AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200750001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 25, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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00 NOT GI V E G T
09 MARK ON
Africa Review
25 May 1984
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Articles Zaire-Angola: Ramifications of Kinshasa's Support for
UNITA
Growing evidence strongly suggests that Zaire is again supporting
the UNITA insurgents in Angola. Luanda appears to be trying to
calm the situation, but if efforts fail Angola could retaliate by
renewing its support for rebels opposed to the Mobutu regime.
The Congolese find Libyan promises of economic aid tempting, but
are wary of Libya's meddling in their internal affairs and using their
country as a base for subverting neighboring regimes.
Sudan: The Southern Insurgency
The Nimeiri regime faces its most serious insurgent challenge since
the conclusion of the Sudanese civil war in 1972, and Nimeiri
appears unwilling to make political concessions to the rebels even
though his forces cannot contain the insurgents.
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President Diouf has gained personal control of the ruling party, and
he appears able to carry out the stringent, long-term fiscal measures
and major structural reforms needed to right the economy
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ALA's Africa Division is developing a computerized data set that
can help track dissident activity in the south and east and improve
understanding of these complex and less studied areas.
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 Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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South Africa: Surprise Leap in Taxes
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Mineworkers and Regional Detente
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Nigeria: New Currency
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Somalia-Saudi Arabia: Oil Given to Somalis)
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Liberia: Rubber on the Rebound
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Sierra Leone: Power Shortages Heighten Discontent
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Mali: Opposition to Economic Reforms
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Zaire-Angola:
Ramifications of Kinshasa's
Support for UNITA
There is a growing body of evidence that strongly
suggests Zaire is again supporting the insurgency of
the South African-backed National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Luanda
seems to be aware of at least some of Kinshasa's
efforts on behalf of the insurgents and appears to be
trying to arrange a high-level meeting to calm the
situation. If such efforts fail, Luanda could retaliate
by renewing support for rebels opposed to the Mobutu
regime.
Fundamental Differences
Zaire and Angola have for years been part of the
larger East-West struggle in central Africa. Each
country's relationship with and dependence on rival
big powers is, in our judgment, a key element in the
undercurrent of mutual distrust and bilateral
disharmony that ebbs and flows.
Angolan and Zairian views appear to be diametrically
opposed on most African problems and international
issues. Angola is widely regarded as one of Africa's
leading "radical" states, while Zaire is considered one
of the continent's most conservative. We doubt that
the basic differences between them will be resolved
any time soon.
Of the nine countries that surround Zaire, Kinshasa
regards Angola as potentially the most dangerous.
President Mobutu's almost paranoid fear of
Communism and of what he refers to as the "red
belt" around Zaire is fueled by the pervasive Soviet
and Cuban presence in Angola and by Luanda's own
avowed commitment to Marxism-Leninism. Luanda's
frequent verbal attacks on Zaire's major Western
backers underscore Mobutu's worries.
Roots of Conflict
The conflict between Angola and Zaire is rooted in
the past, particularly in the turbulent period just
before and after Angola gained independence from
Portugal in 1975. Mobutu supported the two more
moderate factions that vied for ascendancy in Angola,
Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation
of Angola (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.
When a third group-the leftist Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)-came to
power with Soviet and Cuban support, Mobutu's
gamble to influence the outcome of the Angolan civil
war was lost. Zaire's association with the MPLA's
rivals and the deep ideological differences between
Mobutu and Angola's then President Neto ensured
that the highly antagonistic relationship would 25X1
endure.
Angola's collusion with and support for the abortive
invasions of Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978
by the anti-Mobutu Front for the National Liberation
of Congo (FLNC) provided a basis, in turn, for
Kinshasa's wariness of Luanda. Since then, the
continuing presence in Angola of 4,000 to 6,000 25X1
FLNC rebels has been a source of serious concern to
Mobutu
Although relations between the two countries have 25X1
improved somewhat in recent years, either capital
probably would welcome a change of regime in the
other. In our view, however, the type of regime change 25X1
that is most likely to occur in either country would do
little to lessen the differences that separate them. F_~
Secret
ALA AR 84-008
25 May 1984
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Mirror Images
Notwithstanding these differences and mutual
antagonism, in some respects Zaire and Angola are
surprisingly similar
? Ethnic cleavages dominate the political setting in
each country.
? Each has large numbers of residents who are either
opposed to the government or who simply do not
actively support it. Alienation of the vast majority of
the population is the norm.
? Both countries suffer from deteriorating economic
and social conditions that by any impartial standard
would suggest that conditions are ripe for a coup
attempt or at least civil disorder.
? Large numbers of refugees and armed rebels from
each country are resident in the other.
? Both countries have armed forces that are
unprofessional and unreliable. Their failures and
shortcomings are well known.
