NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 19 DECEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010063-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: December 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
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Intelligence
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Contents
Kuwait: Trial of Bombing Suspects
South America-Argentina: Nuclear Developments
Uruguay: Politicians Challenge Junta
Yugoslavia: Difficulties With the IMF
Mexico: Crackdown on Local Leftists
North Korea-Japan: Pressure on Defector Case
Special Analysis
South Africa-Mozambique: Regional Outlook 9
19 December 1983
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KUWAIT: Trial of Bombing Suspects
Kuwait will put on trial 10 persons today for their role in the
bombings last Monday of the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti
facilities.
A government spokesman says the suspects-seven Iraqis and
three Lebanese in Kuwait on resident visas-were all members of the
Iranian-backed Shia dissident Dawa faction and have confessed to
planning the bombings.
Meanwhile, the Army has increased roadblocks and
security checks, arrested a number of Palestinian radicals, and taken
over the port of Shuaybah-a target of the bombers.
The US Charge in Kuwait notes that Kuwaiti security capabilities
are stretched to the limit, and he believes the government may be
moving into a state of martial law. He claims there are expressions
of elation in some circles that the US has been dealt another blow
and disappointment that no US citizen was killed. Although
native Kuwaitis reportedly have rallied around government
countermeasures, they make up only 40 percent of the population.
Comment: Kuwait is reacting quickly and harshly to show it has
the security situation under control. The government probably will not
be able, however, to monitor effectively vulnerable facilities and
suspected elements of the population for any length of time.
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SOUTH AMERICA-ARGENTINA: Nuclear Developments
The public response in South America to Argentina's
announcement that it is developing uranium enrichment capabilities
has been restrained and most/ favorable,
Reaction from Venezuela and Uruguay has been uncritical and
not focused on proliferation concerns. Even in Chile, military officers
do not appear alarmed, according to the US defense attache.
(most Latin
American countries are likely to continue viewing the new Argentine
capabilities positively, although they will watch carefully for
confirmation of President Alfonsin's peaceful intentions. Argentina's
value as a supplier of nuclear materials will grow for the Peruvians,
who are already using Argentine technology for their own programs
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URUGUAY: Politicians Challenge Junta
Uruguay's political parties, encouraged by a large turnout for a
recent rally, are pressing the 10-year-old military government for
democratic elections next November.
The rally in Montevideo late last month attracted approximately
400,000 people-14 percent of the country's population-including
banned leftist and Communist politicians as well as members of the
traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties. The assembly endorsed a
proclamation demanding an immediate end to political proscriptions
and the restoration of constitutional guarantees
A prominent Colorado Party spokesman has asserted that the
political parties have put the regime on the defensive. The military had
earlier proposed that elections be held in November 1984, but talks
broke down when the officers unsuccessfully sought significant
political concessions from the civilians.
President Alvarez-who has repeatedly sought support to extend
his term-criticized the rally and emphasized the strong participation
of leftists. The regime's only punitive action, however, has been the
closing of two minor political papers for publishing articles on banned
politicians. According to press reports, the Blanco Party on 17
December posed a new challenge by nominating exiled leader Wilson
Ferreira as its presidential candidate.
Comment: Constitutional negotiations are unlikely to resume
until at least after the summer vacations beginning this month.
Meanwhile, the parties will maintain their hard line and continue to
press the government.
Alvarez and his military supporters are uncertain about how to
deal with the politicians. The President probably still hopes that by
seeking to heighten concern about leftists he can muster military
support both for his own candidacy and for a much tougher stance
against politicians that would eventually lead to their boycotting the
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Problems in negotiations between the IMF and Yugoslavia on a
stabilization program may delay agreement on a refinancing package
from Western creditors for 1984. According to US Embassy sources,
Belgrade regards specific Fund targets on credit, budgetary growth,
and incomes policy as overly restrictive and rejects the Fund's
forecast that inflation will accelerate in 1984. Several of Yugoslavia's
republics also have rejected as interference in their internal affairs the
Fund's proposal that enterprises sell all foreign exchange earnings to
the Yugoslav National Bank. The Yugoslavs fear that the IMF could
seriously complicate negotiations if it continues to press for new
money contributions from foreign commercial banks.
Comment: A credible IMF program is imperative to sustaining
creditor support, and the Yugoslavs are likely to have to make
concessions on most issues. Placating regional interests will take
time, however, and could seriously impede a successful conclusion of
the refinancing package.
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MEXICO: Crackdown on Local Leftists
President de la Madrid, after several months of mounting
tensions, is taking strong measures against leftist elements in a key
southern city. According to press accounts, government security
forces were used to oust members of a leftist coalition who had
refused to vacate city offices after Mexico City installed a provisional
administration in August. Several injuries were reported.
Comment: President de la Madrid's willingness to use force
reflects his determination to limit opposition protest activities. By
waiting until all state and local elections were over for the year before
sending in troops, he reduced the risk that tensions would spread to
other areas of intense political competition. Although the move will
provide opposition parties with more ammunition to criticize the
government, it is unlikely to help the leftists strengthen either their
ranks or their appeal beyond their small constituency. More
bloodshed is possible, however, if leftist leaders in the southern city
stage demonstrations or try to retake the city hall.
