AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200870001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 28, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
28 December 1984
ALA AR 84-020
28 December 1984
Copv349
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Africa Review
Articles Zimbabwe: Increasing Political Violence
Page
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Prime Minister Mugabe's commitment to a one-party state and his
efforts to achieve a resounding victory in national elections
scheduled for early 1985 have contributed to a new wave of political
violence aimed at intimidating opposition parties.
Zaire: Relations With France and Belgium I 7 25X1
Brussels and Paris have strong cultural and historical ties to Zaire,
and commercial and mining interests remain the driving force in
their relationship with President Mobutu's government.
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West Africa: ECOWAS Struggles To Survive I 11 25X1
The latest meeting of the Economic Community of West African
States produced few concrete results, suggesting that the goal of
economic integration in the region is at best a distant dream.
Mozambique: Turning West, South, and East I 15 25X1
To broaden its international economic ties, Mozambique recently
signed the Lome Convention, reached an agreement with South
Africa on fishing, and accepted an offer from the USSR on oil
supplies.
Tanzania: Nyerere's Image Fading
President Nyerere has suffered setbacks in recent international
forums that have tarnished his political image and weakened his
credibility as a leading spokesman for African concerns.
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Brief South Africa: Extending the UN Arms Embargo
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Secret 1i
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Zimbabwe:
Increasing Political Violence
Leaders of both the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) have intensified their rhetoric and-
either directly or indirectly-incited violence against
opponents in preparation for national elections
scheduled for early 1985. Prime Minister Mugabe's
commitment to a one-party state and his efforts to
achieve a resounding electoral victory for ZANU
have contributed to a new wave of political violence
aimed at intimidating opposition parties. In our view,
this violence will intensify as the election approaches
and as the government continues to crack down on its
opponents. The government may implement new
security measures in Matabeleland and Midlands
Provinces to discourage voting for opposition
The violence is part of a cycle that began in February
1982 when Mugabe expelled ZAPU leader Joshua
Nkomo from the cabinet. The most recent round of
violence was touched off by the murder on 9
November of Moven Ndlovu, a member of the
ZANU central committee and the Zimbabwean
Senate.
Hardening Positions
Prior to Ndlovu's murder, Mugabe appeared
genuinely interested in holding free and fair elections.
He declared that those responsible for the violence
must be punished regardless of their party affiliation.
Mugabe tried to restrain ZANU zealots who were
advocating a harder line against Nkomo and his
party, according to US Embassy reporting.
The killing of Ndlovu and the subsequent upheaval
apparently moved Mugabe and other ZANU
moderates closer to those who are pushing for
heavyhanded treatment of ZAPU. Since the killing,
Mugabe has dismissed two ZAPU cabinet ministers,
publicly declared ZAPU the enemy, and announced
that the "time has come for us to show this evil party
Mugabe and Deputy Prime Minister
Muzenda are considering the arrest of virtually the
entire ZAPU leadership except Nkomo as a means of
keeping ZAPU off balance before the elections.
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At the funeral of Ndlovu, ZANU central committee
member Ernest Kadungure vowed that for every party 25X1
official killed by dissidents three ZAPU members 25X1
Minister of State Security Mnangagwa said ~ 25X1
that the elections would not be free and fair because
ZANU proposes to win them and will take the
necessary measures to do so,
Mnangagwa evidently believes the time has come to
teach ZAPU a lesson. He said last month that the
government would counter any threat to public
security by ordering the ZANU youth league to
retaliate against ZAPU-inspired violence. During the
summer, ZANU youth gangs destroyed ZAPU offices
and injured scores of opposition supporters in
Midlands Province following allegations of ZAPU
assistance to dissidents operating in the region.
Virtually the entire ZANU leadership condones the
youth wing's actions
These party leaders merely want the youth
brigades not to appear as an organized arm of the
party when engaging in acts of violence.
Secret
ALA AR 84-020
28 December 1984
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Incidents of Interparty Violence
Botswana
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Senator Ndlovu was shot by unknown assailants at
his home in the southern city of Beitbridge on 9
November. The ensuing violence between ZANU and
ZAPU supporters left one person dead and 184
injured. To date, no one has been charged with the
~
killing
Several theories have emerged as to the motive
behind the assassination. Press reports initially
blamed "dissidents"for the murder, and this is the
official government version. According to this theory,
Ndlovu's death was part of a continuing campaign by
ZAPU-supported dissidents to kill ZANU officials in
Matabeleland and Midlands. Twelve ZANU officials
have been killed by dissidents this year.
