NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 29 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 29, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
29 October 1983
Top Seeret
29 c o er
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Contents
Grenada: Mopping Up Continues ............................................ 1
Western Europe-USSR: Reactions to Andropov's Offer ......
Zimbabwe: Anti-Western Actions ..........................................
Japan: Nakasone's Political Difficulties ..................................
Egypt-US-Near East: Diplomatic Initiative ............................ 8
Chile: Prospects for Dialogue Fading ...................................... 9
Pakistan: Status of Opposition Agitation ................................ 10
Nicaragua: Security Zone Proposed ...................................... 11
Guatemala: Political Violence .................................................. 11
Denmark-USSR: Foreign Minister's Trip to Moscow .............. 12
Vietnam-Kampuchea-UN: ASEAN Resolution Passes .......... 12
Special Analysis
Brazil: Figueiredo's Government Adrift .................................. 13
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29 October 1983
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 GRENADA: Mopping Up Continues
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With fighting virtually ended in the Grenadian capital, regional
leaders continue to offer suggestions on the formation of a transitional
government.
No major clashes were reported yesterday, but minor pockets of
resistance, mostly snipers, are still being encountered. Members of
the Multinational Force are to begin patrolling the streets of
St. Georges today to prevent looting and restore calm.
International Red Cross officials have agreed to repatriate the
dead and wounded Cubans and have asked for a list of all detainees
held by the US and the Multinational Force. Red Cross personnel
were en route to Barbados yesterday to facilitate the transfer of the
Cuban casualties and Cross visitation of Cuban
and Grenadian POWs.
Barbadian Prime Minister Adams outlined recent events in
Grenada and the region in a public address Thursday.-He said there
would be a transition period of some three months before elections
are held. Adams offered the assistance of the ctions
Office in establishing electoral procedures.
The US cast its veto of the UN Security Council resolution
deploring the military intervention in Grenada. The UK, Togo, and
Zaire abstained, while France, the Netherlands, Jordan, Malta, and
Pakistan joined the USSR, Poland, China, and sponsors Nicaragua,
Guyana, and Zimbabwe in supporting the resolution. The Bishop
government's Grenadian envoy to the UN was refused permission to
speak yesterday after Governor-General coon requested that his
credentials be withdrawn
Comment: Nicaragua is expected to carry the Grenada issue to
the General Assembly if it can arrange a procedural vote in the
Security Council that the US cannot veto. An overwhelming majority
of nonaligned nations will support language deploring the invasion,
and few Allies will lend public support. During the debate on Grenada,
Nicaragua is likely to bring up Central American issues as well.
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WESTERN EUROPE-USSR: Reactions to Andropov's Offer
Allied governments have reacted coolly to General Secretary
Andropov's latest missile offer, but have not dismissed it outright.
A senior British official says that, although the Soviet position at
Geneva remains essentially unchanged, the UK does not want to be
totally negative in its response. The British plan to call for further
study of Moscow's offer to reduce its SS-20 force in the Western
'USSR to 140 launchers in exchange for no NATO deployments. They
will note, however, that the new proposal would leave the USSR with
as many SS-20s facing Western Europe as it had alobally in 1979
when NATO made its dual-track INF decision
A West German Government spokesman says Andropov's offer
contains positive starting points but these are unacceptable because
they do not permit NATO to deploy INF and because they continue to
take British and French nuclear forces into account. He indicates that
the USSR would be responsible if the negotiations ended after INF
deployments begin. The Italian rnment also emphasizes that the
talks must continue.
The Norwegian and Dutch Governments say the new proposals
need further study, even though they do not seem to contain much
new and continue to fall short of NATO's security requirements. A
Dutch official has questioned whether an even more forthcoming
future Soviet offer, timed with a walkout from Geneva, would have
much appeal in view of the imminence of missile deployments.
Comment: Although the governments in the initial basing
countries believe they will win the debates on INF in their parliaments
this month, they presumably are worried that the situation in Grenada
will be exploited by the opponents of deployment. The government of
Prime Minister Thatcher almost certainly expects renewed calls for
dual controls on cruise missiles both from the opposition and from
some Conservatives on Monday. The West German and Italian
Governments probably also expect INF opponents to continue to use
US reactions in Grenada to support their claims that the US is an
irresponsible security partner-particularly where nuclear weapons
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ZIMBABWE: Anti-Western Actions
Zimb licy is becoming more anti-US and anti-
Western.
