control of the leadership and his
supporters now dominate the national security
decisionmaking apparatus.
we believe that
Guebuza is Machel's principal opponent in the
leadership. Guebuza, a former Political Commissar of
the armed forces has support within the military,
according to reporting from the US Embassy
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Machel's appointment f 2bX1
Guebuza to a position in the office of the presidency 25X1
indicates to us his interest in co-opting this talented 25X1
officer, or at least keeping him under close control.
Should military opposition to Machel grow, it may
crystallize around Deputy Defense Minister Mabote.
Although current US Embassy reporting indicates
that Mabote has remained in Machel's camp, he
would be the natural leader of a coup given his
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Angola: Economic Problems
Produce Political Woes
In the event of a continued drop in oil prices and slack
demand for Angolan crude-both likely in our view-
Luanda will have to revise its budget by mid-1985 and
curtail spending,
This economic belt-tightening probably would
force Luanda to press its socialist allies for more
economic assistance, undercut its ability to pay
Moscow and Havana for vital military support, and
further undermine the regime's popular support.
Background
The Angolan economy-with the exception of the
petroleum industry-has yet to regain performance
levels that were attained prior to independence in
1975. Extensive petroleum deposits so far have earned
Angola enough hard currency to support the war
effort. The domestic economy, however, is in a
shambles. Agriculture has reverted to the subsistence
level, there are reports of widespread malnutrition,
shortages of spare parts are endemic, and industrial
production is down from 20 to 60 percent of the pre-
1975 level.
The sharp decline in world demand for petroleum-
which provides 90 percent of Angola's hard currency
earnings-has hit Angola hard. Despite a significant
increase in production from some 150,000 b/d in 1980
to some 200,000 b/d in 1984, revenue has only
increased from $1.45 billion to $1.6 billion during the
same period. This modest improvement has been
insufficient to offset the sharp decline in hard
currency earnings from diamonds and coffee. Total
hard currency earnings from these two sources was
approximately $420 million in 1980, but dropped to
about $130 million in 1984. In the case of coffee, a
combination of poor management and the civil war
have completely shut down most plantations, nearly
eliminating that source of revenue. In late 1984, the
success of UNITA operations against major diamond
mining centers such as Cafunfo threatened continuing
Much of Angola's current economic problems are
directly attributable to UNITA's strategy of hitting
civilian economic targets. In a recent interview in Die
Welt, a senior UNITA official reaffirmed the
insurgents' intention to continue striking at such
targets. Moreover, he indicated that the heretofore
relatively safe petroleum industry would no longer be
spared. He cited, in particular, Western oil companies
in Cabinda who currently provide 80 percent of the
ruling party's budget.
New Problems for Moscow?
Declining oil revenue almost certainly would cause
dos Santos to ask Moscow to relax its demands for
payment for Soviet Bloc military and economic
assistance. As of mid-1984, Angola was committed to
pay 50 percent of its crude oil production to the
USSR and Eastern Europe to meet this debt. In
addition, we estimate Cuba receives approximately
$120 million annually as reimbursement for its troops
stationed in Angola. Moscow apparently already is
feeling the pinch of its commitment to the Angolans
and will ask the East Europeans at an upcoming
Warsaw Pact meeting to pick up more of the tab for
Effect on the Leadership
Angola's growing economic problems probably will
strengthen the hand of Lopo do Nascimento, the
Minister of Planning.
the day-to-day running of the
economy is in his hands. Do Nascimento is a
pragmatist and oil company officials indicate that
much of the success in counteracting Angola's
unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracy is due to his
personal intervention. Although there is a strong
hardline faction in the leadership that espouses a
tightly controlled centralized economy and opposes
production.
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economic flexibility and experimentation, the
economic deterioration is discrediting such policies as
do Nascimento's influence continues to rise. We
would expect do Nascimento to introduce more
market socialism in an effort to get the Angolan
economy on its feet.
Outlook
Economic themes played a major role at the ruling
party conference in mid-January.' Increased
production was one of three major goals spelled out at
that time, and two of five commissions created at the
conference are aimed at improving the country's poor
economic performance.
Both at the party conference and in subsequent
speeches, President dos Santos has voiced open
concern about the economy and warned of dire
consequences, if the situation is not rectified. Dos
Santos and his colleagues apparently are worried
about their ability to retain at least passive popular
support if they cannot provide miminal, regular food
supplies. The concern in Luanda over the country's
economic problems has heightened in the face of
UNITA's intensified efforts to isolate the cities. As
the regime grapples with the economy, dos Santos
may be tempted to look for scapegoats and some of
those in the leadership who oppose any deviation from
Marxist economic principles could be shunted aside or
ousted.
