AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200900001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
25 January 1985
ALA AR 85-003
25 January 1985
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Africa Review I I 25X1
Articles Sub-Saharan Africa: Demographic Problems
in Drought-Afflicted Regions
between urban and rural areas.
Drought and famine in Sub-Saharan Africa are aggravating
longstanding problems caused by rapid population growth, large
numbers of refugees, and growing inequities in living conditions
Mali: Traore's Accommodation With Reality ~~ 7
response to an urgent need for economic assistance
President Traore's government is loosening longstanding ties with
the Soviets somewhat and making a modest turn toward the West in
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Despite a socialist heritage and military dependence on the USSR,
Cape Verde has improved ties with the United States and Portugal
in recent years in response to a need for Western aid and investment.
Botswana: Devalued Currency
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Production Staff: Office of',4frtcan and Latin American Analysis,
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other o.~ces within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Dem?graphic Pr?bleans in
Drought-Afflicted Regions
The current drought and famine in Sub-Saharan
Africa will aggravate the social and political
turbulence already generated by three longstanding
demographic trends in the region: rapid population
growth, large numbers of internal and international
refugees, and growing inequities in living conditions
between urban and rural areas. We believe that these
demographic pressures will complicate efforts by
political leaders to maintain popular support and to
foster economic development for at least the next
decade:
? The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is growing
faster than that of any other continent and of most
LDCs. The rate of growth has accelerated from 2.3
percent a year in 1960 to 3 percent today, and the
United Nations projects it will rise to 3.2 percent by
the end of the century. At these rates the total
population will grow from 415 million people today
to about 690 million by the year 2000.
? The approximately 3 million refugees in Sub-
Saharan countries are a constant drain on resources
urgently needed for national development in both
the home countries of the refugees and the countries
that receive them. In combination with the civil
wars, insurgencies, and food deficits that cause
refugee movements, the problems created by
refugee populations strain the economic, social, and
political structures of both sending and receiving
countries.
? African governments tend to favor urban over rural
areas because they view unrest in the cities as the
greatest potential threat to internal stability. They
recognize that the rapid growth of cities-whether
the result of natural increase, economic migrations,
or refugee flows-requires special attention and
investment, usually at the expense of rural services
and agricultural development.
Rapid Population Growth: The Long-Term Threat
The statistics on population trends in Sub-Saharan
Africa are discouraging. According to UN statistics
for 1984, the average annual growth rate of 37 of the
44 countries in the region is 3.1 percent, considerably
faster than the LDC average of 2 percent. The seven
with slower growth represent only 1.2 percent of the
total Sub-Saharan population but also have a
relatively high average rate of growth of 1.8 percent.
Although the United Nations projects that the LDC
growth rate will drop to an average annual 1.8 percent
by the year 2000, it expects that of Sub-Saharan
Africa to rise to 3.2 percent.
Beyond just the sheer magnitude of the demographic
statistics, however, rapid population growth is the
greatest single long-term constraint on economic
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the
World Bank. Population growth of 3 percent a year-
with rates close to 4 percent in such countries as
Kenya and Tanzania-puts extraordinary pressure on
national food systems and reduces the availability of
goods needed for basic welfare. According to
estimates by the World Bank, per capita income in
Sub-Saharan Africa is now about 4 percent below the
1970 level, and food production per capita has fallen
by at least 20 percent over the past 10 years because
of population pressures on arable lands and
rudimentary farming practices. Cultivators have been
pushed onto more marginal agricultural areas in
zones of lower and uncertain rainfall in parts of East
Africa (Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda), southern
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ALA AR 85-003
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Africa (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), and
West Africa (Mauritania and Niger), according to
analysis by the World Bank. Imports now provide a
fifth of the Sub-Saharan region's food requirements.
In our view, there is no lasting "Malthusian" solution
to Africa's population growth. The loss of hundreds of
thousands of persons through starvation and famine-
caused illnesses over the past year will slow population
growth only for the period of acute food deficits. The
restoration of food supplies and some semblance of
social order will allow for the quick rehabilitation of
populations and the probable reassertion of pre-
existing population growth patterns. Documented
studies of the Dutch famine of 1944-45 and the
famine in parts of Bangladesh in 1974 show a
resumption of normal birth and death levels within
months of the amelioration of the food crises. In the
case of Ethiopia:
? If famine had not afflicted the country, we would
have expected the prevailing high fertility (crude
birthrates of 49 per thousand population) and
relatively high mortality (crude death rates of 21.5
per thousand population) to have resulted in a
population of about 50.3 million in 1990 (assuming
the preliminary census figure of 42.5 million in 1984
is correct).
? If we assume afamine-induced decline in the birth-
rate to 41.5 per thousand and an increase in deaths
equal to the 300,000 estimated famine-induced
deaths in 1984, and that these rates would be
maintained for 1984 through 1986 when normal
conditions of growth would return, we would expect
a population of 48.6 million in 1990.
Refugees: Destabilizing Consequences
In addition to the weight of famine itself, the burden
of refugees and the costs of the other forces that
generate them severely strain the ability of African
nations to help themselves. They drain economic,
physical, and human resources that ideally would be
assigned to development projects to upgrade the
national standard of living. Because of these costs,
however, such resources must be expended on the
rehabilitation of the failed physical and social
infrastructure that led to refugee flight or on
providing for the basic needs of noncitizen refugees
rather than on improved national services
International Refugees. Whether generated by civil
war, insurgency, or famine, international refugees
tend to cause social and political instability in both
sending and receiving countries. A review of official,
academic, and public literature on refugee movements
throughout the world over the past several decades
indicates that:
? The presence of refugees may draw the receiving
country into the sometimes violent internecine
conflicts or international disputes of the sending
country, such as is currently occurring between
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
? Pressures for refugee assistance tend to aggravate
already existing conflicts, such as those between
Ethiopia and Sudan over suspected aid to insurgent
groups under cover of refugee assistance.
? Ethnic and religious tensions can be distorted or
heightened not only at the time of movement and
resettlement but even decades later, as in the
continuing impasse between Rwanda and Uganda
over the proposed repatriation of 100,000 Tutsis
who fled to Uganda following the 1959 Rwandan
revolution in exchange for 31,000 Hutus forcibly
sent out of Uganda to border camps in Rwanda in
1982.