The US Embassy reports that, while there is no hard
evidence as to who the culprits involved are, rumors
are circulating that the death was part of an internal
ZANUpolitical struggle. ZANU's Deputy Chairman
for Matabeleland South-often characterized as
ruthless-was reported to have had a falling out with
Ndlovu. The Deputy Chairman was apparently angry
over what he viewed as Ndlovu's inability to wage a
credible challenge to ZAPU in the Beitbridge district
council elections. According to the rumors, the
Deputy Chairman publicly declared that the senator-
must be removed.
Another version sees the death as a product of
ZANU-ZAPU tensions over district elections in
which ZANU won some seats that ZAPUfeels it
should have taken, according to Embassy reporting.
ZANU apparently used "heavyhanded" tactics, and
there was considerable ill will between the parties.
Given these circumstances, it is possible that ZAPU
zealots took matters into their own hands and killed
Ndlovu. Some senior ZAPU leaders, including
former cabinet member Cephas Msipa, have been
implicated, but most observers-including the
Embassy-discount these charges as nothing more
Cowing the Opposition
Some Embassy sources report that more than 90
percent of the violence is instigated by local ZANU
officials.
Deputy 1rime Minister Muzenda believes the
interparty violence around Gweru in October was
instigated primarily by ZANU's provincial governor
for Midlands. The governor of Matabeleland South,
also a ZANU official, has been accused of inciting
party militants into violent confrontations with ZAPU
members.
The police appear unable or unwilling to contain the
violence and are attempting to steer clear of
interparty clashes. The head of the police, Minister of
Home Affairs Mubako claims he cannot act because
his hands are tied, according to Embassy reporting.
The Embassy expects Harare to make use of
emergency powers ' to detain minority party members
who are troublesome, in the government's eyes. On 26
November ZAPU's treasurer, Kenneth Mano, was
arrested, presumably for telling party supporters to
retaliate if ZANU attacks them. One well-placed
Embassy source reports Mugabe personally ordered
the arrest of Mano after a heated cabinet debate on
the subject, A large number of ZAPU officials and
supporters are still detained in Beitbridge. In
Masvingo, up to 50 supporters of Sithole's breakaway
ZANU faction are being held following clashes with
progovernment ZANU youth, according to Embassy
reporting.
Government officials harassed minority party
candidates-especially from ZAPU-during local
elections in Matabeleland. The Embassy reports that
"election by sight" 2 and the presence of security
'The emergency power regulations that Zimbabwe inherited from
the former Rhodesian regime and has renewed every six months
since independence confer extensive authority on the Home Affairs
Minister and police, allowing them to override several
constitutional guarantees to maintain security.
Election by sight is a process where voters physically line up
behind the candidate of their choice rather than submit a secret
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forces at polling places have been used to intimidate
ZAPU in its traditional areas of support. ZANU
officials in Matabeleland have voided election results
favorable to ZAPU rather than accept defeat at the
polls, according to Embassy reporting. There also
have been accounts of assaults on ZAPU candidates,
detention of opposition members by police, and the
use of legal technicalities to prevent ZAPU members
from running for office.
In late October, Minister of Information Shamuyarira
announced the government soon would begin a mopup
operation against dissidents in Matabeleland.
Embassy sources in Bulawayo believe a curfew will
soon be imposed, or at the very least the number of
troops in the area will increase markedly before the
elections. Widespread hoarding of maize meal already
has begun in anticipation of a curfew, according to
these same sources. Mugabe recently accused ZAPU
of promoting anarchy through the use of the
dissidents, claimed minority parties are importing
guns into the country to assassinate ZANU leaders,
and warned that a curfew might be imposed again in
Matabeleland. In addition, the military may be
readying itself for some type of action before the
draft of the Prime Minister's New Year's message to
the defense forces includes a reference to "vigilance
and preparedness, especially during the runup to the
general elections as disruptive elements are even now
at work."
New public pronouncements linking the ZAPU
leadership to the dissidents clearly represent an
attempt to discredit ZAPU. Even former ZANU
party moderates are beginning to see the dissidents as
an organized political tool of ZAPU operating under
the direction of Nkomo, according to Embassy
reporting. Differing sharply from the official
government view,
believes that the dissidents now
operating in Matabeleland are younger and more
militant members of ZAPU, but they are not
necessarily operating under Nkomo's direction.
are concerned over the vocal anti-ZANU opposition
and fear the minority parties may not be as
disorganized and fragmented as senior party officials
once thought. In October, Mugabe described as an
"unholy alliance" the united front of opposition
parties advocated by Nkomo, and said the effort was
doomed to failure.
Following the ZAPU party congress in October,
Nkomo's party appears to be reenergized, and
meetings in its strongholds appear to be well attended,
despite the presence of security forces and ZANU
youth brigades. The US Embassy reports the ruling
party is increasingly frustrated and defensive in the
face of this opposition. In addition to ZAPU, both the
United African National Council of former Prime
Minister Bishop Muzorewa and the Sithole faction
have been trying to mobilize their supporters.
