NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 3 OCTOBER 1983
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
67
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 3, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7.pdf | 1.24 MB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7
Director of
Central
Intelligence
3 October 83
Copy
CPAS NID 83-232JX
TOP SQGret
Top Seorot
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
3 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7
Top Secret
Contents
It, Lebanon: Political Developments ............................................ 1
Peru-Cuba: Deteriorating Relations ........................................ 2
France-Iraq: Dispute Over Super Etendard Sale ....................
China: Arrests in Tibet .............................................................
Ethiopia: Government Setbacks in the North ........................
Trinidad and Tobago-US: Prime Minister Seeks Meeting .... 7
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Ton Secret
Mediterranean Sea
Beirut
International
Airport
DWF-al .Q2
r e siege
Top Secret
Buhayra
al Qir'a n
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LEBANON: Political Developments
Druze leader Walid Junb/att's call for a Druze civil administration
reflects his skepticism about reconciliation and puts pressure on the
government of President Gemayel to accept political reforms, while
the Christians' unilateral release of some 200 Druze hostages might
result in the lifting of the Druze siege of Christian forces at Dayr al
preempt the planned national reconciliation talks.
because it will bring Lebanon closer to partition and because it will
Junblatt named an eight-member executive committee on
Saturday to oversee a network of village committees dealing with all
social, cultural, economic, developmental, and administrative matters
in areas under Druze control. The Druze already have a similar
apparatus for military control of the Shuf. Lebanese Government
officials told the US Embassy they oppose a Druze civil administration
Christian militiamen they hold there.
The Christian Lebanese Forces militia yesterday released some
200 Druze prisoners in the hope that the move might bring about a
reciprocal Druze gesture at Dayr al Qamar. Junblatt had indicated
such an action might induce the Druze to release the nearly 500
the UN or the Multinational Force for this role.
The interfactional cease-fire committee-composed of
representatives of the Lebanese Army and the Druze, Shia, and
Christian militias-has succeeded in reopening Beirut International
Airport and the coastal road leading south from the capital. The issue
of naming neutral observers to monitor the cease-fire, however,
remains unresolved. The Syrians and Druze refuse to consider either
Comment: The planned Druze civil administration would in effect
create an autonomous Druze ministate in the mountains. Junblatt has
always opposed such an arrangement as politically and economically
unworkable, and his announcement yesterday almost certainly
indicates that he expects little from the national reconciliation talks.
The announcement will create a perception of Druze separatism that
will increase the pressure on Gemayel to make far-reaching
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1 3 October 1983
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PERU-CUBA: Deteriorating Relations
The recent failure to resolve several bilateral issues has cooled
relations between Lima and Havana, but a break is not likely.
Many Peruvians have been angered by Radio Havana broadcasts
sympathetic to the Sendero- Luminoso guerrilla group. The Interior
Minister charges that the broadcasts are subversive.
13 Cuban refugees w o have been living in the Peruvian Embassy in
Havana since 1980 be allowed to leave the country. They also refuse
to support Peru in its current bid for a UN Security Council seat.
Comment: Diplomatic relations between the two nations were
reduced to the Charge level following the occupation of the Peruvian
Embassy compound in Havana by over 10,000 would-be Cuban
refugees in 1980. Although both countries have expressed a desire to
improve ties, Havana's inflexibility over the refugee problem probably
will continue to prevent a rapprochement.
The broadcasts are unlikely to lead to a rupture in relations,
unless evidence of direct Cuban collusion with Sendero Luminoso is
uncovered. Belaunde and others in his government probably fear that
a break with Havana would encourage Cuba to aid the insurgents.
They also may be concerned that it would jeopardize shipments of
Soviet military equipment to Peru.
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2 3 October 1983
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The Cubans refuse to yield to a request that
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FRANCE-IRAQ: Dispute Over Super Etendard Sale
A generally reliable source on Friday told the defense attache in
Paris that Foreign Minister Cheysson supports the sale of Super
Etendard fighter-bombers to Iraq, while Defense Minister Hernu
opposes the deal. A French official told the attache the French Navy is
concerned that Iran will attack French ships in the Persian Gulf if the
aircraft are delivered. Cheysson has announced Paris will complete
the sale, but reliable sources indicate that the delivery might be
delayed by shipping disassembled aircraft or that the operational
capabilities ' ht be reduced by withholding spare
parts.
Comment: Iraq is France's primary oil supplier, and Paris wants
to appear as though it is honoring its commitment to Baghdad. The
stalling tactics could postpone Iraqi use of the Super Etendards by
several months. Such tactics probably are part of attempts to placate
the Iranians, mollify international concern about an escalation of the
conflict, and find a compromise between the Foreign and Defense
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Diplomatic sources in Lhasa report that, as part of the nationwide
crackdown on crime, Chinese authorities have arrested a large
number of Tibetans. Five were executed Friday. The exiled Dalai
Lama claims they were not criminals but political dissidents.
Diplomatic observers report that the crackdown in Tibet seems to be
aimed at dissidents as well as criminals.
Comment: The arrests indicate China has decided to adopt a get-
tough policy toward recalcitrant minorities in Tibet and possibly in
other regions. Since 1980 Beijing, reversing Maoist policies, has
allowed greater freedom in religious and social practice among
minority groups and increased minority representation in local
governments. The crackdown suggests this policy has not been
entirely successful in overcoming local resentment against Chinese
domination. The central authorities probably have found it necessary
to establish clearly the tolerable limits of local autonomy
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ETHIOPIA: Government Setbacks in the North
Chairman
engistu and his military and political advisers are increasingly
concerned about several defeats of government forces in the north by
Tigrean and Eritrean guerrillas. The Army has suffered some 15,000
casualties since February. In addition, morale among Ethiopian forces
is low, and local commanders fear that an attempt to renew large-
scale offensive operations would lead to wholesale desertions. The
leadership plans to send 30,000 new recruits to the north by the end
of the year.
there are no realistic pros ects for a political solution.
to several West European nations. Dispatching new recruits to the
north will not change the military balance there. The Army's
effectiveness continues to be limited by poor tactics and a severe
shortage of competent junior officers and experienced
noncommissioned officers. The senior ranks, nevertheless, remain
unwilling to oppose Mengistu's commitment to pursue the war, and
Comment: The deteriorating situation may have caused Mengistu
to cancel his plans to address the UN General Assembly and to travel
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO-US: Prime Minister Seeks Meeting
president. Until this summer, Chambers was critical of Washington,
accusing the US of providing financial support to some opposition
croups and urging US concessions on a range of bilateral problems.
The efforts by senior Trinidadian officials to arrange a meeting
between Prime Minister Chambers and President Reagan reflect a
recent shift in Port of Spain's attitude toward the US. According to
Embassy reporting, Chambers wants to discuss bilateral economic
issues and regional and national security. Such a meeting would be a
first between any Trinidadian head of state or government and a US
Washington will be more effective in gaining assistance.
are rising, and Chambers faces uncertain prospects for reelection in
1986. Moreover, senior officials are expressing concern over political
instability. They probably have concluded that a warmer approach to
Comment: The desire for closer ties comes when the oil- and gas-
producing island's economy is slumping, unemployment and inflation
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