? Donors of humanitarian aid often demand access to
regions of a country or to institutions deemed
politically sensitive by a government or its political
opponents. This has occurred in Pakistan since the
flight of Afghan refugees to Pakistani border areas
began in 1979.
? The attention and care given to refugees may
engender animosities among citizens of the
receiving country who live in conditions not much
better than a refugee camp~urrently a major
problem in Sudan and Somalia.
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? The sending country is always under regional and
international pressure to arrange for and accept the
repatriation of its citizens. Such repatriation may be
difficult or impossible, at least in the short term,
particularly if civil or social disorder was one of the
causes of the refugee movement, as in the ongoing
conflicts in Chad, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.
In the absence of voluntary repatriation or third-
country resettlement, international aid resources are
increasingly being shifted from care and maintenance
of refugees to comprehensive programs integrated
with host country development plans. The Second
International Conference for Assistance to Refugees
in Africa (ICARA II) in July 1984 was aimed at
devising programs to help host countries cope with
large, semipermanent refugee populations while at the
same time accomplishing national economic and
social development. Fourteen countries claiming
about 2.5 million refugees or returnees submitted
proposals for a total of 128 agricultural, educational,
social, and physical infrastructure projects that would
cost approximately $300 million. Donors expressed
interest in about one-third of the projects, all designed
to reinforce the areas most affected by the arrival or
return of refugees such as the provision of secondary,
vocational, and technical education and agricultural
improvement including reforestation and water
supply
dnternal Refugees. Internal stability and opportunities
for development are also undermined in countries
experiencing spontaneous movements of large
numbers of their own citizens seeking food or refuge.
Governments are usually ill-equipped to cope with the
physical needs of refugees and reluctant for political
reasons to admit that a serious problem exists.
Spontaneous settlement in and around capital cities
and other major urban centers, where refugees tend to
go in the belief food and security will be available, is
usually met by the government's denials of their
plight and alarm at the suggestion of unrest that their
presence signals. This has occurred most recently, for
example, in Ethiopia. At the same time, governments
tend to try to force refugees out of cities or to deny
entry altogether, such as currently in Ethiopia and
Chad, to protect the existing urban populations from
want, and to keep the sight of hungry or frightened
people from international view. Chad has established
five feeding centers in the vicinity of N'Djamena in an
attempt to prevent the major portion of the estimated
80,000 refugees flowing toward the capital from
entering the city.
While the historical record shows that internal
refugees often return home when conditions permit, 25X1
there have been increasing instances of groups staying
permanently in their area of refuge, often remaining
as outsiders with no inclination or ability to adapt to
lifestyles dictated by the new region. As a result, a
new permanent underclass, with few of the skills
necessary for urban living, is being created in several
already overburdened African cities. For example,
nomads in Mauritania who remained around
Nouakchott after the 1973 Sahelian drought are still
living in impoverished neighborhoods and have been
integrated only slightly into the life of the city. They
have been joined by thousands of additional nomads
made destitute by drought in the past few years.
Nomads in Mali have followed a similar pattern.
The Urban-Rural Split: A Worsening Problem
In addition to problems of rapid total population
growth and refugee movements, most Sub-Saharan
countries are woefully equipped to manage the rapid
urbanization that is occurring there. Although Sub-
Saharan Africa is the least urbanized region in the 25X1
world, with only slightly more than a quarter of its
people living in cities, urban growth rates average a
high 5.5 percent a year, ensuring a doubling of the
overall urban population in 12 years. As is the case
with the total population, studies of urban
development patterns show that it is the speed with
which the cities are growing-rather than their
absolute size-that strains governmental resources
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A look at African demographic and social data
indicates that generally poor rural conditions and the
punishing physical drudgery of farming have led to
rural flight even in good economic times, sharpening
the urban-rural split. Numerous demographic surveys
have shown that rural migrants view city life as
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preferable to rural in part because they expect greater
opportunities to be available to their children if not to
The flight to the cities is intensifying in most drought-
stricken countries and includes in some instances the
unprecedented displacement of entire villages or tribal
groups. In Mali, US Embassy officers estimate that
nearly one-third of the 126,000-person population in
the Niger River floodplain has migrated from farms
to join extended family households in major towns or
to set up makeshift camps on their outskirts. We
estimate that a large proportion of these destitute
people will remain in the towns and cities, even after
the worst effects of the food crises are ameliorated,
because they will be unable to return to rural areas
until complex countrywide rural rehabilitation
programs are begun.
An Antirural Policy Bias. A review of academic
literature and the policies of African states over the
past several decades indicates that nearly all African
governments favor urban over rural areas. One reason
is that postindependence African leaders tended to
view the agricultural sector as the source of surplus
revenue to finance what they perceived to be more
important industrial development. Consequently,
governments devoted few resources to domestic food
crops, preferring to focus development spending on
export crops that could earn foreign exchange.
Another reason is that most governments believe that
the main threat to political stability comes from the
demands of politically active or potentially disruptive
urban residents, not from farmers who are not
organized and are far from the centers of power. One
way to reduce urban discontent is to assure the
availability of plentiful, cheap food.
The food pricing and marketing policies of African
governments have reflected these priorities:
? In most African countries, prices of key staples are
regulated by the state rather than the free market.
Prices paid to farmers for their crops are kept
deliberately low-often at levels insufficient to
cover production costs-to subsidize politically
volatile urban consumers. Farmers, as a result, have
little incentive to expand production beyond the
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immediate needs of their families. In our judgment,
these conditions are especially acute in Tanzania,
Mali, and Mozambique.
? According to US agricultural analysts, the food
policies of African governments generally
concentrate on filling urban preference for high-
quality imported wheat and rice (often at subsidized
prices) rather than relying on local grains and other
local foodstuffs. This policy not only discourages
domestic production but drains foreign exchange.
Ethiopia, for example, is using scarce foreign
exchange to cover urban food requirements while
using the military to keep the rural hungry from
entering the cities, according to reports from the US
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Under prodding from international and Western aid
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overnments are tr
some African
donors
y
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liberalize their state-run agricultural sectors and to
redress the antirural policy bias-with solid success in
a few states such as Zimbabwe and Kenya. According
to a review of press and Embassy reporting:
? Senegal and Somalia have turned over the
marketing of many domestic agricultural products
to the private sector.
