INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200710001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Review
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GAVE OUT OR MARK OR
International Issues
GI IIR 84-003
June 1984
copy 473
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' Intelligence
International Issues
Review
This publication is produced by the Office of
Global Issues. Some issues contain articles drafted in
other offices. Some articles are preliminary or
speculative in nature, but the contents are formally
coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the
views of a single analyst; these items are clearly
designated as noncoordinated views.
Secret
G1 11R 84-003
June 1984
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Arms Transfers Upgrading Fighter Aircraft
Many countries are upgrading their fighter aircraft rather than
replacing them with new, high-priced aircraft. Manufacturers of
power plants, electronics equipment, and weapon systems stand to
benefit from the increased interest in fighter upgrades.
Export Prospects for West European 5
Armored Vehicle Manufacturers
West European manufacturers of armored vehicles are caught
between the increased ability of Third World customers to produce
their own armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles,
and the strong preference for US or Soviet manufactured tanks
among those Middle Eastern countries which are the only Third
World countries who can afford main battle tanks.
Poland: Procurement of Western Weapons
Two recently uncovered cases of illicit arms shipments suggest that
Poland purchases large quantities of Western weapons for resale on
the international gray arms market.
iii Secret
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Communist Activities Cuba: Expanding LDC
Economic Services Program
The Cuban economic services programs in the Third World afford
Havana both an opportunity for political penetration and a major
source of hard currency to support the Cuban economy.
The Soviet Military Advisory and 23
Training Program for the Third World
Moscow has an extensive program of advisory and training assist-
ance to support its arms export efforts that also provides significant
opportunities for political penetration.
China's Third World Military
and Economic Programs:
Growing Commercial Interests
China's shift to an arms sales and economic aid policy in the Third
World aimed more at economic benefit than political gain is
reflected in large increases in both of these programs in the last five
years.
International Narcotics Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
Government indifference and military corruption are contributing to
Syria's growth as a major transit point for the receipt and shipment
of illicit narcotics, including opium, morphine, and heroin.
as Enforcement Falters
Prime Minister Seaga's efforts to curb marijuana exports have been
stymied by resource limitations and legislative footdragging. The
manual eradication program has had no impact on the growing
exports of marijuana from the island.
Comments and queries are welcome
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Upgrading Fighter Aircraft
Summary Many countries are upgrading their fighter aircraft rather than replacing
them with new, high-priced aircraft. Manufacturers of power plants,
electronics equipment, and weapon systems stand to benefit from the
increased interest in fighter upgrades. These revenues, however, will not
compensate for the expected loss of $1.4-4 billion in foreign sales that
airframe producers will experience, as upgrade programs reduce the export
market for new fighter aircraft during the next decade.
Fighter Life Extension Programs
Programs to extend the operational life of existing
fighter aircraft provide an attractive alternative to
new aircraft for countries seeking to modernize their
air force. The high costs of procuring advanced
fighters and recent advancements in electronic weap-
on systems have generated interest in fighter up-
grades. According to US attache reports,
the addition of a new power plant and avionics suite to
an older fighter costs one-fourth to one-third of the
$20-25 million unit price of most new fighters. For
example, the inclusion of a head-up-display (HUD)
and associated equipment, not available on fighters
manufactured in the 1960s, and a new engine to an
F-5 would cost about $5 million. Furthermore, mod-
ernization programs eliminate the additional prob-
lems of introducing a new training and logistic pro-
gram that traditionally accompany the purchase of
new fighter aircraft.
The most likely candidates for modernization are
multirole fighters now approaching the end of their
operational life (see table).
=these aircraft have the greatest potential for
upgrade because of their ability to adequately per-
form air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The gener-
al condition of the aircraft, however, can be a limiting
Several countries have already begun or are consider- 25X1
ing extending the usefulness of their existing fighters.
The majority of these projects concentrate on improv-
ing an aircraft's power plant, avionics, and weapons
delivery capabilities, although structural modifica-
tions to the airframe also are often necessary to
accommodate the aircraft's improved performance.
These projects include:
? The Chilean Air Force is upgrading and moderniz-
ing their 1950-vintage Hawker/Hunter fighter-
bombers with an improved radar and modified 25X1
gunsight to improve the aircraft's survivability and
effectiveness in combat.
Secre.
GI IIR 84-003
June 1984
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Possible Candidates for Fighter
Modernization and Life Extension
Primary
Mission
Entered
Series
Production
Approximate
Number
Exported a
Number of
Countries
Operating
Aircraft b
Interceptor-
Light Attack
1964
1,848
Interceptor-
Ground Attack
1958
808
14
Interceptor-
Ground Attack
1953
608
12
a Actual number of operational aircraft will be less due to attrition
and war losses.
b Excludes original country of manufacture and Warsaw Pact
recipients.
? Switzerland plans to upgrade 52 of their Mirage ? The Spanish Air Force wants to extend the life of its
Ills and extend their operational life into the 1990s 56 F-5s to the year 2000.
by adding new electronics equipment and modifying OSpanish Air Force officials concede-d-that
the fuselage for improved subsonic performance, they would not have funds following the purchase of
and press reports. the F-18 for an F-5 replacement.
Great Britain are planning various modifications to
The most extensive upgrade program to date involves
the F-4 Phantom. Israel, West Gemany, Japan, and
their fleets of F-4s.
? Singapore also may upgrade their A-4s but with a
new engine.
notes that the Israeli Air Force plans to install a new
radar and cockpit avionics and is attempting to
develop a standoff guided munition with a range of 40
miles for its Phantoms.
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Supplier Response
Companies that produce components for fighter air-
craft stand to benefit substantially from these mod-
ernization programs. Manufacturers that originally
supplied the equipment for the basic aircraft also are
in a favorable position to profit from upgrades. Peru,
for example, chose a head-up-display and laser range-
finder supplied by the French electronics firm Thom-
son-CSF to enable their Mirage 5s to operate Magic
550 infrared air-to-air missiles, according to press
reports. The Venezuelan Air Force also decided to use
French expertise to modernize the engines and avion-
ics of their Mirage Ills and 5s.
Manufacturers of subassemblies also have provided
upgrade packages for both Communist and Western
aircraft in foreign inventories. Marconi of Great
Britain, for example, is supplying head-up-displays
and technical assistance to China to improve their F-7
fighter aircraft.
Impact on the Fighter Export Market
While suppliers of subassemblies and components
prosper from upgrade and modification programs,
airframe manufacturers probably will suffer. We
believe that financial constraints and the completion
of many inventory modernization and expansion pro-
grams will cause the export market for jet fighters to
experience a possible 40-percent decline from the
10,000 exported during the past decade, and upgrade
programs will depress the market further.' Approxi-
mately 200 to 500 fighters will be upgraded during
the next decade in lieu of new aircraft purchases, in
our opinion, which would represent a loss of between
$1.5-4 billion in foreign sales for airframe producers
worldwide.' For aircraft manufacturers in Western 25X1
Europe such as Dassault of France, who have come to
rely on exports to bolster their production abilities and
reduce costs for domestic armed forces, a decrease in
foreign sales will strike a serious blow to the develop-
ment of their overall military aircraft capabilities,
regardless of the revenues West European electronics
and engine firms earn.
Manufacturers of new aircraft also will face stiff
competition from countries offering upgraded fighters
for export.
is offering used J-35 Draken fighter to Aus-
tria, which is experiencing budgetary constraints and
may not be able to purchase new Mirage 50's.
According to press sources, Singapore Aircraft Indus-
tries may now be in a position to offer modernized
A-4s on the international fighter market.
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Summary
Armored Vehicle Manufacturers
Export Prospects for West European
inventories of Third World militaries.
The prospects for West European armored vehicle exporters are poor.