Muzorewa's party has held numerous enthusiastic
rallies and large-scale fundraisers in Bulawayo and
Harare, despite ZANU attempts to disrupt these
meetings,
Muzorewa recently blamed Mugabe for the
heightened tensions and said, "if ZANU wins, the
rule of intimidation, unfairness, and violence will have
carried the day."
has expanded its activities
somewhat in the past few months in the eastern part
of the country, although its meetings appear to be
sparsely attended. Sithole recently told US officials
that his supporters are prepared to strike back if
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intimidated by ZANU. Sithole, who is in self-imposed
exile in London, has attempted to run the party from
abroad but has been unsuccessful in mustering any
substantial degree of popular support.
Outlook
If the political violence escalates, we believe Mugabe
may find himself under growing pressure to arrest
Nkomo and ban ZAPU from participating in the
elections. Mugabe would like to arrest Nkomo,
but party
moderates have counseled against doing so. They cite
the potential for domestic unrest that such an action
might bring, as well as the adverse international
publicity the move would generate.
Muzenda said in
mid-November that there are no plans to outlaw
ZAPU-at least until after the elections.
In our judgment, interparty violence will intensify.
The death of another senior ZANU official probably
would trigger a more intense government crackdown
against ZAPU and other opposition parties. Mugabe
probably would be forced by party militants to
retaliate by ordering Nkomo's arrest.
We believe the government gradually has been
building a case for the imposition of some type of
curfew or antidissident campaign in Matabeleland or
Midlands prior to the elections. Harare probably will
claim additional security measures are necessary to
prevent dissidents from disrupting the voting, and the
Army undoubtedly will be used to intimidate the
populace from supporting opposition candidates.
While the opposition parties are unlikely to threaten
ZANU's hold on power, ZAPU victories in
Matabeleland and Midlands, coupled with other
opposition party victories, would be politically
embarrassing to the government. We believe Mugabe
and his party desire a sweeping electoral victory that
ZANU can interpret as a popular mandate for
establishing a one-party state. Anything less could be
seen as a setback for ZANU.
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Zaire: Relations With
France and Belgium
President Mobutu has managed to stay in power for
19 years at least partly through effective use of his
relationship with powerful foreign backers-France,
Belgium, the United States, and to a lesser extent
Israel.' According to diplomatic and open sources, he
has convinced Zaire's major backers that his demise
would leave a dangerous political vacuum that
radicals or Communists would be eager to exploit. In
addition, he has skillfully cultivated the impression at
home and abroad that his foreign backers have
become in part responsible for solving or at least
helping to keep the lid on Zaire's major problems.
Zaire's major backers share certain broad interests in
the country: political stability, economic growth, and
a pro-Western government in Kinshasa. Brussels and
Paris have stronger cultural and historical ties to
Zaire than do Tel Aviv or Washington, however, and
strong commercial and mining interests remain the
driving force in their relationship with Mobutu,
according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.
France: Plus ca Change ...
Relations between Paris and Kinshasa are generally
very good, according to diplomatic and open sources,
although Mobutu does not have the intimate personal
and business relationship with French President
Mitterrand that he had with his predecessor, Giscard
d'Estaing. Mobutu's initial fears that a socialist
government in France would abandon him vanished
shortly after Mitterrand came to power. Mobutu's
frequent visits to Paris after the French President's
election in 1981 and Mitterrand's early commitment
to maintain aid and military assistance levels to Zaire
helped get the new relationship off to a solid start.
Successful cooperation with Mitterrand on the
Franco-African summit in Kinshasa in 1982 was
especially timely for Mobutu, according to the US
Embassy in Kinshasa. It diverted attention away from
domestic problems and helped to reverse Mobutu's
growing international isolation resulting from Zaire's
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel
several months earlier.
In our view, Paris wishes to continue its special
relationship with Kinshasa primarily to maintain its
ties to financial and business interests in Zaire.
Cultural interests also play a role. Zaire is the largest
French-speaking country in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
there are approximately 5,000 French citizens in
Zaire.
Maintenance of French support to and cooperation
with Zaire has been a central theme of Mitterrand's
African policy. French aid to Zaire is second only to
that provided by Belgium, and it continues to grow.
Paris recently agreed to a modest increase.
Over the years, Paris has been Mobutu's primary 25X1
military and political backer. Mobutu himself
recognizes this and on occasion has used this as
leverage against Belgium and the United States.
Mobutu has not forgotten the rapidity of the French
response to the uprisings in Shaba spurred by
Angolan-based Zairian dissidents in 1977 and 1978,
and he would doubtless look again to the French to
2
save his regime in the event of another rebel incursion.