? Mali has relinquished the government's monopoly
control over sorghum and millet as a condition for
receiving an IMF standby accord.
? Since 1980 Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and
Tanzania have raised prices paid to farmers for
some food crops in order to encourage production.
In our judgment, these kinds of reforms offer some
hope of progress in meeting the food needs of the
rapidly expanding population, but their immediate
impact has in many cases been offset by the effects of
drought.
Outlook
We expect that the current drought will increase the
social and politics? turbulence already generated by
rapid population growth, refugee movements, and
favoritism for urban over rural areas in the policies of
African governments. In our view, these fundamental,
long-teim trends will be underlying determinants of
instability in the severely drought-affected countries
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for at least the next decade. Moreover, we do not
expect the reconstruction of normally functioning
societies with even the low predrought levels of
economic activity and public services in this decade.
We expect that education, health, population
programs, housing, public transportation, and other
welfare and service sectors will suffer as a substantial
portion of the limited human and monetary resources
available will be drawn off into meeting crises
connected with food shortages and agricultural
rehabilitation.
The need for governments to redirect their resources
from economic and social development to crisis relief
will, in our judgment, force some regimes to adopt
coercive measures such as the current resettlement
scheme in Ethiopia or the closing of borders to
refugees as has been threatened by Sudan and the
Central African Republic. In the short term,
governmental efforts to resettle refugees or to deny
them access to cities may achieve the desired result of
getting the undesirables out of the public eye and
away from the seat of government. Over the longer
term, however, such moves will generate rising
frustration, anger, and in some cases rebellion among
those in both sending and receiving countries who
have been made the scapegoat of inefficient and
shortsighted policies.
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1V[ali: Traore's Accommodatioln
With Reality
Mali, which has a socialist, state-controlled economy
and has been militarily dependent on the USSR since
its close association with Moscow in the 1960x, is now
showing signs of moderation, according to US
Embassy reporting. Bamako is loosening ties
somewhat with the Soviets, improving relations with
France and the United States, and liberalizing some
areas of its economy in search of greater Western
economic aid and investment. We believe longtime
President Traore is responding to unavoidable
economic realities and a growing realization that the
Soviets will not provide desperately needed economic
assistance
Mali's turn to the West has been modest so far and
can be easily stopped or reversed. We believe Bamako
will not completely abandon its socialist orientation at
home or in international forums. Moscow will retain
its influence by continuing to provide military
assistance and by maneuvering behind the scenes to
help Malian leftists. We conclude that chances for a
coup will increase if economic and drought conditions
continue to deteriorate and if the pursuit of
international financial prescriptions fails to promote
growth. A takeover by radicals might deter other
African states from taking needed economic reforms
and offer the USSR new opportunities for regional
influence, but, in our judgment, Mali would still find
itself dependent on the West for economic survival.
Background
Impoverished Mali gained independence from France
in 1960 under the leftist leadership of President
Modibo Keita, who ruled until 1968. He combined a
common outline suggested by State Department's Africa Policy
Bureau. The issues addressed are the country's Soviet connection;
recent signs of Westward movement; reasons for moderation leeway
for further movement; and prospects for reduction in Soviet
influence, for economic liberalization, and for a more balanced
international posture.
centralized one-party political system with socialist
policies based on extensive nationalization of the
agriculturally based economy. Keita forged close
military ties with the USSR and withdrew Mali from
the French political community and the African franc
zone, with debilitating consequences for the economy.
Academic studies show that Keita's ambitious but
unworkable development plans quickly ran afoul of
peasants, who opposed collectivization, and traders,
who disliked restrictions on free enterprise. By 1968,
the government faced growing internal friction,
farmers produced only for themselves, and workers
endured rising inflation, salary cuts, and new taxes.
In 1968, Keita was ousted by junior officers. Their
leader, Moussa Traore, is now in his 16th year as
Head of State. The military cited widespread
corruption, rising foreign debt, and poor harvests as
justificatiAn for its intervention. Although Traore
sought to improve relations with France, he did not
break with the USSR, which continued to provide
significant military assistance. Traore labeled his
ruling ideology "progressive" rather than socialist and
publicly supported a mixed economy. He moved very
gradually in trying to make the public sector more
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efficient, according to the Embassy, realizing only in
the late 1970s that state companies-Keita's legacy-
faced such serious managerial and financial
difficulties that real reform could no longer be
postponed.
Traore, who the US Embassy reports has weathered
three coup attempts over the years, has begun a
transition from a military to a civilian form of
government. In 1979, a single ruling party-the
Democratic Union of Malian People-was created
and Traore was elected President for asix-year term.
Party officials now dominate key government
positions, though the Embassy notes that the military
remains the basis of Traore's rule.
The Soviet Connection
Military and security ties between the USSR and
Mali serve as the cornerstone of their relationship,
and Bamako's dependence on the Soviet Union in
those areas is extensive. Moscow provides minimal
economic assistance, preferring to promote ties
through provision of arms and military training,
party-to-party relations, and student scholarships.
Moscow continues to be the only major source willing
to gratify Mali's desire for expensive and relatively
sophisticated weapons. In our view, Mali faces no
immediate or regional security threats; rather, the
regime's desire for advanced equipment stems largely
from the country's martial traditions.
as Mali's principal military supplier, has
provided equipment from 1974 to 1983 valued at $124
million, including T-34 tanks, 6 MIG-21 and 21
MIG-17 fighter aircraft, and Mi-8 helicopters.
about 70 Soviet
military advisers were in Mali in 1984. An unknown
number of Soviets advise Malian pilots,
and perform all major maintenance for
the Air Force. Moscow also provides some training to
the Malian security service.
