NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 27 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 27, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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6C t
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
27 October 1983
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Contents
Grenada: International Reactions ............................................ 1
Western Europe-Grenada: Views on US Policy .................... 4
Western Europe-Lebanon: Foreign Ministers' Meeting ........ 6
USSR: Andropov's Statement on INF ....................................... 7
USSR-Philippines: Soviets Stick With Marcos ...................... 10
Zambia: National Election ........................................................ 11
Nigeria-OPEC: Discord Over Production Levels .................... 14
Special Analysis
Poland: Jaruzelski at the Plenum ............................................ 15
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GRENADA: International Reactions
As organized resistance draws to a close, the magnitude of the
Cuban presence in Grenada is becoming clear. Reactions from
Central America continue to be cautious. while the Soviets and their
East European allies express outrage.
More than 600 Cubans, including their commander, an Army
colonel, have been captured so far. Cuban President Castro said
yesterday that there were more than 700 Cubans in Grenada,
including 500 construction workers. These workers were nearly all
armed and prepared for organized resistance before the first US
troops landed early Tuesday morning.
Comment: Some additional Cubans may have been landed by the
Vietnam Heroico, which has been in Grenada since the week before
the coup that overthrew the late Prime Minister Bishop.
Public statements by Cuba yesterday that all Cuban resistance
had ceased, even before this was the case, indicate that the Cubans
appear resigned to the loss of Grenada. They probably will step up
their diplomatic demarches and media activity designed to embarrass
the US. Castro may be angry enough, however, to order sabotage
against US forces, bases, or embassies in the Caribbean Basin or
elsewhere using Cuban surrogates or operatives that would give him
plausible denial.
Soviet Reaction
The USSR firmly condemned the US invasion again yesterday,
calling it a crime against peace. and humanity. Moscow has not made
any public statement on its personnel in Grenada, but Castro claimed
yesterday that none of the Soviets were military advisers.
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Comment: Moscow's effort to discredit the US is likely to be
substantial and long lasting. The Soviets will assert that the US action
signals a heightened threat of US intervention in other Latin American
countries. Moscow probably will encourage Nicaragua and other
Third World countries to take the lead in international condemnation.
East European Reaction
East European governments have reacted with predictable
hostility, reflecting both their alliance with the USSR and their concern
about the example this move sets for superpower intervention in
neighboring countries. The USSR's Warsaw Pact allies echoed the
Soviet line, denouncing the invasion as aggression and a violation of
Yugoslavia also condemned the invasion as contrary to the
principles of respect for independence, territorial integrity, and
they will not condemn the US.
Central American Comment
Reaction from most Central American countries remains sparse
and generally cautious. Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador have
privately endorsed the intervention, according to US Embassy
reports, but Honduras is withholding comment. Both Costa Rica and
Belize asserted their opposition to military action but have indicated
resist any US invasion of Nicaragua.
The Sandinistas in Nicaragua have demanded the withdrawal of
US forces from Grenada and have asserted that they are prepared to
Comment: Private backing from Central American governments
will not necessarily translate into public endorsements because most
Central Americans have memories of past interventions in their own
countries. Nevertheless, they probably are encouraged by the US
action in Grenada, seeing in it additional indications of Washington's
resolve to contain Cuba and Nicaragua. Despite the Sandinistas'
confidence that they could resist US intervention, they are likely to
point to events in Grenada in an effort to obtain additional military aid
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Surinamese Move Against Cuba
In a television address,
about the activities of the Cuban Ambassasador. The Army
Commander said that projects undertaken within the framework of
problems" in Suriname's relations with Cuba and expressing concern
outerse reviewed the Grenadian situation, noting "certain
whose continued support he must retain.
Comment: Bouterse admired Bishop's revolutionary charisma,
and he probably perceives that Bishop was abandoned by Cuba. The
chilling of relations with Havana is probably a reaction to what
Bouterse may view as a possible future challenge to his position by
pro-Cuban radicals, as occurred in Grenada. At the same time,
however, Bouterse's remarks were carefully worded to avoid isolation
from the far left and preserve his future with it and the nationalists,
bilateral agreements would be drastically curtailed.
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WESTERN EUROPE-GRENADA: Views on US Policy
and some have been openly critical.