Main battle tanks are now affordable only by countries in the Middle East,
most of whom prefer US and Soviet equipment. Many other Third World
states have begun to produce their own armored personnel carriers (APCs)
and reconnaissance vehicles (RVs). West European manufacturers are
attempting to stay in the market by offering a series of inexpensive light
tanks, APCs and RVs equipped with main guns, and infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs), but the demand for this equipment has not been estab-
lished. We believe West European manufacturers will find a market in
providing new guns, electronics, and engines for vehicles already in the
Armored Vehicle Manufacturers
West European armored vehicle manufacturers have
relied on domestic and intra-European demand for
their products and have had only modest success in
the international market over the past decade (tables 1
and 2). Declining defense budgets and the end of
many rearmament cycles have now reduced the Euro-
pean demand for new armored vehicles. Recent de-
fense budget cutbacks are forcing cancellations and
delays in planned procurements of armored vehicles
by most West European countries. West Germany,
for example, has canceled acquisition of the Wiesel
RV and the
Major European importers of armored vehicles-
Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey-are in the
midst of replacement cycles expected to end by 1987
and have few funds available for further purchases[
At the same time, armored vehicle manufacturers
face a declining demand for their tanks and APCs in
Table 1
West European Armored Vehicle
Production and Demand, 1974-83
Equipment Number Customers
Produced
West European prospects have been
limited because the United States and the Soviet
Union have become major suppliers to Third World
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Table 2
West European Armored Vehicle Sales
to the Third World by Region, 1974-83
Supplier Number Recipients
Middle Latin Asia and Sub-Saharan
East America Pacific Africa
countries. LDC debt problems and declining oil reve- tanks is limited to countries in the Middle East that
nues among Middle Eastern states have also restricted have shown little interest in the West European
sales opportunities. models. Iran is supplementing its US-supplied inven-
tory with inexpensive Soviet-style tanks provided by
the Third World market for expensive main battle
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North Korea and hopes to acquire similar models
from China. Libya, Syria, and Iraq acquire most of
their tanks from the USSR
to trade journals.
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Saudi Arabia, an exception, has expressed its prefer-
ence for the West German Leopard II, but Bonn's
reluctance to export tanks in the face of objections
from Israel has prevented a sale. The Saudis also have
considered the British Challenger, but now appear to
is not considering the French AMX-32
and AMX-40 as replacements for its older AMX-30s.
Neither French tank has drawn export orders despite
a major marketing effort by Paris since 1981.
The demand for West European APCs and RVs is
also declining because Third World states are increas-
ingly able to produce these less sophisticated vehicles
themselve variety
of states-Argentina, Chile, Egypt, and South
Korea-manufacture US and West European APCs
and RVs under license, limiting export opportunities
largely to component sales. Several producers-in-
cluding Brazil, Israel, and South Africa-also have
recently made the jump from licensed assembly to
indigenous design and manufacture of APCs and
RVs. Foreign suppliers instead are now sought out
primarily for inexpensive surplus vehicles or those
that fill a specific military requirement.
Light Tanks and Heavy APCs and RVs:
A Limited Market
To counter these trends, West European defense
industries hope to meet what they believe to be a
demand for light, multirole vehicles that will meet
Third World military and financial constraints,=
Manufacturers believe
that Third World, states-lacking the funds, opera-
tional requirements, and technical expertise to field
main battle tanks-will increasingly seek modern
light tanks designed for operations by their armies. In
anticipation of this demand, Italy's OTO-Melara is
developing the OF-30 light tank, scheduled to begin
production in 1985. To improve sales prospects in
Latin America, OTO-Melara has agreed to coproduce
the OF-30 with the Brazilian firm Engesa, according
Similarly, West European producers of APCs and
RVs envision that their versatile products will supple-
ment and, in some cases, replace tank inventories,
according to trade journals. APCs and RVs equipped
with main guns-ranging from 30-mm to 105-mm-
are being offered to fill a perceived demand for
vehicles with high firepower which are less expensive
and easier to maintain than tanks. For example,
according to open sources:
? French firms offer several RV series-AML, AMX,
EBR, and VBC-with 90-mm guns, while the
AMX-lOP and AMX-10RC mount 105-mm guns.
? The British Scorpion RV is offered with a 30-mm,
76-mm, or 90-mm gun.
? MOWAG of Switzerland recently introduced a
Piranha APC mounting a 105-mm gun.
Manufacturers have already had some initial success
marketing APCs and RVs eauirmed with main guns.
To meet future market demand, manufacturers in
Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are
developing IFVs better suited for combat because of
their high firepower and mobility (table 3). IFVs are
designed to be more mobile than most tanks and are
equipped with a rapid-fire chain gun and side ports
for infantrymen to fire their weapons from inside the
vehicle. West European IFVs will not begin produc-
tion until 1987, however, giving US and Soviet manu-
facturers already exporting IFVs an opportunity to
establish market positions before the first European
vehicles roll off the assembly line. We believe that
traditional West European customers will supplement
their inventories with European IFVs once they be-
come available because most are standardized with
the operational components of earlier, widely exported
APCs and RVs.
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Table 3
West European IFVs Under Development
a Represents armament displayed on prototype models; most vehi-
cles will have interchangeable turrets for various armament
mountings.
b Including crew.
Armament a Speed Troop
(km/h) Capacity b
Oerlikon 70
25-mm cannon
Oerlikon 66
35-mm cannon,
7.62-mm MG
Rarden 30-mm 75
cannon
We also believe, however, that manufacturers may
have only limited success marketing light tanks,
APCs and RVs equipped with main guns, and IFVs.
The market for these vehicles has been slow to
develop, with Third World customers showing only a
small interest in similar models that have been on the
market since 1976. For example, while several coun-
tries-Thailand, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia-have
reviewed Argentina's TAM light tank-incorporating
a West German Marder APC chassis and a 105-mm
gun-none have placed orders for the vehicle. We
believe that Third World customers-contrary to
manufacturer expectations-are willing to wait for an
improvement in their economic situations rather than
purchase these vehicles as less capable substitutes for
tank inventories.
Refurbishment and Upgrading:
Greater Opportunities
The refurbishment and upgrading of vehicles already
in the field is a more promising area for West
European manufacturers. Financially strapped Third
World states, unable to afford new equipment, are
increasingly seeking upgrades to enhance the capabili-
ties of current inventories. By maintaining continuity
in their inventories, upgrading also allows customers
to minimize training requirements and standardiza-
tion problems.
Third World nations are seeking to improve the
accuracy, firepower, and mobility of their existing
tank inventories. According to trade journals, West
European firms are being sought out to equip these
vehicles with:
T-54/55 tanks, while Cockerill of Belguim is offer-
ing its 90-mm gun to Latin American operators of
the US M-41 Bulldog tank.
? High-horsepower engines. Teledyne Continental
Motors of the United Kingdom is reengining the
Jordanian Army's Centurion tanks with its AVDS
1790-2CC engine. Poyaud of France also recently
upgraded Argentina's US-made M-4 Sherman
tanks with its 400HP V-8 powerpack and is seeking
additional orders from operators of French AMX-
13 light tank fleets.
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? Optical fire-control systems.
Thomson-CSF also is offering its DIVT-13 aiming
device for installation in a variety of foreign tanks
including: the US M-48, Soviet T-55 and T-62,
West German Leopard I, and British Centurion.
Several West European APC and RV manufacturers
also are involved in programs to increase the firepow-
er and performance of older vehicles. France's
Hispano-Suiza-one of the most active refitters with
seven turrets for application on vehicles in the 5- to
15-ton range-recently upgraded French RVs pur-
chased by Mexico with its Lynx 90-mm gun. Arma-
ment also is being developed for refitting onto lighter
platforms unable to withstand high-gun recoil forces,
while a few companies have designed integrated gun
turrets with stabilized aiming devices to permit firing
while on the move.
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Summary
Poland: Procurement of Western Weapons
involvement in arms and drug smuggling.