~he Soviets first offered such training in
As Traore has reoriented Mali from military to
civilian government, Moscow simultaneously has
fostered ties with the ruling party, encouraging
Malian party members to attend the CPSU party
and civilian scholarships.
some 100 Malian students
an investment in the future.
attended schools in the USSR in 1983. We believe the
Soviets will continue to offer academic scholarships as
The Soviet purpose in cultivating strong ties with
Mali is not only to curry favor with its armed forces-
the key political force in Mali-but to advance
Moscow's limited military interests in West Africa.
several years have been lengthening runways of the
airfields in Gao and Mopti to approximately 10,000
feet-too long for current Malian needs-and that
SA-3 surface-to-air missiles are deployed at these
airfields. The US Embassy believes the airfields could
be used to transport major Soviet arms and supplies to
client states in southern Africa or even Latin
America. US Embassy reporting a decade ago
indicated that Mali was among several left-leaning
African states that allowed Soviet cargo aircraft to
transit their territory in 1975 when Moscow mounted
an emergency arms ferry to Angola to stave off the
defeat of the faction that now rules in Luanda.
Trend Toward Greater Pragmatism
Despite Mali's heritage of socialism and close ties
with the Soviets, the US Embassy has documented a
trend on Bamako's part since 1980 toward expanding
contacts with the West, primarily with France and the
United States. This has been accompanied by a
movement toward more pragmatic and market-
oriented economic policies. In international forums,
Mali increasingly takes US concerns into
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consideration, although it still prefers to abstain on
most sensitive East-West issues. Moreover, in spite of
a continued large-scale program of Soviet military
and security aid, political relations with Moscow have
cooled in recent yearn
Factors Underdying the Trend. More than any other
factor, according to the US Embassy, severe economic
problems have forced Mali to revise its socialist
economic policies. The Soviet Union is unwilling to
provide the amount and kind of economic assistance
needed, which Mali has come to realize can only come
from the West. Moreover, the Embassy reported that
Western donors in the early 1980s let Mali know that
assistance levels would not be increased unless the
country began to formulate long overdue economic
Two decades of socialist economic policies have failed
to promote economic growth, according to the US
Embassy. Landlocked in West Africa's Sahelian
region, Mali remains one of the world's least
developed countries, with an estimated annual per
capita income of $180. Periodic severe drought as well
as historic mismanagement contribute to low output
of food crops and cotton-the principal cash crop and
source of exhort earnings. Per capita food production
Drought ravaged Mali from 1968 to 1974, and this
year the country is again threatened by major
drought. UN and Western donor estimates suggest
that about one quarter of the country's 7.6 million
Soviet economic influence is marginal because
Moscow has failed to provide economic assistance
sufficient to reduce Mali's economic dependence on
the West. The Embassy points out that the Soviets
provided no food aid to Mali during the great drought
of the early 1970s and has provided only some token
food assistance since then. While Malian officials
have not publicly expressed disappointment with
Soviet aid efforts,
Million US $
Exports
(f.o.b.)
147.1
204.9
153.8
119.5
165.5
Imports
(c.i.f.)
350.6
497.1
390.7
333.1
333.2
_
Trade
balance
-203.5
-292.2
-236.9
-213.6
-167.7
Services (net)
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-40.8
-39.4
-39.9
-40.9
Private trans-
fers (net)
32.4
33.2
29.5
28.7
24.1
Public
transfers
87.8
145.9
129.6
93.0
107.2
Current
account
-83.3
-153.9
-117.1
-131.8
-77.3
Capital (net)
103.3
117.4
75.1
103.1
91.1
Overall
balance
-20.8
-32.2
-38.6
-2.5
4.0
Outstanding
external debt
(medium and
long term)
504.0
686.5
747.2
828.4
879.3
Percent
ReaIGDP
growth
10.1
-1.2
-2.4
4.4
2.0
Debt service
ratio
Nn
13.0
25.0
27.0
34.0
Implicit GDP
-8.3
7.1
11.0
8.8
7.9
US Embassy has picked up recurring reports of
complaints by Malian officers and enlisted men about
the quality of military equipment as well as over long
delays in delivery of weapons.
trainees resent the condescending attitudes of the
Soviet advisers in Mali. some
Malians training in the USSR are embittered by not
being allowed to handle advanced Soviet equipment,
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Malians training in the USSR are embittered by not
being allowed to handle advanced Soviet equipment,
unlike their Angolan and Cuban counterparts.
Signs of Change
Economic Liberalization. The most significant
development in Mali in recent years, according to the
US Embassy, has been the government's serious effort
to liberalize. the country's socialist economic policies.
Traore has received strong support from the IMF, the
World Bank, and Western donor countries. In 1982,
the IMF granted Mali a $34 million standby credit,
and a year later Mali received another $42.3 million
standby credit. While the IMF has praised Bamako's
efforts at economic reform, Fund officials point out
that the Malians so far have enacted only preliminary
structural changes.~~
Mali's economic adjustments, according to the US
Embassy, are aimed at stimulating agricultural
production, reducing public spending and debt,
liberalizing domestic trade, and improving the
efficiency of state enterprises. To this end, the
Embassy reports Mali has reduced government
involvement in the marketing of cereal grains and
increased prices paid to agricultural producers. The
government has adopted a more realistic currency
exchange rate, reduced subsidies on food and fuel for
urban dwellers, and tried to cut public spending that
does not contribute to economic development.
Bamako also is attempting to dismantle some
inefficient public enterprises-so far, only three of 27
companies have been abolished, and reductions in civil
service hiring are planned.
Moderates Gain I~luence. Parallel with Mali's
efforts to liberalize its economy, Western-oriented
technocrats have been appointed to key ministerial
positions in recent years, according to US Embassy
reports. For example, in a 1982 Cabinet shuffle,
Oumar Coulibaly-who played a key role in
negotiating Mali's first IMF standby agreement and
who is Traore's principal economic adviser-assumed
the crucial post of Minister of State for Economy and
Planning. The bent toward technocrats continued in
1984, when Col. Amadou Diarra became Minister of
State for Planning and Djbril Diallo became Minister
of State for Industrial Development and Tourism. We
believe that their appointments reflect the ascension
to power of moderates and indicate the government's
continuing disillusionment with the socialist modeL~
Warming Relations With France and the United
States. Franco-Malian relations have improved, as
demonstrated by Traore's state visit to France in
1982, his first since coming to power, and Mali's
rejoining the African franc zone two years later.
