(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200810001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
A U 1
Africa Review
14 September 1984
ALA AR 84-014
14 September 1984
copy 350
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OCG1 CI
Africa Review
14 September 1984
Articles Mozambique-South Africa: Prospects for Economic Cooperation 1
We estimate that Maputo will earn no more than about $25 million
next year in direct economic benefits attributable to detente with
Pretoria and that long-term gains will be limited by the uncertain
security situation, the high cost of refurbishing the economy, and
Pretoria's reservations about dealing with a Marxist regime.
Ethiopia: Food Supply Problems F__1 5
Drought in northern and southern Ethiopia is causing a severe
shortage of food, and tens of thousands of people are likely to die
this year from starvation and related diseases.
South Africa: The Conservative Party I 11
In 12 byelections in the past two years the Conservatives-South
Africa's strongest rightwing party-have won approximately the
same number of popular votes as the ruling National Party=
Zimbabwe: Judiciary Under Pressure 15
The executive branch is likely to continue to take advantage of
constitutional provisions that allow it to override the judiciary
whenever it believes vital interests of the country are at stake. F
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Briefs
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19
19
20
Nigeria: Succession to Islamic Leadership
20
Sierra Leone: Implications of Cabinet Reshuffle
21
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices withi
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to t
n CIA.
he Chief,
Production Staff,
Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret ii
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Mozambique-South Africa:
Prospects for Economic
Cooperation
Maputo's expectation that its accord with Pretoria
will bring significant short-term improvement in the
Mozambican economy probably will not be met, in
our judgment. Despite the attention given to trade
missions and economic agreements, we estimate that
Maputo will earn no more than about $25 million
during 1985 in direct economic benefits attributable
to detente with Pretoria. Over the longer term,
Maputo hopes to recapture the benefits it gained from
relations with South Africa before Mozambican
independence in 1975, including transit revenues,
mining employment, tourism, and the Cahora Bassa
hydroelectric project. We believe, however, that even
these potentially significant long-term gains will be
constrained by the uncertain security situation in
Mozambique, the high cost of revitalizing
Mozambique's impoverished economy, and Pretoria's
misgivings about dealing with Mozambique's Marxist
government.
Trade and Investment
In an effort to encourage new investment from South
Africa and the West, Maputo recently announced a
comprehensive investment code that provides tax and
import duty concessions for foreign investors,
according to press and Embassy reports. The law also
promises that nationalization will occur only in cases
of national security and that there will be just
compensation in foreign currency.
significantly increased industrial or mining activity.
Moreover, there appear to be few potential
opportunities for new Mozambican exports to South
African markets in view of stiff competition from
existing trade partners.
Significant secondary benefits, such as increased
Mozambican employment or demand for local
products, are unlikely. The small size of the
Mozambican manufacturing sector and the limited
numbers of skilled workers in Mozambique all but
guarantee that the bulk of inputs will be imported
from South Africa.
Transport Accord. Mozambique and South Africa
have signed a transport agreement which, if
implemented, will gradually restore Maputo as a
major port for South Africa's industrial heartland in
Transvaal Province. Before Mozambique's
independence in 1975, Maputo handled as much as 7
million tons of South African goods per year, third
after the South African ports of Durban and Port
Elizabeth. According to press reports, three-quarters
of the traffic through Maputo was South African,
with annual earnings of $75 million in harbor and rail
revenues during the early 1970s. Deteriorating
relations with its newly independent Marxist
neighbor, however, led Pretoria to expand the Durban
port facilities and to modernize the port at Richard's
Bay. As a consequence, the tonnage of South African
goods shipped through Maputo fell to about 1 million
We believe, however, that in the short term the
Nkomati accord and the investment code will result in
important new South African investment in
Mozambique only in the areas of transportation and
tourism. Pretoria has told US officials that it lacks the
capital to finance the improvements in Mozambique's
underdeveloped economic base necessary to support
tons in 1983)
A representative of a South African business
conglomerate recently noted that a major increase in
South African use of the port of Maputo would
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State of the Mozambican Economy
The Mozambican economy has undergone a
catastrophic decline since the country achieved
independence in 1975. During this period from 1975
to 1978, real national income fell by roughly one-
third, according to our estimates. We believe that
real national income, in 1982 judged to be about $1.5
billion, fell by afurther 18 percent during 1983,
largely because of Mozambique's pursuit of
unrealistic socialist policies, a series of weather-
related problems, and diminished economic
cooperation with South Africa.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy,
accounting for about 84 percent of the labor force,
The major export crops
are sugar, tea, cashew nuts, and cotton. By 1977,
production of cashews, sugar, and cotton had dropped
to half of preindependence levels. A decline in world
prices for sugar and cashews since 1980 has shriveled
export earnings even further and widened the current
account gap. The US Embassy reports that in 1982
Mozambican merchandise exports totaled only $197
million, while its imports amounted to approximately
$641 million.
