NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 3 OCTOBER 1983

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 27, 2010
Sequence Number: 
67
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 3, 1983
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7.pdf1.24 MB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Director of Central Intelligence 3 October 83 Copy CPAS NID 83-232JX TOP SQGret Top Seorot National Intelligence Daily Monday 3 October 1983 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Top Secret Contents It, Lebanon: Political Developments ............................................ 1 Peru-Cuba: Deteriorating Relations ........................................ 2 France-Iraq: Dispute Over Super Etendard Sale .................... China: Arrests in Tibet ............................................................. Ethiopia: Government Setbacks in the North ........................ Trinidad and Tobago-US: Prime Minister Seeks Meeting .... 7 Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Ton Secret Mediterranean Sea Beirut International Airport DWF-al .Q2 r e siege Top Secret Buhayra al Qir'a n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Too Secret LEBANON: Political Developments Druze leader Walid Junb/att's call for a Druze civil administration reflects his skepticism about reconciliation and puts pressure on the government of President Gemayel to accept political reforms, while the Christians' unilateral release of some 200 Druze hostages might result in the lifting of the Druze siege of Christian forces at Dayr al preempt the planned national reconciliation talks. because it will bring Lebanon closer to partition and because it will Junblatt named an eight-member executive committee on Saturday to oversee a network of village committees dealing with all social, cultural, economic, developmental, and administrative matters in areas under Druze control. The Druze already have a similar apparatus for military control of the Shuf. Lebanese Government officials told the US Embassy they oppose a Druze civil administration Christian militiamen they hold there. The Christian Lebanese Forces militia yesterday released some 200 Druze prisoners in the hope that the move might bring about a reciprocal Druze gesture at Dayr al Qamar. Junblatt had indicated such an action might induce the Druze to release the nearly 500 the UN or the Multinational Force for this role. The interfactional cease-fire committee-composed of representatives of the Lebanese Army and the Druze, Shia, and Christian militias-has succeeded in reopening Beirut International Airport and the coastal road leading south from the capital. The issue of naming neutral observers to monitor the cease-fire, however, remains unresolved. The Syrians and Druze refuse to consider either Comment: The planned Druze civil administration would in effect create an autonomous Druze ministate in the mountains. Junblatt has always opposed such an arrangement as politically and economically unworkable, and his announcement yesterday almost certainly indicates that he expects little from the national reconciliation talks. The announcement will create a perception of Druze separatism that will increase the pressure on Gemayel to make far-reaching Top Secret 1 3 October 1983 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Top Secret PERU-CUBA: Deteriorating Relations The recent failure to resolve several bilateral issues has cooled relations between Lima and Havana, but a break is not likely. Many Peruvians have been angered by Radio Havana broadcasts sympathetic to the Sendero- Luminoso guerrilla group. The Interior Minister charges that the broadcasts are subversive. 13 Cuban refugees w o have been living in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana since 1980 be allowed to leave the country. They also refuse to support Peru in its current bid for a UN Security Council seat. Comment: Diplomatic relations between the two nations were reduced to the Charge level following the occupation of the Peruvian Embassy compound in Havana by over 10,000 would-be Cuban refugees in 1980. Although both countries have expressed a desire to improve ties, Havana's inflexibility over the refugee problem probably will continue to prevent a rapprochement. The broadcasts are unlikely to lead to a rupture in relations, unless evidence of direct Cuban collusion with Sendero Luminoso is uncovered. Belaunde and others in his government probably fear that a break with Havana would encourage Cuba to aid the insurgents. They also may be concerned that it would jeopardize shipments of Soviet military equipment to Peru. Top Secret 2 3 October 1983 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 The Cubans refuse to yield to a request that Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Top Secret FRANCE-IRAQ: Dispute Over Super Etendard Sale A generally reliable source on Friday told the defense attache in Paris that Foreign Minister Cheysson supports the sale of Super Etendard fighter-bombers to Iraq, while Defense Minister Hernu opposes the deal. A French official told the attache the French Navy is concerned that Iran will attack French ships in the Persian Gulf if the aircraft are delivered. Cheysson has announced Paris will complete the sale, but reliable sources indicate that the delivery might be delayed by shipping disassembled aircraft or that the operational capabilities ' ht be reduced by withholding spare parts. Comment: Iraq is France's primary oil supplier, and Paris wants to appear as though it is honoring its commitment to Baghdad. The stalling tactics could postpone Iraqi use of the Super Etendards by several months. Such tactics probably are part of attempts to placate the Iranians, mollify international concern about an escalation of the conflict, and find a compromise between the Foreign and Defense Top Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Ton Secret Diplomatic sources in Lhasa report that, as part of the nationwide crackdown on crime, Chinese authorities have arrested a large number of Tibetans. Five were executed Friday. The exiled Dalai Lama claims they were not criminals but political dissidents. Diplomatic observers report that the crackdown in Tibet seems to be aimed at dissidents as well as criminals. Comment: The arrests indicate China has decided to adopt a get- tough policy toward recalcitrant minorities in Tibet and possibly in other regions. Since 1980 Beijing, reversing Maoist policies, has allowed greater freedom in religious and social practice among minority groups and increased minority representation in local governments. The crackdown suggests this policy has not been entirely successful in overcoming local resentment against Chinese domination. The central authorities probably have found it necessary to establish clearly the tolerable limits of local autonomy Top Secret 25X1 25X1 5 3 October 1983 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Too Secret ETHIOPIA: Government Setbacks in the North Chairman engistu and his military and political advisers are increasingly concerned about several defeats of government forces in the north by Tigrean and Eritrean guerrillas. The Army has suffered some 15,000 casualties since February. In addition, morale among Ethiopian forces is low, and local commanders fear that an attempt to renew large- scale offensive operations would lead to wholesale desertions. The leadership plans to send 30,000 new recruits to the north by the end of the year. there are no realistic pros ects for a political solution. to several West European nations. Dispatching new recruits to the north will not change the military balance there. The Army's effectiveness continues to be limited by poor tactics and a severe shortage of competent junior officers and experienced noncommissioned officers. The senior ranks, nevertheless, remain unwilling to oppose Mengistu's commitment to pursue the war, and Comment: The deteriorating situation may have caused Mengistu to cancel his plans to address the UN General Assembly and to travel TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO-US: Prime Minister Seeks Meeting president. Until this summer, Chambers was critical of Washington, accusing the US of providing financial support to some opposition croups and urging US concessions on a range of bilateral problems. The efforts by senior Trinidadian officials to arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Chambers and President Reagan reflect a recent shift in Port of Spain's attitude toward the US. According to Embassy reporting, Chambers wants to discuss bilateral economic issues and regional and national security. Such a meeting would be a first between any Trinidadian head of state or government and a US Washington will be more effective in gaining assistance. are rising, and Chambers faces uncertain prospects for reelection in 1986. Moreover, senior officials are expressing concern over political instability. They probably have concluded that a warmer approach to Comment: The desire for closer ties comes when the oil- and gas- producing island's economy is slumping, unemployment and inflation Top Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020067-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7 Too Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020067-7