According to the US Embassy, France's refusal in
1980 to continue to support the Malian franc outside
the framework of the African franc zone-as it had
since 1962-was a major impetus for the Traore
government to turn to the IMF and to embark on
economic reform. Paris is Mali's main bilateral aid
donor-providing at least $40 million annually,
according to Embassy reporting-as well as its main
trading partner. However, French investment has
been insignificant, although French private capital
can be found in most new investments. While the
government is encouraging the development of the
private sector, an inadequate banking system, a
shortage of entrepreneurial ability, and geographical
isolation hinder further French and Western
investment.
According to US Embassy reporting, Bamako would
like to increase its arms acquisitions from France.
a i opes rance wi
extend credit for military purchases. According to one
US Embassy report, the French Ambassador said
Paris hopes to replace the Soviets as the principal
source of Malian military equipment. Paris intends to
demand cash for future arms sales, however, and any
transactions depend upon Mali's ability to arrange
third-party financing. In our estimation, Mali will
most likely look to conservative Persian Gulf states for
such financing and may expect Saudi Arabia in
particular to help it ease away from the Soviet Union.
France maintains a military attache in Bamako and
provides approximately $1 million in annual military
aid, making Paris a distant second to the USSR in
this area. Only small numbers of Malian soldiers train
in France
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US-Malian relations are cordial, with no outstanding
problems. According to US Embassy reporting,
Bamako has expressed considerable satisfaction with
the USAID program and US emergency food
assistance. We believe Bamako will look to the United
States for continued food aid as its drought and
agricultural shortfalls continue. The United States
has a small military training program with Bamako,
and some 10 Malian military personnel were trained
in the United States in 1983.
Cooler Relations With the USSR. Although Malian-
Soviet relations appear outwardly correct, the US
Embassy reports that their political ties have cooled
over the last four years and that private tensions
continue. Despite Traore's recent travels to the West,
including West Berlin in the face of Soviet pressure,
he still has not scheduled an official visit to the USSR
in response to a longstanding invitation.
The Embassy
reports that the official press has criticized the Soviet
treatment of Malian students in Moscow.
Mali also is irritated with the Soviets' 20-year-old
gold mining operation at Kalana, whose production is
unprofitably low from Mali's perspective.
the Soviets have been
smuggling gold out of the mines for several years; the
Malian Government discovered illegal gold shipments
in 1967, 1974, and 1981
Pace of Change: Determining Factors
Political. In our view, the trend toward greater
pragmatism in Mali is heavily dependent on the
continued ascendancy of President Traore and his key
supporters. We agree with the US Embassy that,
although Traore has experienced some shaky periods
in his 16 years in power, he appears to be fully in
control for now and faces no immediate threat. Trade
unionists and students, the principal urban elements
displeased with the belt-tightening associated with
economic reform, lack the resources and unity to
challenge the government. We are unaware of any
significant faction of pro-Soviet officials in influential
military or government positions who oppose the trend
toward economic liberalization and closer ties with
the West. We further believe that Traore's consensus
style of government offers at best limited
opportunities for radicals to influence directly the
decisionmaking process.
The pace of change depends in no little part, in our
view, on whether Traore can continue to reconcile
future differences between civilian and military 25X1
officials within the government. We believe that,
although moderates currently dominate the
decisionmaking process, Traore still will face some
pressure from those lower-ranking military officers
and bureaucrats-including holdovers from the Keita
era-who have a vested interest in the parastatal
system. The role of junior officers trained in the
Soviet Union remains the biggest question, in our
view. Some may adhere to socialist, if not to Soviet
ideals, and may see their opportunities for self-
advancement and personal gain curtailed by Traore's
efforts to give his regime a civilian cast. While US
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Embassy reporting consistently suggests that Maligns
trained in the USSR return home disillusioned, we
cannot dismiss the possibility that at least some of 25X1
them are committed to following Soviet economic and
political models.
Economic. We agree with the US Embassy's
judgment that the process of policy reform is made
more difficult as the economy continues to deteriorate
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and resources shrink under the weight of drought and 25X1
the legacy of socialist inefficiency. Traore has and, in
our view, likely will continue to proceed very
cautiously with dismantling parastatals to avoid 25X1
increasing social stresses and alienating key interest
groups. The state sector is Mali's largest employer
and traditionally has absorbed some 90 percent of
university graduates. Yet, public salaries consume
about 80 percent of the budget and must be cut.
The regime has taken some modest steps to reduce
public-sector employment, but the need to find
alternative sources of work is one of Traore's biggest
challenges. In early 1984, as part of an IMF-designed
reduction of the state sector, the US Embassy
reported the government laid off approximately 1,000
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workers, only to grant a 10-percent wage hike to
remaining public-sector employees a few months later
to help them make ends meet. The regime has
introduced a civil service examination for university
graduates, instead of hiring them automatically, as in
the past. Moreover, graduates are being encouraged
to seek employment in the private sector. This sector,
offers scant opportunity, and we believe the swelling
population will once again place pressure on the
government to absorb workers into the state system.
In addition, the contracting economies of Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, and Libya-traditional sources of unskilled
and semiskilled jobs for more than half a million
Malians-are causing many nationals to return home.
The West. In our judgment, the extent of future
Western support for Mali's economic reforms will be
an important element in determining the degree to
which the country is willing to turn further away from
socialist policies and its traditional ties to the Soviets.
In our view, much depends on France as the principal
Western actor in Mali. US Embassy reporting
suggests that Mali probably cannot expect significant
increases in French economic aid and investment in
the near term, in part because of the limits imposed
by France's own depressed economy. Moreover,
Embassy reporting indicates that French assistance
for the deteriorating economies of Ivory Coast and
Senegal takes priority over Mali, where France has
fewer real interests.
The Soviets. We believe, on the basis of the USSR's
past record in the area, that it will seek to limit Mali's
Westward move and try to exercise influence by
cultivating pro-Soviet sympathizers. Moscow's
position as the principal supplier of military
equipment and training to the Malian armed forces
remains a constant. So will Soviet efforts to cultivate
Mali's security officials, party cadres, and university
students through training in the USSR and through
Soviet personnel stationed in Mali.