At bottom, the French support Mobutu because they
25
believe he is the only individual ca able of ruling
Zaire, according to public statements by
French leaders.
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ALA AR 84-020
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French military advisers command the 31st Paratroop
Brigade and Zaire's only armored unit, which is
stationed a short distance from Kinshasa. The 31st is
responsible for the defense of the capital and would
play a key role in the event of an internal uprising.
One battalion of the 31st was sent to Chad as part of
the peacekeeping force, although the unit was not
accompanied by its French officers. A battalion of the
31st was also used to retake a small town in eastern
Shaba last month following a small-scale rebel attack.
France has approximately 125 military advisers in
Zaire.
Franco-Zairian ties have been free from the
difficulties that have periodically plagued Mobutu's
relations with Brussels. Paris has occasionally taken
steps to muzzle anti-Mobutu dissidents in France,
who are in any event much less vocal and probably
fewer in number than their counterparts in Belgium.
Earlier this year, the French removed several
dissidents from Paris who they believed were planning
to disrupt Mobutu's visit.
Although Paris did approach Mobutu in regard to the
treatment of the Zairian legislators who were
imprisoned for attempting to form a second political
party, the French generally have been reluctant to
press Mobutu for reform. They have been content to
let Washington and, to a lesser extent, Brussels take
the lead-and the backlash-from Mobutu. In the
past, Paris's apparent reluctance to coordinate
positions on foreign assistance with Zaire's other
major aid donors has allowed Mobutu to exploit the
divisions among his backers to get around their
demands for reform, in our view.
There have been some relatively minor irritants in
Franco-Zairian dealings. Mobutu occasionally
complained that France was not providing enough
support for the Zairian peacekeeping force that he
sent to Chad and that Paris has not kept him
adequately informed about French activities there.
This issue took on new significance when the French-
Libyan troop withdrawal was announced. Mobutu
was incensed because he had not been notified in
advance, and Paris had to make a special effort to
smooth relations. Moreover, during Mitterrand's
recent visit to Zaire, Mobutu expressed concern about
French acquiescence in Libya's continuing presence in
Chad. There have also been occasional problems
regarding the accountability of French military
advisers in Zaire, French dissatisfaction with Zaire's
handling of training on Mirage aircraft, and
corruption in the Zairian armed forces that hampers
the French military aid mission. Although a French
official told an officer of the US Embassy in Paris last
year that France intended to make its military mission
in Zaire secondary to its developmental and cultural
programs, Paris does not seem to have made any real
effort to deemphasize it.
Relations will probably remain close so long as the
French perceive that there is no suitable replacement
for Mobutu. For his part, Mobutu will look to Paris as
his first line of defense should he require foreign
intervention.
Belgium: Plus C'est la Meme Chose
The Belgians, like the French, have a special
relationship with Zaire, but it is more volatile,
unpredictable, unstable, and largely subject to
Mobutu's moods and whims, according to the US
Embassy in Brussels. Belgium suffers in part from the
reputation it earned as the colonial power in Zaire.
Zaire's ties with Belgium are also adversely affected
by longstanding economic and commercial problems
and by the activities in Belgium of a large and vocal
anti-Mobutu community consisting of both Zairians
and Europeans.
According to diplomatic and open sources, some of
the issues that have adversely affected relations
between Kinshasa and Brussels in recent years
include:
? The publication in 1980 of the Blumenthal Report,
a well-documented study of financial corruption in
Zaire that implicated both Zairians and Belgian
officials in illegal financial and commercial
dealings.
? Publications and speeches by former Zairian
Foreign Minister Nguza that accuse Mobutu
personally of corruption. Nguza's allegations
embarrassed both governments and angered
Mobutu.
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? Occasional criticism of the Mobutu regime by
senior Belgian officials. One episode resulted in
Mobutu's canceling an official visit last year.
Similarly, he has criticized Belgium's approach
toward Zairian dissidents while praising France's
? Threats by the Zairian-owned mining conglomerate
Gecamines to terminate its processing and
marketing arrangement with a major Belgian firm.
? Disputes over Zaire's longstanding debts to
Belgium's post and telecommunications office and
to Sabena Airlines.
? A protracted feud over the performance of Belgian
cooperants who have been working to implement
reforms in Zaire's customs office.
In Mobutu's eyes, the most serious problem between
the two countries continues to be the criticism leveled
at him by Zairian dissidents who reside in Belgium,
according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. There are
apparently over 50 anti-Mobutu groups in the
country, although most of them are small and
ineffective with no following inside Zaire. Although
members of these groups have been somewhat
successful in focusing negative attention on Kinshasa,
in our view, Mobutu's highly vocal reactions to
dissident activities have greatly exacerbated the
problem and only brought more negative attention to
Mobutu was particularly angered when a dissident
leader in Brussels claimed credit for a bombing
incident in Kinshasa last March; the bombings of the
Air Zaire office and the Zairian Embassy in Brussels
last summer further strained relations. Kinshasa
quietly expelled a Belgian consular official recently
for alleged contacts with dissidents, and it also
accused Belgium-based dissidents of instigating the
recent rebel attack in eastern Shaba.