Two recently uncovered cases of illicit arms shipments suggest that Poland
purchases large quantities of Western weapons for resale on the interna-
tional gray arms market. In one case, the weapons involved probably were
purchased for Bulgaria, which may wish to scale down its direct dealings
with Western suppliers due to recent press allegations of Bulgarian
The US Customs Service recently arrested officers of
two New York firms for attempting to divert a
shipment of arms, ammunition, and security equip-
ment from the United States to Poland. According to
Customs Service officials, Customs agents seized the
following items at JFK International Airport as they
were about to be loaded aboard a chartered plane on
21 February 1984:
? 500 US manufactured Ruger AC-556 F fully auto-
matic rifles with folding stocks.
? 100,000 rounds of US made M198 5.56-mm
ammunition.
? A variety of sophisticated paramilitary and security
equipment including bulletproof vests, antibugging
devices, surveillance cameras, X-ray machines, and
night vision scopes.
Information developed by the US Customs Service
indicates that the weapons-ostensibly destined for
Mexico-were to be flown from New York to Europe.
After picking up an additional 1,000 West German
Heckler and Koch rifles in London and 75 boxes of
ammunition and 33 boxes of pistols in Brussels, the
pilot reportedly was to declare an in-flight emergency
and land in Warsaw.
The types and quantities of ordnance seized suggest
that Poland intended to transship or resell these arms
to another gray market customer. Polish forces do not
Ruger AC-556 F rifles seized by US Customs Service agents en
route to Poland. With a loaded weight of under 8 pounds and a
length of less than 24 inches with the stock folded, the Ruger is
compact, light, and easily concealable. It features semiautomatic,
three-shot burst, and fully automatic modes of fire, and shoots a
5.56-mm subcaliber, hypervelocity round with a very flat trajec-
use 5.56-mm rifles or ammunition, and the number of
weapons involved is too large for them to have been
acquired for familiarization or reverse engineering.
Developed for law enforcement agencies, the Ruger is
also ideally suited for use by terrorist, insurgent, or
criminal groups. Although only slightly larger than
many submachineguns, which fire far less powerful
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age.
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Customs officials are also investigating the possibility
that one of the New York firms involved in this
case-Global Research and Development-may be
connected with a Swiss firm with the same name,
which also supplies Western weapons to Poland.
A second recent arms seizure suggests that Poland
may serve as a purchasing agent for Bulgaria, which
has traditionally bought large quantities of Western
weapons for resale on the gray arms market. Because
of recent press allegations about Bulgaria's role in
international. arms and drug trafficking, however,
Sofia now may wish to reduce its profile. According to
a wide variety of press
reporting, on 2 May 1984 Greek authorities confiscat-
ed over 10,000 small-caliber Belgian Browning and
Spanish Astra pistols aboard a Cypriot freighter
bound from Bulgaria to North Yemen. In April 1984
a Syrian arms dealer in Austria brokered the sale of
similar quantities of the same weapons to Cenzin, the
Polish military supplier. Moreover, Kintex-the Bul-
garian state-controlled military supply organization-
sought the same weapons in late 1983 and had
-previously acquired goods from the Syrian broker via
Cenzin.
As with the US Ruger rifles, these Browning and
Astra pistols are not used by any East European
country. Their sale to gray market arms dealers,
however, would have earned Warsaw and Sofia hard
currency. These weapons also may have turned up in
terrorist or insurgent arms caches. Because of their
small caliber and size, these pistols can be easily
concealed or silenced and can be sold directly to East
European countries without COCOM's permission.
The acquisition of these pistols through a circuitous
route involving at least two private arms dealers
suggests that Poland and Bulgaria wish to retain some
element of plausible denial should these weapons
eventually turn up in the hands of a politically
embarrassing recipient.
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OCCrvL
Summary
Communist Activities
Cuba: Expanding LDC
Economic Services Program
East.
Cuba penetrates national economies and increases its presence and influ-
ence in much of the Third World by providing technical and economic
services. We estimate that more than 20,000 Cuban technicians were
assigned to development projects last year in some 29 LDCs. While several
setbacks reduced the number of technicians abroad from the record level
set in 1981, only 13,600 technicians were abroad five years ago. The
personnel are concentrated in teaching and medical services and construc-
tion work, with others placed as civilian advisers to ministries and planning
agencies. Although some technicians are provided free to many poorer
LDCs, wealthier clients pay hard currency for their services. We estimate
that Cuba charged an estimated $150 million last year from its overseas
personnel, an amount equal to about 10 percent of its total hard currency
export earnings. Recent developments may slow the growth of its civilian
presence in southern Africa and Latin America, but Cuba appears to be
shifting its attention to commercial development activities in the Middle
The Program
Havana uses its economic services program to achieve
several objectives in the developing world:
? Initiate and strengthen relationships with LDCs of
various political leanings.
? Exert direct influence on national bureaucracies.
? Earn hard currency.
? Communicate the Cuban version of Marxism to
large numbers of Third World students through its
teaching contingents.
? Enhance Cuba's international image as a champion
of poorer nations.
that in 1983 more than 20,000 Cuban techni-
cians were working in LDCs, nearly a 50-percent
increase over the number abroad five years ago (see
table). Medical personnel, teachers, and construction
workers made up the large majority of Cuban civil-
ians overseas, although Havana also placed some
4,200 other advisers and experts in a number of fields
suited to economic development. The Cuban contin-
gent abroad last year included:
? About 2,400 medical personnel in more than 20
LDCs, ranging from 750 people in Nicaragua to less
than 25 in a number of Sub-Saharan countries.
Most furnished basic health care in rural areas.
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Cuba: Economic Technicians
in Non-Communist LDCs, 1983 a
Number of
Persons
20,085
3,890
3,500
15
Sub-Saharan Africa
9,170
Angola
6,000
Benin
110
15
200
Equatorial Guinea
15
Ethiopia
1,000
Ghana
25
Guinea
240
1,000
225
30
150
Uganda
15
Latin America
6,315
Guyana
35
Nicaragua
6,200
Middle East
610
Iran
400
200
South Asia
100
Afghanistan
100
or fragmentary, the number given is a judgment within an estimat-
ed range.
? About 5,000 teachers concentrated in Angola
(2,000) and Nicaragua (2,000). Cuban teachers in-
structed at all educational levels, and some helped
design school systems based on the Cuban model.
? More than 8,500 construction workers, with most
employed on roadbuilding and housing projects;
Angola, Libya, and Nicaragua each hosted more
than 2,000 workers.
Terms of employment vary by recipient. For poorer
countries, such as Ethiopia and the majority of Afri-
can recipients, Cuba provides free technicians or
charges only a nominal amount. For others, such as
Angola and Mozambique, there are reports that Cuba
charges up to $1,000 a month in hard currency for
each technician. Wealthier LDCs-Algeria, Libya,
and Iraq-pay Cuba up to $2,000 monthly per person
in hard currency. These payments are transferred
directly to Havana. We estimate that Cuba charges a
total of about $150 million in foreign exchange a year
from its paying customers.
First Major Setbacks for Cuban Program
Havana's economic services program has been well
received by most Third World clients. While Cuba
has encountered some complaints about the quality of
its personnel or their activities, it still has been able to
increase its contingents abroad at a steady pace.
Recently, however, Cuba's program has experienced
unaccustomed setbacks:
? Grenada expelled nearly 700 Cuban technicians
after the invasion, forcing Cuba to abandon con-
struction of the airport that was its largest aid
project abroad.
? Suriname ejected Cuban personnel in October be-
cause of concern that their presence might provoke
a US intervention there as well.
? Cuba evacuated more workers from war zones in
Iraq-a move that was criticized harshly by Bagh-
dad and that cut deeply into Cuban hard currency
earnings from Iraq.
