NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 5 DECEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000600010015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Tnn Secret
-I : Intelligence
Top see, at
5 December 1983
Copy 9 G
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Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Aftermath of US Airstrikes
Warsaw Pact: Tank Modernization Program
West Germany: The Free Democrats and INF
West Germany: Pressure Mounts on Economics Minister 7
Bolivia: Government Crisis Closer 8
Chad: Jockeying Prior to Talks
North Korea-South Korea: Infiltration Incident 10
Special Analyses
Angola-USSR-South Africa: Growing Conflict
EC: Summit Preview
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5 December 1983
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BEIRUT
Beirut
International
Airport )y
Israeli airstrikes
Saturday
ebanon
Bayder
'Pass
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5 December 1983
4410 US airstrikes,
'A Sawfar
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US retaliatory airstrikes yesterday against Syrian positions in
Lebanon and US naval gunfire against Druze militiamen are unlikely to
deter Syria and its Lebanese allies from attacking US reconnaissance
aircraft and Marine positions.
The US airstrikes hit Syrian Army units north of the Baydar Pass.
Following the airstrikes, the US Marine contingent at Beirut
airport came under heav fire.
IAll the Marine casualties
were the result of a direct hit on a forward checkpoint manned jointly
by Marines and Lebanese Army soldiers.
Moscow's first public response, in a radiobroadcast yesterday,
cited Arab condemnation of the US action and noted that US raids on
Lebanese territory controlled by Syrian units of the Arab
peacekeeping force and Israeli actions in Lebanon were ringing
tensions to "a new and dangerous peak."
Comment: Damascus is likely to try to gain maximum political
benefit from the airstrikes and the Syrian shootdown and capture of
the Americans. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam this weekend
pointed to the sequence of Israeli and US airstrikes as evidence of
joint US-Israeli efforts to attack Syrian interests and sovereignty.
Damascus probably believes US military actions against Syrian forces
will win it support among Arab moderates.
The damage inflicted by the airstrikes probably will not cause the
Syrians to alter their present policies. They are likely to continue to
fire on US reconnaissance aircraft and to encourage their Lebanese
allies to fire on Marine positions, hoping to provoke additional US
actions. Syria, however, is not expected to increase its own military
involvement in Lebanon.
In part, the Druze bombardment of Marine positions at the airport
yesterday probably was encouraged by Syria as retaliation for the
airstrikes. Druze militiamen, however, are also motivated by
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increasing concern over the Marine presence. In particular, many
Druze believe the Marines are planning to assist the Lebanese Army
in launching a new offensive against Druze positions along the Alayh
ridgeline.
President Gemayel probably views the airstrikes as encouraging
proof of US intentions to exert military pressure on Syria to withdraw
from Lebanon. The strikes will harden the positions of his Druze and
Muslim opponents, however, and prospects for reconciliation may be
Moscow continues to avoid both specific warnings to the US and
signals to Damascus that would lead it to believe the USSR supports
Syrian military confrontation with the US in Lebanon.
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WARSAW PACT: Tank Modernization Program
The Warsaw Pact has begun an expensive program to modernize
older tanks and extend their combat service life through the remainder
of the century, as new tank models slowly enter the inventory.
Comment: Despite production of newer tanks such as the T-80
and T-72, Warsaw Pact countries probably will not replace their more
than 40,000 older tanks at current rates until well into the next
century. Tanks of the 1950s and 1960s are becoming increasingly
obsolete as modern tanks enter service, and they will still comprise
over half the Pact's inventory in the early 1990s
It is uncertain how many tanks will be improved. The Soviets
could modernize as many as 20,000 of their older tanks, and in the six
East European countries there are 12,000 T-54 and T-55 tanks that
could be modified. In the Warsaw Pact units outside the USSR,
however, the pace of the program could be severely restricted by
stagnating economies and differences in resources and capabilities.
The modernized tanks probably will be fielded with units opposite
China or with units in the southwestern and southern USSR. They also
will make up a large percentage of East European tanks for the
foreseeable future. Even with their improved armor and fire-control
systems, they will be much less effective than the newest generation
of tanks deployed opposite NATO.
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5 5 December 1983
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Comment: The Free Democrats are likely to continue to try to
build an independent record in foreign policy by promoting arms
agreements. Much of the effort will be focused on the public's
concern about the Pershing Ils. The missile remains a particular'
problem for West German politicians, because of the popular
perception of it as a first-strike weapon and a threat to the USSR
emanating exclusively from West German soil. The security resolution
adopted by the Free Democrats at their party congress last week, for
example, endorsed the idea of a limit on the range of Pershing Is.
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Economics Minister Lambsdorff, who probably will be formally
charged with bribery this week, is under increasing pressure from the
public and opposition to resign. According to one press report
attributed to sources close to Chancellor Kohl, the Chancellor and
Lambsdorff have agreed that he will resign once a trial is formally
instituted. Kohl also met last week with Christian Social Union
chairman Strauss, who has made it clear that he would like to become
Comment: Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher would like to
avoid Lambsdorff's early resignation, but his continuation in office is
damaging the government's image. Kohl and Genscher could decide
to expand Finance Minister Stoltenberg's responsibilities temporarily
to include the economics -portfolio, since there is no obvious Free
Democrat available to replace Lambsdorff. This would both keep the
position available in case Lambsdorff is found innocent and keep
Strauss out of the cabinet.