Although Brussels generally has played an activist
role in Zaire, intervening on Mobutu's behalf with
paratroops during Shaba I and II and chairing several
international conferences to assist Zaire economically,
Belgium's efforts seldom satisfy Mobutu completely.
He criticized the Belgian military interventions in
1977 and 1978 for being slow while simultaneously
praising the rapidity of the French response.
Belgium's military aid is nevertheless important to
Mobutu. Brussels has over 100 military advisers in
Zaire, some of whom are stationed with key units
responsible for defending Shaba. The Belgians also
run three of Zaire's six major army schools and
training centers. Although the Belgian military
presence is important, Belgium-unlike France-
provides no military hardware to the Zairian armed
Many Belgians-and especially the socialists-are
opposed to their country's close ties with Zaire,
particularly the military support that Belgium
provides. Their spokesmen, both in and out of the
government, frequently attack Mobutu on human
rights issues.
In an effort to defuse some of the domestic criticism
surrounding its involvement in Zaire, the Belgian
Government devised a new African policy last year.
Generally attributed to Foreign Minister Tindemans,
the policy aimed to reduce the special significance
accorded to Belgium's former colonies and to place
them on an equal footing with other African
countries. It also promised to cut Belgian military
Mobutu correctly interpreted the proposal as a plan
specifically designed to deemphasize Zaire's
preeminent role in Belgian foreign policy, according
to the US Embassy in Brussels. One of the principal
reasons for Mobutu's trip to France and Portugal last
spring was to demonstrate his displeasure with the
new Belgian policy toward Zaire, according to
diplomatic reporting
According to the US Embassy in Brussels, the change
in policy has had no real effect on Belgian relations
with Zaire. Belgian financial and commercial
interests in Zaire and fear of being undercut by
French encroachment are probably the major factors
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that prevent Brussels from significantly altering the
relationship. Belgium plans to increase its aid to Zaire
over the next few years.
The invisible web of relationships that binds industries
and senior officials in both countries is too important
for Brussels to risk a real breach in its ties with
Mobutu, in our view. Furthermore, the approximately
16,000 Belgians resident in Zaire are hostage to
Mobutu's good will. Many thousands of jobs in
Belgium are also directly tied to Zairian minerals.
Over the past year, Zairian-Belgian relations began to
improve somewhat, although most of the basic
problems remain unresolved. Senior Belgian officials
have visited Zaire and attempted to smooth over the
issues dividing the two countries. Brussels has
attempted to mollify Mobutu by expelling dissident
Francois Lumumba, the son of the radical Congolese
leader of the early 1960s, Patrice Lumumba. The
Belgians also made an effort to ease tensions when
they rounded up and relegated to the countryside
several other Zairian dissidents who threatened to
disrupt Mobutu's visit last summer. More recently,
Brussels has responded positively to Kinshasa's
demands that security be tightened at Zairian
Mobutu's official visits to Belgium this year, the first
in five years, reflect his desire to improve bilateral
ties. Mobutu met Tindemans, Prime Minister
Martens, and King Badouin in July and the Foreign
Minister at the United Nations in September.
Belgian Prime Minister Martens praised Mobutu's
efforts at economic reform, announced modest
increases in Belgium's aid to Zaire, and pledged his
country's support for Zaire's debt rescheduling during
his visits to Kinshasa last summer and fall. According
to the US Embassy in Brussels, Martens's promises of
increased aid are, in effect, a renunciation of
Tindemans' policy. Mobutu has, therefore, been
reassured that Zaire retains a special place in Belgian
foreign policy. Tensions over dissidents and debts
apparently have also been papered over, at least for
the time being.
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We believe that Brussels will remain basically
committed to Mobutu, although Zairian-Belgian
relations will probably blow hot and cold. Belgium
would probably intervene to maintain stability in
Zaire, but the strength and rapidity of such a move
would depend on whether the threat stemmed from an
internal uprising or from abroad and on whether
white lives were in danger
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West Africa:
ECOWAS Struggles To Survive
The seventh heads of state summit of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held
in Lome, Togo, in late November, was unusually well
attended but produced few concrete results. The US
Embassy suggests that the high turnout-11 heads of
state attended-reflects a growing recognition of the
organization's weaknesses and of the region's serious
economic problems. Delegates criticized the West for
not providing enough economic aid to Africa and for
the continued high value of the dollar and high
interest rates, which increase the costs of African
imports and foreign borrowing. The only substantive
development was an agreement to establish an
ECOWAS bank to facilitate trade between member
states, although its funding remains doubtful.