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Cuban Aid Programs in Africa.
Incompetent lInternationalism
Cuba has made a concerted effort since the early
I 960s to foster ties with Third World countries-with
a special focus on Africa beginning in the early
1970s by providing them with a variety of civilian
and technical aid programs. Although Havana claims
that such efforts are examples of selfless commitment
to "international proletarianism," the primary goal is
to strengthen Cuban influence with these countries.
The efforts to promote "revolutionary solidarity"' have
backfired in several cases when aid has been provided
without sufficient planning or regard for the needs of
the recipient country. Moreover, some countries have
complained about the quality and cost of Cuban
assistance programs.
The Programs
The aid programs-most in the form of civilian
advisory assistance----involve approximately 13,000
Cuban civilians serving in some 20 African countries.
Havana traditionally has gained a foothold in these
countries by providing medical and educational aid, as
well as assistance in construction, agriculture, and
other technical areas. The Castro regime also has
capitalized on the instability of new regimes by
offering military and security advisers and
intelligence training.
In addition to the goal of achieving greater
international influence and enhancing Castro's image
as a Third World leader, the aid programs are
designed to bring other benefits to Cuba. Chief among
these is the regime's intention to maintain a sense of
revolutionary mission among young people who did
not participate in Cuba's guerrilla struggle by sending
them on "internationalist" missions.
The programs provide economic benefits to Cuba.
Exporting workers relieves domestic unemployment
and allows the personnel, particularly military
advisers, to gain experience. Moreover, some of the
assistance programs provide desperately needed hard
currency. Algeria and Libya, for example, are
charged for Cuban assistance-we estimate between
$7,200 and $12,000 per person a year. In some cases,
the host country has reportedly paid for the workers'
equipment, airfare, and lodging as well as personal
spending money.
Although the aid programs are generally successful,
there have been problems. Several recipients have
complained about the quality and cost of the
assistance, and have claimed that Cuba fails to
address adequately the real development needs of
their countries. Cuban behavior has also been a source
of friction, with charges of assaults by Cuban
cooperants upon local women and livestock.
Havana apparently has
sent ill prepared and unequipped personnel to work in
Africa and, at times, has attempted to control the
day-to-day running of the aid programs. Moreover,
host country complaints indicate that the Cubans
often fail to consider cultural differences.
111- Prepared Medical Teams
The eagerness to send large numbers of medical
personnel overseas has led to some failures in meeting
the specific needs of the recipient country. Officials in
Mali, for example, have complained about Cuba's
medical personnel--three general practitioners and
eight nurses and technicians-to Mali, but was
unwilling to satisfy Mali's request for badly needed
specialized medical aid in the outlying provinces.
Burundi officials also have been dissatisfied with the
quality of Cuban medical assistance and Havana's
failure to provide needed specialists. When the first
medical team arrived there in 1980, the Cuban
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Cuban and Guinea-Bissauan officials sign
cooperation agreement paving the wa or
Ambassador insisted that the doctors and nurses be
placed in pairs because they had not served outside
Cuba before. The training and experience of doctors
and nurses were often incompatible, however, which
severely diminished the quality of their work. Burundi
apparently was not satisfied with the program, as the
last medical team left in early 1984 and has not been
replaced.
Castro's emphasis on
increasing the number of medical graduates has
resulted in a government policy in which quantity
takes precedence over quality in medical training.
Havana's emphasis on the mass production of doctors
has led to lower examination standards, and. as of
mid-1984, medical students needed only a 70-percent
average on their tests to graduate as a general
practitioner. at least
one of the medical teams sent to Burundi was made
up solely of students. Moreover, the Cuban Embassy
did not provide the Burundi Government with the
promised curriculum vitae in advance on each of the
workers to verify his qualifications.
Cuban "internationalists" often are handicapped by
their inability to speak the host country's language,
making the advisers' task impossible. In Seychelles
three Cuban doctors were asked to leave within two
months of their arrival because they could speak
neither French nor English,
medical personnel stationed in Burundi spoke no
French, according to US Embassy reporting.
Moreover, just as the
doctors were becoming proficient in the language,
they were replaced by a new group with no capability
in the host country's language.