Alternating severe droughts and floods in almost
every province in the past three years have resulted in
poor harvests, unrest in the countryside, and
migration of large numbers of people to urban areas
and to neighboring Zimbabwe. Despite food aid in
1983 totaling more than 225,000 tons, all but 35,000
tons of which came from Western donors, press
reports indicate that some 1.5 million people are still
dependent on famine relief provided by foreign donor
countries. Maputo says that nearly 5 million of the
country's 13 million people are affected by drought-
caused food shortages.
Animosity between Maputo and Pretoria deprived
Mozambique of its most significant source of foreign
earnings and further accelerated the economic
decline. Under an agreement reached in 1909 with
Portugal, South Africa used the port of Maputo for
almost half of the imported goods intended for its
industrial heartland in return for the right to recruit
miners in southern Mozambique. At independence,
about 118,000 Mozambican miners worked in South
African mines, and remittances from their salaries, in
addition to transit fares and spending by South
African tourists, represented more than half of
Mozambique's external income. However, according
to South African press sources, only 45,000 or so
Mozambican miners are now left in South Africa,
tourism has virtually ceased, and South African use
of Mozambican transportation is greatly reduced.
require expensive improvements to make it
competitive with South African ports, according to
press and Embassy reporting. Under the new
transport accord, Pretoria will extend $6 million in
credit to Mozambique to refurbish port and rail
facilities. On the basis of press reports of targeted
increases in the tonnage of South African goods to be
shipped through Maputo, we believe that
Mozambique could earn approximately $10 million in
1985 and $30 million in 1986 from additional port
and rail charges,
Tourism. Before independence, South African tourists
spent about $15 million annually in Mozambique,
according to press reports. A South African company
has now agreed to build a $40 million luxury hotel on
Mozambique's Inhaca Island and a second hotel on
the mainland. According to press reports, company
officials estimate that Mozambique could
accommodate 10,000 tourists per year in small
groups, but that it will be years before South African
tourism in Mozambique reaches its preindependence
levels.
Employment
Mozambique claims to have lost $2.6 billion since
1978 in South African payments for Mozambican
mine workers. In addition to reducing the number of
Mozambican miners, South Africa terminated an
earlier agreement under which it had paid Maputo in
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gold 60 percent of the wages of Mozambicans
working in South African mines, using an official gold
price substantially below the world rate. Maputo, in
turn, would earn foreign exchange by selling the gold
at the world market price and, then, paying the
workers their wages in local currency when they
returned to Mozambique.
The potential for increased employment of
Mozambicans in South Africa, however, is limited.
Employment in the mining sector is not increasing
because of mechanization, and South African
employers are reluctant to hire Mozambicans at the
expense of already trained workers from South Africa
and other countries. High black unemployment in
South Africa also will limit opportunities for the
employment of Mozambican workers in other sectors.
Cahora Bassa
Under the terms of an agreement signed in May by
Mozambique, South Africa, and Portugal, Maputo
may receive hard currency earnings if it can protect
facilities associated with the Cahora Bassa dam, a
hydroelectric project in Mozambique that is largely
owned by Portugal and, until October 1983, supplied
South Africa with electricity. Mozambique could
realize earnings of as much as $9 million annually, if
the damaged powerlines can be rapidly repaired,
protected from insurgent attacks, and made to work
number of incidents appears to have increased over
previous levels and attacks have focused more on key
economic targets, especially in the region around the
capital.
forces guarding them.
Insurgent activity already is proving a hindrance to
economic cooperation with Pretoria. South African
officials say there was a seven-day backlog in August
at Komatipoort of goods to be moved by rail to the
port at Maputo. They also note that, because of
RENAMO sabotage against the Cahora Bassa
transmission lines, no power from the dam has
reached South Africa since October 1983. Repairs are
proceeding at a slow pace, and South African officials
indicate that the lines, which extend over 500 miles of
Mozambican territory, are extremely vulnerable to
further sabotage even if South Africa follows through
on its offer of logistic assistance to Mozambican
Continuing high levels of insurgent activity also
undermine the prospects for greater economic
cooperation by heightening Mozambican suspicions of
South African intentions. Although Mozambican
officials have been careful, thus far, to avoid accusing
the South African Government directly of continuing
to provide support for RENAMO, they have alleged
that other sectors in South Africa are aiding the
insurgents. South African material support had been
at capacity.
Security Considerations
Insurgents of the National Resistance of Mozambique
(RENAMO) have generally focused on economic
targets in an effort to add to Mozambique's serious
economic problems. The guerrillas have disrupted
communication and transportation links, sabotaged
rail lines, attacked trains, mined roads, and ambushed
vehicles. They also have attacked power transmission
lines from the Cahora Bassa dam and the pipeline
that carries Zimbabwean oil from the Mozambican
port of Beira.
Mozambican officials, in our judgment, hoped that
the insurgent actions would diminish soon after the
signing of the nonaggression pact with South Africa.
