INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200740001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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International Issues
Review
Secret
GI HR 84-006
December 1984
Copy 4 4
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Intelligence Secret
Review
International Issues
This publication is produced by the Office of
Global Issues. Some issues contain articles drafted in
other offices. Some articles are preliminary or
speculative in nature, but the contents are formally
coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the
views of a single analyst; these items are clearly
Secret
GI IIR 84-006
December 1984
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Note to Readers This is the last issue of the International Issues Review. Beginning in 1985,
the Office of Global Issues will publish material previously seen in the
Review in several publications with more specifically focused subject areas
and audiences. Readers interested in receiving future publications should
write to the Chief, International Security Issues Division, OGI, 2G18
H
d
ea
quarters, specifiying subject areas of interest.
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Contents
Narcotics Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
OGI Strategic Narcotics Branch,
This article summarizes narcotics-related issues of interest since
1
_ 1- .
Octo
Opium Production Yields in Thailand
Yields of opium poppy have declined steadily in Thailand over the
past four years. Despite regional variations in growing conditions,
crop substitution rograms have had no discernible effect on poppy
yields.
Arms Transfers Arms Transfers: Significant
Sales, and N,, 7 nations
This article summarizes arms transfer issues of interest during the
fa 11
f 100A
I
o
.
Communist Activities Nicaragua: Atte
t
T
mp
s
o Develop a Communist-Type 21
The Sandinistas are following the Cuban and Soviet models in
setting up the educational system in Nicaragua. Direct Cuban and
Soviet assistance will begin to decline as Managua gains experience
Secret
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Narcotics
Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
Summary Each International Issues Review presents a summary of recent develop-
ments affecting narcotics production and trafficking in host countries and
US attempts to halt illicit drug activities abroad. The items in this
summary cover the period from 1 October to 15 December 1984.
South America
From 6 to 9 November, representatives from Argenti-
na, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Colombia met in Bogota to discuss
measures to combat illegal drug trafficking and abuse
in South America. According to the US Embassy, two
of the more important items raised in the meeting
were the formation of a multilateral police force and
the standardization of sentences for drug-related of-
fenses. According to press reports, Venezuela urged
the participating nations to adopt a uniform drug
code, offering its own new drug law as a model. Other
issues discussed were: the establishment in each coun-
try of a center with a secure communications system
and data base on drug trafficking; the implementation
of stronger controls on the production, transportation,
and sale of chemicals used in cocaine processing; and
more effective drug treatment and rehabilitation pro-
grams. A number of reservations were expressed
about several of the proposals, particularly the estab-
lishment of the communications network. Some offi-
cials are reluctant to share sensitive law enforcement
information out of fear that traffickers will corr pt
police officials assigned to the center.
Colombian Developments
The Colombian crackdown on drugs continues to keep
traffickers off balance ... two judges have been dis-
missed for impropriety in the handling of drug-related
cases ... as of 19 October the Colombian National
Council on Drugs had suspended the licenses of 147
aircraft suspected of involvement in drug traffick-
ing ... 55 of the 147 licenses have been revoked ... on
29 October a Bogota criminal court judge filed indict-
ments against Pablo Escobar and 16 others for com-
plicity in the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara
Bonilla ... Escobar has managed to elude Colombian
authorities and, according to press reports, avoided
capture when Colombian police raided a farm outside
Medellin on 16 November ... according to the US
Embassy, Colombia has eradicated a total of 3,250
hectares of cannabis this year representing a potential
4,875 metric tons of marijuana ... authorities also
seized 1,716 metric tons of marijuana in September,
On the legal front, the Colombian Government took
several measures that should strengthen its hand in its
war with the drug mafia:
? On 26 October the government passed a decree that
gives the government authority to dispose of vehicles
and other properties used in the production and
transportation of narcotics. The decree authorizes
the government to use the funds acquired from the
sale of the property to finance the activities of the
National Council on Narcotics.
Secret
GI IIR 84-006
December 1984
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? On 14 November, the Colombian Senate rejected a Americans for every Colombian extradited to the
proposed constitutional amendment that would have United States ...
prevented the extradition of Colombian nationals to
the United States. The amendment was introduced
by Senator Jose Ignacio Vives Echeverria, a senator
from Magdalena Department suspected of being in
the pay of drug traffickers. The amendment was
F__
soundly defeated by a vote of 42 to 4.
On the downside the fate of the Mutual Legal
Assistance and Extradition Treaties remains unclear:
? The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty-passed by
the Colombian Senate-is still tied up in the Colom-
bian House of Representatives. It has been stalled
since 1983, and, according to the US Embassy, the
Betancur administration has exerted no pressure to
get it out of committee. The Embassy reports that a
majority of representatives want changes before
they will approve the treaty, and the Embassy sees
no hope for any action soon.
? Colombian officials still want to revise the US-
Colombian Extradition Treaty. During a meeting
with Embassy officials on 17 October and again in
an interview published on 28 October, Minister of
Justice Enrique Parejo brought up the subject of
modifying the treaty. Attorney General Carlos Ji-
menez has voiced opposition to the treaty on several
occasions. Although the Supreme Court of Colom-
bia continues to support the legality of the Extradi-
tion Treaty, Jimenez claims the treaty violates
several articles of the Colombian Constitution.C
Colombian traffickers are responding to the govern-
the threats are being taken seriously in
light of the 26 November bombing outside the US
Embassy in Bogota.