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North Korea has publicly linked its seizure last month of a
Japanese freighter and its crew to the earlier defection of a North
Korean soldier. The North Korean official news agency claimed on
Saturday that crew members of the ship had confessed to helping a
North Korean Army sergeant defect to Japan in late October. North
Korea detained the ship when it returned in mid-November, and the
ship's captain and en icinneer are being held for investigation of alleged
espionage activities.
Comment: P'yongyang's tough action is in line with its attitude
toward Tokyo following Japan's sanctions against North Korea for the
recent terrorist attack in Rangoon. North Korea may be trying to use
the detained ship and crew as leverage to force the return of the
defector or at least to discourage Japan from permitting the defector
to resettle in South Korea. Tokyo would like to resolve the issue
before a new Japanese cabinet takes office, but the complex
diplomatic and legal ramifications make early settlement doubtful.F-
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Regional Outlook
Declining economic conditions and a South African-backed
insurgency have prompted the beleaguered regime of President
Machel to seek closer ties with the West and a negotiated settlement
with Pretoria. Ministerial discussions, which began late last year, are
scheduled to resume tomorrow, but the deep differences between the
two countries will make any progress slow and difficult.
The next session, like the two previous ones, will center on
Pretoria's demands that Mozambique deny African National
Congress insurgents from South Africa the use of its territory to stage
military operations into South Africa. As a precondition for broader
discussions on bilateral economic and security issues, Pretoria is
likely to give Maputo the names of "undesirable" South African
refugees residing in Mozambique and demand they be expelled in a
verifiable way.
Machel has tried over the past year to improve relations with the
West, and it is in this context that he is willing to negotiate with the
South Africans. Maputo's growing insurgency and economic
problems-which the US Ambassador describes as catastrophic-
underlie its attempt to obtain more Western aid and to secure US help
in bringing an end to South African aid to Mozambique's National
Machel has said privately that he is willing to come to terms on
almost any issue in order to achieve better relations with the West. He
has cited as an example a recent policy reversal under which the
continued
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19 December 1983
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government is now encouraging private enterprise at the expense of
state-run enterprises. Mozambique is seeking membership in the IMF
and the Lome Convention, and US officials recently reached an
agreement in principle to sign an OPIC agreement by the end of this
In addition, Machel reportedly has counseled Zimbabwean leader
Mugabe not to ruin his country's relations with the West and has
offered to help Washington make progress on Cuban withdrawal from
Angola. The US Embassy in Maputo reports that Mozambican media
treatment of the US has improved markedly. Machel also has
expressed his willingness to impose a more moderate tone on
Mozambique's UN voting record.
Machel's pro-Western tendencies reflect economic necessity
more than an ideological change of heart.
Moreover, Machel's failure to obtain any significant new aid
commitments during his West European tour in October may have
reduced his expectations of receiving large amounts of Western
economic assistance any time soon.
The Mozambican President's principal objective in talks with
Pretoria is to gain relief from the South African-backed insurgents.
Embassy reporting indicates that he strongly believes-probably
incorrectly-that the National Resistance Movement would die away
without South African logistic support.
Like other black African leaders, Machel overestimates US
influence on Pretoria. He probably would view continued South
African stonewalling as a sign that the West was ignoring his recent
overtures, which could prompt him to end Mozambique's current
moderate policy
In any case, Mozambique's heavy dependence on Soviet military
support to fight the insurgents restricts Machel's flexibility. Even as
Machel has turned increasingly to the West during the past year, the
Soviets have delivered new attack helicopters and MIG fighters to
strengthen the regime.
Pretoria's deep antipathy toward the Machel government is a
major impediment to any mutual accommodation between the two
neighbors.
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officials frequently have said that the regime cannot be trusted to
abide by any agreement reached between the two countries
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South Africa's skepticism about the possibility of peaceful
coexistence is reinforced by Mozambique's ties with the USSR
Pretoria's ties with the National Resistance Movement insurgents
probably are based as much on its hostility toward Maputo and its
Soviet backers as it is on South African interest in developing a force
to offset the ANC. South Africa is unlikely to stop supporting its
Deep mutual suspicions probably will keep South Africa and
Mozambique from reaching common ground during the ministerial
meetings. Maputo is unlikely to accede to Pretoria's demand for the
verifiable expulsion of ANC members without assurances that the
South Africans will end support for the National Resistance
Movement insurgents. Pretoria, however, continues to deny any
connection with or control over the group.
Without South Africa's agreement to reduce its support for the
Mozambican guerrillas, the beleaguered Machel government is likely
to look increasingly to the Soviets and their allies for materiel and
training, while entreating the West to provide much-needed economic
assistance. Mozambique is likely to continue its political dealings with
the West, hoping the US will eventually be able to persuade South
Africa to ease the pressure in the Mozambique region.
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