Havana's Pressure Tactics
Havana also has created frictions with African
nations by attempting to use aid programs as a
mechanism for influencing the host country's internal
sector involvement in agriculture, Havana pressed
Luanda to assume complete state control of
agricultural production-a concept supported by
Cuban advisers working in the Angolan agricultural
sector. Moreover, Cuban officials pressed the
Angolans to permit them to assume direct
management of the entire Angolan sugar industry.
The Angolans-mindful of the time in the late 1970s
when Cuban workers in the Angolan sugar industry
were asked to leave and stripped two sugar mills of
equipment and fixtures on their way out-firmly
rejected Havana's proposal. The Angolans said they
would accept Cuban technicians only on the condition
that they be supervised by Angolan managers, and the
Cubans eventually agreed to this limitation. The
Cubans were also pushing the Angolans into
accepting their offer to provide paramilitary training
to peasants and arming agricultural workers to
improve security in Angola's agricultural zones.
Cuban interference led the Angola Government in
1980 to begin letting specific contracts lapse as they
expired, When this
became obvious to Castro, the Cuban leader sent a
message to President dos Santos announcing that
henceforth all Cuban assistance was to be paid for in
US currency. Castro threatened to remove "all
Cubans" from Angola if this demand was not met.
Apparently, differences were resolved; we have not
observed any significant decline in Cuban economic
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assistance to Angola and dos Santos recently publicly
claimed that Cuban civilians are provided free
Another example of Cuban pressure tactics occurred
When the government hesitated to accept a
Cuban medical contingent, Cuba maneuvered events
so that the Malian Government did not have a choice.
Just prior to closing time on a Friday, a Cuban
Embassy officer verbally informed Malian officials
that a special Air Cubana flight with the medical
contingent on board would arrive the following
Monday, a Malian holiday. The Government of Mali
was thus denied an opportunity to respond to the
notification and had the Cuban aid forced upon it.
offers of aid. In 1984, Burkina, for example,
according to Embassy reporting, planned to utilize
Cuban security advisers in restructuring the internal
security and intelligence collection service and in
training military personnel. Other Cuban inroads in
Africa in the last 18 months included expanded
cooperation with Burkina and Ghana and new
agreements with Zambia and Zimbabwe
Nevertheless, Castro's assistance programs in Africa
probably will continue to encounter problems, in part
because of the wide scope of Havana's efforts. Those
countries such as Burundi and Mali that have
experienced difficulties probably will look elsewhere
for help. Others may limit Cuban aid for fear of
alienating Western sources of financial assistance.
Moreover, some African recipients, wary of Havana's
meddling in their internal politics, will try to limit the
Cuban presence in their country. Angola, however,
will have difficulty controlling Cuban activities
because of its heavy dependence on Cuban military
support. For its part, Havana, confined by its own
severe economic constraints and unable to provide
substantial material or economic assistance, will
continue to rely on sending personnel rather than
giving financial or material aid.
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Outlook
Despite some failures in its international assistance
programs, Cuba will continue to probe for new
opportunities to gain influence in Africa and
elsewhere in the Third World. Its aid is particularly
appealing to those countries where young, leftist
governments look to Cuba as an example of a
successful revolution and as source of badly needed
free or inexpensive assistance. These nations view
Cuba's experience as a developing country as having
more relevance to their problems than the
sophisticated "high-technology" societies of the West.
Therefore, despite the problems experienced by some
nations, many countries still gladly accept Cuban
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Nigeria: Expanded Libyan
Presence
General Buhari's northern Muslim-based military
government has acceded to a Libyan request to open
an Islamic religious studies center in Kano,
The city, in the heart
of Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north, has a long-
established community of Libyan traders and has
been the site in recent years of frequent doctrinal
disputes and clashes between rival Islamic sects. We
believe the new center will afford Libya better
opportunities to exploit local Islamic rivalries, develop
contacts with young Islamic student radicals, and
facilitate Tripoli's efforts to recruit and assist anti-
Habre Chadian dissidents located in Nigeria's
northeastern Borno State.
The Libyan Ambassador in Lagos, Abdulkadir
Sharaf Al-Din, has been mentioned by local observers
as the center's future director. Sharaf Ad-Din came to
Kano in the early 1960s to work as an engineer and
independent contractor, became fluent in the local
Hausa language, and married a Lebanese woman
from an influential Kano business family. He has
been Tripoli's Ambassador in Lagos for nearly 10
years and,
considers Kano his home. Sharaf Al-Din has
developed close ties with a number of prominent
Nigerians, including former armed forces Chief of
Staff Yar-Adua. Dr.