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Maputo has responded to continued heavy RENAMO 25X1
activity by attempting to negotiate an end to the
Press reports indicate
that several meetings between RENAMO and
Mozambican officials may already have taken place,
including indirect talks in Pretoria during late August
in which South Africa acted as intermediary.)
both the intensity and impact of the
insurgency have increased since the accord. The
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The South Africans have offered to provide economic
help to facilitate Maputo's efforts to reintegrate
RENAMO members into Mozambican society.
Pretoria has said that it would contribute funds to
projects in Mozambique that would employ former
RENAMO members and that it also would provide
some jobs in South Africa for former insurgents.
Despite this, we believe that any negotiations are
likely to be difficult and protracted because the two
sides seem far apart. RENAMO, for example, has
publicly demanded a constitutional change to end
one=party rule, dissolution of the national assembly, a
government of national reconciliation, and key
positions in the government and the leadership of the
armed forces. Furthermore, President Machel will be
constrained by radical elements within his regime,
and ewe believe that divisions exist within the
RENAMO leadership that will make it difficult to
negotiate an agreement or to implement any that may
be reached.
Outlook
The prospects for expanded economic cooperation
over the long term are potentially significant but
probably will be limited by political and security
considerations and the expensive improvements
necessary to refurbish Mozambique's neglected
infrastructure. Heavier use of the Mozambican
transport routes could have important economic
benefits for both countries, but Pretoria will be
reluctant to become overly dependent on its Marxist
neighbor. South African tourism could become a
source of foreign exchange earnings for Mozambique
but will take years to return to earlier levels.
Although we expect some new ventures, South
African investment in Mozambique probably will be
constrained by the lack of attractive investment
opportunities in impoverished and violence-ridden
Mozambique and by continuing reservations about
the regime's Marxist makeup.
Over the long term, the security situation in
Mozambique is almost certain to improve, if South
Africa continues to adhere to the terms of the
Nkomati accord. We expect the insurgency to break
down into disorganized banditry as RENAMO
exhausts its stockpiles of South African-supplied
arms, but even then we doubt that the government
would be able to restore order in the countryside for at
least two years. The prospects for ending the
deleterious effects of the insurgency on. Mozambique's
economy, therefore, will depend on Maputo's ability
to reach a rapprochement with RENAMO
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Ethiopia: Food Supply Problems
Drought in northern and southern Ethiopia is
aggravating an already tight domestic food situation.
International donors have promised substantial
quantities of food aid, but severe transportation and
security problems sharply limit distribution-
especially in the northern provinces. As a result, the
country is suffering a food deficit, and tens of
thousands are likely to die this year from starvation
and related causes. Nonetheless, we do not believe
conditions are yet as serious as in the early 1970s,
when more than 200,000 people died, although the
US Embassy reports that the situation may be
approaching that point. We doubt that the Mengistu
regime will be seriously threatened by the food crisis
because the government apparently has made a
concerted effort to ensure that the politically
important urban areas do not suffer major shortages.
Background
Until the mid-1950s, Ethiopia was virtually self-
sufficient in food supplies. Over the past 30 years,
however, recurrent drought, deforestation, heavy soil
erosion, primitive farming techniques, inappropriate
pricing policies, and, since 1975, the government's
collectivization efforts have sharply cut agricultural
productivity. As a result, food production has fallen
behind population growth, particularly in the past
decade, causing food shortages in various parts of the
country. Moreover, domestic transportation
difficulties, an inefficient marketing system, and
inadequate storage facilities frequently have
prevented local food deficits from being relieved by
surpluses elsewhere.
The shortages have been particularly serious in the
northern region. These provinces, which traditionally
consume more food than they produce, have been
hard hit by drought over the past several years.
Moreover, insurgencies in Eritrea, Tigray, and the
northern parts of Gondar and Welo have isolated the
population and hindered the movement of food to the
region from government-controlled areas.
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Ethiopia, therefore, has had to rely increasingly on
food imnorts to cover consumption needs. In 1982,
Addis Ababa imported some
273,000 metric tons of cereals, compared to 118,000
metric tons in 1974. Moreover, we believe all of the
food imports were project and relief aid, not
commercial purchases.
The Picture This Year
The Crops. Despite a relatively good harvest in
November and December 1983, the country's food
situation at the start of this year was precarious. The
strongest producing regions of central Ethiopia had a
cereal and pulse crop ' last year of 7.3 million metric
tons, according to government estimates, down about
0.4 million metric tons from 1982. IMF estimates,
however, are lower, suggesting harvests closer to 6.8
million metric tons. In addition, seed requirements
and storage losses probably reduced the grain
available for consumption by almost one-fifth. Crops
were poor again in the north and in Sidamo to the
south.
The situation deteriorated further earlier this year
with the failure of the belg-or "small" rains-that
normally begin in February. US Embassy reporting
indicates that the lack of the early rain caused the
midyear crop, normally about 5 to 15 percent of total
grain production, to fail.