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Secret
? Angolan rebels this year have begun to mount
attacks specifically against civilian technicians; in
April there were 80 casualties in a bombing of a
facility housing Cuban workers.
Cuba probably will respond to these developments
with more careful planning of its foreign activities and
a tightening of control over its technicians to avoid the
appearance of illegal or otherwise unacceptable be-
havior. Havana also may step up efforts to create
more stable commercial and business ties as a way to
maintain and then expand its presence.
Impact: Political Returns Emphasized
Havana has tailored its services program to exploit
opportunities for influence in the Third World while
enhancing its international image. Castro has openly
admitted that Cuba provides educational assistance to
exert long-term influence on LDCs. Cuba expects to
gain from its educational presence overseas through
the rise to prominence of alumni of Cuban programs,
as well as a broad diffusion of Cuban-trained students
within the technical and political infrastructure of
LDCs. According to open sources, Cuban teachers
have influenced primary and secondary school sys-
tems in Ethiopia, Guyana, Nicaragua, and South
Yemen using the Cuban model, which emphasizes
Communist ideology. The Cuban press also has re-
ported that educational personnel are selected for
overseas duty on the basis of their loyalty and the
strength of their Communist beliefs. They then re-
ceive six months of training on the political and
educational goals of their mission, as well as on social
and economic conditions of their assigned country.
Other open sources report that in the last five years
Cuban teachers in Angola have taught over 300,000
students. According to the press in Managua, 80,000
Nicaraguan students were taught by Cuban teachers
in 1981.
Economic technicians placed in ministries and plan-
ning agencies also advance Cuban policies in the
LDCs. An estimated 4,200 Cubans are assigned as
advisers to the economic bureaucracies of more than
20 Third World countries. These personnel, unlike
most Cuban civilians overseas, work closely with host-
country officials on a daily basis. They have been
hired to assist in economic planning, trade develop-
ment, agricultural reorganization, mass communica-
tions, social and cultural affairs, and other specialties.
In the course of their duties, they probably introduce
or reinforce Communist concepts of social, political,
and economic organization. We estimate that between
1,000 and 1,500 such advisory personnel are in Nica-
ragua, dispersed throughout every sector of govern-
ment. Another 1,500 are in Angola and nearly 500
are in Mozambique.
Cuban medical and construction personnel are usually
less effective instruments of influence because they
often operate in sparsely populated areas and their
work is apolitical. Cuban construction workers live in
self-contained camps near their jobsites, and most are
motivated by material incentives. Still, Havana propa-
gandizes the activities of its medical and construction
personnel in the interest of international image build-
ing. The personnel themselves, particularly the medi-
cal technicians, also may have a positive impact on the
rural populaces that benefit directly from their serv-
ices.
Cuban economic technicians also are capable of play-
ing a limited military role in their assigned LDC. For
example, construction workers in Grenada had access
to small arms, and Cuban teachers have had to defend
themselves in Nicaragua.
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While their
fighting skills are limited, Cubans are expected to be
able to use small arms in response to hostile action
because they often are stationed in dangerous areas.
Most Cubans have had basic military instruction in
the armed forces or militia organizations
Managua has hinted about plans this year to replace
some 1,500 Cuban teachers with Nicaraguans
trained in Cuban institutes. Rebel activities have
already caused the substitution of young Cuban
men with recent military training for most women
and older technicians.
Economic Spinoffs Growing in Importance
Hard currency earnings from Cuba's activities abroad
last year more than offset any negative impact the
export of some skills might have had on Cuba's own
economy. We estimate that Cuba charged about $150
million for its technical assistance programs in the
Third World last year.' Nearly a fourth of all Cuban
economic technicians abroad worked under hard cur-
rency contracts in Arab countries; other receipts came
from Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. The ex-
port of labor also has slightly reduced unemployment
in Cuba-a desirable side effect for a country whose
rapidly growing 3-million-member work force is al-
ready underemployed.
Prospects
We believe that recent events in the Third World may
slow the growth of the Cuban technical services
program, at least over the near term. These include:
? In Latin America; the expulsion from Grenada and
growing problems in Nicaragua. In the wake of the
public revelation of Cuban penetration of Grenada's
military and economic establishment, we expect
many potential recipients to proceed more cautious-
ly in permitting a Cuban presence, particularly in
the Western Hemisphere. In Nicaragua, even
though the Cubans remain firmly entrenched,
about 10 percent of that figure from its civilian technicians
overseas. Actual receipts could have been less than charges because
? In southern Africa, further progress in regional
negotiations may reduce tensions and narrow the
opportunities for Cuba to maintain large numbers of
technicians in the area, particularly if Western
influence begins to grow. Therefore, the Nkomati
accords and Angola's Cuban troop withdrawal dis-
cussions are both threats to the substantial Cuban
civilian presence in southern Africa. Also, Angolan
rebels this year have announced they now will
include civilian technicians in their attacks until all
Cubans leave the country. More than one-third of
Cuban technicians currently abroad are concentrat-
ed in the region.
Nonetheless, we expect Cuba to pursue all available
opportunities to preserve its technical presence
abroad. Through its program, Cuba has increased its
influence abroad at low cost, maximized foreign
exchange earnings, and eased unemployment at home.
For their part, some economically desperate LDCs
will continue to accept material assistance and aid
personnel from almost any source, including Havana.
In the event of Cuban troop withdrawals from major
client states, Cuba may find it has to rely primarily on
its economic technicians to preserve its Third World
influence.
While maintaining as much as possible its existing
Third World ties, Cuba may now be trying to promote
the commercial construction component of the pro-
gram and forge more economic relationships in the
Middle East and diplomatic ties in Africa.
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secret
The head of Cuban overseas construction has publicly
stated that Havana actively seeks a larger role in
commercial construction activities. The important
commercial relationship with Libya appears healthy,
and this year Havana named high-level foreign assist-
ance experts as ambassadors to Baghdad and
Maputo. New construction projects in Congo and
Angola already have been set up.
All these activities will generate hard currency re-
ceipts for Havana while setting the stage for a
growing presence in the Middle East and Africa
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The Soviet Military Advisory and
Training Program for
the Third World
Summary Since the mid-1970s, the number of Soviet advisers, instructors, and
technicians in LDCs and the scope of military training provided in the
USSR has expanded significantly. In 1983 some 17,500 Soviet military
personnel (excluding troops) were stationed in LDCs as diverse as Peru,
Tanzania, and Syria. In addition, an estimated 4,200 trainees from the
Third World-most of them from the Middle East, North Africa, and
South Asia-went to the USSR for military training. Both are record
numbers. Moscow's willingness to provide this assistance reflects its view of
the opportunities to increase its presence, and hopefully influence, in
LDCs. During the past decade, the program also has earned substantial
hard currency for Moscow, although such considerations apparently
remain secondary to the Soviets.
Experts in LDCs: Expanded Presence
and Functions
Between 1978 and 1983 the estimated presence of
Soviet military advisers, technicians, and instructors
in LDCs grew by more than 60 percent, largely as a
result of higher volumes of arms deliveries, which
included increasingly sophisticated weapons (figures 1
and 2). Security/intelligence assistance gave further
impetus to the growth, as did Moscow's continued
willingness to provide services under more generous
financial terms than the West. In 1983 the Soviet
contingent was by far the largest in Syria, which
accounted for about 30 percent of the total Third
World presence. Large groups also were in Libya,
Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Yemens,
while smaller numbers were posted to countries like
Mozambique, Algeria, India, Peru, and Nicaragua.F-
About three-fourths of Soviet military and paramili-
tary personnel in LDCs probably are assigned to LDC
armed forces. Armies, almost always the largest
service that absorb the greatest volume of weapons
imports, account for an estimated 30 percent of these
personnel. Air forces and air defense units, although
much smaller, together probably comprise a similar
share because of the inability of most clients to
operate and maintain even moderately sophisticated
weapons. Few Soviets, by contrast, are assigned to
LDC navies-almost always the smallest service.