Most Allied governments are disturbed by US actions in Grenada,
British Foreign Secretary Howe, in an emergency Parliamentary
debate, avoided condemnation of US actions despite strong .
opposition criticism. He expressed regret that the US ignored British
advice not to intervene and said consultations between London and
Washington had been "less than he would have wished.'
condemn the US moves categorically.
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau yesterday said that he
regretted US actions in Grenada. He said that, "without further
explanation," the intervention is unjustified. but he refused to
aggressive policy
A West German spokesman said yesterday that his government
regretted the events in Grenada and would have advised against the
US action had it been consulted beforehand. When asked about the
possible impact on the INF debate, he said the government would
discuss that with its Allies. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister
Genscher told the US Ambassador in Bonn that opposition groups
would cite the Grenada actions as proof that the US is pursuing an
justify US intervention
French President Mitterrand, according to press reports,
condemned US actions at a Cabinet meeting and stressed the right of
all peoples to self-determination. Prime Minister Mauroy told the
National Assembly that the operation is an attack on international law
and said that the information the-government had received could not
private channels
Comment: Prime Minister Thatcher probably will continue to
stress the importance of not allowing disputes over the Caribbean to
damage more important Alliance considerations such as INF
deployment. Despite her irritation at what she sees as US insensitivity
to British concerns, she probably will express her displeasure through
the period leading up to a crucial debate in the Bundestag
Some West German Social Democrats are trying to use the
Grenada issue to foment more opposition to INF deployment durin
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WESTERN EUROPE-LEBANON: Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The French, British, and Italian Foreign Ministers almost certainly
will agree on continued participation in the Multinational Force in
Beirut at their meeting in Paris today, but they may contend that troop
reductions will be necessary in the next few months.
French Foreign Minister Cheysson expressed reservations to
Western diplomats on Monday about long-term French participation
in the Force. He noted that the French public will urge a withdrawal if
the Lebanese e order and if there are additional French
casualties.
Cheysson and British Foreign Secretary Howe agreed on
Tuesday, however, on the need to maintain the MNF in Beirut. They
also agreed it is necessary to urge the Lebanese Government to seek
accommodation with the various factions and for the MNF
participants to develop a long-term strategy for Lebanon.
Comment: The governments of West European contributors to
the MNF remain very concerned about the domestic reaction to any
further casualties. Events in Grenada may also make them even more
sensitive to criticism that their participation in the MNF adds to an
increasing East-West confrontation in the Third World.
The governments probably hope to make at least a symbolic
reduction in their forces in the near future. They may suggest that the
US persuade the government of President Gemayel to be more
flexible in the national reconciliation talks. They may also raise the
possibility of integrating the MNF into a UN peacekeeping force to
expand par '
ide a stronger justification for its
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presence.
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USSR: Andropov's Statement on INF
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General Secretary Andropov's offer to negotiate an INF agreement
that would freeze SS-20 deployments in the eastern USSR and reduce
the number of Soviet missiles opposite NATO to approximately 140
was coupled with a threat to break off the talks once US INF
deployments begin.
In a Pravda interview today, Andropov insisted that Moscow
would not retreat from its opposition to any US missile deployments
in Europe or its stand on taking British, and French systems into
account in an agreement. He said Moscow would be more flexible on
the issue of aircraft limitations
Andropov's offer to freeze SS-20s in the eastern USSR was
contingent on no substantial change in the strategic situation in Asia.
He maintained that a reduction to about 140 SS-20 launchers
opposite NATO would ensure equality in warheads with British and
Andropov was quoted as saying that "the appearance of-new
American missiles in Western Europe would make it impossible to
continue the talks now being held in Geneva." At the same time, he
stated that if the US postponed its missile deployments, the USSR
would begin to reduce Rs remainina - issiles, which he said
number more than 200.
Comment: This is the most authoritative Soviet statement that
the USSR will break off the INF talks once US deployments begin. Its
wording leaves open the possibility of a breakoff of START talks as
well.
Although a suspension of either or both talks would be a dramatic
gesture, it would not necessarily mean that the USSR was no longer
interested in arms negotiations as a means of limiting US
deployments. After reassessing the prospects for negotiations,
Moscow might even propose the merger of START and INF talks. It
might take a number of months to work out the details of such a
proposal and resume negotiations.