Impact on Consumption. The government estimates
that about 5 million people have been affected this
year by drought and "manmade" disasters-in other
words, the insurgencies. Although we believe this
estimate is overstated, nevertheless, about 4 million
' Cereals include teff, barley, wheat, maize, sorghum, millet, and
oats. Pulses are horsebeans, chickpeas, haricot beans, field peas,
lentils, and vetch.
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people-10 to 15 percent of the country's
population-face food shortages. The government
estimates that about 80 percent of those affected live
in. the northern provinces-many in insurgent-held
areas-and the remainder reside in the south. The
situation is complicated by sizable refugee movements
both within the country and across international
boundaries.
Import Requirements. Translating this picture into an
assessment of the shortfall between production and
minimal consumption requirements is difficult
because figures for harvests, national population,
refugee movements, the number of drought-affected
people, the amount of food necessary per person, and
the size of reserve stocks vary widely. Most
calculations of the national import requirements for
1984 have ranged from about 400,000 to 1 million
metric tons.' Needs could be substantially higher if
the recent census reveals a population much larger
than the almost 35 million now generally used in
shortfall calculations.'
Food Aid and Distribution
Lacking both large food reserves for emergency relief
and the foreign exchange for substantial commercial
imports, Addis Ababa has looked to bilateral and
multilateral donors for help. Earlier this year, the
government requested roughly 450,000 metric tons of
emergency aid for April through December-about
half the amount it had calculated as necessary to feed
drought-affected people. The government had scaled
down its appeal because it recognized that it could not
distribute more even if it got the full amount.
Moreover, in view of its past record of distributing less
than 10,000 metric tons a month of food, the
government probably is not capable of delivering even
the; amount requested. Some of the remaining gap,
however, probably would be filled by private
voluntary agencies.
Transportation probably is the major obstacle
impeding distribution efforts. Once food is unloaded
at Ethiopia's two ports-Massawa, recently the major
receiving point, or Assab-shipment to inland
' In comparison, the World Food Program estimated last year that
Ethiopia would need over 600,000 metric tons of cereal imports and
other food aid in 1983, according to US Embassy reporting.
' Each 1 million people require about 180,000 metric tons a year of
food to maintain subsistence nutrition (500 grams per day).
distribution centers is often delayed. The official
agencies responsible for disbursing the food suffer
severe shortages of trucks, funds, spare parts, tires,
mechanics, and managerial expertise. An inadequate
road network also contributes to the transportation
morass.
Deteriorating security worsens these problems in the
northern provinces. The road from Massawa to
Asmara, the central distribution point in Eritrea
Province, requires convoys at most times, according to
US Embassy reporting, as do many roads out of
Asmara. Major arteries in Gondar, Welo, and Tigray
often are unsafe also. Moreover, even when convoys
do arrive, food distribution frequently is limited to
population centers along the main roads.
Near-Term Prospects
We believe deaths from starvation and related causes
will accelerate over the next several weeks as domestic
food stocks dwindle and government and private
voluntary organizations are unable to distribute
enough aid. By the end of the year, starvation-related
deaths could total in the tens of thousands, somewhat
higher than the probable number of such deaths last
year.
A good harvest in November and December, however,
would ease the situation. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration assessments indicate
that normal to above-normal rains have fallen since
May in the main growing areas of central Ethiopia.
This suggests that the harvest in these regions may be
fairly good, providing the rains did not disrupt
planting activities. Seed shortages and drought,
however, continue to plague the northern and
southern regions, and some areas have experienced
pest infestations. Consequently, Ethiopia almost
certainly will need substantial food imports next year
even with a good harvest.
Nevertheless, we do not believe the current food
problems seriously threaten the Mengistu regime.
Most of the affected people live in areas in the north
under insurgent control. Food supplies reportedly are
tight in the cities, as is usual at this time of year, but
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we do not believe the regime will allow major
shortages to develop. Instead, the government
probably will draw down stocks specifically reserved
for urban consumers at the expense of relief programs
in rural areas.
Over the Longer Term
Food production problems are likely to continue for at
least several years. Government efforts to collectivize
the agricultural sector and the insurgencies in the
northern provinces will continue to limit agricultural
output. Moreover, severe soil erosion and depletion
impair the prospects for a long-term recovery, leaving
the country susceptible to short-term food crises
whenever drought reoccurs.
Despite some signs of a more flexible approach toward
the small farmer, Addis Ababa is not likely to provide
enough incentives to increase production
substantially. An adequate incentive program
probably would require some combination of greatly
increased credit to the private farmer, sharply higher
producer prices, enlarged access to agricultural
inputs, improved technology, or expanded individual
holdings-an unlikely approach from the ideologically
driven Ethiopian Government already strapped by
large military expenses.
Ethiopia, therefore, will continue to need imported
food, even in years of favorable weather. Moreover, it
probably will not be able to afford commercial
imports and will remain dependent on food aid,
largely from Western governments, private voluntary
organizations, and multilateral institutions.