Soviet officers sent to LDCs typically function as
advisers to the various services and-to a lesser
extent-as academic instructors. In recent years these
officers have-
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(in Ethiopia currently,F
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acUret
Figure 1
USSR: Military and Security/Intelligence
Personnel in LDCs, 1974-83
Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia Middle East
North Africa
a Estimated number of persons present for one month or more.
Excludes troops.
? Occasionally, provided operational support in a
combat situation
Military Training in the USSR:
Diverse Courses and Clients
Since the late 1970s, Moscow has provided an ex-
panded variety of military and related instruction in
the USSR to foreign students from a growing number
of LDCs. Training is focused on the operation, main-
tenance, and repair of weapon systems and tactical
military planning, largely because of continuing high
levels of arms deliveries to LDCs. Anticipated deliver-
ies of new types of weapons-to either established or
new clients-often will lead to the dispatch of trainees
at least several months before the equipment is re-
An estimated two-thirds of all LDC military and
paramilitary trainees sent to the USSR in 1979-83
(figure 3) received instruction on ground weapons,
fighter aircraft, and air defense hardware-the most
important military items supplied by Moscow.
Specialized training is concentrated in the USSR
because of the lack of facilities and other support in
LDCs to accommodate training on advanced weap-
ons, in security/intelligence, and for staff officers.
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Figure 2
USSR: Comparison of Military Deliveries and
Military Presence in LDCs, 1974-83
USSR: Military Advisory Personnel
Present in LDCsa
Thousand persons
20
Moscow also encourages training in the USSR be-
cause of the favorable environment there for propa-
gandizing frequently impressionable LDC personnel.
Regardless of the military rank of the trainee, his
country of origin, or the substantive content of specif-
ic courses, heavy doses of political and ideological
indoctrination almost always are integral parts of
Soviet instruction.
and open sources indicate that
Moscow provides training at:
? Military and higher military schools, which offer
theoretical and practical instruction, mainly for
officers.
? Academies, which typically give advanced training.
? Special institutes, which ordinarily provide brief
courses on specific subjects, such as weapons firing.
? Autonomous facilities, where LDC enlisted men are
taught operational and technical subjects.
? State manufacturing facilities, such as tank plants.
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oVtIoL
Figure 3
USSR: Military and Related Trainees
From LDCs, 1974-83
South Asia
North Africa
a Estimated number of departures. Actual departures to the USSR probably
are significantly higher and more evenly distributed than depicted above;
a poor data base, however, prevents better quantification.
Soviet policy stipulates that, training be geared to the
"cultural level" of students,
rainees from more advanced s, suc
as Syria, ostensibly receive instruction similar to that
provided Soviets, while Angolans, North Yemenis
and others are taught at a more basic level.
Surging Hard Currency Receipts
One of Moscow's motivations for providing advisory
and training assistance to LDCs is financial. Al-
though Soviet terms remain concessional compared
with those of Western suppliers, Moscow increasingly
has attempted to generate hard currency earnings
from the program. This policy was adopted after the
1973 Middle East war, when key Soviet clients in the
Middle East and North Africa realized large in-
creases in oil revenues. Most of the LDCs now
obligated to pay for Soviet assistance are major oil
producers, although Moscow sometimes demands re-
imbursement from less affluent clients
At the same time, the Soviets
have been willing to provide services on more conces-
sionary terms than previously to some clients in
difficult circumstances.
that hard currency obliga-
tions of LDCs for technical services totaled over $600
million in 1979-83-more than twice the amount
during the previous five years. Some three-fourths of
the 1979-83 total probably came from payments for
Soviets posted to LDCs, since Moscow absorbs most
of the costs of training in the USSR
An Assessment: Gains Outweigh Costs
The large-scale expansion of the Soviet advisory and
training program since the mid-1970s reflects mutual,
practical benefits to Moscow and its clients, although
both sides have not fully realized their aims. To the
extent that the expanded Soviet presence abroad and
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stepped-up training in the USSR have been at West-
ern expense, Moscow has realized its goal of denying
or reducing non-Communist initiatives. In some
cases-mainly among ideologically compatible, heavi-
ly dependent clients-Moscow has been able to trans-
late an active program into true gains in influence.
Improvements in Moscow's position attributable to
the training program often are manifested when pro-
Soviet alumni assume positions of key responsibility in
their government. Most serve in radical regimes, such
as Angola, Syria, and Ethiopia. Similarly, high-rank-
ing Soviet military advisers often are at or near the
power center because the military is the leading
political force of many Third World nations.
Although most recipients view Soviet advisory serv-
ices and training as essential elements of military
assistance and some have complimented Soviet ef-
forts, Moscow has failed to realize gains in influence
proportionate to growth in the Soviet program. Soviet
clients, regardless of their political orientation, dis-
trust Moscow to varying degrees, questioning its true
motivations for providing assistance.
a deterioration
in Soviet relations with specific clients and the finan-
cial burden of providing support to some nonpaying
LDCs could lead to selectively reduced assistance.
IOn
working level, substantive deficiencies and Soviet
heavyhandedness are frequent complaints.
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Soviet Weltanschauung historically has emphasized
the long term, viewing setbacks largely as events
posing future opportunities. Moscow's commitments
to this perspective-manifested also in arms transfers,
the main tangible determinant of the scope of the
advisory and training program-presages continued
growth in the program. Nevertheless, political and
other constraints could slow the rate of expansion.
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Summary
China's Third World Military
and Economic Programs:
Growing Commercial Interests
China's economic aid and military transfer programs in the Third World
have changed dramatically over the past few years. In the late 1970s,
Beijing began to emphasize military sales to earn hard currency and to
reduce its economic aid to conserve resources for its own economic
development. Since then, Beijing has reduced grant aid and emphasized
commercial payoffs in almost all of its dealings with developing countries.
The new policy represents a radical departure for Beijing in the Third
World. Earlier, China had provided both economic and military aid on
generous terms to poor clients who often could not afford a more costly
Western presence. China never attempted to compete with other military
suppliers in the quantity or sophistication of weaponry. Military agree-
ments featured mostly small arms and, for some clients, old-model tanks
and aircraft. The economic program highlighted showy projects such as the
Tan-Zam Railway in Africa and sports stadiums in a number of countries.
An Emphasis on Profits
China has achieved enviable results since it began its
sales drive in LDCs just five years ago. Moving much
more opportunistically to exploit market conditions in
LDCs, Beijing has been able to:
? Increase its arms sales almost 10 times over those of
the previous four years. Since 1980, China has
signed agreements to sell $6 billion of weapons, 95
percent of them to Egypt, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and
Pakistan.
? Expand hard currency technical service contracts
that provide economic technicians to LDCs for
development projects. China now has nearly 30,000
technicians employed in LDCs, the highest level
ever and double the number in 1980.
? Shift from the use of grant aid and interest-free
loans in its economic aid programs to an emphasis
on earning hard currency from harder repayment
terms and some interest charges.
Military Sales: A Product of the 1980s
Since Beijing began to pursue its new arms sales
policy, it has sold more than $6 billion of weapons to
LDCs, a sixfold increase over all previous sales since
the program began in the 1950s. Opportunities pro-
vided by the Iran-Iraq war have propelled China into
second place among Communist military suppliers,
ahead of all of the East European countries combined
but still far behind the USSR. Beijing has picked up
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secret
China's Expanding Relations With the Third World, 1973 and 1983
O Afghisto
lEOYPt ', 1=~
___ Tdge Rwanda fi__
?Q
Chilee \- `; 3
wire- n
Economic agreement
Military agreement
Military and economic agreement
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paVerde@ ,
The Bambia .
1. the
Sierra Le e-
-ti eriau
Lt6Ya. --~ o~dao a a+
Spa tame and
Principe al-incial
Guinea
1 i
V
,omorbs
agaaca
Laos
itch
Western Samoa, not shown on
this map, has an economic
agreement with China.