Other Developments
The National Committee To Fight Narcotics Traf-
ficking (CNLCN) in Bolivia was reorganized follow-
ing the 8 October dismissal of its former director, Dr.
Rafael Otazo, over his controversial meeting with
cocaine king Roberto Suarez. The new head of the
Committee is Lt. Col. Carlos Fernandez, who has
moved his offices into a new building and replaced
many key staffers throughout the organization. Fer-
nandez has also appointed directors to oversee and
coordinate police operations and other coca control
activities in specific departments. According to the
US Embassy, the upheaval within the Committee-
normal for Bolivia-has affected the efficiency of the
organizations involved. Evidence of improved morale
came on 27 October, when special units of the
ment initiatives with intimidation and violence ... two
national police officers were killed in October during
drug control operations in the Lomas/Yari area of
Caqueta ... one of the officers was killed while lead-
ing a ground patrol on 12 October; the other by sniper
fire on 15 October while landing his helicopter at the
Lomas airstrip ... in response, the Colombian Air
Force staged a series of bombing and strafing runs
using several T-33 aircraft against airfields and sus-
pected cocaine processing facilities ... the traffickers
have threatened to assassinate President Betancur,
the Spanish Ambassador, and US Embassy officials
in retaliation for their role in the ongoing drug
crackdown ... they have also threatened to kill five
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Bolivian National Police led by Fernandez launched
several raids against suspected cocaine processing and
trafficking centers operated by Suarez. Logistic sup-
port for the operation was provided by the Bolivian
Air Force and included several aircraft, helicopters,
and T-33s. Suarez was not captured, but several of his
ranches in the Beni region were occupied, 300 kilo-
grams of cocaine seized, and his trafficking network
disrupted. Suarez counterattacked in the media, lam-
basting the Bolivian Government for being a US
lackey, accusing the US Ambassador of interfering in
Bolivian affairs, and leveling charges of corruption at
several high-ranking members of the Siles administra-
tion. Although no major traffickers were arrested, the
October raid is the first evidence that Bolivian police
and military units-under pressure-can conduct
joint operations against trafficking organizations.=
On 29 October, peasants in the Chapare region of
central Bolivia protested recent government restric-
tions on the sale and movement of coca leaves outside
the area. According to the US Embassy, more than
7,000 demonstrated peacefully in Cochabamba, the
region's major city. The following day, several public
buildings were occupied, and some of the demonstra-
tors went on a hunger strike. On 1 December, a
tentative accord reached between the government and
the campesinos included a provision that La Paz
would at least listen to a proposal from the Minister of
Campesino Affairs to permit free production and
marketing of coca in the Chapare. Siles is attempting
to placate both the United States and the coca
growers whose support he needs to maintain his
On 22 November, three men tried to kidnap Bolivian
congresswoman Nora Matienzo de Lopez, a member
of the Chamber of Deputies and vice president of a
congressional commission investigating links between
the Bolivian Government and cocaine traffickers. At a
press conference later in the day, other members of
the commission revealed that they had received
threatening phone calls and letters. A US Embassy
source claims that Colombian drug traffickers were
responsible for the attempted kidnaping. Bolivian
traffickers may make more frequent use of violence
and intimidation, favorite tactics of the Colombian
drug mafia, to counter increased government pressure
At the request of the Bolivian Government, a high-
level OAS commission visited Bolivia, 15 through 30
November, to evaluate La Paz's drug control pro-
grams. The commission examined Bolivian programs
to control the cultivation, processing, and trafficking
of illicit drugs, and considered various enforcement
measures, both social and economic, to aid them in
their efforts. The commission is expected to recom-
mend to Bolivia a wide-ranging program to control
and enforce the growing, processing, and trafficking
of drugs within an international framework and a plan
to prevent corruption within the organizations in-
volved. US officials speculate that the visit was
requested by Siles to drum up support for his drug
policies and to deflect domestic congressional opposi-
In mid-November, 19 Peruvian members of a US-
backed coca eradication team operating in the upper
Huallaga River Valley of north-central Peru were
killed by unknown assailants. The eradication team
had been operating without the protection of the
Special Civil Guard Unit (UMOPAR) since August,
when the military took over the political and military
administration of the region under the provisions of
the state of emergency. According to the US Embas-
sy, the restrictions placed on UMOPAR units by the
military have resulted in fewer arrests and lower
seizures of narcotics. The Peruvian Government has
acted quickly to assuage public outrage and postponed
the scheduled withdrawal of the armed forces from
the region. More important, the military has decided
to lift the restrictions placed on UMOPAR units and
will permit them to resume their interdiction and
Peru's first National Drug Abuse Prevention Confer-
ence-organized and cosponsored by the United
States Information Service, Lima-was held 29
through 31 October in Lima. The conference was
officially opened by the Minister of Health and closed
by President Belaunde and was attended by over 300
representatives of various civic organizations, church
and youth groups, the medical profession, educators,
news media, and the Peruvian Government. Among
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the topics discussed were: drug addiction, treatment,
prevention, and public awareness of drugs. According
to the US Embassy, a psychodrama illustrating the
impact of drug abuse on family life and values was
particularly effective. The Embassy believes the con-
ference has helped dispel the notion that drug abuse is
strictly a US problem and followup sessions are in the
works.