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Secret
South Africa:
The Conservative Party
The Conservative Party is the strongest rightwing
political party in South Africa. Since its formation in
1982, it has developed a base of support in all four of
the country's provinces, and, while it is more popular
among Afrikaners, it is gaining support among
English-speaking South Africans as well. In 12
byelections during the past two years, the
Conservatives have won approximately the same
number of popular votes as the ruling National Party.
The Conservatives recently entered into an electoral
agreement with the ultraright Herstigte Nasionale
Party, and plan to contest several byelections this fall
as part of a united right wing. While the party at
present is not a danger to the Nationalists, a series of
byelection victories combined with a severe economic
depression or a major foreign policy failure could
cause massive defections from the Nationalists to the
right
The Conservative Party was formed in March 1982,
when Dr. Andries Treurnicht, leader of the National
Party in the Transvaal and Minister of State
Administration, left the party with 15 other members
of parliament. Treurnicht and his colleagues rejected
any "power sharing" with Coloreds and Indians,
arguing that the Nationalists had sold out the white
people. A newspaper survey taken immediately after
the split found that the new party had the support of
18 percent of the white electorate, as opposed to 43
percent for the National Party and 21.7 percent for
the Progressive Federal Party, the official opposition.
The same poll showed that in the Transvaal, which as
the most populous province has 76 of the 165 seats in
parliament, Nationalist support dropped from 63 to
48 percent, while the Conservatives stood at 38
percent.
Building a New Party
Treurnicht and his chief lieutenants moved quickly to
absorb small rightwing movements opposed to the
government. Within three months, chapters were
opened in all four provinces, and an effort was made
to attract English-speaking voters. Three small parties
decided to cast their lots with the Conservatives:
? The National Conservative Party of Dr. Connie
Mulder, which had attracted approximately 20,000
votes in the 1981 general election. Mulder, a former
National Party official who held a senior cabinet
post and-until 1978-the expected successor of
Prime Minister B. J. Vorster, was named to the
executive committee of the new party.
? Aksies Eie Toekom (Actions Own Future), a small
conservative party, that had contested several
constituencies unsuccessfully in the 1981 election.
Founded in the late 1970s by Afrikaner intellectuals
disenchanted with the National Party, its leaders
included Bessie Verwoerd, widow of former Prime
Minister H. F. Verwoerd.
? The South Africa First Party, which represented
several thousand English speakers in Natal and the
eastern Cape. Although this party had not
previously contested national or provincial elections,
its union with the Conservative Party provided
Treurnicht with a tenuous base outside the
Afrikaner community.
The Conservatives were unable in 1982 to forge an
alliance with the ultraright Herstigte Nasionale
Party,2 which received 20 to 25 percent of the
Afrikaner vote in the 1981 election. The leaders of the
Herstigters rejected the Conservatives' claim that
they had a right to lead the opposition to the
Nationalists, and were angered by the desertion of
thousands of their members to the new party. One
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Andries Treurnicht
Leader of the Conservative Party
Dr' Andries Treurnicht has been an intellectual
leader of conservative Afrikanerdom since the early
1960s. As a Dutch Reformed Church clergyman,
newspaper editor, head of the semisecret Broederbond
and Cabinet minister, Treurnicht has been
uncompromising advocate of apartheid.
In 1971, Treurnicht entered parliament representing
Waterberg, an extremely conservative constituency in
the northern Transvaal. As the intellectual leader of
the Nationalist right wing and deputy head of the
Party in the Transvaal, Treurnicht entered the
Cabinet in 1976, and two years later was elected h a
of the Transvaal caucus of the National Party.
Treurnicht, who was born in 1920 in Cape Province,
received his education at the University of Cape Town
and the Dutch Reformed seminary at Stellenbosch.
After serving as a clergyman in Cape Province,
Treurnicht was elected head of the Cape provincial
synod of the church. In 1960, apparently at the behest
of then Prime Minister Verwoerd, Treurnicht acted to
stifle opposition in the Dutch Reformed Church to
the government's apartheid policy.
As an editor of the conservative Hoofstad, Treurnicht
became a leader of the right in the National Party.
According to Embassy reporting, Treurnicht first
encouraged four Nationalist parliamentarians to
leave the party and form the Herstigte Nasionale
Party, and then refused to join the new organization.
As the chief of the Afrikaner Broederbond in the
1970s, Treurnicht purged those "Broeders" who
In the early 1980s, Treurnicht became Prime
Minister Botha's most persistent critic in the Cabinet.
While avoiding public confrontations with the Prime
Minister, Treurnicht struggled against any reforms in
South Africa's racial laws. Because of his opposition
to racial reform, Treurnicht was given the name "Dr.
No" by the English press. Treurnicht left the
National Party in March 1982 following an ill-
advised decision to challenge Botha publicly on
National Party's policy on constitutional reform.