C.A.R.-Central African Republic
P.D.R.Y.-People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
Y.A.R.-Yemen Arab Republic
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Gjil eli
g maha
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nl
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Table 1 Million us $ Table 2
China: Military Transfers China: Military Agreements
to LDCs, by Year With LDCs, 1980-83 a
1978 233 96
1979 193 100
1980 940 252
a Recent information places deliveries at $1.3 billion for 1982 and
$1.4 billion for 1983.
several new clients in the 1980s-including Iran,
Jordan, Libya, and Liberia-bringing its customer list
to 46. The new emphasis on financial returns has
changed the direction of the Chinese program away
from traditional Asian and African clients to wealthi-
er Middle Eastern LDCs.
The Soviet Union's refusal to supply Iraq at the
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war provided China with
its most important breakthrough into the internation-
al arms market. Since then, Iraq (which first bought 3
57
Chinese arms during the war in early 1981) has 497
become Beijing's best customer, with more than $3.8 60
billion of orders for 70 F-7 fighter aircraft, antiship 436
i
il
m
ss
es, machineguns, ordnance, and support equip-
ment. A few other major clients make up 75 percent
of the remaining orders:
? Egypt has bought more $1 billion in Chinese arms,
mostly naval equipment and jet fighters.
? Pakistan has signed $1 billion in contracts for FT-6 ? Libya signed agreements worth more than $300
aircraft, T-54 tanks, A-5 Fantan fighter aircraft, million for military equipment, including antiair-
and other military equipment. craft guns and ammunition.
? Iran has purchased ground and air defense equip-
ment, ammunition, and other supplies worth $500
million.
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aecrer
These deals have included newer, more sophisticated
equipment than China had traditionally been able to
supply. For example, T-69 tanks were first deployed
with Chinese forces in 1981, and MIG-21 jet fighters
have been exported for only two years.
Deliveries Hit Record Levels. China's drive to fill
orders rapidly produced record deliveries in the 1980s.
Average annual arms shipments of $530 million' to
Third World clients doubled those of any previous
year. Iraq has received about one-fourth of the deliv-
eries since 1980, including China's first export of
MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, substantial numbers of
medium tanks, field and air defense artillery, and
other military support equipment. Other major hard-
ware transfers shipped to LDCs for the first time
include:
? Tanks to Iraq.
? Jet fighters, patrol boats, submarines, and subma-
rine chasers to Egypt.
? Fantan fighters to Pakistan.
Basis for New Policy. Beijing's new aggressiveness in
the international arms market underscores China's
intent to pursue a competitive commercial arms ex-
port policy that emphasizes hard currency earnings
rather than politics as the basic criterion for conclud-
ing agreements. Beijing has made administrative
changes to facilitate such sales.
Because sales to
Iraq have become so important to China, Beijing
opened its first overseas arms sales office in Jordan in
May 1982 to facilitate weapons transactions with
Baghdad.
China's more hardnosed approach to arms transfers is
reflected in the reduction of grant assistance that was
a key feature of China's program before 1978. We
estimate that $615 million of the $1.3 billion of
Chinese military transfers to 38 clients before 1979
was provided free of charge; since then, we have
documented less than $10 million in military grants.
Economic Relations: Competing for
Commercial Development Contracts
As with the military program, China is cutting down
on giveaways in its economic aid and is now empha-
sizing commercial returns and hard currency earnings
from technical services. The economic program has
evolved from a modest effort featuring liberal
amounts of grant aid to a major campaign to sell
technical services and equipment for profit. Beijing's
current leadership is trying to push China into the
world economy by introducing its most salable
items-such as cheap labor-into the international
marketplace. In its aid program, China is now seeking
to combine enhanced hard currency earnings with
benefits to LDC economies.
On the commercial side, China is working on housing
in Kuwait, a number of construction projects in Iraq,
and a $375 million railway line in Nigeria. Last year,
Beijing signed a $1.6 billion railway construction
agreement with Libya and is negotiating a similar
contract with Algeria. Even though they are newcom-
ers in the international commercial contracting field,
the Chinese have been named general contractor on
several major projects in LDCs, where they select
subcontractors (generally Western or Japanese com-
panies) and arrange for local services.
New Aid Hits Record Lows. Since 1980, China's new
economic aid pledges have fallen dramatically, a
victim of China's economic retrenchment in the post-
Mao period. Only a few traditional recipients such as
Nepal, Pakistan, and several African countries have
received significant new commitments to carry out
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programs already in progress. Agreements in the
1980s comprise less than 15 percent of China's total
economic aid since 1956 and have followed a down-
trend that began in the mid-1970s. Chinese economic
aid increased somewhat in 1983 over 1982; most was
provided on somewhat harder terms than before-
shorter repayment periods, low interest charges, and
almost no grant aid. The terms of Chinese assistance
still are far more generous than that of most other
Communist and some Western donors.
Technical Services: A Fast Growing Business. The
provision of project personnel has become the main-
stay of China's economic program in LDCs as com-
mitments of capital to aid projects dwindle. The
number of Chinese employed in the Third World in
1983 has doubled since 1980-mostly in Iraq, Jordan,
and North Yemen. Beijing also is using a small
technical presence to build relationships with such
Soviet-oriented Marxist states as Angola and Mozam-
bique.
Technical services, which formerly were provided free
by Beijing to almost all aid recipients, now are being
promoted to earn foreign exchange. We estimate that
about half of the 29,000 Chinese economic techni-
cians employed by Third World countries in 1983
were serving under commercial contracts with the rest
financed through aid agreements.
Beginning in 1980, China moved rapidly to export
some of its abundant labor on commercial terms and
began to bid on construction projects in Arab oil
states. To handle its new sales in the Middle East and
elsewhere, China opened offices in Dubai, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, and North Yemen.
some 42 companies are involved in
construction projects abroad and 40 new labor con-
tracts were signed during the first half of 1983 alone.
In 1983 China exploited another potentially lucrative
source of funds for the first time by providing labor to
projects financed by multilateral agencies in Morocco,
Nepal, Nigeria, and Somalia.
China has been successful in marketing services be-
cause of the reasonable salary rates for personnel-
from $2,000 per month for project managers down to
$400 a month for laborers. These charges compare
with as much as $8,000 a month for personnel from
Table 3
China: Economic Aid to LDCs, by Year
1981
1982
other Communist countries. Another selling point is
the industriousness of Chinese personnel and their
ability to endure difficult working conditions that
would not be tolerated by skilled workers from other
countries.
China still is providing a substantial number of
technicians to LDCs under aid agreements. Most of
the technicians that China provides free of charge are
delivering basic services in public health and educa-
tion. We estimate that 1,200 doctors and at least 500
teachers from China worked in the Third World
(mainly Africa) in 1983.
most technicians and
laborers under this program cost the LDCs only about
$100 to $300 monthly for local subsistence.
Prospects Are Mixed
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China's new approach in its economic aid and military 25X1
transfer programs in the Third World will provide
Beijing with a number of opportunities to expand its
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influence in the LDCs And strengthen its own domes-
tic economy. We expect China to continue its oppor-
tunistic approach to arms sales, moving in where a
client with a large Soviet inventory-as Iraq-is
denied resupply in a crisis because of political reasons.
It may be difficult for Beijing to maintain its current
level of military sales once the Iran-Iraq conflict is
resolved. Sales to these two countries amount to 55
percent of Chinese overall sales, and 70 percent of the
new sales in the 1980s. Other limiting factors include:
? Increasing competition among global arms
suppliers.
? The accelerated pace of Western arms technology.
? The demand for more sophisticated arms by LDC
clients.