In late November, Ecuadorean National Police, sup-
ported by DEA and Ecuadorean Army units, de-
stroyed 75 hectares of coca and 18 coca paste labora-
tories, arrested five Colombians, and seized three
canoes with outboard motors. The operation took
place near the town of Santa Elena in northeast
Ecuador, not far from the Colombian border. Despite
bad weather and some mechanical problems with
support aircraft, the operation was a success and
underscores Quito's determination to take the offen-
sive against drug trafficking. Continued action on the
narcotics front by Ecuador will make it more difficult
for Colombian traffickers to find safehaven from the
ongoing crackdown in Colombia
Brazilian narcotics authorities continue to press for
increased drug control measures, minus the voice of
one strong advocate-Dr. Hugo Povoa, Director of
surfacing in Caracas despite his following through on
a number of antinarcotics campaign promises. His
accomplishments include: reactivating the moribund
US-Venezuelan working group established in 1978 to
control drug trafficking; the signing of an accord by
the Venezuelan and Colombian Ministers of Defense
giving formal recognition to cooperative efforts to
control narcotics trafficking and guerrilla operations
along their common border; and promulgating a new
antidrug law that revised and strengthened Venezue-
la's antiquated 1930s version. US Embassy sources
have expressed
concern over situations that belie Lusinchi's highly
publicized antidrug commitment. Responsibility for
narcotics policy and enforcement remains essentially
scattered and uncoordinated among various ministries
and policy and military units. The size of the well-
regarded narcotics squad of the State Security Police
had been reduced. The announced border patrol coop-
eration agreement with Brazil has not been formal-
ized but, rather, exists as a verbal arrangement
between regional commanders. Some veteran observ-
ers fear that the current government interest may
wane and follow the pattern of past Venezuelan
administrations on narcotics control-persuasive rhet-
oric and politically expedient, ineffectual gestures.
In Paraguay, the disposition of cocaine-processing
chemicals seized by the government remains unre-
solved, despite pressure from US officials. According
to Embassy and DEA reports, the intended recipient
of the chemicals almost certainly is Army strongman
Gen. Andres Rodriguez whose alleged involvement in
the Federal Police Narcotics Division, who resigned in
late November. A number of control programs have
resulted in a relatively brief time. The Planning
Ministry has allocated an additional $150,000 for
eradication, primarily for continuing coca eradication
in the Amazonas region. At the recent Second Annual
Drug Enforcement Conference in Brazil, Brazilian
and Colombian enforcement officials stated their
information-sharing preference as a source was secure
telephone lines for which the DEA Administrator
promised technical assistance. The US Customs Ser-
vice will conduct a narcotics detection course for the
Brazilian Customs Service in January 1985. In addi-
tion, a long-planned drug education program for new
military recruits will become operational in January
1985. The varied nature of these measures reflects
growing recognition by Brazilian narcotics authorities
of the need for a multifaceted approach to effective
narcotics control.
Doubts about Venezuelan President Lusinchi's tenac-
ity in actively pursuing control of the drug trade are
the narcotics trade dates back to the early 1970s.
Rodriguez apparently
still intends to divert the c emicals to traffickers
outside Paraguay. Paraguayan customs authorities
have refused to approve destruction of the chemicals
pending the outcome of a case in a local court
involving importation of the contraband substances.
Embassy sources believe that the government may
have initiated the case as a pretext to avoid destroying
the chemicals.
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Mexico
The discovery by Mexican federal police and Army
troops in mid-November of marijuana plantations and
processing facilities of unprecedented size and sophis-
tication in the northern border state of Chihuahua
underscores the marked resurgence of narcotics activ-
ity during the past year. The fields-many of which
were located near rail lines or highways providing
easy transport to the US border-reportedly were
irrigated by complex networks of pumps drawing
water from a river and were tended by forced labor-
ers. No reliable estimates have been made thus far of
the quantities of cannabis that were under cultivation
or had already been processed for shipment to the
United States, but unconfirmed reports say the
amount might have been considerably more than what
the Drug Enforcement Administration believes was
produced for export in all of Mexico in 1983. In our
judgment, Mexico has surpassed Jamaica as the
second-largest exporter of marijuana to the United
States, and we believe the discovery of such large
plantations is a further indication that Mexican nar-
cotics production and trafficking have rebounded
beyond the government's ability to regain control any
time soon. President de la Madrid reportedly remains
committed to reviving antidrug efforts, however, and
is likely to continue seeking increased assistance from
the United States, which has provided about half of
the approximately $15 million in funds and resources
that Mexico has devoted to narcotics suppression this
Caribbean
Operation Wagonwheel-a major US drug interdic-
tion effort-has affected trafficking patterns in the
Caribbean. Smugglers of Colombian marijuana have
shifted to routes in the western Caribbean instead of
the traditional path through the Windward Passage
and north through The Bahamas. Marijuana traffic
through the Yucatan Channel has increased; and
Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Honduran waters have
become increasingly popular staging areas for mari-
juana headed north. ~
The Jamaican Government showed signs of signifi-
cant progress in the antinarcotics front over the past
two months, an indication that US pressure for an
improved drug control effort may be paying off:
? On 25 November 1984, Jamaican Constabulary
Force (JCF) officers raided a major processing
facility and seized 10 tons of cured marijuana. The
facility included sleeping quarters for an estimated
50 workers and a lighting system that allowed them
to process marijuana 24 hours a day. Extensive
fields of marijuana also surrounded the apparently
permanent installation. The JCF reportedly burned
the processed marijuana and the wooden buildings
and planned to return the following week to destroy
the remaining crops. This seizure, as well as other
recent multiton seizures, was a good indication that
growers harvested a bumper crop this fall.