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The US Embassy reports that information linking radical
members of President Siles's party to a group of seven captured
guerrillas and to recent terrorist activities, including the bombing of
Congress, is causing serious strains within the government. Moderate
cabinet members, including the Defense and Interior Ministers,
privately have indicated that they may resign if the matter is not
settled. Siles has denied to the US Ambassador that terrorist
activities have received official encouragement
Comment: Resignation of the moderates would further isolate the
government and enable coup plotters in the military to expand their
political backing. Siles is nearing the point where he must purge his
government of radicals, who have been a major source of difficulties
since he took office, or almost certainly face a coup.
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CHAD: Jockeying Prior to Talks
According to a senior Sudanese official, Sudanese President
Nimeiri's special envoy met with Chadian President Habre and
dissident leader Goukouni last month to propose that they meet and
set an agenda before the OAU-sponsored Chad conference opens on
21 December in Addis Ababa. The US Embassy in N'Djamena reports
that the Libyan-backed dissidents were receptive to the proposal, but
Habre declined on the grounds that there was not enough time.
Middle-level dissident leaders in Paris have agreed to a French
suggestion that they meet there with Chadian Government officials in
preparation for the OAU meeting, according to the US Embassy in
Comment: Preconference pressures are building on Habre and
Goukouni, and complications could arise to delay or prevent the OAU
meeting. Habre may suspect that the dissidents would try to
manipulate talks to their own advantage before the OAU conference.
Libya's continuing effort to influence the meeting also demonstrates
the fragile nature of OAU-sponsored diplomatic initiatives.
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NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA: Infiltration Incident
South Korean forces intercepted an armed three-man North
Korean infiltration team in the southern part of the country on
Saturday. Authorities in Seoul reported that two of the agents were
wounded and captured, and South Korean naval units sank an
infiltration boat offshore. The incident is receiving extensive coverage
in the South Korean media.
Comment: This is the first known North Korean infiltration
attempt since the bombing in Rangoon on 8 October, although such
operations aimed at intelligence gathering have been fairly frequent
over the years. Seoul will try to use this incident as part of its
international cam ai n to isolate and discredit North Korea.
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Special Analysis
ANGOLA-USSR-SOUTH AFRICA: Growing Conflict
The expanding UNITA insurgency has prompted Moscow and
Havana to increase significantly their support for the besieged
Angolan regime. Moscow's growing commitment primarily reflects its
determination to protect its key asset in southern Africa, a resolve that
may have been increased by recent Soviet setbacks in Grenada and
Western Europe. Pretoria, meanwhile, probably is satisfied with the
situation in Angola, especially because the insurgent successes have
eased pressure for a settlement in Namibia. Moreover, the South
Africans appear confident that more Soviet and Cuban assistance will
not defeat the insurgents.
Moscow's growing concern over Angola is evident in remarks by
Soviet officials to foreign diplomats, media commentary, and high-
level visits between Luanda, Havana, and Moscow. The most obvious
sign, however, has been the major increase in the quality and quantity
of arms delivered to Angola over the past several months
TASS noted on 4 November that the "USSR and other countries
of the socialist community will not leave the Angolan people in the
time of trouble and will continue to support them in every way." A
senior South African official recently told the US Embassy that the
Soviets had warned Pretoria that they would do whatever was
necessary to save the Angolan regime.
The Soviet Response
The growing threat to Moscow's client regime in Luanda is the
immediate cause for the Soviet response. Moscow may also see a
forceful response in Angola as demonstrating its resolve to counter a
resurgent US challenge.
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Commentary in Pravda has claimed that Washington bears the
main responsibility for the turmoil in Angola. In this context Angola is
especially significant as a symbol of Moscow's expanded global
Luanda Fights On
Recent military successes by UNITA insurgents and the increased
Soviet and Cuban commitment seem to have hardened political views
in Luanda. President dos Santos until recently had seemed willing to
swap a Cuban troop withdrawal for independence in Namibia. He is
now insisting publicly that South African support to UNITA must end
Various diplomatic reports from Luanda suggest that ideological
and ethnic factionalism continue in the ruling Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola. The government, however, seems united in
its resolve to fight UNITA.
Several senior South African officials, including the Prime
Minister, have said that UNITA will win the Angolan civil war, despite
increased Soviet and Cuban assistance. A recent South African
military intelligence estimate concluded that UNITA is now the
dominant armed force in Angola and that more Soviet and Cuban
involvement would only turn Angola into the Soviets' "Vietnam in
Africa." Pretoria probably further calculates that the inability of
Luanda to part with Cuban troops has eased pressure on South Africa
to agree to a Namibian settlement
The South Africans have recently reinforced their air and ground
units in northern Namibia and southern Angola. Pretoria, however,
probably will confine itself to increased support for UNITA and actions
against Namibian SWAPO guerrillas in southern Angola.