? Both governments are basically weak and need to be
shored up by outside powers. Each would need the
help of foreign military forces to cope with an
internal uprising or an invasion by externally based
rebels
Uneasy Rapprochement Since 1978
Bilateral relations were fairly good for five years after
the end of the second Shaba invasion in 1978,
although underlying suspicions and distrust did not
dissipate. A rapprochement developed that was based
essentially on a mutual agreement not to support each
other's dissidents. Both countries seemed to make an
effort to live up to the agreement, at least until last
year. Even now, each continues to stress publicly a
good neighbor policy and a commitment to
nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other.
Moreover, Kinshasa and Luanda have cooperated
effectively on a variety of other issues. They have
worked with UN officials in caring for refugees along
their common border. Local officials from both
countries also meet occasionally along the frontier to
work out problems such as smuggling and the release
of prisoners. Last July they cooperated with the Red
Cross in obtaining the release of European captives
held by UNITA in Angola. When an Angolan
military aircraft transporting Soviet Bloc personnel
inadvertently strayed across the border in late 1982
and landed inside Zaire, the incident seemed to be
resolved without much difficulty. In our view, such
cooperation would have been unthinkable just a few
years before.
We believe one of the primary reasons the
rapprochement has worked reasonably well until now
has been the MPLA regime's preoccupation with its
war against UNITA and deteriorating economic and
social conditions in Angola. Luanda would probably
have a difficult time coping with the additional
complications that would accompany renewed activity
by the FLNC rebels residing in Angola.
Luanda's Growing Suspicions
The rapprochement is threatened by Angola's
growing conviction that Zaire is again supporting
UNITA's guerrilla army. According to diplomatic
reporting from Luanda, the MPLA has become
increasingly preoccupied with the idea that the
Western powers may be using Zaire as a conduit for
aid to the rebels.
Luanda has come to believe that Zaire has renewed
substantially its assistance to Savimbi largely because
of the spread of UNITA's insurgency over the past
several months into the northeastern part of Angola
that adjoins Zaire and Zambia. UNITA has been
active in Angola's Moxico Province since 1982 and
now largely controls the Cazombo salient close to
Zaire. We believe that the rebels' prospects for
continued military success in northeastern Angola are
good, given Angola's military problems and the
MPLA's past inability to halt UNITA's advances.
Angola's suspicions have been heightened by Soviet
disinformation efforts that link Zaire and UNITA to
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alleged US, South African, and Israeli efforts to
undermine the Luanda regime.
Mobutu told the US
Ambassador in Kinshasa earlier this year that Zaire's
military relationship with Israel had worsened
Angolan suspicions with regard to UNITA.
Luanda may believe that a principal purpose in
establishing an Israeli military advisory mission in
Zaire has been to support UNITA. Luanda claimed
publicly in February that three captives taken at Luao
during fighting with UNITA stated that they had
been trained by Israeli instructors in Zaire. The
Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa told US officials in
March that the MPLA regime is gathering "proof' of
Israeli training of UNITA in Zaire's Shaba Region.
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We believe that Mobutu intends to continue his
support for UNITA despite his vigorous assurances to
Luanda that UNITA is not active in Zaire. Mobutu
may feel more secure now about providing such 25X1
support because he appears to believe that the
MPLA's economic and security problems would not
enable Luanda to retaliate. 25X1
The Effects of UNITA's Operations
We believe hostilities between Angolan and Zairian
forces could result if UNITA continues expanding its
operations in northern Angola. In our view, an
unintentional confrontation could develop from
Angolan troops fleeing into Zaire or from their
crossing the border in pursuit of rebel forces.
Angolans could also come into conflict with Zairian
forces if they were to attempt to destroy
transportation facilities on the border-such as
bridges-in an effort to sever suspected UNITA
resupply lines. Patrols could also blunder into battle
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because of mistaken identity or panic. Thus,
UNITA's continued operations in northern Angola
could cause Angolan-Zairian relations to deteriorate
even if Luanda never gets "hard" proof of Zaire's
increased support
Despite attempts by local officials to calm border
problems, numerous incidents continue to occur. The
Zairian armed forces increased patrols along the
border last November in the expectation that Angolan
refugees, troops, and FLNC soldiers would be
entering Zaire to escape the fighting with UNITA.
Troops from both countries frequently cross the
Both Zairian and Angolan civilians living in the
border region have suffered because of the fighting in
northern Angola. Villages on both sides of the border
have been victimized by patrolling troops. Landmines
planted by Angolan forces to inhibit rebel movements
have also caused hundreds of civilian deaths and
casualties, according to diplomatic reporting.
The steady expansion of UNITA's operations has also
caused shifts in the Angolan population living along
the border with Shaba. According to a Zairian
official, some 3,000 Angolan refugees moved across
the border to the area near Dilolo during February; by
the end of March, the total had reached 10,000. Even
before the new influx, about 200,000 Angolan
refugees resided in Zaire-the vast majority of them
in Shaba, according to UN officials. FLNC rebels in
the area have also moved to avoid the fighting. In
addition, Angola's mobilization of some FLNC
soldiers probably has been responsible for the rumors
of another Shaba invasion that occur from time to
time.