Treurnicht is highly respected in Afrikanerdom. A
poll taken in 1983 showed that 40 percent of
Afrikaners rated him as a "true Afrikaner. " In our
opinion, he is the only Afrikaner with the public
stature and political experience to lead a united
rightwing opposition to Prime Minister Botha
joined the rightwing party.
survey showed that Herstigters lost as much as 55
percent of their strength nationwide to the
Conservatives in the first month following the
formation of the new party.
Immediately following the Conservatives' formation,
Treurnicht established a program to define the party's
opposition to the Nationalists. The party stressed
domestic issues, arguing that the Nationalists' policies
represented the "thin edge of the wedge"-the first
steps toward black majority rule. The program:
? Denounced constitutional reform, arguing that
Coloreds and Indians should be given their own
"heartland" and not allowed to sit in parliament
with whites.
? Called for strict segregation, arguing that racial
mixing degraded whites.
? Claimed that the government's agricultural policies
had forced farmers to abandon their land.
Growing Electoral Strength
The Conservatives' organizational effort showed
marked successes, especially in the conservative
Transvaal. In 12 byelections countrywide during the
past two years, the Conservatives won only 7,000
fewer votes than the Nationalists out of a total of
more than 121,000 (see table). In the four byelections
contested by all three parties, Conservatives finished
first or second to the Nationalists and Herstigters.F-
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Secret
Parliamentary/Provincial Council
Byelections 1982-84 a
Entered
Won
Popular
Vote
Percent
National Party
12
8
54,903
45.2
Conservative Party
12
4
47,416
39.9
Herstigte Nasionale
4
0
7,695
6.2
New Republic
1
0
2,105
1.6
Progressive Federal
2
0
8,993
7.1
Total
121,112
a 1982-Walvis Bay, Stellenbosch, Parys, Germiston (Provincial
Council).
1983-Waterberg, Waterkloof, Soutpansberg, Carltonville (Provin-
cial Council).
1984-Soutpansberg, and Soutpansberg, Potgietsrus, Rosettenville
(Provincial Council).
In the constitutional referendum last November,
approximately one-third of the country's Afrikaners
voted against the National Party's proposed
constitutional reforms, according to a US Embassy
analysis. Following the election, Treurnicht claimed
in parliamentary debates with National Party
ministers that in a general election the Conservatives
would win at least 40 seats.
The Conservatives' strength is not limited to a few
rural districts. The strong showing in an English
working-class suburb of Johannesburg in a byelection
in July indicates to US diplomats that the new party
has drawing power in urban and English-speaking
districts. The recent electoral agreement between the
Herstigte Nasionale Party and the Conservatives will
further strengthen the right in the byelections
scheduled for November.
Outlook
The Conservative Party is not an immediate danger to
Prime Minister P. W. Botha's National Party. Botha's
foreign policies are popular-a recent survey by the
Center for Applied Social Science in South Africa
showed over 92 percent white approval-and have
helped forge a political alliance between Afrikaans
and English speakers. Furthermore, Treurnicht's
party lacks support to finance a daily newspaper-a
major hindrance in a country where the government
controls the broadcast media. While many Nationalist
members of parliament-between 15 and 20,
including two ministers, according to recent press
reporting-sympathize with the aims and strategy of
the new party, National Party patronage and
discipline make it unlikely that they will leave at this
time.
The Conservatives do, however, pose a longer term
threat to the Nationalists. P. W. Botha is 68, and,
following his death or retirement, an alliance between
the Conservatives and dissident Nationalists could
hold the political balance in the parliament. This
scenario could become a distinct possibility should the
Prime Minister die or resign during a major domestic
crisis or foreign policy setback.
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,ul1 UI
Zimbabwe: Judiciary Under
PressureF__~
The prospects for an independent judiciary in
Zimbabwe are dim. Although court decisions
probably will continue to uphold the letter of the law,
we anticipate that the executive branch will take
advantage of constitutional provisions that allow it to
override the court whenever it believes "vital
interests" of the country are at stake. Prime Minister
Mugabe's government is most likely to interfere only
in major political/ security cases, but any significant
judicial meddling is likely to produce strong reactions
from Western critics who view the legal system as the
lone protector of civil rights in Zimbabwe.
The 1980 Zimbabwe Constitution drafted in the
United Kingdom during the Lancaster House talks
gives the executive great power over the judiciary.
Civil rights guarantees are strictly qualified and
subject to abrogation when, in the government's
opinion, the needs of national defense, public safety,
order, morality, or health prevail. The executive also
enjoys predominance because the judiciary lacks
extensive powers of review. Unlike their American
counterparts, Zimbabwean courts cannot directly
review government actions, but are strictly limited to
examining the parliament's procedure. The judiciary
thus is not equipped to ensure human rights
protections beyond those listed in the Constitution,
and even most of these guarantees can be violated at
the will of the executive
Government's Power of Detention
The executive exploits the judiciary's constitutional
weakness by enforcing security acts passed by the
previous white-ruled Rhodesian Government,
according to Embassy and press reporting. The
Emergency Powers Act, the most important of these,
empowers the police to detain any person if it appears
"expedient in the interest of public safety or order."
