NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 12 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: November 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Central
Intelligence
OCPAS./Ci
c?Y* 285
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
12 November 1983
CPAS NID 83-265JX
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12 November 1983
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Contents
USSR-Syria: Foreign Ministers' Meeting ................................
Lebanon: Gemayel To Visit Damascus .....................................
USSR: Statement on Arms Control Talks ..............................
1
2
3
North Yemen: Worsening Economic Prospects ......................
5
Ell Salvador: Political and Military Developments ..................
Chile: Opposition Rally Planned ..............................................
Grenada: Interim Government ................................................ 10
Peru: Municipal Elections ........................................................ 11
USSR-Western Europe: Bid To Influence INF Debates ........ 11
Special Analysis
USSR: Problems and Prospects of a New Succession .......... 12
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12 November 1983
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USSR-SYRIA: Foreign Ministers' Meeting
Soviet and Syrian media coverage of the meetings in Moscow
between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam, which ended yesterday, suggests frank discussion of
Syria's pressure on PLO leader Arafat and continuing concern by both
sides about US military intentions in Lebanon. 25X1
TASS noted that the two men reviewed the situation in Tripoli,
Lebanon, where Arafat's forces are under siege by Syrian-backed
PLO rebels. Gromyko in a speech yesterday described as "urgent"
the need to end strife within the Palestinian movement and called for
greater Arab unity.
The Soviet Foreign Minister also accused the US and Israel of
planning "aggressive intrigues" against Lebanon and repeated the
warning against armed interference there that Moscow first issued in
an official TASS statement on 4 November. He added that pressure is
also being exerted on Syria.
Syrian media coverage of the talks yesterday omitted the Soviet
call for Arab solidarity.
Comment: The remarks by Gromyko suggest that, while the
Soviets have made clear their displeasure with Syria's attempt to
defeat Arafat, they nonetheless do not want the issue to harm
bilateral ties. Gromyko is the first Soviet leader to repeat the earlier
TASS warning against US military action in Lebanon, although he
made it less direct by not specifically mentioning Washington.
The Soviet Foreign Minister did not claim that the US plans
military action against the Syrians or their forces in Lebanon. In
addition, he did not express support for Syria or say what the USSR's
reaction would be to a US military move. Moscow's reluctance to offer
explicit public backing for Damascus reflects its concern that an
outbreak of fighting would lead to Syrian pressure for direct Soviet
military assistance, which the USSR still appears reluctant to provide.
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LEBANON: Gemayel To Visit Damascus
President Gemayel reportedly plans to meet with Syrian President
Assad for the first time on Monday,
Press reports indicate Gemayel will spend two days in Damascus
before going to Saudi Arabia later in the week. The Israeli Foreign
Ministry informed the US that the Lebanese Government had
confirmed Gemayel's trip and had urgently requested a meetin this
weekend of US, Lebanese, and Israeli officials.
Comment: Gemayel probably will try to persuade Assad to drop
Syria's demands that Lebanon abrogate its accord with Israel. The
Lebanese President almost certainly recognizes that his planned
visits to Washington and to West European capitals will not result in a
new formula for Israeli withdrawal. He therefore believes he must
soften the position of the Syrians and their Lebanese allies if the
reconciliation process is to continue in Lebanon.
Assad, however, is unlikely to compromise in his demands for a
complete Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, Gemayel's visit to Damascus
probably will heighten Israeli and Lebanese Christian suspicions that
he might give in to opposition demands.
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The announcement by the Soviets yesterday that they will break
off INF talks if the West German Bundestag approves the deployment
of new US missiles is the first public declaration by Moscow that it
views the debate in Bonn as decisive to the future of the negotiations.
A statement issued by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn cautioned that
the fate of the INF talks depends on the outcome of the Bundestag
debate on 21 and 22 November. The statement alluded to General
Secretary Andropov's warning late last month that arrival of new US
missiles in Western Europe would make continuation of negotiations
in Geneva impossible. On Wednesday, a Soviet delegate to the INF
talks-speaking "for the sake of argument"-had said that any
resumption of arms-control talks would be on a different basis, with a
"global" approach.
A Soviet delegate to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna,
meanwhile, said at the plenary meeting on Thursday that INF
deployment will have a negative effect on the MBFR talks as well. The
US delegation reports that his language was more threatening than
that used in a similar statement by the East on 13 October. According
to an Eastern delegate, a high-level Warsaw Pact meeting later this
month will consider the future of MBFR in the wake of INF
deployments.
Comment: The specific reference in the Soviet Embassy
statement to the INF talks suggests that the USSR has not yet
decided also to walk out on other negotiations, such as START. The
Soviet official in Geneva who hinted that the talks might-resume had
previously been the most pessimistic member of his delegation
concerning the effect of INF deployments. His remark may signal that
Moscow is considering a somewhat early resumption of INF
negotiations in a different forum, perhaps by including them in
___
START. F
~
Despite the warning in Vienna, the Soviets are less likely to break
off MBFR talks.
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NORTH YEMEN: Worsening Economic Prospects
The failure of President Salih's government to obtain increased
foreign economic assistance may result in a serious loss of popular
and military support.
Inadequate revenues have already forced Sanaa to abandon its
budget goals for 1983 and to cut back imports. The prices of many
goods, including foodstuffs, are rising sharply, according to the US
Embassy.
Business hoarding and panic buying among consumers have
made the situation worse. Earnings from abroad-virtually all from
worker remittances-are declining, and foreign exchange reserves
are almost exhausted.
Comment: Without increased foreign help, the government will
have to impose more stringent austerity measures, which will affect
social programs and consumer subsidies. The regime still must cope
with the massive rebuilding costs resulting from the earthquake of last
December.