Troubled Official Contacts
At the official level, Zaire and Angola are attempting
to maintain the outward appearance of good relations
and to tend to problems before they get out of hand.
Mobutu professes to be concerned about Angola's
conviction that Zaire is assisting UNITA, according
to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. He even claims to
have offered helicopters to enable Angola to
investigate the alleged presence of UNITA bases
inside Zaire.
Umba visited Luanda last November to attend
celebrations marking the eighth anniversary of
Angolan independence, MPLA officials expressed
heightened concern about Zaire's dealings with
UNITA, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.
Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge also raised the
issue with his Zairian counterpart during bilateral
meetings last November. Other sessions failed
because dos Santos had poisoned the atmosphere at
preliminary meetings with the Zairian Foreign
Minister by accusing Mobutu of collusion with
Savimbi. The Angolans also charged Zaire with
allowing the rebels to operate training camps in Zaire.
Although Kinshasa and Luanda established
consulates, respectively, in Luena, Angola, and
Lubumbashi, Zaire, two years ago in an effort to
build mutual trust, even this raised mutual security
concerns. Zairian security officials have feared that
the Angolan Consulate could be used to recruit
members of the Angolan community in Zaire to
engage in subversive activities against Mobutu. Other
Zairian officials have also expressed concern that the
Angolan Consulate will monitor UNITA's activities
in Shaba and in northeastern Angola.
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The Problem of Angolan Dissidents in Zaire
The FNLA (or COMIRA). Although Angola's main
concern is UNITA, Luanda may also suspect Mobutu
of supporting the FNLA. This group reorganized in
1980 under the name The Military Committee of the
Resistance in Angola (COMIRA) and expelled its
longtime leader, Holden Roberto. Angola complained
last spring to Zaire that FNLA forces were active in
the Bandundu-Malange border region.
Over the past two or three years, Zaire has attempted
to deflect Angolan attention away from its support for
UNITA by acting aggressively against FNLA cadre
in our judgment.
Angolan officials have been negotiating in Kinshasa
with FNLA leaders over the past two years to entice
them to return and join the MPLA. Although a few 25X1
FNLA personnel may have returned to Luanda, a
rapprochement with the FNLA as a group is unlikely,
several competing factions.
The FNLA poses no real threat to the Luanda regime.
Although FNLA rebels may make occasional,
isolated hit-and-run raids against Angolan forces, the
rebels are weak, poorly armed, and divided into
FLEC. There apparently have been few Angolan-
Zairian frictions in Angola's Cabinda area, where the
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC) is based.
FLEC leaders periodically have threatened to attack
Gulf Oil Corporation's installations at Cabinda.
Although the rebels may have the capacity to engage
in some small-scale sabotage, their forces are divided,
weak, poorly armed, and ill trained and pose no
danger to the government in Luanda. FLEC
personnel move freely across the border into Zaire,
but we do not believe that the Zairian Government is
assisting them.
Mobutu's enemies.
Zairian Rebels in Angola: Tit for Tat?
In our judgment, Luanda is not now interested in
adding to its woes by mobilizing Angolan-based, anti-
Mobutu rebels. If Angolan suspicions of Kinshasa's
support for UNITA continue to grow, however,
Luanda could decide to activate the FLNC once
again. Furthermore, a power struggle in Luanda-a
genuine possibility given the fragility of the dos
Santos government-could result in a new Angolan
leadership that might be more willing to support
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Angola has kept the FLNC effectively reined in since
the group's last abortive invasion of Shaba from
Angola in 1978, despite the existence of several major
FLNC bases and other camps in northern Angola.
Although the MPLA regime does not appear to be
supporting or even encouraging the dissidents, the
FLNC has been useful to Luanda as insurance
against obvious interference by Zaire
Luanda has disarmed some of the rebels and sent
some to southern Angola to assist in fighting UNITA.
In addition, since the late 1970s, the rebels' internal
problems have made them less of a threat to Zaire,
In our view, the FLNC could not undertake a
major military incursion into Zaire without Luanda's
encouragement and substantial support from outside
forces such as Moscow, Havana, or Tripoli
We believe, however, that the FLNC could easily
engage in sabotage or terrorism in Shaba Region-
even with only limited resources. In our view, such
actions would be highly effective and destabilizing in
Shaba-the principal source of Zaire's wealth-
especially if the large expatriate community and
mining infrastructure were threatened. Zaire's leaders
are also aware that their armed forces lack the
capacity to protect the country's vulnerable
infrastructure from sabotage.
In Sum
In our judgment, Zaire and Angola will continue to
believe the worst of each other. As long as there is a
Soviet Bloc presence in Angola, Mobutu will fear that
Luanda is the hub of anti-Zairian subversion. For
their part, the Angolans almost certainly will suspect
Mobutu of supporting UNITA as an agent of the
West.
We doubt that Kinshasa will be able to expand its
support for UNITA substantially without Luanda's
knowledge. If Luanda gets solid evidence of
significant Zairian assistance to UNITA, this would
increase the likelihood of Angolan retaliation. In any
event, continued UNITA activity along the Zairian
border will put pressure on Luanda to retaliate. And,
if Luanda renews its support for anti-Mobutu rebels,
central Africa would again become highly unstable.