As the Traore government has improved relations
with the West and moved to liberalize the economy,
the Soviets have sought from time to time to stir up
antiregime sentiment. In 1981, for example, Mali
expelled a Soviet military attache on charges of
having been in contact with coup plotters. Suspicion
of Moscow's complicity was heightened when the
government presented evidence of Soviet incitement
of dissident students two years earlier and of Soviet
funding for antigovernment propaganda. Malian
officials believed the Soviets hoped to destabilize Mali
so it would look unattractive to prospective Western
investors. Malian perceptions of further signs of
Soviet subversion appeared in 1984 when two Soviet
diplomats on home leave were asked not to return to
Mali. According to the US Embassy, Mali accused
the diplomats of trying to incite students at a
teacher's college in Bamako.
The Libyans. We believe that Tripoli's ambitions in
West Africa are another factor that may weigh on the
Traore government as it calculates how much
movement toward the West is politically expedient.
While there is no evidence that the Libyans are
actively proselytizing Malians or that Tripoli is
subverting the Traore regime, we believe Libya may
seek to undermine France's position in Mali if
Bamako's Westward shift goes too far in Tripoli's
view. Although Chad, Sudan, and Niger are the
priority targets for Libyan subversion, according to
Embassy reporting, Tripoli in recent years has sought
sporadically to stir opposition to the Bamako
Government by Mali's Tuareg peoples. We further
believe that Tripoli may recruit sympathizers from
the thousands of Malians who work in Libya. In our
view, Libya's support for radical coups in the region
have not gone unnoticed by Bamako, which probably
will try to stay on good terms with the Libyans and
the Soviets.
Outlook
Traore Holds on. In our view, the most likely scenario
is for Traore to stay in power, but under slowly
mounting pressure and facing tougher choices. He has
maintained the support of the armed forces and has
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successfully managed the process of giving his regime
a more civilian cast. We believe that so long as Traore
remains in power, present trends will continue-
experimentation with economic reform, closer ties
with the West, cooler relations with the Soviets, and a
samewhat more balanced foreign policy. ?n balance,
however, Mali's Westward trend has been modest so
far and we believe it will advance slowly.~~
In our judgment, Malians at this point still seem
willing to give Traore the benefit of the doubt as he
pursues IMF-designed austerity programs. Despite
IMF optimism, however, the economy continues to
deteriorate, particularly because of severe drought. If
noticeable improvements are not publicly evident in
the not-too-distant future, we believe Traore is likely
to come under increasing pressure to modify his
reformist tact. If economic and drought challenges go
unmet, Traore's support probably will ebb and the
possibility of a successful coup or assassination will
grow
Our analysis suggests that continued Western
economic and food aid will be critical to Mali's
gradual Westward shift. But, in the absence of
significant Western military help with Mali as well,
we believe the Soviets will retain important leverage
because of Bamako's unpaid arms debt and general
military dependence on Moscow. As a result, we
expect the Traore government will try to steer a
careful path between East and West, with no
dramatic lessening of Soviet influence or abrupt shift
to the West in Mali's votes in international forums
Soviets for arms, which we believe would argue for
continued pragmatic dealings with both East and
West
We cannot rule out the possibility of a junior officers'
coup that might create a situation affording
opportunities for exploitation by the Soviets or the
Libyans. Such a scenario would be more likely if
inexperienced and ill-educated junior officers
assumed power and tried to emulate the nationalist
revolutions in neighboring Burkina or Ghana, even
though a Yraajority of IVialians do not appear to wish to
see a return to the ICeita-style radicalism of the early
1960s. A radical coup would hinder US efforts to
promote economic reform in the region-as other
regimes would fear implementing austerity
programs-and could give Moscow a psychological
victory. Libya might also gain a foothold for meddling
in the area
On balance, however, we believe a junior officer
regime would face the same serious economic
problems as the present government and find it
necessary to cooperate uneasily with the West to
assure continued economic aid. As a result, we expect
the new government would try to hide its radical
intentions and play down its connections with the
Soviets or the Libyans
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.Palace Coup. Less likely, in our view, is a palace coup
that probably would be motivated by discontent with
Traore's failure to cope effectively with worsening
economic and drought problems. Such a coup would
not necessarily represent a rejection of Mali's
Westward shift, although the process could be slowed
or altered in ways we cannot now foresee. Most of
Traore's key colleagues who might be involved in a
palace coup appear to us to be moderates, although
pro-Soviet officers might acquire some greater
influence. In any case, a new senior military
government would continue to be dependent on the
West for economic aid and food assistance and on the
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~es;rei
Cape Verde. I)r~ftan~
Westward t
Despite their country's socialist heritage and military
dependence on the Soviets, Cape Verdean leaders
have proved quite pragmatic in their foreign palicy.
While maintaining close ties with Communist
countries and voting against the West in international
forums, the US Embassy reports that Praia's relations
with Portugal-its former master-and the United
States have warmed considerably in recent years. We
believe Cape Verde's modest Westward movement
reflects an increasing awareness by government and
party officials that Western aid and investment is
crucial to staving off economic ruin. The country's
extreme poverty and complete dependence on foreign
assistance, however, render it vulnerable to external
pressures and enticements, in our judgment. Praia's
flexibility could lead it to move closer to or further
from the West, in our view, depending on calculations
of what is required for political and eoonomic survival.
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Background
The impoverished Cape Verde islands, located 400
miles off the west coast of Africa, achieved
independence peacefully in 1975 under President
Aristides Pereira following a coup in Portugal that
ended 500 years of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.
Pereira was a cofounder of aSoviet-backed, anti-
Portuguese movement (the African Party for the
Independence of Cauinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) that
fought a successful guerrilla war in mainland Guinea-
Bissau and helped inspire Portugal's 1974 coup.
Pereira's goal after independence, according to US
Embassy reporting from that period, was to see Cape
Verde federated with Guinea-Bissau as one state.
common outline suggested by State Department's Africa Policy
Bureau. The issues addressed are the country's Soviet connection;
recent signs of Westward movement; reasons for moderation;
leeway for further movement; and prospects for reduction in Soviet
influence, for economic liberalization, and for a more balanced;
After a coup in 1980, however, Bissau rejected
federation, and the Cape Verdean wing of the
independence movement was reborn as the African
Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV).