Ahmed Said Fituri will be the new Libyan
ambassador in Lagos, despite some Nigerian officials'
concern over his background in the subversive Libyan
Peoples' Bureau organization in Tripoli.
Nigeria evidently is willing to gamble on an expanded
Libyan presence in the north, perhaps in part because
Buhari may be under pressure from radical elements
in the Muslim community. Lagos may also hope that
Tripoli will breathe life into an agreement signed last
year that calls for the establishment of a joint bank
and holding company, thereby providing Nigeria with
badly needed financial aid.
Nevertheless, we believe Nigeria remains alert to the
possibility of Libyan mischiefmaking in the Islamic
community, and probably will try to limit Tripoli's
influence. The US Embassy reports that Lagos
continues to suspect Libyan involvement in violent
rioting by extremist Muslim groups in the north
during the past five years. Even so, Sharaf Al-Din's
long-established connections with Nigerian Muslims
probably will make it difficult for Lagos to prevent
him from establishing a more effective Libyan
foothold in the Muslim community
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Congo: Limited Move Westward
Growing French Economic Role. In recent years,
according to the US Embassy, Congo has further
strengthened commercial ties with France,
traditionally its chief economic partner and
benefactor. In our judgment, the coming to power of
French socialists gave the French a political boost in
Congo and facilitated closer economic collaboration.
Sassou has met with French President Mitterrand
four times since the latter's election in 1981. France
and other European Community states supply over
two-thirds of Congo's imports and purchase 20
percent of its exports, as well as providing almost all
of Brazzaville's development assistance. Since 1981,
the Embassy reports that France alone has provided
no less than 54 percent of Congo's total annual
imports. In addition to 7,000 private French citizens
who work in Congo, there are some 500 French "co-
operants" in technical positions throughout the
Congolese Government.
Congo counts on French investment in light industry,
agriculture, commerce, and, above all, petroleum, to
keep its economy afloat, according to the US
Embassy. French expatriates and multinationals
dominate the private sector. The French-owned ELF-
Congo is the major petroleum producer and is
responsible for marketing most of the country's crude
oil.
trading partner in black Africa. Although the
expansion of trade ties so far has not been
accompanied by a surge of American investment or of
official bilateral development aid, the US Embassy
reports that Brazzaville, nonetheless, remains
enthusiastic about budding relations with the United
States. Congo recently agreed to accept modest food
assistance and military educational training for
Congolese officers that supplement US development
aid, which the US Embassy reports has averaged $2
million a year since 1981. American investment in
Congo totals approximately $4 million, and
Brazzaville decided last year to award two contracts
worth $70 million to American companies.
In our view, diplomatic ties have also grown closer
since relations were reestablished at Brazzaville's
behest in 1977. According to the US Embassy, US
officials recently have been given greater access to the
media and senior Congolese officials, leading to a
greater exchange of views on mutually important
issues such as Chad. In addition to unprecedented
treatment accorded a new US Ambassador last
summer, Sassou has appointed a resident Ambassador
to Washington for the first time, and senior Congolese
officials made an unusual number of visits to
Washington last year.
Cooler Relations With the USSR. Signs of a cooling
trend in relations with the Soviets include reports that
senior Congolese officials on a number of recent
occasions have publicly noted the lack of Soviet
support for the country's economic development.
Congo recently
Improved Relations With the United States. Congo's
trade with the United States, consisting largely of
Congolese crude oil and petroleum products
purchased by American oil companies, has increased
significantly under Sassou's tenure. The United
States has become Brazzaville's leading trading
partner overall, and Congo is the third-largest US
asked the Soviet Union to build a new embassy on a
smaller plot of land because a French oil company
would like to construct a new building on part of the
present Soviet compound. Although Sassou
reluctantly attended Brezhnev's funeral, he chose to
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be represented at Andropov's burial by Congo's
Foreign Minister. According to the Embassy, a group
of Soviet technicians recently departed Congo without
having completed scheduled aircraft maintenance
because Brazzaville refused a Soviet request for a
100-percent salary increase. The Embassy also reports
that many educational scholarships for study in the
Soviet Union recently have gone unfilled, and that
last year the Soviets reduced by half the number of
scholarships offered Brazzaville.
Greater Concern for Nonalignment. Brazzaville's
attempts to present a more balanced foreign policy
has been most notable in the government-run media,
in our view. For example, Congo printed a US
response to Soviet disinformation over responsibility
for the Korean airline shootdown incident and a
positive article on President Reagan's recent criticism
of apartheid. Other examples include Congo's
participation in the Los Angeles Olympics despite
Soviet pressure to join the boycott, Brazzaville's
hosting of a reconciliation conference between the
pro-Western Chadian Government and Libyan-
backed dissidents, recent efforts to cooperate with
Kinshasa to deter Zairian dissidents, and an offer to
serve as a channel of communication between the
United States and Angola.