? Jamaican authorities have begun applying the ex-
panded enforcement powers of the recently amend-
ed Civil Aviation Act. On 9 November 1984, two
persons were apprehended after landing without
permission at an airport in Portland Parish. A
Jamaican magistrate imposed fines of $20,000 each
on the two violaters, who pleaded guilty. The traf-
fickers were deported and their aircraft confiscated.
Before the recent amendment, which became law
last month, the maximum fine would have been
$200 apiece.
On the downside, in a November conversation with a
US official, Prime Minister Seaga reemphasized his
opposition to eradication of marijuana with herbicides
sprayed from aircraft. Seaga pointed out the steps
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Jamaica had taken recently, notably the airfields bill
and the taxes levied on major traffickers, and added
that aerial spraying was simply too controversial in
Jamaica. Given the Prime Minister's strong opposi-
tion to spraying and his evident conviction that he has
gone as far as he can against the marijuana industry,
we believe it is highly unlikely that the Jamaican
Government will begin an aerial eradication program.
Southeast Asia
Prime Minister Prem and other high-level military
officials have approved plans to eradicate opium
poppy cultivation in Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son
Provinces in northern Thailand during the 1984-85
poppy season.
widespread opium cultivation in Burma.
Burma's test aerial eradication program has been
delayed due to flooding at the airport serving the test
site. Government officials are still confident that a
program will get under way this year. Some 200
hectares of poppy have been identified during aerial
training and photo missions over the test area in the
Shan State. The ineffectiveness of Rangoon's manual
eradication program prompted the interest in aerial
eradication, probably the most effective way to reduce
On 15 October the Malaysian Government, concerned
over rising narcotics trafficking, submitted legislation
to Parliament providing for preventive detention of
drug traffickers. The legislation would authorize the
Home Affairs Minister to imprison drug traffickers
without trial for an initial period of two years, subject
to extension in increments of two years. The new
legislation was prompted by the failure of laws en-
acted in 1983, including the death penalty for traf-
ficking more than 15 grams of heroin, to shut down
the major traffickers and financiers behind the drug
networks. The government also plans to enter into
several bilateral treaties that would improve
government-to-government cooperation in bringing
drug smugglers, dealers, and financiers to trial and
open the way for confiscation of their overseas as well
Approval of
eradication plans probably indicates that the Prem
government has reached a political consensus in favor
of opium eradication. With the exception of a small
eradication program late in the season last year,
previous crop destruction plans received strong politi-
cal opposition from many agencies of the Thai Gov-
ernment
A successful poppy eradication program
this year will reduce the 1984-85 harvest and may
deter future plantings.
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ing worse and promised stepped-up efforts at inter-
dicting processed narcotics. Only Pakistan submitted
an estimate for its 1984 opium crop-some 45 metric
tons. The Afghan delegate claimed that the regime's
land reform policy had succeeded in almost eliminat-
ing opium cultivation; yet, satellite imagery shows
that at least 4,000 hectares of poppies producing
approximately 160 tons of opium were grown in
Afghanistan in 1984. Iran, probably the world's sec-
ond-largest opium producer, would admit only to
Southwest Asia
In October, under the auspices of the United Nations,
Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani representatives held a
rare meeting to discuss regional narcotics production
and trafficking developments. All the delegates
-trafficking situation was grow-
d th t the dru
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having a large number of drug addicts. In light of
these comments, it is unlikely that either Afghanistan
or Iran will initiate serious efforts to control opium
President Zia in October ordered Pakistan's Ministry
of Defense to carry out an aerial photographic surve
of Pakistan's 1985 opium poppy crop,
traffickers convicted for dealing in amounts as little as
10 grams of heroin or 1 kilogram of opium be
sentenced from two years to life in jail. Most of the
major narcotics cases are now being tried by military
tribunals which, according to the Embassy, often
impose sentences of less than two years and rarely
greater than three. An important test of the new law
should occur soon when a heroin laboratory operator
who was arrested in the Khyber Tribal Agency in
October comes to trial. Although several laboratories
have been raided by authorities in the past, this
operator is only the second to be arrested. The first,
who was tried before the promulgation of the new
previously opposed an aerial survey as a security risk,
since opium cultivation was close to the Afghan
border and in areas controlled by militant tribesmen.
Dropping his opposition to the survey is another
indication that President Zia is increasingly con-
cerned with the severity of Pakistan's narcotics prob-
lem. Moreover, he may use the results of the survey to
disprove recent attempts by Afghanistan and Iran to
portray Pakistan as the major source of narcotics for
the region's vast number of addicts.0
The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that opium
producers in remote parts of Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province planted more poppies this October
and November than last year. According to the
Embassy, opium growers are probably responding to
increased demand, which reportedly has driven up
opium prices at the farm by 33 percent. Although
opium production is declining where the government
is combining enforcement operations with develop-
ment projects, the Embassy report suggests that 1985
may become the second consecutive year of increased
cultivation in areas where authorities have little or no
control. With good weather, the 1985 opium crop
could be as much as 60 percent greater than the
approximately 45 tons harvested in 1984. We expect
much of this increase would be converted into heroin
destined for US and European drug markets.
The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that, nearly a
year after President Zia signed tougher drug laws,
Pakistani courts still are not imposing maximum
sentences on convicted drug traffickers. Designed to
be serious deterrents, the new laws require that
laws, received only a three-year sentence.