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Congo-Libya: Trying To Keep Tripoli
at Arm's Length
Brazzaville's relations with Libya illustrate many of
the difficulties African governments experience in
attempting to deal with Tripoli. The Congolese find
Libyan promises to assist in their economic
development tempting, but are wary of Libya's
meddling in their internal affairs and using their
country as a base for subverting neighboring regimes.
As long as President Sassou-Nguesso remains in
control, Congo is likely to continue a cooperative but
cautious relationship with Tripoli.
False Starts
Libya has only recently sought to develop a presence
in Congo, even though it has long had formal
diplomatic relations with the country. Tripoli sent two
diplomats to Brazzaville in July 1981 to open an
embassy, but it did not inform the Congolese,
according to the US Embassy. This diplomatic gaffe
caused Congo to delay approval for a Libyan
diplomatic mission until October 1981. Libya finally
opened a People's Bureau in February 1982 with an
official staff of six, which has since increased to 24.
We believe Colonel Qadhafi may be using Congo as a
base of operations against moderate central African
regimes. He has tried to increase his leverage with
Brazzaville by offering military aid, knowing that
Congo is displeased with shoddy equipment supplied
by the Soviets.
Libya has sought to increase its influence with
economic assistance as well.
7 Secret
ALA AR 84-008
25 May 1984
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Libyan leader Qadhaft
Last January, Tripoli agreed to aid
forestry production in northern Sangha region.
Why Are They There?
In addition to the personnel officially attached to the
People's Bureau, 25 others who arrived in Brazzaville
last February make for a current presence of at least
49 Libyans the figure may
be closer at
Libya hardly needs so many staffers to administer
bilateral aid programs, and it probably uses the
surplus to run regional intelligence operations from
Brazzaville. Neighboring African regimes fear that
their dissidents, with Libyan assistance, use Congo as
a base for destabilization efforts.
Does Congo Approve?
We believe that Sassou does not want to antagonize
Congo's moderate neighbors or Western aid donors by
condoning Libyan destabilization efforts. Congo's
good neighbor policy has ended a cycle of mutual
coup attempts that Kinshasa and Brazzaville
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sponsored in the 1970s and has given the country the
political stability it needs to diversify and improve the
economy.
Sassou has a number of reasons to tolerate a certain
amount of Libyan adventurism. France, traditionally
Congo's largest source of economic aid, faces
continued budgetary constraints, and Sassou probably
feels he cannot jeopardize possible Libyan aid by
questioning Qadhafi's actions. In addition, Sassou is
pressed on the left by radicals who question his
revolutionary zeal. Moreover, the government lacks
enough security personnel to monitor fully Libya's
actions.
Sassou, nonetheless, is aware of Libya's meddling in
the affairs of Congo's neighbors. He may also worry
that regional and tribal tensions in Congo could be
exploited by Qadhafi. But for the foreseeable future,
we believe Sassou will continue his uneasy
relationship with Tripoli-hands extended in
supplication, but eyes open for danger.
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Sudan: The Southern Insurgency
The Nimeiri regime faces its most serious insurgent
threat since the conclusion of the Sudanese civil war
in 1972. Southern rebels under the command of John
Garang, a former Sudanese Army officer, are
conducting increasingly sophisticated assaults on
military garrisons and police posts, foreign economic
projects, and the southern transportation network.
Their successes have eroded morale in the Sudanese
military. President Nimeiri appears unwilling to make
political concessions to stem the rebellion, even
though his forces cannot contain what probably will
be a major insurgent offensive during the next few
months.
Insurgent capabilities have dramatically improved
over the last year, largely for three reasons:
? The mutiny of some 500 southern Sudanese military
and police personnel in May 1983 brought into the
insurgent movement an experienced military cadre
that is familiar with the southern region and with
the organization and operations of the Sudanese
Army.
? Ethiopia continues to provide the guerrillas a secure
base area that permits them to train and operate
from Ethiopian territory.
? Ethiopian, Soviet, and Libyan support to Garang
has at least temporarily unified the insurgents under
his leadership and guaranteed them access to
modern arms.
There are sharp tribal and ideological differences
among the dissidents, however, and Garang's
leadership is only grudgingly accepted by some of
them. A clash between Garang's Dinka tribe and
Nuer supporters of Samuel Gaitut in early April in an
Ethiopian border area demonstrated the fragility of
Garang's coalition.
Insurgent Strategy and Tactics
Garang has approximately 6,000 men in his Sudanese
People's Liberation Army. His strategy has been to
apply military and economic pressure on Nimeiri
through limited operations during the dry season
while preparing for a larger offensive in the rainy
season that is about to begin. The group's operations
since November 1983 have been aimed at shutting
down vital oil and water projects and attacking
foreign workers to gain international attention and
demonstrate the weakness of the Sudanese military.