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The South Africans probably would not attack government or
Cuban bases in southern Angola unless they thought their buffer zone
or UNITA's stronghold in Angola was threatened. They apparently
intend to avoid a major battle in their operations around Cahama.
Soviet and Cuban arms shipments over the past few months will
strengthen air defenses in the south and add to Luanda's already
substantial advantage in firepower over the lightly armed guerrillas.
Luanda's hold on major cities and key garrisons probably also
has been strengthened. UNITA, however, would not have been likely
to challenge these strongly defended points in any case
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Special Analysis
EC leaders are meeting in Athens today and tomorrow to try to
wrap up an intense round of negotiations on budget reform. Few
important decisions are likely to be made, however, and most
budgetary issues probably will be put off until next spring. At best the
leaders will agree in principle to limit future agricultural spending, and
they may adopt some dairy reforms. The continuation of the budget
impasse will further strain relations among the Ten. It also will
compound difficulties in reforming the Common Agricultural Policy
and increase agricultural trade frictions with the US, as the Community
looks for scapegoats for its internal financial problems.
The EC is on the verge of bankruptcy. The UK and West Germany,
however, have threatened to block the measures necessary to keep
the EC solvent unless the Community agrees to cut their budget
payments and curb runaway farm spending.
EC expenditures have skyrocketed in recent years and are rapidly
approaching the legal cap on revenues. Spending on the Common
Agricultural Policy, which consumes more than two-thirds of the EC
budget, is running 40 percent ahead of 1982. The Community already
has passed a supplementary budget allocation and suspended
advanced payments of export subsidies, because by law the EC
cannot run a deficit.
The EC leaders will consider increasing revenues by raising the
amount of value-added tax passed to the Community by member
governments. Ireland and Denmark favor this simple means of
balancing the budget, because they benefit the most from generous
EC farm supports. The UK and West Germany are the largest net
financial contributors to the EC, and they complain that they bear too
much of the budgetary burden.
Prime Minister Thatcher has said she will veto the increase in the
value-added tax if her budget demands are not met. Although EC
ministers have met seven times since August in Special Council
sessions to try to work out a budget compromise, they accomplished
little and left a large and complicated agenda for the summit. As a
result, the leaders are unlikely to reach the kind of far-reaching
settlement Thatcher demands.
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Nevertheless, the heads of government will try hard to keep the
negotiations alive and avoid open confrontation. Recent bilateral
meetings between Thatcher, West German Chancellor Kohl, and
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French President Mitterrand reportedly were friendly and productive,
and the Ten is likely to pledge at Athens to redouble its efforts to
settle the budget issue by the middle of 1984. In the meantime, the
Community will try to scrape by with its limited resources.
Agricultural Reform
A comprehensive budget settlement will require major reforms of
the Common Agricultural Policy to limit production and to halt the
Community's open-ended guarantee to buy surpluses, especially in
the dairy and grain sectors. Agreement along these lines is unlikely at
Athens, although French Finance Minister Delors recently indicated
France's willingness to restrict overall spending. Dairy products are
the most likely target for action, and the Ten may adopt a "super
levy" to tax surplus production.
In addition, the leaders may give the EC Commission a mandate
to restrict imports of corn gluten and other feed grain substitutes. The
Commission's proposal for a tax on vegetable oils and fats also will be
discussed, but it almost certainly will be blocked by the UK, the
Netherlands, and West Germany.
Recent French and British proposals for the EC to assume a more
visible role in the Middle East peace negotiations may result in a
statement at the Summit that likely will be quieter in tone than the
Community's Venice Declaration of 1980. France probably prefers
that a new EC peace initiative be formalized during its EC presidency,
which begins on 1 January. According to US Embassy sources, the
Community is expected to consult fully with the US in the preparation
of any declaration on the Middle East.
Greece, the current EC president, may use the summit to push for
trade actions against Turkish Cyprus.
The leaders also will discuss a range of industrial policy and trade
issues, including the Commission's proposal for a new common
commercial policy instrument and the specialty steel dispute with the
US. Once again, however, no major initiatives are likely. The
Commission may press for adoption of the ESPRIT program on
research and development in information technology, but the UK and
West Germany will try to hold it in abeyance pending settlement of the
overall budget issue.
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Impact on the US
If major budget problems are not resolved, the Commission will
not be able to negotiate effectively when it meets with US cabinet
officials at the US-EC consultations on 9 December. The Commission
may plead that, although agricultural reforms are being discussed, the
EC is not yet in a position to address US concerns.
The EC's continued inability to reform the budget and to
rationalize the Common Agricultural Policy may also intensify EC
competition with the US for third markets in agricultural goods. The
EC subsidizes many agricultural exports in order to dispose of farm
surpluses
In addition, the Ten's failure to find an internal solution to the
budget morass may add to the growing conviction among some EC
members that part of the cost of agricultural reform should be
shouldered by the US and other countries. EC officials have
frequently said that, if expenditures of the Common Agricultural
Policy are cut, agricultural imports also have to be scrutinized. Failure
to resolve the budget dispute will increase chances that other EC
countries will acquiesce to French proposals for a tax on vegetable
oils-a measure intended to increase domestic consumption of butter
and to reduce imports of US soybeans.
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