NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 26 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
26 October 1983
1 up sum quit
CPAS NID 83-251JX
26 to er 19998
Copy 2 8 5
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Contents
Grenada: International Reactions ............................................ 1
Lebanon: Responsibility for the Bombings ............................ 4
France: Bleak Socialist Party Congress .................................. 6
Nicaragua: Insurgent Actions .................................................. 7
Bulgaria: Looking to the West ................................................ 9
USSR-US-Nicaragua: High-Level Soviet Statement .............. 10
Saudi Arabia: Possible Postponement of Arab Summit ........ 11
Hungary-EC: Status of Proposed Trade Agreement .............. 12
USSR: Pressures on the Media .............................................. 13
Special Analysis
PLO: Arafat's Precarious Position .......................................... 14
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26 October 1983
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GRENADA: International Reactions
(Information as of 2300 EDT, 25 October 1983)
has varied from praise to condemnation.
Cuban personnel apparently took an active role in helping the
Grenadian military resist US and other elements of the multinational
force during the fighting yesterday. Worldwide reaction to the situation
The Cuban media began broadcasting descriptions of the Cuban
resistance on the island yesterday, statin that the Cubans "would
not surrender under any circumstances."
Comment: At least 400 Cubans were estimated to be on the
island at the time of the coup last week, of which all but a few dozen
were construction workers. Most of them are military reservists and
appear to have been armed and organized into small military units.
They may also have been reinfor d by some personnel from the
Vietnam Heroico.
Havana-by taking a fighting stance against the US-may hope
to drag out the hostilities in an attempt to gain a propaganda victory.
The Cubans' resistance against heavy odds also gives the Castro
regime a face-saving, low-cost means of covering up its failure to
anticipate the leadershi enada and to support the late
Prime Minister Bishop.
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governments had played a major role in Washington's decision to act.
British Reaction
Prime Minister Thatcher, during a stormy question session in the
House of Commons, said she had warned the US that the UK had
"very considerable doubts" about intervention in Grenada, and she
confirmed that no British forces were involved in the landings.
Thatcher added that she believed requests from Caribbean
remain clear of the fighting.
Foreign Secretary Howe, responding to demands that he disclose
the extent of US consultations with the UK, said the Prime Minister
had been informed of US plans on Monday. He announced that the
British destroyer Antrim, cruising near Grenada, was under orders to
Debate in the House of Commons on Grenada
with a special three-hour "emergency" session.
prominent rightwing Member of Parliament.
Comment: The tone of Thatcher's and Howe's remarks indicates
concern about a credibility problem that could lead leftwing Laborites
and rightwing Tories to charge that Washington cannot be trusted to
inform London promptly of its actions, even when they affect a
Commonwealth member. Such accusations could reopen the
question of "dual key" controls on INF, an issue already raised by a
excuse to bring down a leftwing regime.
In order to limit damage, Thatcher probably will encourage
Caribbean members of the Commonwealth to become involved in the
restoration of order in Grenada and urge the US to withdraw its forces
as soon as possible. Most Members of Parliament probably believe
that the US used the unstable Grenadian political situation as an
Thatcher might reluctantly send a small military contingent to
function in a peacekeeping role if the Organization of East Caribbean
States requested such assistance. If such a force were drawn from
Belize, London probably would try to persuade Washington to use its
leverage to obtain guarantees that Guatemala would not act against
that country in the interim.
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the US "and its puppets" be removed. The Soviets did not
immediately report the detention of some of their personnel.
Soviet Reaction
Initial Soviet commentary claimed the US was trying to
subordinate Grenada to neocolonialist rule. Radio Moscow charged
that the US also has plans to intervene in Nicaragua and Cuba, and
TASS called for a worldwide campaign to demand that the troops of
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RUFF UMBRA
LEBANON: Responsibility for the Bombings
were responsible for the bombing attacks in Beirut.
two persons it suspects played a major role.
A senior Lebanese Army officer believes the bombings were
directed by Husayn Musawi, the leader of Islamic Amal, a breakaway
Shia group. The officer noted that the Syrians were involved in
planning the operation and that the Iranians probably supported it.
The US defense attache says Lebanese intelligence hopes to arrest
knowledge of the attacks
In Paris, the US defense attache reports that French military
leaders also believe the bombings may have been carried out by pro-
Iranian Shiias. Although the French are not convinced that Syria or
Iran was directly involved, they believe Damascus had advance
The French have in the past demonstrated that
they will defend their forces.
justify a further buildup of its forces in Lebanon.
In Moscow yesterday, Pravda's top commentator on the Middle
East called the bombings a direct result of Washington's
"adventurist" policy. On Monday a report on the Soviet nightly
television news program accused the US of using the bombings to
participated in the attacks
Comment: Syrian and Iranian intelligence organizations probably
were aware that radical Shias were preparing an operation, but they
may not have helped plan it. Syrians or Iranians are unlikely to have
Lebanon agreement on troop withdrawal.