Rebel attacks on transportation already have led to
serious shortages of food, fuel, and ammunition.
Recent US Embassy reporting indicates the local
populace blames the government and not the
insurgents for the shortages.
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Assaults during February and March demonstrate 25X1
that the insurgents are capable of battalion-size
operations and understand how to support their
assaults with directed fire and heavy mortar barrages.
We believe the insurgents have had portable
SAM-7 missiles for some time, although Sudanese
aircraft losses to date have been due to the insurgents'
use of heavy machineguns. The guerrillas' effective
use of machineguns against Sudanese helicopters and
their reported possession of SAM-7 missiles have
helped offset the government's advantage in airpower.
Government Forces
The Nimeiri regime has responded by increasing the
number of ground force units in the south from 12 to
16 battalions. Airborne units are rotated into the
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ALA AR 84-008
25 May 1984
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region to support anti-insurgent sweep operations, and
smaller armor, artillery, and antiaircraft units have
been sent south to shore up weak garrisons.
The Sudanese Air Force has been barely able to keep
the southern garrisons supplied. The Air Force's only
flyable fixed-wing transports are five C-130s and
three DHC-5 Buffalos. Continued heavy use and
inadequate maintenance may soon take some of these
aircraft out of service.
Supply shortages will increase when the rainy season
further curtails ground transportation. Most of the
military's small arms are worn out, its ammunition is
outdated and defective, and the lack of spare parts has
idled many of the Army's vehicles. The Army's
relations with the local population, moreover, will
deteriorate if it begins to confiscate already scarce
civilian food supplies.
These problems and continuing insurgent successes
have demoralized government forces.
Stalled Reconciliation Efforts
The US Embassy reports that attempts to reach a
political settlement with the south have made no
progress since Nimeiri made a conciliatory speech in
early March. Insurgent leaders have ignored
Nimeiri's offer of amnesty and rebuffed his attempts
to establish contacts with their representatives
abroad.
The President and his advisers have focused much of
their attention on more immediate concerns, such as
the Libyan airstrike in March and labor unrest in
Khartoum. The US Embassy notes that Nimeiri
appears reluctant to risk the support of the Muslim
Brotherhood by offering concessions to the non-
Muslim south. Moreover, the recent worsening of
Nimeiri's health has made it even less likely that he
will adopt bold new measures to solve the southern
problem.
Outlook
Significant insurgent operations probably will take
place before the height of the rainy season in July and
August, even though the guerrillas' recent infighting
has delayed their preparations for a major offensive.
The insurgents are likely to attempt to occupy a
garrison, consolidate their support bases in Upper
Nile, and establish new bases in the southwest before
moving against a strategic provincial capital.
Government forces probably will be unable to
withstand a sustained insurgent offensive during the
rainy season or conduct significant offensive
operations of their own. Khartoum's likely strategy of
minimizing engagements with the insurgents by
defending only the most important garrisons probably
will not forestall a major government defeat in the
south.
Despite the bleak military prospects, Nimeiri
probably will continue to resist pressure from Western
governments and Egypt to make major concessions to
southern interests, such as relaxing the application of
Islamic law. He may believe that the foreign military
aid he has received since the Libyan airstrike will
enable him to subdue the insurgents or at least to
negotiate a more favorable settlement later.1
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Senegal:
Facing the Economic Crisis
Over the past year, President Abdou Diouf has gained
personal control of the ruling party and now is in a
better position to turn to efforts to arrest Senegal's
downward economic spiral. We believe Diouf has the
will to stick with the stringent long-term fiscal
measures and major structural reforms needed to
right the economy. Senegal, however, will continue to
require generous aid from its Western and moderate
Arab donors.
Diouf faces no major threats from domestic interest
groups or from external forces, but he will have to
cope with several minor problems that will be
aggravated by economic difficulties. These irritants, if
not attended to, could lead to serious unrest, even
compelling the military to take over. Such a step
would be a sharp departure from the military's
traditional apolitical role.
Political Victories
Diouf began his efforts to solidify and consolidate his
hold on Senegalese politics following his decisive
victory in the presidential election in February 1983.
The election gave him the personal mandate he had
lacked as the constitutional successor to former
President Leopold Senghor and left the ruling
Socialist Party dominant in the National Assembly.
Diouf's most significant task was to neutralize the
party's "barons"-the powerful and corrupt cronies of
Senghor-who had used their positions in both the
government and the party to impede policies
threatening to their interests. Last January Diouf and
Jean Collin, the President's right-hand man and
number-two power in both the government and the
party, used a party congress to grant Diouf the
authority to appoint the Political Bureau and Central
Committee. Diouf used this power to remove
"barons" from the Political Bureau and to install his
own men.
Diouf and Collin also used the congress to make
structural changes in the party, including reducing
the powers of the influential regional secretaries.
Diouf now is more directly involved with the activities
of local party offices. The changes give Diouf more
control over party affairs, but also more
administrative details to oversee.