Europe
The West German Government may increase its
efforts to get foreign governments to suppress drug
crop production, according to authorities who met in
October with visiting State Department officials. Not-
ing that narcotics production is increasing in areas
where Germany funds crop substitution programs,
Finance Ministry officials said they now plan to
specify crop suppression requirements in their rural
development programs and link their aid to efforts by
governments of drug-producing countries to enforce
production controls. These policy changes-more in
line with US narcotics control programs-reflect
greater determination by the Germans to attack
narcotics trafficking as close to its source as possible
and get producer countries to take greater responsibil-
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Opium Production Yields
in Thailand '
Summary A statistical analysis of reporting on poppy cultivation in Thailand
indicates that yields have declined steadily over the past four years,
possibly due to soil depletion and weather conditions. Average yields range
from 5 to 7 kilograms of raw opium per hectare, considerably less than was
once believed. Regional differences in yields arise from local growing
conditions and are not related to the presence of crop substitution
Introduction
Much of the world's supply of heroin comes from the
opium produced in a region of Southeast Asia known
as the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, and Laos).
Estimation of opium production requires knowledge of
both the number of hectares planted and the yield of
the cultivated area. Previous crop assessments have
suffered from limited information on yields.
Production of Raw Opium
Highland Units which are
major producers one year tend to be major producers
the following year-as indicated by the high correla-
tion in production from one year to the next. A
statistical model permits projections of the relative
production levels expected next year. However, since
data are not available for all Highland Units for every
year, it is not possible to conclude how often a minor
producer one year becomes a major producer the
following year. there are a
few new growers each year and a few Highland Units
show considerable annual variations in production.
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' These yields are for selected Highland Units
were interred from the production and hectarage
figures. The analysis demonstrates a significant de-
cline in yields over the past four years and suggests
land Unit
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Secret
regional differences in yields.
these regional differences arise from
local growing conditions and are not a result of the
crop substitution programs.
The yields decreased steadily from 7.7 kilograms per
hectare in 1981 to 5.4 kilograms per hectare in 1984.
Much of this decline has been attributed to soil
depletion and poor rainfall. It is clear from the
statistical analysis that the decline in yields is real
and not due to random fluctuations in the data. C
The distribution of the yields within a single year
shows a clustering by region, most apparent in 1983
(map). The higher yields are prevalent along the
ridges north of Chiang Mai and south of Chiang Rai,
with lower yields occurring in the outlying areas.
These high-yield areas are consistent with local
weather conditions for the 1983 growing season=
Another explanation advanced for the regional differ-
ences in yields relates to the crop substitution
programs in Thailand. The presence of such programs
provides farmers with superior growing techniques,
equipment, and fertilizers. If these factors are applied
to poppy cultivation, then yields are expected to be
higher in areas with major crop substitution efforts.
By examining the yields and the crop substitution
programs by Highland Unit, this idea was tested.
Outlook
The statistical analysis of field reports on poppy
cultivation offers a systematic framework for examin-
ing both yields and overall opium production. The
dramatic decline in yields over the past four years is
unlikely to continue, since yields cannot fall much
lower. Different yields in different Highland Units are
probably attributable to local growing conditions, not
to the presence of crop substitution programs, as was
earlier believed. This finding does not preclude an
effect from crop substitution over
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Using 1983 data, the average yield for Highland
Units with crop substitution programs was compared
to the average yield for Highland Units without such
programs. The respective averages were 5.81 and 6.28
kilograms per hectare, and a statistical test revealed
no significant difference between these two values.
Thus, the crop substitution programs do not account
for differences in yields reported at the Highland Unit
level. Nevertheless, it is possible that these programs
induce yields over a smaller region and some further
research will be required to address this issue.
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Summary
Arms Transfers
Arms Transfers: Significant Sales and Negotiations
s
an negotiations from the fall of 1984 are presented.
This article presents a listing and analysis of recent significant arms sales,
negotiations, and trends. An item may be considered significant for
political, military, or economic reasons. Prices will be listed when possible.
Sale
d
Algeria also is negotiating with both France and the
USSR for new air defense systems. The French
electronics firm Thompson-CSD recently sent a sales
team to Algeria to demonstrate its ability to upgrade
Soviet equipment now in the Algerian inventory. They
also took the opportunity to demonstrate weaknesses
in the Soviet equipment, presumably suggesting
French replacements. The presence of Soviet Air
Defense Chief, Marshal Koldunov, at the 1 November
National Anniversary celebration unsettled French
Embassy personnel who fear losing the estimated $1
The Soviet Union agreed in principle, during Presi-
dent Assad's mid-October visit to Moscow, to provide
Syria with new Soviet military equipment and in-
creased quantities of equipment already in Syrian
Kuwait became the first non-Bloc customer for Soviet
SA-13 and SA-14 antiaircraft missiles when Minister
of Defense Sabah signed agreements worth over $30
million during his August visit to the USSR. Also
included were spare parts for the SA-8 launchers that
were delivered to Kuwait in October.
Saudi Arabia signed an Industrial-Military Coopera-
tion Agreement with Brazil in October. The agree-
ment includes exchanges of technology and training
personnel and the ioint production of arms.