The summit failed to tackle key problems such as
migration and currency convertibility, according to
the US Embassy, and it was marked by thinly veiled
criticism of Nigeria's border policy. Nigeria closed its
borders last April in an attempt to combat smuggling,
but the move has hurt trade for neighboring countries.
Nigerian Head of State Buhari has given no
indication when the borders would be reopened.
According to press reports, Guinean President Konte
warned that ECOWAS faces disintegration if
member states fail to meet their obligations. These
obligations include not only the previously agreed
upon open borders policy, but also financial
commitments. Press reports indicate that member
states have not been paying their dues on schedule.
ECOWAS groups together 16 West African states,
having an estimated population of 160 million, with
many different languages and currencies. According
to academic studies and press reports, its founding
members hoped to establish a common market and a
common tariff policy by 1989. They also hoped to
harmonize agricultural, industrial, and monetary
policies, and to promote specialization to serve each
other's needs more efficiently. Member states believed
Regional Membership
Benin + +
Burkina + +
Cape Verde +
The Gambia +
Guinea-Bissau +
Guinea +
Ivory Coast +
Liberia +
Mali +
Mauritania +
Niger +
Nigeria +
Senegal +
ECOWAS, or Economic Community of West African States, was
founded by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975.
b CEAO, or Economic Community of West Africa, was founded by
the Treaty of Abidjan in 1973.
that, by combining resources, rapid economic growth
could be promoted and new jobs would be created for
their growing populations. The Treaty of Lagos,
which created ECOWAS, also stressed the
elimination of economic disparities between member
states through various compensatory schemes.
ECOWAS was founded in 1975, but, according to 25X1
academic sources, its roots lay in Nigeria's emergent
regional role in the early 1970s. Following the end of
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its civil war, Nigeria launched a diplomatic campaign
to establish its preeminence in the region and to
undermine the influence of the French, who supported
the unsuccessful Biafran secessionists. The French-
speaking states of Niger, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali,
Mauritania, and Burkina already had formed their
own Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) in
1973 with French support. Benin and Guinea, two
other francophone states, declined at the time to join
CEAO out of fear that their close trade ties with
Nigeria would be jeopardized. Nigerian diplomacy
successfully allayed francophone African fears,
however, so that, when ECOWAS was formed,
members of the smaller French-speaking community
also joined. The first four years of ECOWAS were
devoted largely to institution building and staffing.
More recent efforts have focused on trying to
institutionalize the principle of the free movement of
people, which has been hampered by Nigeria's foot-
dragging.
The Challenge of Migration
Guinean President Konte's criticism of Nigerian
policy reflects the increasing irritation of states which
view Nigeria as an outlet for their surplus workers
and goods. At the 1979 heads of state summit,
members approved a protocol that called for
implementing, over a span of 15 years, procedures to
allow free entry without a visa for 90 days; the right
of residence for any length without a visa; and the
right of community citizens to open a business in a
member country.
ECOWAS has yet to reconcile this liberalization of
migration policy with national interests. The protocol
was based on the assumption that new jobs would be
created as economic integration advanced. ECOWAS
recognizes the right of member states to enforce
migration laws, yet the protocol, unless revised,
suggests there must be completely free movement of
community citizens by the early 1990s. We do not
believe Nigeria will allow open borders, and, as a
result, the migration issue may pose a serious threat to
ECOWAS's survival.
At the time of the protocol's establishment, Nigeria's
oil boom facilitated migration from surrounding
states. Since then, however, the world recession and
the fall in international oil prices have caused an
unprecedented economic crisis in Nigeria and anger
against illegal aliens. According to press reports,
Nigeria's expulsion of up to 2 million foreign Africans
in 1983 outraged other African states, although they
recognized Lagos had the right to enforce its
immigration laws.
Demographers estimate Nigeria's population will
grow from 88 million to at least 150 million by the
year 2000. As a result, the country's ability to absorb
surplus labor from ECOWAS countries will be
sharply curtailed, worsening already chronic
underemployment and unemployment in the region.
Migration currently serves as a safety valve for
overpopulation and political discontent. At least 20
percent of Guinea's population already work outside
their country, for example, as do about 20 percent of
all Burkinans, according to press reports.
Economic Integration
In 1980, ECOWAS agreed on deadlines for the
removal of trade barriers, with least developed
members given the longest time to protect their goods.
As originally envisioned, members planned to
establish free trade and a common customs tariff
against external goods by 1989. We do not believe
ECOWAS will attain these goals, and the deadlines
most likely will be extended.