Orders will continue, however, to stem largely from
traditional clients such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Beijing will also serve smaller clients, such as Sub-
Saharan African buyers that depend on Beijing for
small arms and more basic military equipment. Even
if military sales levels decline, we foresee an active
military presence for China in the Third World
through the end of the decade because military
deliveries will be sustained at an unusually high rate
under several billion dollars of contracts still out-
standing.
In the future, we believe that China will emphasize
the export of basic military equipment, spare parts-
especially for Soviet equipment-and support facili-
ties. This is the type of military export commitment
that can be readily met by China's defense industries.
China probably will be able to increase sales to
countries like Egypt and Somalia, which receive Arab
funds to maintain their Soviet-built military establish-
ments. China is a far more desirable supplier than the
USSR from the point of view of the conservative Arab
states.
We also believe that China will move aggressively to
market the few competitive weapon systems that it
produces, such as its MIG-21 fighter and improved
medium tanks. Weapons like these will appeal to a
wider group of customers and result in a more stable
and predictable flow of orders.
On the economic side, many of China's new ventures
in LDCs are commercially oriented and provide the
opportunity for hard currency earnings. The Chinese
now are focusing on contracts with Middle Eastern
countries-Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Kuwait-that
can pay hard currency for Chinese services. Prospects
for marketing civilian technical services appear al-
most unlimited because of the low salary rates
charged and China's reputation for quality work. We
believe that economic and technical exchanges will
continue to be the mainstay of China's program
through the end of the century.
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Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
Summary Syria is a major transit point for the receipt and shipment of illicit
narcotics-opium, morphine, and heroin-from Southwest Asia, through
the Middle East and Turkey to Europe. The Syrian Government officially
frowns on drug activity, but heroin trafficking is now flourishing, primarily
due to Syria's location astride traditional Middle East smuggling and trade
routes, porous borders, and merchants with commercial and family links to
neighboring countries. Moreover, apparent government indifference and
military corruption have created an environment favorable to narcotics
traffickers. We believe Syrian involvement in narcotics trafficking will
grow over the next few years as Southwest Asian opium production
increases and as Syrian traffickers refine and improve their distribution
networks.
Narcotics Processing and Trafficking:
Dimensions of the Problem
Evidence is mounting that Syria is becoming a
major-if not the foremost-opiate trafficking and
processing country in the Middle East. Morphine and
heroin processing laboratories are reported to be
operating in the northwest coastal region of Syria, and
all modes of transportation are being used to move
opiates abroad. According to official Syrian statistics,
narcotics-related arrests and drug seizures by Syrian
law enforcement officials are rising rapidly, despite
the absence of a vigorous antinarcotics program.
Official Syrian statistics also reflect that the quanti-
ties of opium, morphine, and heroin seized increased
by more than 400 percent from 1981 to 1983. In 1983
Syrian officials investigated nearly 350 drug cases-
an increase of nearly 50 percent from 1981-and
arrested nearly 800 persons-an increase of nearly 30
percent.'
' Syria has a long history of smalltime illicit narcotics trafficking.
There is no significant poppy cultivation, however, and societal
constraints have restricted drug use to lower-class and rural
workers, military people based in Lebanon, and Syria's tiny
Syria's rise to prominence as a transit point for
narcotics can be attributed to less favorable traffick-
ing conditions in other countries in the turbulent
Middle East. The Turkish antinarcotics campaign has
resulted in stepped-up enforcement; the civil war in
Lebanon has hampered smuggling; and the fanatical
policing and interdiction efforts of the Iranian clerics
have threatened drug smugglers with death.
Syria, in contrast, offers both a government uninter-
ested in the narcotics problem and favorable locations
for refining and trafficking (see map). The northwest
coastal region, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea
and the mountains of Turkey, affords suitable terrain
along with a cadre of influential individuals willing to
ignore illicit activity. Latakia Province in particular is
mountainous and crisscrossed by trails, making it easy
to establish and operate a secret refinery. According
to State reporting, the region is a stronghold for
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Narcotics Smuggling Through Syria
Turke
To Europe N!c rt - jartii
Saudi Arabia
Caspian r
Sea
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Sudan
Jordan
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central authorities, and the dominant inhabitants are
members of President Hafiz al-Assad's Alawite mi-
nority sect. With Alawites holding most key positions
in the government and providing a disproportionate
number of Army officers, we believe corruption buys
the most influential connections.
Aleppo, a dynamic commercial and industrial city in
northwest Syria, is reported to be the major center of
heroin trafficking between producing areas in South-
west Asia and consuming countries in Europe. US
Embassy sources reported Syrian heroin laboratories
in Aleppo in 1980. The city also has available both
ample manufacturing and warehouse space to conceal
refinery operations and plentiful supplies of acetic
anhydride and other essential chemicals, according to
State reporting. Moreover, Aleppo merchants have
long-established commercial ties with Lebanon and
Turkey. Many of these merchants are Kurds with
family ties in Turkey or Iran, or Armenians with
connections in Turkey, the Middle East, Europe, or
the United States. The Kurdish and Armenian com-
munities also offer a bridge to a number of active
underground organizations.
Syrian traffickers rely on numerous routes to acquire
heroin and move it into the world market. Opium or
heroin arrives in Syria via traditional smuggling
routes through Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Paki-
stan. From Aleppo, the drugs move overland into
Turkey or on to Latakia, Tartus, Damascus, or Am-
man, Jordon. According to DEA sources, the Syrian
ports of Latakia and Tartus are the embarkation
points for large shipments, while the Damascus and
Amman airports are used by couriers trafficking in
smaller amounts of heroin. The drugs apparently are
carried through a number of countries-Lebanon,
Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia
among others-before arriving in Western markets.
The illicit drugs appear to be destined primarily for
distribution centers in Western Europe-Switzerland,
Belgium, and the Netherlands-and to a lesser extent
in the United States. Recently, there has been some
indication that Spain and Germany are developing
into distribution centers.
DEA sources 25X1
also report direct heroin trafficking by Syrians to
West European and American markets. The wider
distribution network is facilitating a greater and more
constant flow of heroin while at the same time making
interdiction more difficult for European law enforce-
ment officials. This increased activity is reflected in
the rising number of arrests of Syrian nationals in
West European countries.
Government Tolerance
The Syrian Government apparently lacks both the
resources and the will to control the trafficking
problem. The increased level of defense spending and
military mobilization for Lebanon have undoubtedly
limited the resources available for customs and anti-
narcotics police. Neither the Antinarcotics Section of
the Damascus Northern Division Police nor the
Syrian Customs have adequate narcotics training
programs, and poor coordination between the two
agencies often thwarts interdiction efforts. The Syrian
Government also lacks a commitment to drug control.
Though Damascus is a signatory to several interna-
tional narcotics agreements, drug regulations are
rarely enforced. In July 1983 Pan Arab Narcotics
Bureau Director Gharaibeh protested the lack of
Syrian efforts to control the trafficking of heroin to
Europe and the United States.
Political, military, and religious tensions in the Mid-
dle East are clearly diverting Syria's attention from
narcotics control, but evidence is accumulating that
both local officials and higher level government au-
thorities are beginning to view trafficking as a source
of foreign exchange and local currency. Embassy
reporting indicates that there is at least some coopera-
tion between border guards or Customs officials and
heroin traffickers. Local authorities ignore drug
transactions, and it is commonly accepted that Syrian
gold merchants trade gold for raw opium.
' Syria is a signatory to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Single Convention,
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the Arab
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Military Corruption
We believe that the current level of narcotics process-
ing and trafficking could not be accomplished without
the involvement of the military because of its special
status in the Syrian Government and its dominant
role in Lebanon, a major transshipment point for
Syrian drugs. One indication of military involvement
is that, contrary to the situation in most countries
troubled by trafficking, narcotics smuggling actually
flourishes in areas of Syria least hostile to the central
authorities and the military. Although these allega-
tions have not been fully corroborated, evidence is
accumulating that members of Syria's military are
reaping rewards from drug dealing.
ics.
near the Syrian frontier in Turkey, selling heroin to
buy weapons for an Iranian underground group.