Tucano trainer aircraft, Astros multiple rocket
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launchers, and Osorio tanks. F_
Europe
Greece announced that it would buy 40 Mirage 2000s
from France and 40 F-16 fighters from the United
States. The decision follows six years of prolonged
negotiations over terms involving substantial and
complex ofrset arrangements for Greek defense and
civilian industries. Athens reduced its total order from
100 to 80 aircraft, but plans to purchase an additional
20 fighters of one or the other type in three years. F_
Africa
Togo became the first foreign customer for the Epsi-
lon trainer aircraft when it ordered three from France
in October. Over 150 of these aircraft have already
been delivered to the French Air Force.
Guinea-Bissau has received as many as five MIG-21
fighters and three MIG-21 trainers from the USSR.
This is the first known delivery of MIG aircraft to
Central America
Nicaragua took delivery of substantial amounts of
Soviet military equipment in October. A Bulgarian
ship unloaded armored cars, attack helicopters-the
first anywhere in Central America-and three batter-
ies of radar-controlled antiaircraft guns-Nicara-
gua's first. Cuba delivered two minesweepers and one
patrol boat. In November a Soviet cargo ship, the first
to directly deliver combat weapons to Nicaragua,
unloaded four small coastal minesweepers, additional
attack helicopters, and probably other military equip-
ment. Another Soviet cargo ship delivered two more
MI-8 medium-lift helicopters, which are routinely
reconfigured with rocket pods and bomb racks.F
West Germany sold BO- 105 helicopters to Mexico
and Honduras for $8 million and $6 million, respec-
tively. Mexico will receive six aircraft; and Honduras,
transport aircraft from Italy for $28 million
Guatemala purchased an unknown number o
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South America
Chile took delivery of two warships for its fleet. The
SS Almirante Cochrane, a County-class frigate and
former HMS Antrim, arrived in September from the
United Kingdom. The SS Simpson, a West German-
built Type 209 submarine, was turned over to the
Chilean Navy in the same month and is expected to 25X1
arrive in Chile in late December. 25X1
Argentina also took delivery of a West German sub- 25X1
marine. The TR-1700-class Santa Cruz left for Ar-
gentina in September.
Bolivia bought 18 T-33 jet trainer aircraft from
France for $6 million. Long-range Bolivian plans call
for the acquisition of three to six more modern
aircraft over the next three to five years.
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Peru has purchased $8 million worth of general
purpose bombs from South Africa. Working under a
30 November deadline to spend an authorized $16
million, the Peruvian Air Force ordered these muni-
tions from Pretoria which was the only country willing
to provide financing. Peru wanted 100-percent credit
in the deal.
Israel made its first sale of the Manned Portable
Anti-Tank Weapons System (MAPATS) to Venezuela
for an estimated $5 million. The Venezuelans will get
25 launchers and 300 missile rounds. Delivery is
scheduled for April 1985
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Summary
Communist Activities
Nicaragua: Attempts To Develop A
Communist-Type Educational System
The Sandinistas are trying to instill Marxist-Leninist ideology in the
Nicaraguan educational system following the examples of Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Such attempts have been generally successful, but strong
resistance has been encountered from church-affiliated schools. Now that
the elections have occurred the Sandinistas will probably try to increase
r,roee,... r,._ II
The Government of Nicaragua, dominated by the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), is ac-
tively trying to follow the Communist method of
indoctrination in its educational system. Since coming
to power in 1979, Sandinista educational changes
have included:
? Acceptance of Soviet and Cuban assistance in the
Nicaraguan educational system.
? Use of educational content permeated by Marxist-
Leninist ideology.
? Attempts to control private religious education.C
Soviet and Cuban Assistance
Nicaragua receives extensive cooperation in the field
of education from Cuba and the Soviet Union includ-
ing aid agreements, academic scholarships, and teach-
er exchanges.
The major areas of Cuban and Nicaraguan coopera-
tion are student and teacher exchanges and training:
? A delegation of teachers and student organizations
headed by new Nicaraguan Education Minister
Tunnerman visited Cuba in October 1979 to learn
about the Cuban educational system.
? In late 1979, over 1,000 Cuban teachers were sent
to Nicaragua to help in a nationwide literacy
cam-
paign. Since 1981,
as many as 2,000 u an teachers in Nicaragua,
down to 1,500 at the present time.
? Approximately 1,200 Nicaraguan students have at-
tended the schools on Cuba's Isle of Youth each
year since 1980.
? Cuban and Nicaraguan media reported that about
1,000 Nicaraguan youth arrived in Cuba in Febru-
ary 1984 for several months of intensive teacher
training. In June over 200 new Nicaraguan primary
school teachers were reported to have returned from
Cuba.F----]
Soviet cooperation in Nicaraguan education consists
mainly of academic scholarships for study in the 25X1
Soviet Union and some advisory and assistance
programs:
? In December 1980 the Soviet Union agreed to
provide for technical advice and institutional sup-
port for the reorganization of Nicaragua's higher
education, according to a State Department report.
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Secret
Major Entities Involved in Education
FSLN National Committee
Department of Pro- National Associa-
paganda and Politi- tion of Nicaraguan
Educators, Carlos
cal Education
(DEPEP), Leonel Carrion Cruz,' Co-
Espinoza Linart a ordinator, 19 July
Sandinista Youth
Association of San- Directorate Mem-
dinista Children, ber for Press and
Ana Morales (indi- Information, Car-
rect educational los Nunez Tellez,a
link) President, GRN
di
i
n
(
il
State Counc
l Committee
CPSU Central Committee
PCC Centra
l
i
f S
Internal Education
Education, Cul-
Propaganda De-
a
oc
Academy o
Department, Anto-
ture, and Science
partment, B. I.