The party shakeup was only one part of Diouf's attack
on the entrenched self-interests he inherited. The
second was a housecleaning of the National
Assembly. In April Diouf and Collin engineered a
turnover of the officers of that body, removing the
"barons" from their last bastion of power. As in the
purge of the party, Diouf installed loyalists into
leadership positions who would help carry out his
programs.
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The President's efforts-encouraged by the IMF-to
cut bloated government ministries have been less
successful. University students, whose only hope of
employment upon graduation is the state, went on
strike for two months this year to protest a prospective
shortage of government jobs. Diouf's cautious
reaction to the strike shows that, even with his powers,
he realizes he has to weigh carefully the political 25X1
consequences of his acts.
Under the best of conditions, we believe it will take
Diouf years to pare away the layers of flab that
encase the Senegalese public sector. We have seen no
signs that he is daunted by the task, but following
through on it will cause considerable unhappiness and
dislocations.
Economic Difficulties
The economy shares the same problems facing other
resource-poor African states: increased oil costs,
falling prices of raw materials, few exportable
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ALA AR 84-008
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commodities, a rapidly expanding population,
inadequate and uncertain rainfall, and undeveloped
infrastructures. To make a normally bad situation
worse, this year's rains came so late and so miserly
that Senegal expects its worst harvest since
independence in 1960. The peanut crop, the country's
major export item, is down 50 percent from last year.
Cereal production will meet only about a quarter of
the need. Forage shortages are likely to cause
starvation or premature slaughtering of perhaps a
fifth of livestock herds
The drop in export earnings and need to spend more
foreign exchange for food imports will hurt Diouf's
fiscal austerity program. Diouf has withstood
economic adversity in the past, however, and he most
likely will do so again. In 1981, the first year of
Diouf's presidency, the economy was in even more
precarious straits than it is now. The IMF, France,
and moderate Arab Gulf states saved the day. Since
then, Diouf has adhered closely enough to IMF
guidelines to win a renewed IMF seal of approval,
which should also ensure continued assistance from
major individual donors. This support will keep
Senegal going, but only further austerity and
structural reform will promote recovery.
Less certain is the continuing support of the
population. Up to now, the people have, with good
reason, blamed the previous regime for Senegal's
economic ills. Diouf rolled into office on a wave of
popular approval and high expectations. His
modernization and anticorruption plans had
widespread appeal, as did his reputation for personal
rectitude and technical brilliance. After three and a
half years of at best halting progress, though,
enthusiasm for Diouf is ebbing.
Diouf's fiscal austerity is resulting in higher prices
and reduced imports of a broad range of staples and
consumer goods. Farmers are particularly hard hit by
the loss of crop revenues. At the same time, they face
higher prices for food and fertilizer, and tighter
credit. The poor peanut crop will increase
unemployment significantly throughout Senegal's
nonfarm labor force, a large portion of which is
involved in the industrial processing of peanuts.
Business will also suffer from tight credit, restricted
imports, and reduced consumer and business
spending. The urban elite is unhappy that imported
items are scarcer and more expensive.
Potential Threats
Senegal's major interest groups do not currently pose
a threat to Diouf, but this could change quickly.
Leaders of the country's influential Islamic religious
sects hold sway over rural peasants and a growing
number of young urban dwellers. Diouf has placated
the sects whenever possible, but some of his plans for
reducing corruption and reorganizing the economy
run counter to their interests. The sect leaders'
toleration of Diouf could turn to outright opposition if
he pushes his programs too far too fast.
Wildcat strikes by workers or students could set off a
chain reaction of popular protest based on pent-up
economic discontent. The leadership of the
government-dominated labor confederation has weak
control of its rank and file. Diouf, for example, had to
intercede last March to put the lid on a garbage
collectors' strike. Recent power struggles at the upper
reaches of the' confederation and splintering or
breaking away of individual unions have further
weakened the influence of the national leadership.
Some of the 15 small opposition olitical parties are
capable of minor troublemaking.
The Military
The armed forces could become the final arbiter of
power should social turmoil or economic collapse
result in a political crisis. Military intervention,
however, would almost certainly take place only as a
last resort. The French schooled Senegal's armed
forces in the concept of military subservience to
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civilian authority, and dedication to the preservation
of the civil government remains high. Senegalese
regular Army officers are trained in French schools,
and French advisers serve with Senegalese forces. In
addition, France maintains infantry and air combat
units in Senegal totaling almost 1,500 men.
Another factor militating against military
intervention in politics is the ethnic diversity of the
Army. No single tribe dominates; virtually all are well
represented. The Senegalese soldier identifies with his
profession, not his religious or tribal origins, and sees
himself as a guardian of the state.
Outside Meddling
The country's moderate, pro-Western orientation, the
basing of a French intervention force, and chronic
economic troubles make Senegal an inviting target for
outside meddling. Soviet and Libyan subversion
currently is at a low level because the government is
able to monitor their activities and steps in forcefully
when the situation warrants. In addition, the lack of
receptivity by most Senegalese to radical political or
religious doctrines hinders meddling by outsiders.
