NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 7 DECEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: December 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
* Intelligence
idD
-Tvirt-SeeFet?
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
7 December 1983
-Top-Seeret
f`PARNIfl 11.4.9RItilf
7 Decembfir 1983
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C?44' 285
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Contents
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USSR: Intentions Toward START Talks
Ethiopia-Cuba-Angola: Troop Withdrawal
Italy-Lebanon: Concern About MNF Contingent
1
2
3
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Suriname: Possible Security Crackdown
5
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USSR: Signs of Andropov's Return to Work
7
Israel-US: Public Reaction to Agreements
7
USSR-Syria: Delivery of Reconnaissance Drone
8
USSR-Algeria: Ogarkov's Visit
8
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OPEC: Dispute Over Production Accord
9
Seychelles: Alleged Coup Plot
10
Taiwan: Legislative Election Results
10
Special Analysis
USSR: Role in the Space Services Market
11
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USSR: Intentions Toward START Talks
The Soviets may refuse to set a date for resuming START
negotiations when the current round ends tomorrow, hoping to
increase public demands on US and allied leaders for a softening of
arms control positions.
At the press conference on Monday, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko said that new NATO INF deployments will have
consequences for the START talks, but he declined to elaborate.
Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov said the START talks "are movin
in the same direction" as the disrupted INF negotiations.
General Secretary Andropov had said on 27 October that
deployment of new NATO INF systems would make it impossible to
continue the talks in Geneva, implying that START as well as INF
would be disrupted. His announcement on 24 November of the Soviet
walkout from the INF talks, however, made no reference to START.
Comment: Refusal to set a date for resuming the START talks
would be consistent with Soviet efforts to maintain a state of tension
over arms control issues. The Soviets would foreclose none of their
options?including a return to the talks after a normal two-month
interval?and they could observe reactions in the West before
announcing under what conditions they would be willing to resume
the talks. They might claim a need to adjust their negotiating position
to account for new INF deployments and perhaps for British and
French systems.
An indefinite recess is more likely than an outright announcement
by the USSR that it is breaking off the START negotiations. Moscow
would have to consider that such intransigence would undercut its
efforts to influence Western opinion. A walkout also would be more
difficult to reverse and would deprive the Soviets of the alternative of
introducing INF issues in the START forum and of any possibility of
early progress in limiting US strategic systems.
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ETHIOPIA-CUBA-ANGOLA: Troop Withdrawal
The withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Ethiopia carries
some risks for the Mengistu regime, but they are outweighed by
potential benefits.
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that 3,000 to 4,000
Cuban troops have left Ethiopa during the past month as part of a
reduction. 2,000 to 3,000 troops are
destined for Angola.
The Embassy says about 2,000 to 3,000 Cuban combat troops
are to remain in Ethiopia and will be stationed near the capital?
apparently to protect the regime against internal threats. All Cuban
troops are to be withdrawn from the Ogaden, where they have acted
as a strategic reserve
Comment: A troop withdrawal may have begun, but the
departure of specific Cuban units is not yet confirmed. Cuban troops
in the Ogaden have not engaged in combat since 1978 and are likely
candidates to be withdrawn.
The Somali military no longer is a serious threat to Ethiopian
control of the Ogaden, and there is little need to retain a Cuban
presence in the region. Moreover, Addis Ababa as well as Havana and
Moscow are likely to welcome the reduction of the financial burden of
maintaining Cuban troops there.
A troop reduction may appease senior Ethiopian military officers,
who have resented the Cuban presence and who reportedly asked
Mengistu in late October to begin reducing their number. Some
officers may hope the Cuban withdrawal will free equipment for use
by Ethiopian units against northern insurgents
Mengistu's reported decision to retain some Cuban troops near
the capital is probably intended to prevent opponents from
concluding that reduction will weaken the regime's defenses. Their
retention, moreover, encourages continued Soviet-Cuban support.
Mengistu clearly recognizes the necessity of Soviet military aid in his
campaign against the insurgencies.
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ITALY-LEBANON: Concern About MNF Contingent
There is growing sentiment in Italy for withdrawing Italian forces
from Lebanon, and the government wants to link a continued presence
in Beirut to a successful conclusion of the peace talks in Geneva.
Comment: The sentiment in the government for withdrawal is
partly caused by genuine concern for the safety of Italian troops.
Policy on Lebanon also is an issue in the struggle between the
Christian Democrats and the Socialists for leadership of the
government.
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USSR: Signs of Andropov's Return to Work
US Embassy officers in Moscow observed General Secretary
Andropov's motorcade on Monday, and another Moscow-based
diplomat believes he saw Andropov entering the Kremlin a week
earlier.
Pravda
announced on Saturday the appointment of a new department chief in
the Central Committee to replace one of Brezhnev's cronies who
stepped down in early September.
Comment: These indications, along with the scheduling of the
Supreme Soviet for 28 December, suggest that Andropov's health has
improved enough to permit a more normal work schedule. Last
Thursday he probably attended the Politburo session, which
presumably approved the scheduling of the Supreme Soviet. The
appointment of the new department chief is another indication that
Andropov is making his presence felt again.