Zimbabwe this week cosponsored, along with Guyana and
Nicaragua, a draft resolution in the UN Security Council condemning
the US invasion of Grenada. Zimbabwe had earlier abstained on the
Security Council vote deploring the shooting down of the South
Korean airliner, despite a direct US appeal to Prime Minister Mugabe.
In Harare this week, the Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry
discouraged members of the diplomatic community from attending a
memorial mass arranged by the French and US Embassies for those
killed by the terrorist attack in Lebanon. Last month, Mugabe
condemned the UK for criticizing his redetention of white officers after
the courts had cleared them of sabotage charges, and anji-British
demonstrations were staged outside the British Embassy.
Comment: Zimbabwe's actions in part reflect its pique over press
reports this month that the US was considering a large cut in aid to
Zimbabwe. These reports angered Mugabe, who had described US-
Zimbabwean relations as excellent following his visit to the US in
September, and influenced Harare's position on Grenada and the
memorial service. The inexperience and ideological biases of many
Foreign Ministry officials also have contributed to the anti-Western
actions.
Underlying domestic considerations-and Mugabe's own
socialist predilections-may be leading him to pursue a foreign policy
that he will find difficult to reverse. Harare has had little success in
correcting the country's economic decline and has grown increasingly
frustrated over the dearth of Western investment. Mugabe is feeling
pressure from hardliners within his party, and this may grow as a
ma'or part scheduled for next May draws nearer
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Prime Minister Nakasone is struggling to deal with the
repercussions of the bribery conviction of former Prime Minister
Tanaka, his principal ally.
Nakasone met with Tanaka yesterday and indirectly asked him to
resign from the Diet. Tanaka refused. Opposition parties continue to
boycott the Diet because Tanaka is still a ' r
legislation, including a tax cut, is pending.m
Liberal Democratic Party leaders continue to support Nakasone,
but they are now looking to him to secure Tanaka's resignation.
Recent polls show a drop in support for both Nakasone and his party.
Comment: Nakasone has increased his vulnerability by meeting
with Tanaka. His personal prestige is now committed to winning
Tanaka's agreement to step down. He risks antagonizing leading
lieutenants of the Tanaka faction whose support he needs to defeat a
no-confidence mo hat may be introduced by the Japan Socialist
Party.
Nakasone will have difficulty accommodating the conflicting
demands of his allies in setting the time of the elections. Tanaka
prefers early elections to vindicate himself by winning reelection to
the Diet as an independent. Nakasone is afraid, however, that if the
Liberal Democratic Party loses seats in early elections he will be
blamed and be challenged for the leadership of the party.
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EGYPT-US-NEAR EAST: Diplomatic Initiative
Cairo has launched a diplomatic campaign to build moderate Arab
solidarity, increase support for Iraq, and keen the US engaged in the
Middle East peace process.
Foreign Minister All met with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn in
Baghdad on Wednesday and made his first official visit to Jordan
Thursday. Minister of State Ghali visited Beirut yesterday. President
Mubarak told the US Ambassador on Wednesday that it was essential
to reactivate the US peace initiative and that Ali would ask the
Jordanians if they are willing to act on the Palestinian problem.
Mubarak also urged the US to support Iraq. He emphasized that
Baghdad was ready to normalize ties with Washington and suggested
that Egypt could be a conduit for secret aid to Iraq.
Comment: The initiative reflects heightened Egyptian concern
that the situation in the Middle East is deteriorating and that Syrian,
Iranian, and Libyan influence will grow. Cairo believes the time is right
to rally Arab moderates and attempt to reassert its leadership. It has,
however, few effective means to influence events.
Egypt's efforts on behalf of Iraq complement Baghdad's own
diplomatic campaign for international-especially US-action against
Iran. Mubarak probably overstated Iraqi readiness to normalize
relations with the US, despite Saddam Husayn's recent public
comments that he might restore ties with Washington before the war
ends
The Egyptians also are worried that the Beirut bombings might
distract the US from a constructive diplomatic role or cause
Washington to act rashly. They fear that the US mi ht come to rely
more heavol el for the security of Lebanon.
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CHILE: Prospects for Dialogue Fading
Prospects for a renewal of talks between Interior Minister Jarpa
and the Democratic Alliance are diminishing because of the
government's increasingly tough line and the declining ability of the
opposition to mobilize protestors.
The government has decreed imprisonment and exile for protest
organizers and removed names from already published lists of exiles
permitted to return.
The opposition believes its ability to mount effective challenges
has slipped rapidly, and leaders are scrambling to devise tactics that
will restore momentum. The increasing frequency of the protests is
also eliminating the lulls that had facilitated talks.