Although the Constitution says the government must
obtain a ministerial detention order to jail someone
more than seven days and order a review tribunal for
those detained more than 30 days, the executive often
is lax about complying with these restraints. The
Zimbabwe's judicial system operates under two
different sets of legal principles, one European and
one African, that coexist in a single legal framework.
On the European side, Zimbabwean common law is
based on the Roman-Dutch tradition of South Africa.
The British legal system also has had significant
influence on the country's judicial forms and
practices.
Despite European legal predominance, customary
law-the body of convention and practices regulating
the relationships in the African community-
continues to be recognized in civil cases when the
parties agree that it should be applied. The adherence
to customary law remains quite strong in the rural
areas of Zimbabwe.
The courts are organized on three levels. At the
lowest level there are three sets of courts: the Village
and Community courts deal with civil cases based on
African customary law; the Magistrate courts have
jurisdiction to hear both civil and criminal cases; and
the Regional courts deal with more serious criminal
cases.
The middle level consists of a High Court. It is
staffed by 10 pusine (associate) judges and has both
original and appellate jurisdiction. The majority of
the High Court's caseload is appeals from the
Magistrate courts
At the highest level is the Supreme Court. This five-
member court has jurisdiction over violation of the
Declaration of Rights and hears limited appeals from
the High Court.
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government increasingly has used the Emergency
Powers Act to hold individuals after they have been
acquitted by the courts. Such actions are within the
powers given the government by the Lancaster House
Constitution, but undermine the independence of the
judiciary and call into question Zimbabwe's efforts to
protect human rights.
In addition to detention, Rhodesian-era law allows the
government to suspend rights of free expression and
assembly and protection from illegal search by
proclaiming a public emergency. Declaration of a
public emergency enables the government to require
that all political meetings and speakers be approved a
week in advance. According to press accounts, the act
recently was amended to make it illegal to do or say
anything likely to undermine the President.
In a decision handed down on 17 August, the
Supreme Court declared that certain constitutional
rights cannot be abridged even by the broad powers of
the Emergency Powers Act. These include protections
to life and freedom of conscience and prohibitions
against slavery, forced labor, torture, and the
deprivation of property. The government, however,
can thwart these rulings by failing to enforce them. It
did this recently when the Supreme Court ordered
black squatters removed from a white farmer's land.
The government, through an order issued under the
Emergency Powers Act by the Minister of Lands and
Resettlement, simply instructed the Police
Commissioner not to enforce the Supreme Court's
decision. The court was powerless to uphold its ruling.
Another security act left over from the Rhodesian
government, the Unlawful Organizations Act, has yet
to be used by the Mugabe government. It permits the
President to declare unlawful any group "likely to
endanger, disturb, or interfere with defense, public
The government has also threatened the independence
of the judiciary by publicly criticizing the courts as a
"system inherited from the colonial past which is not
in tune with the present government." Former Home
Affairs Minister Ushewokunze made several harsh
attacks on the judiciary that went unchallenged by
others in the government, leading the court and the
international community to believe he was voicing
government policy
courts
Mugabe was incensed about acquittals of the
Thornhill Six, a group of white officers who allegedly
plotted the destruction of almost one-half of
Zimbabwe's operational aircraft.
The following case studies illustrate how the
government, by implementation of the Emergency
Powers Act, has been able to override the court's
decisions:
? Thornhill Six. In July 1982, the six white Air Force
officers arrested for sabotaging the aircraft at
Thornhill Air Base are sent to prison where they are
tortured and denied access to attorneys until they
agree to confess. On 31 August 1983 the officers are
acquitted by Judge Enoch Dumbutchena, the first
black jurist appointed by Mugabe. All six officers
are immediately redetained under the Emergency
Powers Act. On 22 December 1983 the last of the
six is released after intense negotiations between
Britain and the Mugabe government.
? Hartleberry/Evan. In November 1983, after 11
months in custody, Philip Hartleberry and Colin
Evans, two members of Zimbabwe's secret service,
are acquitted of spying for South Africa after a
High Court judge finds their confessions have not
been given freely. They are detained again
immediately after acquittal and apparently are still
in custody.
? York Brothers. In May 1982, after five months in
detention, Noel and Alan York, brothers from a
prominent farming family, are acquitted in the
High Court of charges of illegal possession of
weapons, but immediately detained again. They are
released in July by order of the Supreme Court, but
redetained hours later. They are finally released in
August 1982 after a personal appeal by their family
to Prime Minister Mugabe.