ISRAEL-US: Public Reaction to Agreements
The negative Israeli public reaction to the agreements reached
during Prime Minister Shamir's visit to the US last week has put the
government on the defensive and probably will reinforce Shamir's
reluctance to take a more active military role in Lebanon. The Labor
Party and most major newspapers have criticized the agreements.
They fear that there are secret provisions that may draw Israel?at
great cost?into renewed hostilities with Syria in support of US
objectives in Lebanon. The four-man Communist faction in the
Knesset has submitted a motion of no-confidence over the accords
that will be discussed today.
Comment: Shamir probably recognizes that, in the absence of a
clear threat from the Syrians, a more active Israeli role in Lebanon
would be politically risky.
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USSR-SYRIA: Delivery of Reconnaissance Drone
The Soviets have provided the Syrians a low-altitude tactical
photoreconnaissance drone, the DR-3, which may carry a television
camera for immediate battlefield surveillance.
Comment: The delivery of the drone is another indication of the
Soviets' willingness to provide the Syrians with the latest military
equipment. It gives them capabilities comparable to those of the
Israelis, who have long used drones to monitor Syrian military activity.
The drone could provide timely information on Israeli ground activity
in Lebanon and be of particular value in heavily defended areas. The
aircraft is vulnerable to ground fire, however, and Damascus may
choose to reserve its use for crisis situations. Soviet personnel will
have to operate it if it is to be employed soon, but Moscow probably
plans to train Syrians in its use.
USSR-ALGERIA: Ogarkov's Visit
Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov arrived in Algeria yesterday on
what TASS describes as an "official friendly" visit. The last high-
ranking Soviet military official to travel to Algeria was Air Force
Commander in Chief Kutakhov, who visited there in 1981.
Comment: The visit underlines Algeria's importance to the USSR
as a longstanding arms customer that pays in hard currency. In recent
years Algiers has expanded its purchases of arms from the West, and
Ogarkov may be trying to halt this trend. Last summer the USSR
delivered some advanced early warning radars, and it probably hopes
to play a major role in Algeria's current program to improve its air
defenses.
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OPEC: Dispute Over Production Accord
OPEC's oil ministers meet today in Geneva, amid renewed market
weakness and demands by several producers for higher production
quotas. Most members are resolved to maintain the current
benchmark price of $29 per barrel and to reaffirm the cartel's
production ceiling of 17.5 million barrels per day, but Nigeria,
Venezuela, Iran, and Iraq are seeking higher individual allocations.
The Iranian oil minister also will lobby to restore the OPEC
benchmark price of $34 per barrel. Other issues that are expected to
be discussed include overproduction by Saudi Arabia; rumored price
discounting by Qatar, Indonesia, and Iran; and the question of
OPEC's next secretary general.
Comment: The meeting is unlikely to result in any major changes
in OPEC price and production policies. OPEC's current output of
18.4 million barrels per day has slipped nearly 800,000 barrels per
day from its peak in September, but it is still nearly 1 million barrels
per day above the cartel's ceiling. Current spot prices of about $1 per
barrel below official prices face further erosion if OPEC continues at
existing production levels.
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SEYCHELLES: Alleged Coup Plot
The Seychelles Government announced on Monday it had
discovered a coup plot planned by an opposition group based in
London. The announcement followed South Africa's arrest of five
mercenaries allegedly recruited for the attempt. The Defense Minister
claimed the plotters hoped to assassinate President Rene and other
leaders as well as the US Ambassador and other American personnel.
He said the conspirators wanted to make it appear that the regime
had lost control, thereby provoking the US to conduct a "Grenada-
style intervention."
Comment: There is no information to confirm the government's
announcement, but Rene worries constantly about real and imagined
threats to his power. The Soviet Ambassador has played on his fears
and has heightened his mistrust of Washington by alleging US aid to
various dissident groups. Moscow has frequently demonstrated its
support for Rene by sending ships for port visits at his request during
coup scares. The announcement of the plot may be both a
manifestation of Rene's paranoia and a ploy to head off any possible
US intervention.
TAIWAN: Legislative Election Results
The ruling Kuomintang's showing in the supplemental legislative
elections on Saturday was stronger than expected, while militant
Taiwanese ousted the moderate leadership of the opposition. All but
two of the ruling party's 58 nominees won. The party's total vote
dropped, however, from 84 percent in 1980 to about 70 percent. The
mainlander-dominated Kuomintang now commands around 360 of
the 379 legislative seats.
Comment: The Kuomintang's victory is the result of its
rejuvenated campaign organization, a more restrictive campaign law,
and opposition infighting. Nonetheless, the election demonstrated
that the militant oppositionists maintain a strong and possibly
growing core of voter support among the ethnic Taiwanese majority.
The collapse of the moderate opposition and success of the
militants?who favor confrontational politics?may !portend an
increase in political tension.