Andropov's offer to reduce to 140 the number of SS-20 launchers
opposite NATO was made implicitly in June, when he offered to count
warheads rather than launchers. Nonetheless, Moscow can be
expected to emphasize its willingness to remove 100 SS-20 launchers
from its forces opposite NATO.
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While opponents of INF will use the offer to press their
governments at least to postpone deployments, almost all West
European government officials will reject the Soviet proposals. At the
same time, however, they will stress the need for negotiations to
continue after INF basing begins later this year.
Many officials expected the USSR to propose even greater
reductions, and they will continue to oppose Soviet demands that
British and French systems be taken into account. They may even
note that NATO, publicly credited the USSR with 140 SS-20s in
December 1979, when the Alliance made its dual-track INF decision in
an effort to deal with that threat
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Continuing favorable Soviet media coverage of President Marcos
suggests Moscow believes he will survive the current political turmoil.
Soviet coverage of opposition complaints against Marcos has
increased as the crisis has continued, but it has not been
sympathetic. One commentator recently said the rightwing opposition
had been upset by the President's independent foreign policy. He
expressed doubt about opposition claims that Marcos was involved in
the Aquino assassination.
The Soviets also have played up ties between the Philippine
opposition and the US and have suggested that Washington was
behind Aquino's death. Moscow has cited foreign allegations that
dissatisfaction with Philippine trade and military policies led the US to
conclude that Marcos had to be replaced
The US Embassy in Moscow reports that a Soviet Foreign
Ministry official recently said the USSR appreciates the Marcos
government's frequent support for nonaligned positions at the UN
and welcomes its questioning of the need for US bases in the
Philippines. According to the official, Moscow expects Washington to
use its influence with Manila to stabilize the situation.
Comment: Moscow's decision not to ally itself with the opposition
is partly due to its belief that no probable successor to Marcos is
likely to be as sympathetic to Soviet interests. Marcos is the only
current ASEAN head of state to have visited the USSR and to have
agreed to accept Soviet economic aid. In addition, the pro-Soviet left
in the Philippines is weak and has virtually no chance of playing an
important political role.
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President Kaunda, running unopposed in the national election
today, should win a strong "yes" vote for another five-year term, but
his new mandate could erode rapidly if Zambia fails to make some
economic gains in the near future.
Inflation is approaching 30 percent for the year, and copper and
cobalt mining, which accounts for more than 90 percent of Zambia's
export earnings, is operating at a loss. A slight rise in copper prices
earlier this year has been offset by the high cost of oil and other
essential imports. Mismanagement, corruption, and drought have
contributed to the gloomy economic picture.
Kaunda has had to cope with Zambia's independent and
aggressive labor unions, which represent some 300,000 laborers or.
about 80 percent of the work force. Earlier this year, he prevented
widespread strikes by agreeing to a modest pay raise for workers and
by appointing a number of labor union officials to the board of
directors of the state-run Industrial and Mining Corporation.
Comment: Zambia's economy probably will continue to decline
because there is little likelihood of a substantial rise in the price of
copper and cobalt in the near term. The country's economic woes are
a ravated b the lack of economic expertise within the government.
Kaunda, in preparing for the election, has had to defend a wide
range of recent austerity measures required by the IMF in exchange
for financial assistance. Those measures include devaluation and cuts
in imports and government spending. If he has to impose additional
austerity moves, he is likely to be opposed by the labor unions, which
regard themselves as champions of the population at large as well as
protectors of the workers.
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The US Embassy in Lagos reports that Nigerian officials are angry
about increased oil production in Saudi Arabia and Iran and are
relaxing controls on output imposed in August. Nigeria previously had
ordered foreign operators to limit its production to its OPEC
allocation of 1.3 million barrels per day through the end of the year.
The officials say that, because other OPEC members are exceeding
their quotas, Nigeria will produce an additional 100,000 barrels per
day until overall OPEC production falls within its ceiling. OPEC
production currently is running nearly 1.5 million barrels per day
above the cartel's self-imposed daily limit of 17.5 million barrels.
Comment: The Nigerians probably will try to raise the issue of
Saudi and Iranian overproduction when OPEC's Monitoring
Committee meets in Vienna today. Nigeria's decision to increase
output could lead to more violations of the already shaky OPEC
accord and put the cartel in a poor position to defend prices when
seasonal demand weakens again early next year.