Karami and Franjiyah, along with Walid Junblatt, are the major
figures in the National Salvation Front who will play a key role in the
talks in Geneva. Assad probably will urge them to raise the Israel-
its goal of getting US forces out of Lebanon.
The Soviets earlier had issued only brief factual reporting on the
bombings. The article in Pravda is Moscow's first major comment on
the attacks, and it probably will set the tone for future media
coverage. Moscow is now trying to capitalize on the incident to further
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FRANCE: Bleak Socialist Party Congress
causes for concern.
Delegates to the Socialist Party congress that begins on Friday will
focus on the economy and the government's unpopularity, although
the situations in Lebanon. Chad. and the Persian Gulf also will be
The previous congress, held in 1981, was largely a celebration of
Socialist election victories. The party's factions unite to conform the
dominance of President Mitterrand and his followers.
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country behind the government's policies.
Comment: Last-minute compromises may again permit a display
of party unity this weekend, but factionalism has reappeared.
Leftwing candidates favoring a more expansionary and protectionist
economic program polled nearly 18 percent of the votes when
delegates to the congress were chosen. Awareness of this dissent
within the party will underscore the Socialists' failure to rally the
France
Public opinion polls continue to reflect low confidence in the
government. Defeats in elections for national and local offices this fall
have confirmed that the left no longer commands majority support in
its victory in 1981.
The two labor unions most closely associated with the
government also lost heavily last week in nationwide voting for social
security boards. Recent highly political demonstrations by middle-
management workers show the extent to which the Socialist-
Communist coalition has alienated the moderate voters who ensured
prevent defeat in the legislative elections scheduled for 198
The congress will put the best face possible on these
developments by endorsing Mitterrand's economic program and his
less controversial foreign policy. The delegates will question,
however, whether the government can restore its fortunes in lime
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NICARAGUA: Insurgent Actions
Insurgents continue to raid ports and other economic targets in
Nicaragua, but several guerrilla commanders apparently have been
Press reports state that several civilians were killed last week
during a raid on Puerto Cabezas. An insurgent radiobroadcast
claimed the attack was the work of the Misura, the Miskito Indian
guerrilla organization, which professes to have some 3,000 armed
followers in Nicara ua.
Nicaraguan Democratic Force on a small town in Jinoteaa
The Sandinistas claim that as many as 46 persons-mostly
civilians-were killed in an attack carried out last week by the
Department.
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the Misura apparently still controls most of the 25X1
terrain outside of the main towns in the northeast and is able to move
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BULGARIA: Looking to the West
Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov is seeking improved ties with the
West at a time when the USSR is cautioning against expanded East-
West relations.
Moscow has reduced economic
support to Sofia and that Bulgaria recently has adopted a more
accommodating policy toward the West to meet its economic needs.
The US Embassy in Sofia reports that the Soviets are pushing the
Bulgarians to reduce their trade deficit by increasing exports of
agricultural and consumer goods to the USSR. In addition, Moscow
has rejected Sofia's request for a large, interest-free line of credit-a
standard feature of the annual trade package for almost two decades.
Bulgaria has made a series of gestures over the last few months in
an effort to improve its poor image in the West. Zhivkov stressed his
desire for better relations with the US during a meeting with the US
Ambassador last August, and a Hungarian official recently said Sofia
has sought Budapest's advice on ways to accommodate the US
concerns.
Last month Sofia resolved some contentious bilateral issues,
including several longstanding divided-family cases, and it has
stopped jamming Voice of America broadcasts. Bulgaria also has
been less strident than the USSR on the airliner incident and INF
deployment.
Comment: Zhivkov appears willing to risk Moscow's displeasure
by expanding economic ties with the West, and his unchallenged
position in the leadership enables him to take some controversial
initiatives. Zhivkov may now be more inclined to push Bulgaria's
national interests because of the Soviets' focus on postsuccession
consolidation, but his room to maneuver is limited.
Bulgaria still relies on the USSR for half its total foreign trade,
including most of its energy supplies. As a result, it probably will not
stray far from Soviet positions on key international issues.
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USSR-US-NICARAGUA: High-Level Soviet Statement
The USSR yesterday condemned what it described as a US effort
to overthrow Nicaragua's lawful government and said "a serious
threat" now exists. A government statement accused the US of
sabotaging Managua's efforts to arrange a political settlement in
Central America. Although the statement concluded that
"interference must be stopped," it did not hint at any counteraction.
Comment: The unusually high-level statement suggests that
Moscow is increasingly worried about the ability of the Sandinistas to
withstand insurgent attacks. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to avoid
any commitment to Nicaragua that could lead it into a regional
confrontation with the US. The statement is aimed at increasing
international support for Nicaragua. Although it was prepared before
the military action in Grenada, the Soviets also probably hope it will
put pressure on the US to avoid using force elsewhere in the area.
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SAUDI ARABIA: Possible Postponement of Arab Summit
A senior official in the Saudi Foreign Ministry suggested to US
Embassy officers this week that Riyadh might instead promote an
early meeting of key Arab foreign ministers.