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Payload Capabilities of Selected US, French,
and Soviet Launch Vehicles
Vehicle
Payload (kg)
(Low Earth orbit)
Payload (kg)
(Dcostationary orbit)
Height (m)
Space
Transportation
System
29,500
56
t [oiled States
II
Delta 2914
Atlas/
Centaur
2,000
5,135
335
955
35
43
Titan III C
12,275
1,455
38
France t'SSR
Ariane
4,7(4)
950
47
(SI -12)
PR ton
(1 III)
(ST 13)
Proton
Not used 19,(8)0
2,700 Not used
58 58
3010201,403629) 10 83
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Special Analysis
USSR: Role in the Space Services Market
The USSR is competing for a share of the growing market in space
systems and services in order to supplement its hard currency
earnings, open up markets for other products, acquire advanced
technology, and enhance its national prestige. In the near term, the
Soviets probably will continue to concentrate on the sale of launch
services and, to a lesser extent, on the leasing of the services of their
communications satellites. In the longer term, the Soviets' experience
in processing materials in space could give them an advantage over
potential competitors if they decide to sell products manufactured in
space.
Over the next decade the USSR is likely to have the most success
in the launch service business?which industry sources estimate will
gross billions of dollars worldwide each year by the late 1980s. The
Soviets are entering the market using the Proton space booster.
Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have tripled the production
capacity at the Proton manufacturing plant, doubled the number of
Proton launch sites from two to four, and tripled the assembly and
checkout capability at the launch center.
The Soviets also are developing a heavy-lift launch vehicle and a
shuttle orbiter that will become operational during the early 1990s.
Because of the similarities of Soviet and US shuttle orbiters, the
Soviets will be able to compete for payloads designed by Western
countries to be carried on the US shuttle. Success in obtaining
commercial contracts for the Proton launcher is likely to improve the
Soviets' prospects for competing for payloads for their shuttle when it
becomes operational.
The Soviets probably will soon be able to produce four to six
Proton boosters annually?beyond those needed for their own
military and scientific missions?for commercial launches. The Proton
is unlikely to enable the USSR to take scheduled customers away
from the US shuttle during the 1980s. On the other hand, it probably
will put the Soviets in a good position to compete with the European
Space Agency and private US firms for a portion of the launch service
market that the US shuttle cannot accommodate.
continued
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INTERSPUTNIK Members
Potand
Hungary
Bulgaria
.fhis 1983 Novosti Press Agency map shoNAs the 14 INTI1RSPl1INIK
members, some of which do not have operating ground stations,
and one nonmember user, Algeria. In addition, other Third World
nations are planning to use the system in the luturc, some have
ground stations under construction
301022 (A0362/) 10 83
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Moscow already has succeeded in having the Proton included on
a list of candidate launch vehicles for the International Maritime
Satellite Organization. It is offering prices that may undercut its
Western competitors.
Communication Services and Remote-Sensing Data
Since the late 1970s, the Soviet-sponsored INTERSPUTNIK
organization has tried to compete with the US-sponsored
International Telecommunications Organization?INTELSAT?in selling
international communication services in the Third World.
INTERSPUTNIK is a much smaller organization than INTELSAT, which
currently provides services to more than 120 countries.
INTERSPUTNIK primarily services the needs of countries belonging
to the Warsaw Pact. It has attracted new users, however, among such
pro-Soviet Third World countries as Algeria, Angola, Iraq, Libya, and
Nicaragua.
The export of remote-sensing data from outer space is not yet
profitable, but the market for such data is growing and is potentially
large for data manipulated by computers. The USSR, which has one
operational military satellite system dedicated to remote sensing,
currently does not yet have the technology to compete in the civilian
remote-sensing market. Another Soviet system with multispectral
scanners is in development, however, and it will improve the USSR's
competitiveness after it becomes operational in the late 1980s.
The Soviets thus far have given no public indication that they
intend to try to sell remote-sensing data. Their strong support for
international regulation of the dissemination of such data?because
of the potential military applications?appeals to many Third World
countries.
Communication Satellite Systems
If the Soviets decide to sell communication satellites to a
worldwide market, they will either have to increase their service life or
price them low enough to offset the cost of more frequent
continued
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Soviet Concept for Modular Space Station
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replacement than is required with Western equipment. The less
complex Soviet satellites are cheaper than Western ones, however,
and may attract some buyers among the Third World nations.
Materials Processing
The USSR has conducted extensive experiments in space-based
materials science on its Salyut space stations, and officials in the
Soviet space program indicate they are now ready to move beyond
the research and development phase of materials processing in
space. They might include a processing module for special materials
as part of a modular space station.
Most of the products the Soviets are experimenting with have
important military applications. Soviet defense industries and
domestic consumers probably will have a priority claim on these
products.
The Soviets have not given any hint that they intend to sell space-
processed products outside the USSR?except possibly in Warsaw
Pact countries. They almost certainly will not launch a major effort to
market these products to foreign organizations and firms in the next
few years. Their experience in processing could give the Soviets at
least initial advantage in future sales of space-processed products.
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