Pereira came to power committed to a socialist
ideology and to governing through aSoviet-style
political system. Soon after independence, the Soviets
became the new government's principal military
supplier. Although ostensibly nonaligned, Praia-
along with the other newly independent Portuguese-
speaking countries-associated itself with Africa's
"progressive" camp. Despite its leftist credentials,
however, Cape Verde has received almost all its 25X1
economic assistance and humanitarian aid from the
West, according to the Embassy.
The Soviet Connection
Although Cape Verde is dependent on the Soviet
Union for the bulk of its military needs-including 15
Soviet advisers and technicians, the US Embassy
reports that the Pereira government has consistently
refused repeated Soviet requests for a naval base and
military air transit rights. From the perspectives of
both the USSR and the West, Cape Verde's major
attraction is its strategic location. The 10 islands that
form the republic cover a 300-kilometer horseshoe off
West Africa. The islands are astride the primary sea
lanes between Europe and the Indian Ocean/Persian
Gulf area. Military access to Cape Verde's main port
and airfield would expand Soviet ability to monitor
approaches to the Mediterranean and Western naval 25X1
forces operating in the central Atlantic. At present,
Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft staging
from Angola can effectively monitor only the South 25X1
Atlantic and the area off South Africa's Cape of
The US Embassy reports that Cape Verde allows
Soviet, Cuban, and South African civil aircraft to
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land and refuel at its international airport. Under the
terms of a 1975 civil air agreement, Cuban troops in
civilian dress are allowed to transit Cape Verde en
route to and from Angola. According to the Embassy,
the Pereira government also allows both Soviet and
Western naval vessels to make periodic port visits.
Apart from gaining access, the US Embassy reports
that the Soviets want Cape Verde to maintain its
position as a socialist state and to support Soviet
positions in international forums. The Embassy
reported in 1983 that 110 Cape Verdean civilians
were receiving technical training in the USSR.
Returning trainees from Moscow increasingly occupy
positions of authority.
Pragmatism Toward the West
Right from independence, according to US Embassy
reporting, the Cape Verdean Government has proved
more pragmatic than might have been expected from
the radical background of its leaders and their often
fiery rhetoric. We agree with the Embassy that the
leadership has become even less doctrinaire in recent
years. We believe this moderation reflects the
generally conservative nature of the population and an
increasing awareness by the PAICV that the West is
the country's most reliable source of assistance. While
maintaining outwardly friendly ties with Communist
countries and engaging in militant posturing against
the West in international forums, the Embassy reports
that Cape Verde desires relations with all friendly
states willing to provide essential economic aid.
According to the US Embassy, Soviet reticence to
provide economic development assistance has not gone
unnoticed by Praia. We believe Pereira's recent
chairmanship of an international committee on
drought control in the Sahel gave him further
opportunity to appreciate the relative importance of
Western-versus-Communist economic assistance.
Moreover, the Embassy points out that the Cape
Verdeans are unhappy over obsolete Communist-
supplied military equipment provided at excessive
prices, racist behavior by Soviet advisers, and poor
technical and military training
The US Embassy reports that Cape Verde suffers
from chronic drought, an absence of significant raw
materials, overpopulation, and a 40-percent rate of
Cape Verde: Selected Financial
Indicators
Exports (f.o.b.) ____
3.0
4.1
9.1
6.1
Imports (f.o.b.)
57.5
71.1
81.4
86.1
Trade balance
-54.5
-66.9
-72.3
-79.9
Current account
balance _
-29.5
-37.5
-25.1
-42.4
Gross foreign reserves
37.8
41.5
43.2
38.6
Disbursed debt
outstanding
15.9
_
_
16.8
20.4
_
39.4
Percent
Real GAP_growth
9.7
3.1
0.6
4.9
Inflation
13.3
6.9
14.6
11.5
unemployment. About one-third of the country's
315,000 people depend on subsistence farming for a
living, but drought from 1969 to the present has
devastated agriculture. The government is the largest
employer, and, with agricultural production stagnant,
rural employment is dependent on public works
projects underwritten by foreign aid programs.
Earnings from principal exports-bananas, lobsters,
and salt-covered only 4.3 percent of import costs in
1981, according to one recent academic study. The
US Embassy reports that the value of imports in 1982
exceeded exports by a ratio of 40 to 1. We believe
Cape Verde's traditional negative trade balance may
be worsening.
According to the US Embassy, two-thirds of Cape
Verde's GNP comes from foreign aid and remittances
from 300,000 Cape Verdeans living abroad, mostly in
the United States. Some $20 million in remittances is
received annually from the United States. Although
emigration and international food aid has prevented
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mass starvation, the Embassy reports that
international loans have not been sufficient to allow
the government to implement its fairly realistic first
development plan intended to cover the period
1982-85.
Signs of Change
Pragmatic Socialism. Four years ago, the US
Embassy reported that Pereira purged the Cabinet of
most pro-Soviet radicals-who had argued for a
closer orientation of Cape Verde's policies toward the
East-and that he consolidated control of his
moderate leftist faction over the party and
government. According to the Embassy, some
remaining pro-Soviet individuals have shifted in
recent years to a more pragmatic line, supporting
diversification of the country's sources of economic
and military assistance. These developments have
paved the way for subsequent modest efforts by
Pereira to liberalize the country's Marxist orientation.
The US Embassy reported that resolutions adopted by
the last party congress in mid-1983 were remarkable
for their pragmatism and did not directly mention
"socialism," while recognizing the "necessity of
private enterprise within the primacy of the public
sector." The regime has held back from instituting
radical reform of the preindependence landholding
system at the expense of the wealthy. Instead,
according to the Embassy, Pereira has distributed
small parcels of land to farmers on a very limited
scale. We believe that Pereira's behind-the-scenes role
since the late 1970s in hosting periodic talks on a
Namibian settlement is indicative in part of his efforts
to project a more balanced foreign policy.
Cdoser Ties With the West. Relations with Portugal,
Cape Verde's principal trading partner, and the
United States have warmed considerably in recent
years, according to US Embassy reporting. Cape
Verde's first two ambassadors were assigned to
Lisbon and Washington. By 1980, Portugal provided
Cape Verde with over $5 million for construction
projects, university scholarships, and transportation
improvements, in addition to over 50 technical
advisers. Pereira visited Lisbon in 1981 to repay a
visit to Praia the year before by President Eanes.