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? Dabengwa/Masuku. In April 1983, Dumiso
Dabengwa, former Supreme Commander of the
military wing of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe
African People's Union, Lt. Gen. Lookout Masuku,
former Deputy Commander of the National Army,
and four other codefendents are acquitted of
charges of high treason and illegal possession of
arms. All are redetained immediately. On 8
November 1983, the High Court declares
Dabengwa's detention illegal and finds he should be
released from prison, a decision later reversed by
Chief Justice Georges. All but two, who were
released in March 1984, remain in detention.F-
The Mugabe government has made further efforts to
extend its powers over the judiciary by introducing
the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act, according
to Embassy reports. This bill, which was introduced in
last year's parliament, would strengthen the executive
and weaken the judiciary, according to former Chief
Justice Georges
The Judiciary's Reaction
In every major political/security case that has come
before the court since independence, the judiciary has
found against the government and has upheld the
rights of individuals. These findings continue even
though Mugabe has appointed many African judges
to the court who, according to Embassy reporting, are
reputed to be sympathetic to the government's
problems.
In addition to fighting off government pressure to find
in its favor, the judiciary, in our view, has criticized
the government in an effort to create international
pressure to allow the court to function independently.
For example, former acting Chief Justice Baron has
said that he knows of no other common law country
where the right to silence and related freedoms have
been so coded and where "the dice are so heavily
loaded against suspects and accused persons."F---]
The judiciary also has attempted to hold off the
erosion of individual rights by turning with increasing
frequency to British common law and American
constitutional law. This effort was clearly
demonstrated by the use of Miranda versus Arizona
in the Thornhill Six decision. Attorney General
Chidyausiku and prominent attorney Honour Mkushi
foresee the continued and even increased use of
British and American decisions in future cases.
Outlook
We believe the government will continue to
"Africanize" the court. In particular, Mugabe is
likely to place as many University of Zimbabwe
graduates as possible on the court in hopes they will
be more in tune with his policies.
We anticipate, nevertheless, that the judiciary, even
as its makeup changes, will continue to follow
established legal precedents. We believe, however,
that the government will continue to try to circumvent
decisions it perceives as running counter to
government policy.
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Africa
Briefs
Black miners at eight of South Africa's 34 gold mines are threatening to stage
their first legal strike beginning 17 September if their wage demands are not met.
A complete stoppage at the eight mines would reduce gold production by 25
percent and potentially cut foreign exchange earnings by 10 percent at a time
when the country already faces serious economic difficulties. The mineowners have
stated that they will replace striking miners and that they will not change their
offer of a 14-percent wage increase-slightly more than the prevailing
12-percent inflation rate. The National Union of Mineworkers is demanding an
18-percent wage increase. The union, which represents less than 20 percent of
South Africa's black miners, claims that many nonunion miners will support the
strike.
African National Congress guerrillas have bombed two oil facilities since ANC
representatives attended a conference of antiapartheid groups in London this
spring to promote an oil embargo against South Africa. The ANC has conducted
more than 30 attacks against South Africa's energy infrastructure since 1981,
including well-protected facilities like the SASOL synthetic fuel installations and
the Koeberg nuclear reactor
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Zambia has sent a team to Moscow to discuss rescheduling of Zambian debt to the
USSR, according to US Embassy sources. These negotiations followed a recent
rescheduling of nearly $200 million in debts that Zambia owes to Western
creditors. Lusaka had faced debt service payments 15 times larger than available
funds.
Lusaka's debt payments to Moscow were $68 million in arrears at the end of
1983, and an additional $49 million is due this year. Virtually all of this debt arose
from a $180 million arms purchase agreement signed in 1979.
Nigeria
In our view, the imminent succession to the Sultanate of Sokoto probably will
affect the stability of the largest Islamic community in Sub-Saharan Africa for
years to come.
The Nigerian Government, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan already are lobbying on
behalf of potential successors. So far all contenders are from wealthy families of
the northern Nigerian elite who have ties with the West and with the country's
secular administrative class. The best known outside Nigeria is the Permanent
Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji. Unless a
pro-Libyan or pro-Iranian candidate enters the field, which does not now appear
likely, the successor almost certainly will be a moderate
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.~ca.I ci
Even so, the incumbent's death would add another element of tension to Nigeria's
already delicate political climate. Infighting among Islamic factions and their
quarrels with federal and state authorities in recent years have led to military
intervention on three occasions and cost thousands of lives. A new sultan will have
to mediate the growing friction between established Islamic leaders and followers
of the Muslim fundamentalist revival, a tension that increasingly affects Nigeria's
overall political climate.
President Siaka Stevens' recent cabinet changes
do not signal a change in Sierra Leone's economic austerity policies. Despite
previous opposition to IMF-imposed belt-tightening, newly appointed Finance
Minister Abdulai Conteh decided immediately to keep open the dialogue with the
Fund for new loans. Conteh is not well versed in economic matters, however, and
he probably is less able to deal with austerity issues than was his predecessor, Salia
Jusu-Sheriff, the architect of the existing IMF agreement.
The new Foreign Minister, Dr. Sheka Hassan Kanu, is likely to do better at
articulating Stevens' Western-leaning nonalignment than did his predecessor.
Kanu probably will concentrate on obtaining greatly needed foreign development
aid. The US Embassy expects him to be more cooperative on UN votes.
21 Secret
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14 September 1984
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