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Special Analysis
POLAND: Jaruzelski at the Plenum
First Secretary Jaruzelski's performance in the party plenum this
month demonstrated his control over the party leadership and his
determination to continue a moderate course. He has helped put his
critics on the defensive by decimating the Solidarity underground and
by limiting the impact of the papal visit. Positive press treatment in the
USSR of Jaruzelski and the course of the plenum suggests Moscow is
generally satisfied with political trends in Poland.
Jaruzelski sidestepped possible criticism of his policies by
avoiding any serious debate on controversial issues at the first
plenum devoted to ideology in 20 years. In his speech to the plenum,
Jaruzelski condemned his domestic critics as "armchair
revolutionaries" and reaffirmed his itment to improving the
party's governing style.
The Polish leader's failure to implement any of the long-rumored
personnel changes suggests, however, that he is not entirely
confident of his control. Jaruzelski
apparently wanted to promote moderate Vice-Premier Rakowski to
the Politburo and secretariat as early as last April, opposition in
Poland and in the USSR has deterred him from doing so.
Jaruzelski showed his command of the party leadership in
particular by securing the adoption of a new cadre policy. The policy
will allow some qualified nonparty people to hold middle- and lower-
level management positions traditionally reserved for party members.
The First Secretary will find it difficult to carry out the new cadre
policy, however, because his control of the party leadership does not
necessarily extend down to the local bureaucracy,
In addition, a moderate
commentator in the party press has complained that hardliners and
inefficient bureaucrats are merely being shifted to other positions.
Resistance to Jaruzelski's efforts could appear during the next
several months, when local and regional party organizations hold
elections. A source of the US Embassy claims that the disruptions
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put such party officials into middle- and lower-level leadership
positions, assuring continued resistance to Jaruzelski's policies.
caused by Solidarity and martial law have left only "crusty
apparatchiks" and hardliners in the rank and file. The elections could
overcome
A Cautious Approach
The plenum indicated that Jaruzelski will move deliberately and is
not prepared to take dramatic steps to gain popular support or to
restructure the economy. In his closing speech, Jaruzelski said that
Poland's political and economic problems will take many years to
demands.
Jaruzelski again flatly rejected any dialogue with Solidarity,
denouncing underground activists as "favorites of imperialist
subversion." The regime's virtually complete control of the security
situation allows Jaruzelski generally to ignore the underground's
would help reduce pressure on the government.
Several Solidarity activists recently implied to US Embassy
officers that underground activity is shifting from planning
demonstrations to organizing educational activities. Such a move
discourage the clergy from taking actions hostile to the regime.
and the recent highly publicized investigations of activist priests,
including Lech Walesa's adviser in Gdansk, probably are intended to
Despite increased criticism in the press of the political role of the
church, the restrained tone of the Politburo report suggests the
regime is not prepared to launch a new crackdown. The press attacks
judges that such tactics will only reinforce its popular support.
religious symbols from public buildings and factories. The church
The Polish episcopate, according to the US Embassy, is not
greatly concerned with the attacks or the government's removal of
significant steps by the US toward easing sanctions.
over the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Walesa or the lack of
The criticism of the US in the Politburo report, although not as
strident as recent statements by the leadership, nonetheless
coincides with an extension of police harassment to US Consulates in
Poznan and Krakow. This step, which is satisfying to both hardliners
and the Soviets, may be intended to show the regime's displeasure
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In the USSR, positive media coverage of the plenum suggests
strong Soviet backing for Jaruzelski. If Jaruzelski travels to Moscow
soon, the Soviets probably will reiterate their support.
Jaruzelski's failure to announce personnel changes at the plenum
may have removed some of Moscow's reservations about portions of
the party program that are not in the Soviet mold. Moscow probably
was especially pleased that Rakowski was not promoted.
The Next Steps
Jaruzelski will have the opportunity to announce personnel
changes soon in a session of the legislature, and he may try to
improve his position by bringing more of his followers into key
government positions. He also may try to use the current round of
meetings examining the activities of individual party members and
organizations to eliminate opponents at the local and regional level.
At this point, Jaruzelski's leadership position appears secure for
the next several years. Entrenched bureaucrats, however, probably
will continue to oppose his efforts to change the party's ruling style.
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