Despite moderation in some areas, Congo's actions in
international forums have continued to demonstrate
close alignment with the Soviet Bloc and radical
African countries. According to the US Embassy,
Congo voted against or abstained on every issue of
importance to the United States at the United
Nations in 1984. In addition, Congo's new Foreign
Minister in his speech before the last UN General
Assembly used traditional harsh anti-imperialist
rhetoric and indirectly attacked the United States on
apartheid, Israel, and Nicaragua.
Limits to Westward Drift
Although Congo clearly wants to ease some socialist
impediments to development and to foster more
intimate economic relations with the West, we believe
a number of factors will impact on the regime's ability
to do so. In our view, future movement is likely to be
slow and incremental, and will not entail any
fundamental abandonment of Congo's self-styled
"revolutionary" ideology. The pace and direction of
the country's trend toward moderation and its turn to
the West will be influenced by Sassou's need to stay
on reasonably cooperative terms with domestic
leftists, the Soviets, and the Libyans, as well as by
Western responsiveness to Congo's economic aid and
investment needs
Political. Although the President's political position
appears secure for now, his power play at last year's
party congress and associated purges probably has
created some powerful enemies. In our view, Sassou's
moderate policies provide a potential rallying point
which opponents could exploit, particularly if the
economic benefits of his policies do not measure up to
popular expectation
Economic. Congo's economic recession already has
resulted in increased urban unemployment and
business failures. We believe such developments could
threaten Sassou's position because he has used
promises of new projects to curry favors and help
control ethnic and regional tensions. In our view,
Sassou recognizes that further Western assistance and
investment could help limit the economic and political
fallout of more austere policies that the regime is
likely to have to resort to over at least the next two
years. From our perspective, the recession probably
will place constraints on significant reform of the
state enterprise system because it provides
employment for a large number of Congolese.
Western Aid Levels. In our judgment, Sassou
probably harbors unrealistic expectations for
European and US aid and investment over the next
year or so and he could become disillusioned about the
benefits of closer relations with the West. We believe
France, the key country in furthering Congo's
Westward drift, is unprepared to provide additional
aid because of its own budgetary constraints and its
other more important commitments in Africa. In fact,
the US Embassy reports that France has recently
taken a hard line to pressure Brazzaville into
negotiating an IMF program and to reschedule its
debt through the Paris Club to prevent a further
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deterioration in the economy. According to the
Embassy, French tactics include continued refusal to
reschedule bilateral debts, demand for cash payments
on military deliveries, and the recent cutoff of some
economic assistance.
The Soviets. In our view, Western reluctance to
provide major military hardware and to offer terms
competitive with the USSR leaves Brazzaville little
choice but to preserve ties to Moscow and access to
Soviet arms, a critical element in ensuring Army
support. Moreover, we believe Sassou has to be wary
of the many Soviet- and Cuban-trained Congolese
who hold government and security positions and can
be instrumental in spreading Soviet disinformation
and trying to block Western initiatives. In addition,
Sassou undoubtedly worries that Moscow could
support dissident elements should its interests be
seriously threatened by Brazzaville's flirtation with
the West.
Although the Soviets probably are confident that
internal political constraints will limit Sassou's
initiatives toward the West, they have begun to show
a higher profile toward Congo. The US Embassy
reports that the USSR gave exceptionally positive
coverage to Congo's last party congress and shortly
thereafter delivered previously ordered military
equipment, including at least four MIG-21 fighter
aircraft and a dozen ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft systems.
According to the Embassy, the Soviet Union and
Congo also have signed a number of limited economic
agreements
The Libyans. We believe that the Congolese-well
aware of Libyan leader Qadhafi's proclivity for trying
to subvert his opponents in black Africa-will wish to
avoid giving offense to Tripoli. In our view, the
increased Libyan presence that began with the
opening of a People's Bureau in Brazzaville in 1982
reflects a decision by Qadhafi to use Congo as a base
of operations against Chad and other moderate
central African regimes. The US Embassy estimates
the Libyan presence to be at least 50, substantially
more than needed to administer its small bilateral aid
program.
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Libya offered
$35 million in loans for unspecified projects. The US
Embassy reports that Libya and Congo are
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economic aid to date.