Comment: The declining prospects for dialogue also may be
straining Jarpa's relations with President Pinochet. There have been
confrontations between them over economic and political policies,
and Jarpa is now apparently concen't on developing his own
base of political support.
Reduced turnout for protests is making the moderate opposition
leaders increasingly desperate. A willingness to cooperate with the
Communists could split the leadership of the Christian Democratic
Party between Gabriel Valdes-who reportedly believes the Alliance
must promote mass mobilization-and more conservative members
of the party led by Andres Zaldivar
This increased polarization, the lack of an effective channel for
dialogue, and growing frustration of the opposition, if coupled with a
harsh government crackdown on leaders of the national strike set for
next month, could provoke widespread violence.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
29 October 1983
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PAKISTAN: Status of Opposition Agitation
Opposition leaders are continuing efforts to incite disturbances in
Punjab Province.
The Punjabi leader of a major religious party has ruled out
additional negotiations with President Zia and has condoned hunger
strikes by lawyers in Lahore, the provincial capital, to demand the
release of imprisoned colleagues. The US Consulate General reports
that 5,000 trade unionists on Wednesday staged the largest
antigovernment demonstration in Punjab so far. Their threat to shut
down electrical power nationwide on Saturday, however, has been
averted by negotiations between union officials and the government.
The Consulate General says the government blames the Al
Zulfikar terrorist group for recent bombings in Lahore and has
arrested 10 of the 12 members believed to be responsible. Another
bomb exploded Tuesday in downtown Lahore, killing two persons and
injuring 17. An Al Zulfikar leader who is a son of former Prime Minister
Bhutto told a BBC interviewer that the organization had carried out an
earlier bombing.
Comment: The opposition will be more willing to negotiate with
President Zia if their efforts to increase agitation in the Punjab have
only limited success. Al Zulfikar's terrorist actions and its ties to
Afghanistan and India discredit the opposition generally and
encourage Zia to take tough actions toward all opposition groups.
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NICARAGUA: Security Zone Proposed
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The Nicaraguan junta is proposing to create a 25-nautical-mile
security zone off both its coasts. The US Embassy expects the
Nicaraguan Council of State to pass the proposal intact by early
November. Civilian ships and aircraft entering the security zone, even
for transit, would have to request permits seven days in advance, and
official and military craft would have to file requests 15 days in
advance. Violators would be subject to fines up to $200,000 and loss
of their vessels.
Comment: Creation of the zone is one reflection of Nicaragua's
heightened concern that its ports are vulnerable to guerrilla attacks.
No other Latin American country claims a security zone, although the
UK has declared one around the Falkland Islands. The US recognizes
no security zones, only 3-nautical-mile limits to territorial waters, but
US naval vessels usually remain beyond the 12-nautical-mile limit
claimed by Nicaragua. With its small navy, Nicaragua will probably be
cautious in enforcing the new security zone
Guatemala is experiencing a new wave of political killings and
abductions. According to the US Embassy, the number of kidnapings
jumped from 12 in August to 56 in September-the first full month of
Chief of State Mejia's rule. In two cases this month Guatemalan
employees of the US Agency for International Development have
disappeared, and the US Ambassador believes the government is
responsible. The Christian Democrats publicly accused rightwing
leaders-in concert with local authorities-of the murder last week of
three party officials. Two leaders of a new leftist party also have been
abducted.
Comment: Although leftist insurgent groups are responsible for
some of the increased violence, the characteristics surrounding the
incidents and the victims involved-as well as similarities to past
patterns of violence in Guatemala-indicate that security forces and
ultrarightist civilian elements are almost certainly heavily involved.
Unless Mejia takes forceful steps to reverse the trend and to account
for the missing AID employees, his efforts to enhance Guatemala's
image abroad are likely to fail. Moreover, if violence against moderate
and leftist political parties is left unchecked, some parties, particularly
the new ones, are likely to be afraid to participate in the elections set
for next year.
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DENMARK-USSR: Foreign Minister's Trip to Moscow
Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen is to visit Moscow on
Monday for discussions with Soviet officials on INF. He will return to
Copenhagen on Tuesday, two days before a Danish parliamentary
debate on the issue. Opposition parties are expected to sponsor a
resolution similar to the one that passed in May calling for a delay in
deployment during extended Geneva negotiations and urging the
inclusion of British and French systems in the talks. The government
of Prime Minister Schlueter apparently believes that a compromise
can be achieved on such a resolution, according to the US Embassy,
but government sources have hinted that the government will not
resign even if defeated on a resolution it cannot accept.