Saudi diplomatic activity has intensified over
the past few months in an effort to ease outstanding problems,
including the rift,between Syria and Iraq, Syrian hostility toward PLO
chief Arafat, and the situation in Lebanon. Riyadh has made little
progress on these issues, however, and the summit appears
increasingly likely to be postponed. Syria, Jordan, and other Arab
states almost certainly would favor a delay.
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HUNGARY-EC: Status of Proposed Trade Agreement
EC member states last week endorsed the Commission's
negotiations with Hungary on a trade agreement and urged
Commission Vice President Haferkamp to draft a bilateral protocol as
soon as possible, according to an EC diplomat. Last April the
Hungarians requested a trade agreement in order to gain access to
EC markets for their beef and industrial products. In recent weeks
they have pushed hard for such an aareement during high-level
meetings with the West Germans.
Comment: Budapest is pursuing the agreement as part of its
broader strategy of turning to the West to improve its precarious
balance-of-payments position. Negotiations over specific concessions
are likely to be protracted. The West Germans and British apparently
favor an agreement to loosen Hungary's ties to the East, but the
French and Italians fear increased competition from Hungarian
agricultural products. Although Budapest probably notified Moscow
before approaching the EC for exploratory talks, the Soviets may be
concerned that closer ties with the EC could reduce Hungary's
traditional role as a food supplier to CEMA.
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trying to be responsive to different ministries.
paralyzed by conflicting pressures from Centr
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in the past few months Soviet media have occasionally been
editors-in-chief of the major newspapers receive phone ca s
c each v ri u art officials instructing them on how to cover
stories. differing demands may have
to make it more responsive to fast-breaking events.
caused the delays and contradictions last month in the coverage of
the airliner shootdown. Moscow expanded the bureaucracy's access
to and influence over the media in recent years as part of an attempt
procedures may be coming
Comment: The Soviets evidently did not foresee the disruptions
that conflicting pressures eventually would cause. A recent Politburo
meeting calling for better media "coordination" suggests that the
problem is being studied and that chanaes in media personnel and
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Special Analysis
seek a negotiated solution to the Palestinian issue.
have to accept collegial rule with the radicals and follow the more
militant line the radicals espouse. The eclipse of PLO moderates
means there is no longer a credible Palestinian leadership willing to
PLO Chairman Arafat has lost his preeminent role in shaping PLO
policy, and the balance of power has shifted decisively in favor of the
radicals. Arafat and other moderate leaders, if they are to survive, will
Habbash and Naif Hawatmah, who head important leftist Palestinian
Arafat continues to maneuver as best he can to retain at least the
title of PLO chief. Toward that goal, he still has the support of George
Arab leaders had all but ignored Arafat's plight since he returned
encourage increasing numbers of his followers to defect.
hope the encirclement will demonstrate Arafat's weakness and
Rebel Strategy
Arafat's opponents continue their military encirclement of his
forces in northern Lebanon, but the rebels' desire to establish their
legitimacy restrains them and the Syrians from a military assault. They
Most of the rebels probably would be satisfied if they could push
Arafat into convening a Fatah congress or the Palestine National
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Arafat's approval.
Council-or both-at which Arafat would bow to collegial rule and his
moderate lieutenants would be replaced in key positions by radicals.
If Arafat refused to compromise, the rebels would try to force a
meeting of the PLO organs and the election of new leaders without
The rebels would still have problems, however, even if they gained
a majority in the appropriate forums. There would be rancorous
debates, and Arafat's remaining followers would try to disrupt the
proceedings. The radicals, even if they were able to m v Arafat,
would find it difficult to agree on a new leader.
some leverage in his attempt to retain a semblance of authority.
The cost of forcing Arafat's removal is likely to be a PLO more
divided and less influential in the Arab world. This danger gives Arafat
deal with the rebels and the Syrians.
Outlook
Support from key PLO leaders and Arab states will at best buy
Arafat some time. His immediate objective, in fact, seems to be to
avoid making major concessions until an Arab summit convenes. The
PLO chief probably hopes the Arab leaders will unite in urging
restraint on Assad, thereby increasing Arafat's ability to negotiate a
methods.
The Fatah rebels will become stronger as the widespread
disaffection with Arafat's policies leads to further defections from his
ranks. The burden is on Arafat to reach an accommodation before the
rebels gain enough adherents to oust him by at least nominally legal
and amenable to Syrian direction
Despite their bitter propaganda exchanges, reconciliation
between Arafat and Assad is still possible. It will require, however,
that Arafat accept a collective leadership dominated by the radicals
satisfactory to Syria.
Radical domination of the PLO leaves the Palestinian nationalist
movement without a leadership willing to pursue a political solution of
the Palestinian issue. PLO militants will try to preserve some
semblance of independence but accept Syria's insistence that the
issue be addressed in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement
years ago to act as the sole representative of the Palestinians.
would risk losing the Arab League mandate given the PLO nine
If Arafat were to try to join Jordan's King Hussein in supporting
expanded Middle East peace talks, he probably would lose more of
his following and thus a legitimate claim to represent the PLO. He also
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