Outlook
In our view, Congo's recent Westward moves have
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significant economic reform. Our analysis suggests
that the Soviets are prepared to tolerate a certain
amount of movement toward the West, while focusing
efforts to retain influence in the military and security
apparatus. We believe Congo's importance would
increase significantly, however, if the Soviets lost
access to Luanda. In such a case, we would expect
Moscow to expend substantially more resources to
encourage the emergence of a more radical regime in
Brazzaville in hopes of gaining military access,
particularly if no alternative were available elsewhere
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within definite limits.
Limited Westward Drift Continues. In our judgment,
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but probably cannot do much more to move
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Africa
Briefs
Dissatisfaction with President Biya's regime apparently is growing among the
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Bamileke-who inhabit the western highlands-claim that Biya consistently
favors his fellow Beti tribesmen in east central Cameroon. Many Bamileke
reportedly believe that government efforts to crack down on corruption are
directed primarily at reducing their share of the economy. Furthermore, the
Bamileke complain that military assignments and promotions favor Beti officers
and enlisted men, and they have been angered by repeated searches of the
residence of the most senior Bamileke officer, Brig. Gen. Jean Nganso-Sunji,
Chief of the Cameroonian Air Force. The government was pursuing allegations,
which proved groundless, that the General was storing arms for a coup attempt.
The Bamileke have a history of sporadic violence against the government that
predated independence in 1960 and continued into the early 1970s. Bamileke
strongholds in the western highlands still remain under a state of emergency
directed against bandit remnants of a largely moribund dissident group called the
Cameroon Peoples Union. Former President Ahidjo, a northern Muslim,
maintained power by balancing Cameroon's ethnic groups and relying heavily on
the support of northerners and Bamileke businessmen. Although the Bamileke
were not implicated in the April 1984 coup attempt against Biya by northern
military supporters of Ahidjo, there have been several recent allegations of
antigovernment plotting by Bamileke military and civilians, in league with other
northerners and western Cameroon anglophone tribesmen displeased over what
they perceive as government favoritism toward the Beti. Although the President
has attempted to reduce Bamileke discontent by appointing a prominent Bamileke
businessman to his inner circle of advisers and by annulling some controversial
military promotions, we believe tribal discontent will continue to threaten the
stability of Biya's regime.
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US criticism of Uganda's human rights report has deeply stung President Obote.
Obote and some of his key cabinet members strongly expressed their displeasure
with the report in a confrontational meeting with the Ambassador late last month.
Since then Kampala canceled the US military training program, postponed a US-
funded family planning conference, and briefly detained two Ugandan employees
of the US Embassy last week, according to recent US Embassy reporting. We
doubt that Obote has approved a coordinated campaign of harassment against US
personnel-particularly at a time when Uganda's negotiations with the IMF are at
a critical stage-but low-level officials may on their own initiative continue to
demonstrate their hostility toward the United States.
Angola is expected to join the Lome Convention soon, thereby making it eligible to
receive badly needed development aid from the European Community,
Luanda's refusal to accept a clause linking West Berlin to
the convention a prevented Angola's accession up until now. Angola's Soviet and
East European allies flatly reject the clause and apparently had warned the dos
Santos regime against signing any agreement containing even an implied reference
to West Berlin.
Under a compromise solution proposed by West Germany, Angola will sign the
convention without making specific reference to Berlin. Once the agreement is
signed, Bonn will send a note to Luanda stating that West Germany understands
that Angola recognizes the clause. Bonn does not expect Angola to reply.
Prime Minister Salim, the likely successor to President Nyerere, recently
engineered some moderating amendments to Tanzania's draconian Preventive
Detention Act, according to Embassy reports. The President retains authority to
detain persons without formal charge, but must inform them of the cause for
detention within 15 days and submit a detainment order to an advisory committee
within 90 days. Detainees also gained the right to judicial review.
The Detention Act will apply to Zanzibar for the first time, superseding provisions
of the new Zanzibari state constitution specifying that detainees must be brought
before a court within 24 hours and released unless charged.
Zanzibari Attorney General Bakari has made an official
protest, voicing displeasure among Zanzibaris with laws weakening Zanzibar's
previous autonomy. Dissidents almost certainly will use the issue to further incite
separatists' sentiment on the island, especially during the upcoming Tanzanian
presidential election. Salim, a Zanzibari, may draw political fire from fellow
islanders for undermining their constitutional freedoms.
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25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000200930001-2
 Svc
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000200930001-2
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP85TO1184R000200930001-2