Moreover, European authorities have arrested several
terrorists carrying both Syrian passports and narcot-
Outlook
The "Syrian Connection" is likely to become a grow-
ing problem for European and US authorities over the
next few years.
of Syrian heroin.
State, and DEA sources that significant quantities of
Southwest Asian opium are being smuggled into
Syria. We believe that production from this area is on
the rise, and that Syrian traffickers will get their
share of this opium. Government indifference and
military corruption and the enormous profits to be
earned are additional factors that will likely motivate
Syrians to attempt to increase their refining and
distributing activities. This effort will be facilitated by
the large number of Syrians living in Europe and the
United States who provide an in-place network of
potential couriers and distributors. Continued reliance
on large numbers of couriers and direct contact with
dealers throughout Europe and the United States will
also make it more difficult to interdict large quantities
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individuals associated with insurgents
and terrorists are involved in the narcotics trade. We
also believe that terrorist operatives have little to risk
by trafficking in heroin within Syria. Numerous
insurgent and terrorist groups operate from camps in
Latakia Province and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa
Valley of Lebanon, both known centers of smuggling
and trafficking activity.
Turkish diplomatic sources believe
that Syrian-based groups such as the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the
Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan may be trading drugs for guns. According
to the Turkish press, an Iranian Kurd was arrested
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Jamaica: Drug Trafficking Increases
as Enforcement FaltersF----] 25X1
Summary Jamaican marijuana traffickers are apparently increasing marijuana ex-
ports from the island. We estimate an increase over the 1,750 tons exported
last year. The use of larger vessels and planes may be responsible for the in-
crease. Prime Minister Seaga faces a difficult reelection next year and is
unwilling to alienate marijuana growers-a potentially significant constitu-
ency-by pursuing effective drug enforcement. The manual eradication
program, now three years old, has made little progress in reducing 25X1
marijuana cultivation and stands almost no chance of significantly affect-
ing rising exports.
Increased Marijuana Trafficking
Increasingly sophisticated drug smuggling techniques
allowed Jamaican traffickers to ship larger amounts
of marijuana-some 1,750 tons according to the Drug
Enforcement Administration-to the United States
during 1983. Jamaican farmers probably were en-
couraged by the trafficker's successes last year, and
we believe that marijuana exports will continue at
least at current and possibly higher levels in 1984.
Last year, Jamaican drug runners apparently expand-
ed their trafficking by flying larger quantities of
marijuana aboard bigger aircraft.
seven new unregistered
airfields have been built since October 1982. One of
these strips is at least 60 meters longer than the
average unlicensed airfield. Additionally,
the Salt Island runway was
recently lengthened to 1,450 meters and is now the
longest unregistered airfield in Jamaica. Runways of
this length could accommodate large aircraft, which
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According to the DEA, smuggling by private airplane
accounted for as much as 75 percent of the marijuana
leaving Jamaica during the last three years.
could carry more than 4 tons of marijuana a flight.
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Smuggling marijuana by boat, once a minor traffick-
ing method, also increased during 1983. DEA investi-
gations show that prior to 1982, Jamaican traffickers
transported less than 250 tons of marijuana a year
using small pleasure craft. By the beginning of 1983,
traffickers had begun to use larger "motherships" to
smuggle Jamaican marijuana. For example, in Febru-
ary 1983 the US Coast Guard boarded a commercial
vessel near The Bahamas and found about 15 tons of
Jamaican marijuana-more than 11 times the aver-
age maritime shipment of Jamaican cannabis. =
Drug Control Flounders
Prime Minister Seaga initiated new antidrug smug-
gling programs in late 1983 in response to US pres-
sure to stem rising marijuana production. We believe
that Seaga's actions are motivated by his interest in
obtaining the multimillion dollar loans under the
Caribbean Basin Initiative and from the International
Monetary Fund. During a meeting with Vice Presi-
dent Bush in October 1983 to discuss solutions to
current Jamaican economic problems, Seaga was
careful to specifically detail his plans for narcotics
control on the Island. Rather than attempt to eradi-
cate all marijuana cultivation-a move which would
alienate large portions of his electoral constituency-
Seaga told Bush that he intended to disrupt illicit
drug transportation. F__~
Legislation to allow Jamaican police and defense
forces to destroy unregistered airfields and seize
private property associated with drug trafficking was
introduced into Parliament by Seaga just before his
meeting with Bush. That legislation quickly came
under critical attack and has not yet been enacted.
The legislation is presently under review by a consti-
tutional committee-a third of whose members have
been reported by US Embassy sources as having
marijuana trafficking connections. If the bill returns
to the Parliament before the end of the year, we
believe it will be severely weakened and ineffective.
The delay in ratification initially did not deter the
Jamaican Defense Force from destroying 16 unregis-
tered airstrips during December 1983 and January
1984, but it became clear that traffickers could repair
the airfields as fast as the Army could destroy them.
Additional Impediments to Interdiction
With the destruction of unregistered airfields stalled,
Seaga focused on the difficult task of eradicating
marijuana by hand. According to DEA and Embassy
reports, Jamaica's manual eradication program de-
stroyed less than 15 percent of the more than 1,800
hectares of marijuana estimated by the US Embassy
to be under cultivation last year. We believe that
several factors will limit the effectiveness of a manual
eradication program:
? Seaga's concern over declining public support and
his tenuous political position prior to elections
scheduled for mid-1985 may lead him to reconsider
his pledges to stop illegal marijuana smuggling. The
Embassy reports that the public remains largely
apathetic toward marijuana control, although recent
drug-related violence has heightened awareness of
the problem. Marijuana use is tolerated at most
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levels of Jamaican society and is used during reli-
gious ceremonies by the large and influential Ethio-
pian Zion Coptic Church. According to the Embas-
sy, most Jamaicans believe that drug exports
generate much needed revenue for poorer workers
and there is widespread support for legalizing
marijuana.
? Chronic corruption throughout Jamaica's law en-
forcement structure also has inhibited Seaga's drug
control efforts. A US Embassy source
implicated the Jamaican
Constabulary Force-Jamaica's national police-in
marijuana smuggling operations and in systematic
thefts of confiscated drugs. Moreover, the Embassy
has reported corruption within the comparatively
reputable Jamaican Defense Force.
? Jamaican marijuana traffickers have intimidated
Kingston into restricting marijuana eradication pro-
grams. Embassy sources report that after the gov-
ernment destroyed a small marijuana field on pri-
vate property in November 1982, traffickers burned
20 hectares of sugarcane as a threat to disrupt the
island's sugar production. We believe that Seaga
took the warning and, according to the Embassy,
has restricted marijuana eradication to public lands.
? Marijuana traffickers also have expanded their in-
fluence in marijuana cultivation areas. US Embassy
officials report that wealthy traffickers often build
roads and contribute to local construction when
government money is unavailable. By donating to
community development, traffickers have increased
local Jamaican recalcitrance to the government's
marijuana destruction campaign.
Outlook
In our judgment, Jamaican marijuana production and
smuggling to the United States will continue to
increase for the next several years. Even in the
unlikely event that strong legislation authorizing air-
field destruction is passed, the military does not have
enough manpower to effectively destroy all the unli-
censed airstrips. Seaga's alternative, the manual mar-
ijuana eradication program, has been under way for
at least three years with little success. Eliminating
marijuana by hand is very labor intensive, and we
believe Kingston cannot afford the resources neces-
sary to sustain an effective eradication campaign.
Finally, Seaga faces severe national economic prob-
lems and a questionable political future. He may be
leery of pursuing an effective antidrug program,
which would alienate well-organized marijuana traf-
fickers who, in turn, could influence large segments of
rural voters during next year's elections.
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