Sciences
nio Diaz Ruiz
Department, Jose
Stukalin,- Deputy
Carneado
Felipe C
Chairman, Presidi-
Rodriguez b
um of the Supreme
Soviet
Culture Depart-
Science and Education
ment, V. F.
Institutions
Shauro, candidate
Department
member, CPSU
Central Committee
-
rect educational
link)
ez b
Higher Education,
Fernandez Alva-
rez.
Minister of Cul- Council President, Ministry of Cul- State Committee for
Houses.
GRN h1.. . E Minister of Education, Fernando Cardenal Minister of Educa- Council Vice Presi- Minister of
P oko- Vocational and Tech-
Martinez;a Carlos Tunnerman Bernheim tion, Jose Ramon dent, respectively, nical Education, N. A.
was Minister until July 1984. Fernandez Alvar- for Ministry of f'yev Education and Petrovichev C
Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal
Martinez,, brother of Fernando
Demichev c Printing Plants, and
the Book Trade, B. N.
Pastuklov c
ro and secretariat b - -- - -
Minister of Higher Standing Work Minister of Higher Academy of Sciences
Education, Fernan- Committee for and Secondary
do Vecino Alegret,b Education, Sci- Specialized Educa-
Vice President, Cu- ence, and Sports, tion, V. P. Yelyu-
ban-Soviet Friend- Mirta Rosa Rodri- tin
ship Association guez Alonso,
Union of Young
Communists' Sec-
retary of Ideology
ture, Armando En- responsible for
rique Hart Davo- Ministry of Cul-
los,b Member, PCC ture, Fidel Castro
politburo Ruz, First Secre-
tary, PCC politbu-
a Members, Sandinista Assembly.
b Members, PCC Central Committee.
Full members of the CPSU Central Committee.
? In 1981 the Soviets provided assistance for the
construction of training schools and equipment for
the National University, according to the US Em-
bassy in Managua.
? In December 1982 Nicaragua and the Soviet Union
signed an agreement recognizing the equivalency of
their educational degrees.
? The number of Nicaraguans studying in the Soviet
Union has grown from 135 in 1980 to about 1,000 in
1983.
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Ideological Content in Education
The Sandinistas have used both Soviet and Cuban
educational systems and concepts to gain firmer con-
trol of the ideological content of Nicaraguan educa-
tion. They have increased the Marxist content of
texts, implemented a literacy campaign modeled after
Cuba's, and promoted a "new man" concept similar to
Using Cuban and Soviet material, the Sandinistas
have increased the Marxist content of text:
? In its 1981 report on Nicaragua, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights noted
charges by parents that textbooks were highly politi-
cal in content and criticized the dogmatic Marxist-
Leninist content of Cuban educational materials.
themes and emphasized Castro's guidance and as-
sistance to the Nicaraguan Revolution.
in Nicaragua had pro-Cuban, pro-Sandinista
? The US Embassy in Managua reported that a
Cuban agreement to provide literary material has
noticeably increased the flow of Soviet Bloc books
into Nicaragua.
asserts that, although domestic and imported books
are not censored, few books are imported from the
West while Marxist literature is freely circulated.
? The State Department's 1983 human rights report
Another early development was the Sandinistas' use
of a "new man" concept in their educational pro-
grams. This concept reflects the Soviet philosophy
which continues to stress the need to "mold the new
man," that is, changing man himself in order to make
a revolutionary transformation of society:
? In 1979 Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Education
Miguel de Castilla spoke of the need to shape a
"new man" and announced that the National Au-
tonomous University would offer courses in Marx-
ist-Leninist political training in order to achieve this
goal.
? Also in 1979 the Association of Sandinist Children
requested the establishment of a political-education
school for children 6 to 14 in order to develop the
"new man" mentality and integrate them into the
Described as the first goal of Sandinista education,
the formation of the "new man," also called the new
Nicaraguan, was outlined in a November 1982 Minis-
try of Education working paper. The paper listed
political and social values that individuals must devel-
op to enable them to participate in the construction of
the Sandinistas' new revolutionary society. These
values included discipline, a revolutionary view, anti-
imperialism, internationalism, and identification with
Nicaragua conducted a National Literacy Crusade in
1980 similar to a campaign conducted in Cuba in the
early days of the revolution. The Nicaraguan literacy
campaign was administered by Father Fernando Car-
denal Martinez, who became Nicaraguan's Education
Minister in July 1984 (see inset). Fernando's brother
and current Nicaraguan Minister of Culture, Ernesto
Cardenal Martinez wrote that he was impressed by
the 1961 Cuban campaign which combined the teach-
ing of basic reading and writing skills with socialist
During 1980, classes were suspended for five months
to let 80,000 volunteers, mostly high school students,
participate in the literacy campaign. According to the
US Embassy, the FSLN called the national literacy
campaign "the greatest political seminar in Nicara-
guan history." The US Embassy commented that the
campaign plus the continued commitment to adult
education is an excellent way to indoctrinate Nicara-
guans in FSLN ideology. By 1984, political ideology,
especially that of Sandino, was being taught every-
where from preschool to civil defense courses to
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Fernando Cardenal Martinez
Fernando Cardenal Martinez is a Jesuit priest, who
directed the Sandinista literacy campaign in 1979
and 1980 before becoming vice coordinator of the
Sandinista youth organization JS-19J in 1980 and
then second in command of the Sandinista Defense
Committees in 1983. In July 1984 he became Minis-
ter of Education-an appointment the head of the
Jesuit Order in the Vatican had forbidden him to
accept. He has been pro-Sandinista since 1970 when
he was fired from his post as vice rector of the Jesuit-
run Central American University in Managua (UCA)
for supporting a leftist-inspired student strike. In
1973 he founded the Revolutionary Christian Move-
ment, which spawned many subsequent FSLN lead-
ers. He told an interviewer in December 1982 that he
had "not found, in this work I now do with youth, the
least contradiction, inconsistency, or conflict of con-
science with the orientation I had all the way through
my Jesuit training."