Even if ECOWAS manages to promote freer trade,
we doubt that the organization will be able to provide
financial compensation to members that suffer losses
resulting from trade liberalization as called for in the
1975 Treaty of Lagos. We believe the bleak economic
outlook for West Africa over the next decade,
together with poor and often inaccurate data available
on member states, will frustrate compensation
schemes.
Moreover, French-speaking members harbor new
doubts about ECOWAS's viability. For example,
Benin decided to join CEAO in 1984, and, at their
1983 summit, CEAO heads of state reasserted
concern for "preserving their francophone speciality."
Press reports also indicate CEAO members rejected
an ECOWAS call for the harmonization of regional
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customs tariffs. The rejection probably reflects the
fact that CEAO's trade liberalization and freedom of
movement policies have advanced at a more rapid
pace than have those of ECOWAS.
Defense Cooperation
ECOWAS's attempts to promote defense cooperation
have proceeded even more slowly than its efforts at
economic integration and lag still nascent CEAO
defense arrangements. At the 1980 ECOWAS
summit, Nigeria's Defense Minister presented a case
for a community defense force, recalling the 1977
mercenary attack on Benin and the potential threat of
external aggression. Conservative francophone
members also supported the idea, and privately noted
their concern over Libyan regional threats. According
to press reports, although left-leaning Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Cape Verde, and Benin expressed reservations
about the plan, ECOWAS members approved a
defense protocol at the 1981 summit. Under this
agreement, member states are pledged not to attack
each other and to regard borders as inviolable.
ECOWAS, however, did not become involved in
trying to resolve recent border disputes such as the
one between Nigeria and Cameroon in 1981 or the
brief conflict between Nigeria and Chad in 1983 over
the ownership of disputed islands in Lake Chad.
We believe any successful mobilization would depend
on Nigeria's taking the lead, since it has the region's
largest standing army. In all likelihood, in our view,
different military backgrounds, command structures,
and logistic problems would make the mobilization
and deployment of a community force difficult even if
ECOWAS members agree to do so.
Outlook
ECOWAS is in abeyance, and, despite the numerous
treaties and protocols, members have not yet agreed
to what degree national sovereignty should be
subjugated to regional interests. Stagnation and
paralysis marked the latest ECOWAS meeting, and,
in our view, the goal of economic integration is at best
a distant dream. Primary products, markets, and
transportation still are geared to trade with Europe,
and, as a result, the industrialized West continues as
West Africa's primary trading partner.
Uncomplementary economies hamper economic
integration-many produce the same agricultural
exports and lack an industrial base to absorb mineral
production. Moreover, varying political and economic
ideologies of member states also are likely to hamper
integration efforts. The harmonization of economic
policies still is at the planning level, and smaller states
fear Nigeria's comparatively advanced
industrialization will ensure its permanent domination
of the community.
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Mozambique:
Turning West, South, and East
Mozambique recently has completed several major
steps to try to broaden its international economic ties.
Earlier this month, Maputo signed the Lome
Convention, a trade and aid pact between the
European Economic Community and 65 less
developed nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific. Maputo had refused earlier offers of
membership for fear of alienating its Soviet Bloc
Mozambique and South Africa have signed an
agreement that provides financial assistance to the
Mozambican fishing industry and allows South
Africans to fish in Mozambican waters, according to
the US Embassy. The agreement calls for the creation
of joint programs on marine resources and an
exchange of scientific and technical information.
Mozambique will earn much-needed foreign currency
from license fees and taxes levied on the South
African catch. The fishing agreement is the latest
bilateral accord since the Nkomati nonaggression
Maputo's expanding economic ties with the West and
South Africa has not led its old allies to abandon it.
According to press reports, the Soviet Union will
provide Mozambique with about 4,600 barrels per day
of refined oil products in 1985, enough to meet 60
percent of Mozambique's oil needs. We believe that
Mozambique's inability to obtain a secure source of
oil because of its foreign currency shortage induced it
to accept the Soviet offer. Although Moscow
generally has demanded payment in hard currency in
its commercial deals with African countries, the
agreement reportedly includes three years of credit.
Moscow's willingness to finance sales to Mozambique
despite Maputo's foreign currency crunch probably
reflects an effort to regain some of the ground the
Soviets lost when Mozambique signed the Nkomati
nonaggression pact.
15 Secret
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Tanzania:
Nyerere's Image Fading
President Nyerere has suffered setbacks in recent
international forums that have tarnished his political
image and weakened his credibility as a leading
spokesman for African concerns. His election in
November as OAU chairman was a recognition of his
stature as a respected elder statesman, but the
organization's lack of unity on key African issues has
spoiled Nyerere's leadership image.
The controversy over the seating of Western Sahara
sharply divided the OAU at its summit last month.