Pereira's trip resulted in promises of additional
Presidene Pereira meeting with President
Reagan, September 19~3~~
technical assistance and a number of fishing
agreements. The Embassy reports that Pereira also
signed a military training agreement, ending Cape 25X1
Verde's policy of accepting military assistance
exclusively from Soviet bloc countries.
Symbolic visits and modest economic assistance have
strengthened US relations with Cape Verde. The US
Embassy reports that ties were boosted in 1982 by two
visits to the islands by Vice President Bush and
reinforced by Pereira's visit to the White House the
following year. Many Cape Verdeans feel a bond with
the United States through relatives or friends there.
The US Embassy reports that US private investment
in Cape Verde is minimal and that US assistance in
1982 amounted to about $2 million, a reduction from 25X1
the previous year's level of $3 million. The assistance
includes athree-year PL-480 program that provides
about 15,000 tons of corn annually, agricultural
research assistance, and a modest military
educational training program. Nonetheless, the
Embassy reports that even this comparatively small
amount of aid, coupled with emergency disaster
assistance last year, has contributed to Cape Verde's
appreciation of the value of closer ties with the West.
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More Distance in Soviet Relations. The Pereira
government has taken some modest gestures in recent
years to demonstrate unhappiness with the lack of
greater support from the Soviets. According to the US
Embassy, Pereira has no plans in the near term to
visit the USSR to counterbalance recent trips to
Western countries, including a visit to France in 1984.
The Embassy also reports that Pereira has loosened
the rulin arty's ties with the Soviet Communist
Party
In the military sphere, the Embassy reports that the
PAICV decided in closed session early last year to
take further steps to lessen reliance on the USSR for
military assistance. According to the Embassy, Cape
Verde is trying to reach agreement with Moscow for
the return of two AN-26 transport aircraft and two
patrol craft because of their high operational and
maintenance costs. Partly to keep an eye on Soviet
fishing and naval activities,
How Far C'an Praia Go?
Domestic Considerations. h'rom our perspective,
Pereira appears to be strong enough for the near term
to pursue closer ties with the West. His country's need
for substantial international economic assistance will
not diminish any time soon and will continue to
motivate Pereira to cooperate with the West. In our
view, he faces no serious political challenges, despite
the country's economic plight. The steady exodus
abroad of the more disgruntled Cape Verdeans has
been one important safety valve. We also believe that
Pereira's considerable domestic prestige-magnified
by his role as facilitator for Angolan-South African
talks-has kept in check the influence of remaining
radicals who favor closer ties to the Soviet Bloc.
Moreover, Pereira's hand is strengthened by his close
links with the leadership of the country's 2,200-man
Army, dating from the independence struggle against
the Portuguese.
External Constraints. Despite his dominant position
in the country's hierarchy, Pereira is well aware of
external constraints on his freedom to maneuver. US
Embassy reporting suggests that Western donor
interest in Cape Verde is slight and is largely an
outgrowth of humanitarian concern and a desire to
deny the Soviets access. Portugal, traditionally the
principal Western actor in Cape Verde, is in no
economic position to shoulder the burden of financial
and military aid that would be required to wean the
country completely away from Moscow.
transit Cape Verde en route to Nicaragua.
In our view, Pereira probably believes that he cannot
afford to risk jeopardizing the Army's Soviet arms
supply and provoking a leftist move against him by
being more evenhanded in international forums. US
Embassy reporting suggests that Pereira continues to
closely monitor pro-Soviet elements out of concern
that Moscow may try to protect its privileged position
in Cape Verde by backing the leftist faction.
Additionally, we believe Pereira feels he must cast a
wary eye on Libya, as one of the Soviets' closest allies
in Africa. The Embassy reports that Pereira fears the
possibility of Libyan subversion in retaliation for his
continued refusal to allow Libyan arms flights to
Outlook
Our analysis suggests that most PAICV leaders on
balance appear willing to deemphasize ideology, doing
what they must to ensure their country's national
security and to prevent its economic collapse. We
believe that the most likely near-term outlook for
Cape Verde, so long as Pereira remains in power, is
for the government to continue its pragmatic brand of
nonalignment. In our judgment, this will include
increased efforts to cultivate the West for desperately
needed food and financial assistance along with a
continued reluctant dependence on the Soviets for
most arms and an unwillingness to give serious offense
to Moscow in international forums. Despite Praia's
recent profession of greater understanding of US
positions, we doubt that the government will make
more than marginal improvements in its UN voting
record and speeches on international issues of interest
to the United States.
In our view, however, Cape Verde's extreme poverty
and complete dependence on foreign assistance render
it vulnerable to external pressures and enticements.
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We believe some potential leaders would like to
change the country's policies in order to solve its
problems. For these reasons, the ideology of the Cape
Verdean leadership-which still has shallow roots-
cannot be considered immutable
From our perspective, Cape Verde could follow the
wishes of a radical minority and move left toward
more tangible cooperation with the Soviet Union. It
also could move more markedly toward the United
States and the West, clearly pleasing a substantial
body of Cape Verde's population. Such changes, in
our estimation, could result from a palace coup or a
military takeover by factions representing a different
mix of power between the country's relative
pragmatists and its more radical elements, who would
join forces out of a conviction that Pereira's policies
were inadequate.
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Africa
Briefs
Black labor union officials are threatening a national strike by up to 1 million
workers over a dispute with the government-owned synthetic fuel company,
according to press and Embassy reports. The company fired 90 percent of its black
workers-some 5,000-for joining atwo-day general strike last November. The
company has reinstated more than 1,500 of the workers and has promised to
consider rehiring another 2,500, but union leaders demand 95-percent
reinstatement. We believe that company and union representatives are likely to
reach a compromise before the end of the 30-day conciliation period required prior
to a legal strike.
Botswana Devalued Currency
Botswana has announced a 15-percent devaluation to maintain parity with the
declining South African rand. Even though Gaborone pegs the value of the Pula to
a weighted average of several major currencies, it is most concerned about the
ratio with the South African rand. Economic authorities in Botswana have feared
that a strong Pula would make Botswana's manufactured exports less competitive
in South Africa. The Pula was devalued 5 percent last July, but since then the rand
has fallen by 30 percent relative to the dollar.
21 Secret
ALA AR 85-003
25 January 1985
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