? Responding to parents' complaints in late 1982
about government attempts to indoctrinate their
children in Marxist-Leninist ideology, Education
Minister Tunnerman stated that, despite the revolu-
tion's guarantee of the existence of private schools,
only the state can make policy and it cannot ignore
the reality of the class struggle.
? In addition, students in church-affiliated schools
have been required to spend part of their vacations
in FSLN -coordinated work programs.
The Catholic Church, however, has, on occasion,
successfully challenged the Sandinistas. For example,
this year at one Catholic high school the Church
removed and replaced proregime teachers despite a
Sandinista threat to close the school if it made such
change. The Sandinistas did not act on their threat.
Cuba, when faced with a similar problem in early
1961, closed the 250 schools operated by the Catholic
Church. Students in Cuba have also been refused
admission to universities for continued participation
in religious activities, according to the State Depart-
Control of Private Religious Education
Sandinista attempts to force a Marxist curriculum on
churcn-affiliated schools have had only limited suc-
cess. Unlike Cuba and the Soviet Union, many Nica-
raguan high school students attend church-affiliated
institutions. The Sandinistas have tried to reach these
students through the curriculum as well as through
outside programs:
? The Sandinistas use threats, such as school closures,
to press for the appointment of proregime teachers
to Catholic schools.
? To continue their work, teachers and students
throughout the country are required to attend Civil
rlAf,-n-P courses for political indoctrination,
? Marxist materials have been used in in Catholic
-.
equi
schools .
-
=teachers often glossed over such material and
concentrated on more traditional Catholic
teachings.
ment's 1983 human rights report.
The policy in the Soviet Union is even more restric-
tive. The Law on Religious Associations forbids in-
struction of any religious teachings in educational
institutions. Soviet textbooks and teachers depict reli-
gion as unsanitary, unhealthy, corrupting, morally
degrading, and encouraging ignorance.
After gaining power in 1979, the Sandinistas formed
government and party organizations to achieve direct
party control of education. They have developed a
rudimentary organizational structure resembling the
educational bureaucracy in Cuba and the Soviet
Union:
? The FSLN's Department of Propaganda and Politi-
cal Education performs functions similar to the
Cuban Communist Party's Internal Education De-
partment and the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union's Propaganda Department.
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? Both the Nicaraguan Minister of Education and
Minister of Culture are highly placed members of
the Sandinista party just as their counterpart Cuban
and Soviet ministers are in top positions in their
parties. Like their Cuban and Soviet counterparts,
the Nicaraguan ministries concentrate on dissemi-
nating party ideology to the education system.
? An organization that appears to be developing Cu-
ban and Soviet styles is the Association of Sandinis-
ta Children (ANS). Like the Cuban and Soviet
Pioneer organizations, the ANS is a propaganda
vehicle to indoctrinate young children in party
ideology.
Assessment
Although Soviet educational assistance to Nicaragua
has grown, Cuba has provided more substantial aid in
the form of volunteer teachers and training, and
probably has had more direct influence. Direct Soviet
and Cuban involvement in Nicaraguan education will
probably continue at its present level for the next few
years and decline as the Sandinistas gain greater
experience in educational control. However, the San-
diristas are likely to maintain their dependence on
Soviet and Cuban literature for Marxist educational
material.
Despite complaints from parents, the FSLN has had
some success in incorporating Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy into its educational materials, primarily by taking
advantage of the opportunities to obtain materials
from Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Nicaraguan
literacy campaign of 1980, which mirrored Cuba's
program, provided opportunities to indoctrinate Nica-
raguans, particularly adults, in FSLN ideology.
The Sandinistas have had more limited success in
gaining control of students receiving private religious
education. Many of Nicaragua's students still attend
Catholic schools, and the Sandinistas have been un-
able to dominate the Catholic Church. However,
there is a small faction of Catholic priests who form
the "Popular Church" and continue to support the
Sandinistas. Mostly from religious orders outside the
direct control of the Church hierarchy, members hold
various official and semiofficial positions in defiance
of Vatican and Jesuit orders to leave or refuse such
appointments. Nevertheless, these priests have appar- 25X1
ently failed to convince the majority of the population
to withhold support from the Church hierarchy.
Recently there have been some indications of efforts
to lessen external influences and ease internal policies:
? Nicaraguan teacher trainees returning from Cuba
are replacing Cuban teachers, so that, by the end of
the year, only a few Cuban teachers may be left.
? There has been less mention of Soviet themes, such
as the "new man concept," in Nicaraguan educa-
tional literature, suggesting an attempt to back
away from close association with the Soviets.
? The FSLN has shown restraint in dealing with
church-affiliated schools as part of an attempt to
improve relations with the Catholic Church.
However, these may have been only temporary mea-
sures aimed at reducing tensions prior to the elections.
We expect that as long as the Sandinistas stay in
power they will continue to take opportunities to
exploit education for their own gain.
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