The Tanzanian delegation had committed itself to
leaving the summit if Western Sahara was not seated.
The delegation from Western Sahara eventually was
seated, but founding member state Morocco walked
out of the meeting in protest and Zairian
representatives soon followed. Eleven more countries
threatened to join the walkout, but later decided to
stay.
The remaining members pressed ahead with the
conference, turning to Africa's immense economic
problems. In an effort to project an image of self-help,
the member states agreed to start a fund for drought
relief. They acknowledged that their ability to donate
substantial sums of money was limited, but hoped the
effort would encourage outside donors to contribute to
Members also agreed that the problems of southern
Africa deserved greater attention. They passed a
special resolution calling for more assistance to
liberation movements in southern Africa, but did not
create a mechanism for carrying out this resolution.
Nyerere claimed a major victory in focusing the
continent's attention on economic issues and a unified
effort in dealing with the problems in southern Africa,
but the hope for unity was destroyed with Morocco's
announcement that it does not plan to return to the
OAU next year.
Nyerere later admitted ~ that he 25X1
expected his tenure as chairman to be characterized
by dissension and that little real progress would be
made toward Namibian independence.
The Debtor Club
Nyerere's next setback came as a result of a new
initiative he proposed in the struggle against Western
creditors. Nyerere held a press conference soon after
the OAU summit to call on fellow Africans to default
as a group on debt payments. He claimed this would
force the capitalist nations to deal with Africans on
their own terms and to pay more attention to the
particular difficulties that Africans face. The
initiative, however, elicited no reaction. African
debtor nations, probably realizing that they would
jeopardize further aid if they defaulted on current
payments, ignored the call.
The Frontline States Summit
The Tanzanian President also stirred controversy at a
meeting of the Frontline States held in Arusha,
Tanzania, in December. Prior to the meeting,
Nyerere-in his capacity as leader of the Frontline
States-condemned the principle of linking the
withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola to Namibian
independence. His outspoken stance probably
embarrassed Angolan President dos Santos, who had
indicated a willingness to negotiate the removal of
Cuban troops in return for the withdrawal of South
African forces from Namibia.
Nyerere criticized Mozambican President Machel for
his dealings with South Africa and Zambian
President Kaunda for his active support of Angola's
regional negotiations. On Nyerere's side was
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who vehemently
opposed negotiations of any sort with South Africa
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The difference between the two camps came to a head
during the Frontline summit. In the end, Kaunda
walked out and the summit broke up, ending without
a joint communique. Although members pledged not
to make press statements about the summit itself,
their representatives' statements later at the United
Nations clearly denote a split.
Outlook
Nyerere's long-held position as an international
spokesman and elder statesman for Africa continues
to dwindle as it has for the past year or so. Kaunda's
involvement in the South Africa-Angola negotiations
has undermined Nyerere's position as the Frontline
States' leader. Nyerere, however, seldom has backed
down from a confrontation and is therefore likely to
wage-a fierce battle for acceptance of his ideas.
Tensions within the Frontline States are likely to
increase as a result of Nyerere's hardline stance and
probably will further damage the organization's
influence in the region. Similarly, although Nyerere's
tenure as OAU chairman offers him a chance to
regain his image as Africa's leader, the poor prospects
for effective action by the OAU make it unlikely that
Nyerere will recapture his former luster.
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Africa
Brief
South Africa Extending the UN Arms Embargo
The UN Security Council on 13 December unanimously requested UN member
nations not to buy military equipment produced in South Africa. The nonbinding
resolution follows the 1977 mandatory UN embargo against weapon sales to
Pretoria. This embargo stimulated domestic arms production, with the result that
South Africa has become self-sufficient in most weapon categories except high-
performance aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and large naval warships. Pretoria
seeks to keep product lines open and skilled workers on the job by producing
weapons for foreign markets as well as its own forces. Export sales eventually
could earn significant revenues and reduce the unit costs of equipment produced
for the South African military.
Supporters of the extended embargo are concerned that exports would further
strengthen South Africa's arms industries and forces. Pretoria offers a broad
selection of modern and mostly combat-proven equipment, including long-range
155-mm guns, rugged and reliable armored vehicles, compact night rifle sights,
and jam-resistant radios. It successfully advertised its wares at a major arms show
in Chile last March and probably would arrange attractive financing. 25X1
The UN resolution by itself probably will not be a major impediment to sales of
South African arms, which are finding few buyers anyway. The resolution
reinforces the country's pariah status-undoubtedly deterring some potential
customers-but Pretoria promises confidentiality, and at least ammunition and
small items of equipment could be purchased without public exposure. A more
important constraint, we believe, is uncompetitive prices caused by South Africa's
relatively small scale of production.F__~ 25X1
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