Attitudes could begin to change, however, if economic
conditions dramatically worsen, Western aid dries up,
or IMF-mandated reforms do not produce results.
The Soviets have over 100 officials in Dakar, but this
is because their Embassy has regional responsibilities.
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Chad: Monitoring the Southern
Insurgency
Although Libyan-backed Chadian dissidents pose the
greatest potential threat in the north, rebels in the
south and east also pose problems for Chadian
President Habre's efforts to hold Chad together.
ALA's Africa Division is developing a computerized
data set that can help track trends in the south and
east to improve understanding of these complex and
less studied areas.
Scope
The data set uses
insurgent
actions since September 1983 in provinces not directly
bordering Libya. Incidents include rebel infiltrations
from Libyan-occupied provinces or neighboring
countries into the southern and eastern regions,
violence involving the rebels, and incidents fostering
or inhibiting reconciliation between the rebels and the
Chadian Government.
The inset details the types of information that have
been collected for the roughly 300 incidents recorded
so far. Data is entered for the location and date of the
event; the identity and number of rebels involved;
casualties among civilians, rebels, and government
personnel; and target of the attack, if applicable.
Textual descriptions of incidents can also be included
for information not as easily placed into simple
categories. This information can include the names of
insurgents or victims, types of weapons used or
recovered, and other unique aspects of the event.
Analysts are able to obtain simple tallies (for example,
the number of rebels who rallied in January) and
produce tables (such as, where each group conducted
its operations over a given period), bar histograms,
and pie charts.
Limitations
As with any electronic or paper files, the utility of the
data set depends upon the reliability and
comprehensiveness of the information.
Africa Division is developing similar computer data
sets to track terrorist and insurgent actions in South
Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The choice of
information on incidents in those countries will differ
from that of the Chadian data set to reflect the
specific characteristics of these insurgencies and
intelligence interests of consumers.
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ALA AR 84-008
25 May 1984
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Types of Information Coded on Incidents Involving
Insurgents in Southern Chad
Type of Event
Fighting
Sabotage
Infiltration by insurgents
Reconciliation/rallying to government
Breakdown of reconciliation
Date
Month
Day
Year
Nature of Target
Government
Military
Civilian
Foreign
Economic
Other rebels
Region/Prefecture
West
Chari Baguirmi
Kanem
Lake Chad
South
Logone Occidental
Logone Oriental
Mayo Kebbi
Moyen Chari
Tandjile
Center-East
Batha Biltine
Guera
Quaddai
Salamat
N'Djamena
Size of Attack/Rally Force
Casualties
Number of civilians, officials, rebels killed or
wounded
Group Name
Armed Forces of Chad (ex-FA T Kamougue
followers)
Black Commandos
Chadian Armed Forces (FAT)
Coconut Palm Commandos
Commandos of Hope
Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)
First Army
Green Commandos
Green Commandos of Hope
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT)
National Democrat Union (UND)
Organization for the Liberation of Chad From
Imperialism and Fascism (OLTIF)
Red Commandos
Third Army
Volcan
Textual Description of Event
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Table 1
Incidents of Rebel Activity in Southern Chad,
by Region and Month
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
West 2 1 8 1 8 6
N'Djamena 5 2 1
Table 2
Incidents of Rebel Activity in Southern Chad,
by Group and Month
Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR)
3
7
3
10
8
1
Green Commandos
1
7
1
6
4
1
1
First Army
1
3
6
1
Commandos of Hope
6
3
1
National Democratic Union (UND)
1
3
2
Coconut Palm Commandos
1
3
Kamougue's former Armed Forces of
Chad (ex-FAT)
Organization for the Liberation of Chad
From Imperialism and Fascism (OLTIF)
Transitional Government of National
Unity (GUNT)
Chadian Armed Forces
Black Commandos
Green Commandos of Hope
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Africa
Briefs
South Africa Surprise Leap in Taxes
Projections of a large budget deficit have prompted the government to increase the
general sales tax from 7 to 10 percent. Only some basic foodstuffs are exempt from
taxation. The size and timing of the increase, which comes less than four months
after the rate was moved up from 6 to 7 percent,
Because record high interest rates have increased the cost of government
borrowing, officials are emphasizing tax increases and spending restraint to control
the budget deficit. The government also is worried about the current account
deficit, and it hopes the higher sales tax will slow consumer credit buying and thus
reduce imports. Restraint on demand, however, is likely to force the economy to
contract in 1984 for the third consecutive year.
The exemption of some foodstuffs from sales tax is a concession to blacks, who
normally bear disproportionately more of the sales tax burden. Several black
leaders, however, have criticized the new measures, contending that the benefits of
the exemption will be outweighed by the overall effects of the tax increase and its
contractionary impact on the economy.
Mineworkers and Regional Detente
South Africa may double the number of Mozambicans working in its mines as a
reward to Maputo for signing the recent nonaggression pact,
The South Africans also have implied that Lesotho mineworkers will bear
the brunt of replacement by Mozambicans if Maseru does not agree to a security
accord with Pretoria. Lesotho would feel the pinch from cuts in mine employment
because 40 percent of the country's national income comes from the remittances of
its miners in South Africa.