Comment: The Soviets probably will urge the Foreign Minister,
who represents a minority government having difficulties in
parliament on the INF issue, to respond positively to General
Secretary Andropov's latest proposals. Ellemann-Jensen will want to
prevent his comments in Moscow from being used against him in the
parliamentary debate and probably will express satisfaction with the
Soviet willingness to show flexibility. He nevertheless is likely to
reaffirm Denmark's adherence to the NATO position on deployment.
VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA-UN: ASEAN Resolution Passes
The General Assembly on Thursday endorsed ASEAN's call on
Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea and to allow free
elections there. This is the fifth consecutive year the UN has solidly
supported the ASEAN position. During the week before the vote,
Vietnam for the first time refrained from challenging Democratic
Kampuchea's claim to a UN seat. Challenges in past years had met
with lopsided defeats.
Comment: Vietnam apparently hoped to soften the annual
setbacks in the UN that underscore Hanoi's diplomatic, isolation on
Kampuchea. Although UN backing is heartening to ASEAN, the
outcome will only strengthen Hanoi's conviction that any diplomatic
settlement must be reached outside the UN framework.
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Special Analysis
BRAZIL: Figueiredo's Government Adrift
The government of President Figueiredo has become discredited
by its handling of the economy and seems unable to halt the decline of
its fortunes. Balancing financial imperatives against political pressures
will remain difficult, and the option of a debt moratorium may become
increasingly attractive to policymakers. Although the possibility of a
coup appears remote, the President's ineffectual leadership has
disgruntled some elements in the military, and sentiment could build
for policy changes or even for his resignation.
Government Losing Initiative
Rising public discontent and social unrest have led to general
condemnation of the government's austerity program as well as to
looting of supermarkets in several states. Many are calling for
Figueiredo to resign, and a national poll conducted last month gave
him the lowest popularity rating ever registered by any Brazilian
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Figueiredo has lost control over the ruling party and-unlike
previous military rulers since 1964-seems to have little chance of
imposing his choice for the next resident.
Last week more than one-tenth of the ruling party's Congressmen
joined the opposition in repealing a wage-restraint law and three
other measures that form part of the Brazilian austerity pledge to the
IMF. This action followed the legislative rejection of a salary law-the
first defeats of government-sponsored bills in 19 years of military rule.
Prospects
If Figueiredo remains indecisive, day-to-day decisionmaking will
stay in the hands of five or six military and civilian advisers. Without
authoritative guidance, the administration is likely to continue
floundering, further eroding public confidence.
The military is unlikely to intervene any time soon unless the
security situation deteriorates suddenly. Figueiredo has purged most
hardliners from the upper ranks, and the high command is composed
of moderates loyal to the President and committed to a return to
civilian rule. Nonetheless, the officer corps is unlikely to tolerate
another 17 months of ineffectual government, and, if the situation
continues to worsen, Figueiredo's military advisers may urge him to
resign.
Even if the President reasserts himself, he is unlikely to regain
control over the political process. The loosening of authoritarian
measures over the past few years has weakened the government's
legal means of suppressing dissent and imposing its programs.
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For the near future, Brasilia probably will continue to muddle
through by trying to balance the need for belt-tightening against
demands for a milder austerity program. According to US Embassy
reporting, a recently introduced wage-restraint law-far milder than
the previous one-has a good chance of winning Congressional
approval. Until this issue is settled, foreign creditors will remain
uncertain about the government's ability to push through its
legislation and are likely to delay their scheduled loan disbursements
further.
Even if the government negotiates an agreement on salaries with
Congress, it will continue to have difficulties in implementing
austerity. Brasilia will strive to keep the IMF program on track and to
maintain workable relations with foreign creditors, but economic
activity probably will continue to decline, riski in
already high unemployment and social unrest.
The Moratorium Option
Growing opposition from the middle class and labor, combined
with spreading disorder, would intensify interest among Brazilian
policymakers in declaring a moratorium on foreign debt payments.
According to press reports, some bankers believe Brasilia may be
building up its foreign exchange and oil reserves in preparation for
Initially, Brasilia might contemplate a temporary moratorium-
perhaps 90 days-aimed at persuading foreign banks to allow a more
generous long-term restructuring of Brazil's debt. This would be a
gamble for the government however, and could stalemate
negotiations
This probably would cause trade credits to contract and
economic activity to plummet. Even so, Brasilia might see this
nationalist option as a means of deflecting public resentment and
creating a new political consensus.
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