Whether South Africa will carry through with its threat to Lesotho is uncertain.
The Lesotho Foreign Minister recently told the US Embassy that Maseru is close
to signing a security accord. Moreover, South African mine owners have expressed
concern about replacing highly skilled Lesotho miners with less skilled workers
from Mozambique. Thus, we believe that any increase in Mozambican workers
will be gradual, and that any cuts in mining jobs will not fall disproportionately on
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ALA AR 84-008
25 May 1984
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Nigeria last month unexpectedly closed its borders and issued a sharply reduced
quantity of new naira notes to replace existing currency. The military regime
announced that the conversion was needed to decrease money in circulation,
curtail black-market trafficking of naira, and eliminate the "ill-gotten gains" of
corrupt Nigerians, former civilian officials in exile, and foreigners. The move has
temporarily tightened liquidity, causing prices to drop considerably. Black-market
trafficking, however, continued with hardly an interruption. The new naira is
selling both domestically and in markets across the borders at close to the old rate.
Although Lagos caught several minor offenders in the anticorruption drive, the
major ones had long before converted their naira into foreign currency and moved
their money abroad. The currency conversion may temporarily reduce the money
supply, but we believe that these benefits will be short lived and do little to address
trade distortions resulting from the overvalued naira. Moreover, the exchange is
causing additional hardship for the average Nigerian.
Somalia-Saudi Arabia Oil Given to Somalis
Somalia may be able to avoid a major financial or production crisis for a few
months even without an IMF agreement. The US Embassy in Mogadishu reports
that Saudi Arabia apparently has granted Somalia 60,000 metric tons of crude
oil-enough to cover the country's needs for the next two to three months. The
grant, which replaces one that ended at the beginning of this year, will release up
to $13 million in foreign exchange that Somalia could use to reduce its past due
debt. Increased food aid shipments and the likelihood of higher agricultural
production as a result of recent rainfall also will ease the country's economic
problems.
We believe these developments are likely to reduce pressure on the government to
reach a quick agreement with the IMF on a loan of about $85 million. President
Siad has rejected IMF measures to liberalize the state-run economy, largely
because he fears they would limit his ability to dispense patronage. Siad is likely to
credit the oil grant to US intervention and may again ask Washington to urge the
IMF to soften its conditions. Low export earnings and difficulties in obtaining
enough foreign aid, however, eventually are likely to lead Mogadishu to reopen
formal negotiations with the Fund.
Firestone, Liberia's largest foreign rubber concessionaire, is projecting profits for
the first time in several years and will be able to resume tax payments that had
been curtailed during the years of losses. The chief inducement to continuing
operations in Liberia is the resurgence in world rubber prices, which this year have
reached 58 cents a pound-some 50 percent above their low of 39 cents a pound in
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late 1982. Moreover, cost-cutting measures are helping boost profits, and early
rains this year probably will raise production. Natural rubber is Monrovia's
second-largest export commodity behind iron ore, which currently is in low
demand worldwide.
Firestone's commitment to remain in Liberia portends other domestic benefits for
Head of State Doe's regime. It will soften public accusations that Doe is unable to
manage the economy. In addition, Firestone's expensive social welfare projects-
schools, housing, medical facilities, and transportation-will continue for the
20,000 or so workers employed by the company in Liberia. These workers account
for 40 percent of the country's estimated salaried labor force.
Sierra Leone Power Shortages Heighten Discontent
Power shortages have added to the public's dissatisfaction with the deterioration of
the economy, according to the US Embassy. The outages have affected public
transit, telephone communications, and food refrigeration, particularly in
Freetown, the capital. Austerity measures mandated by the IMF, including
devaluation, have been unpopular, and the government's inability to stem
corruption and smuggling of exports has lowered hard currency earnings. Sierra
Leoneans are struggling with an inflation rate of 90 percent this year, and they will
face higher food prices as shortages develop this summer. They may take to the
streets as they did in 1981. President Stevens could bu~ time by blaming these
economic woes on unpopular ministers and conduct a cabinet reshuffle in an effort
to ease the criticism.
Mali Opposition to Economic Reforms
The US Embassy reports that President Traore is facing the first organized threat
to his economic reform program since he introduced it two years ago. Labor
leaders attacked Traore's IMF-mandated program at their annual Labor Day rally
on 1 May. The unions demanded the return to state enterprises, salary increases
when Mali reenters the French-backed West African Monetary Union in June,
and denounced the policy of examinations for entering civil servants. The rally
ended peacefully when union officials promised to negotiate their demands with
the regime, but, in our judgment, there could be serious unrest over the longer
term as Mali's economy continues to deteriorate. The left-leaning Traore
government in recent years has begun turning away from socialism toward a more
open economy and to Western donors for increased aid, and it has been one of the
few black African countries to meet IMF performance criteria to date.
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