North Yemen's worsening economic situation will provide
opportunities for Islamic fundamentalist groups and leftist National
Democratic Front insurgents seeking to foment unrest. The biggest
risk is that dissatisfaction will spread to the military, Salih's main
source of power, if he cannot meet the Army payroll or cuts back on
subventions to key commanders.
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EL SALVADOR: Political and Military Developments
The Constituent Assembly has agreed temporarily to drop
consideration of the contentious agrarian reform articles of the
constitution, and the military situation remains essentially unchanged.
The Assembly spent about a month deliberating the agrarian
reform articles without reaching an agreement. The political parties
were unable to agree on the amount of acreage that should be
subject to future land reform. The US Embassy reports that Assembly
leaders do not anticipate additional problems, however, and that ti
expect to complete the remaining articles by the end of the month.
Comment: The slow progress on the constitution-along with
recent publicity about death-squad activities and the continued
military stalemate-apparently has contributed to a growing belief in
San Salvador that the elections scheduled for early next year may
have to be postponed. The Assembly will have to move rapidly to
complete ratification and pass new electoral laws to avoid a
postponement.
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CHILE: Opposition Rally Planned
Plans for a massive opposition rally on 18 November and
increased terrorist activities reflect new efforts by antigovernment
forces to extract political concessions, but President Pinochet seems
increasingly determined to resist.
Declining support for recent and sometimes hastily scheduled
"days of protest" has prompted the opposition Democratic Alliance
to plan more carefully for the demonstration in Santiago. Christian
Democratic Party organizers have scheduled an evening rally, in
which labor and radical leftist activists may participate.
most Communist-led groups have been
disappointed by the recent poor response to their individual protest
efforts, including a proposed call for a national strike.
Other Communists, however, are opposed to peaceful protests.
Santiago police report that the "Zero Front"-a new 60-member
terrorist group of Communist and other Marxist activists-has killed
two policemen and carried out several bombings.
Political talks between the Alliance and Interior Minister Jarpa
have been suspended since early last month, and the opposition
reportedly has increasing doubts about the Interior Minister's
objectives and survivability.
Comment: There have been several signs in recent weeks that
Pinochet is uneasy over Jarpa's growing power and may replace him
as soon as his skills and credibility are no longer needed. If Jarpa is
dismissed or quits, however, prospects for political dialogue would
fade even further; because many Chileans would question the
government's intentions. A large, peaceful rally would give the
Alliance renewed confidence for talks with the government, but a low
turnout could be a major setback for the opposition.
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Governor General Scoon's recent measures resemble the
repressive tactics of former Prime Minister Bishop's regime, but they
may be intended only to control the immediate security situation.
Under the authority of the Grenadian constitution, Scoon last week
declared a state of emergency, banned most public meetings,
authorized arrests without warrants, and warned of press censorship.
He established a judicial tribunal to implement these regulations and
this week formed a nine-member advisory council of Grenadian-born
nonpartisan senior technocrats to act as an interim government. The
council's mandate includes planning a security force to replace US
troops, the establishment of a nonpolitical Grenadian police, and
preparations for general elections next year.
Comment: Scoon may want to use a heavy hand to retain stability
until an effective and loyal police force can be installed. If the state of
emergency continues over a longer period, however, the measures
probably will provoke public discontent, criticism from democratic
nations and expatriates, and further propaganda from international
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PERU: Municipal Elections
The governing party is likely to suffer losses in nationwide
municipal elections tomorrow, reflecting widespread discontent with
the economic and counterterrorist policies of President Belaunde.
Although many voters remain undecided, most polls show that the
principal opposition party, the American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance, leads in the Lima mayoral race. The US Embassy reports
that another opposition group, the United Left coalition, has
campaigned effectively in Lima and in major municipalities of the
south to offset the antileftist backlash against increasing terrorism.
Comment: Significant municipal losses would further weaken
Belaunde's credibility and political base and could lead to a
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would further undermine the military's confidence in civilian rule.
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The Soviet-sponsored Second Vienna Dialogue for Disarmament
and Detente opens on Monday. Invitations have been issued to the
West German Greens, West European Socialists and Communists,
members of the European Parliament, and the US nuclear freeze
movement. The first Vienna dialogue in 1982 attracted 300 delegates.
The event will be hosted by the International Liaison Forum of Peace
Forces, a front organization of the CPSU Central Committee's
International Department closely associated with the World Peace
Council.
Comment: The Vienna meeting is intended to rally antinuclear
activists and to influence current debates in West European
parliaments on INF deployments. Moscow also is calculating that the
presence of independent peace groups and personalities will enable
the Soviets to portray opposition to INF as broader than it is. It is
doubtful, however, that they can change the outcome of the
parliamentary debates favoring deployment.
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Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Personnel appointments
and agro-industrial sector
Age:
52
Advantages: Andropov's choice, high visibility, recently
expanded responsibilities, Central Committee
clout
Liabilities: Junior, limited experience, probably lacks
military and defense-industrial support
Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Ideology
Age:
72
Liabilities: Passed over once before, not fully trusted, ill
health
Position:
Central Committee
Secretary
Responsibilities:
Heavy and defense-related
industry
Age:
60
Advantages: Administrative experience, probable support
of defense sector, image of toughness
Liabilities: Ambitions threaten other leaders, lacks
central party experience
Prospect: Ideologically conservative candidate
Position:
Defense Minister
Responsibilities:
Military Affairs
Age:
75
Advantages: Past experience in Secretariat, military
backing
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Special Analysis
USSR: Problems and Prospects of a New Succession
General Secretary Andropov's absence from the anniversary
ceremonies in Moscow this year-no general secretary has missed
them in 30 years-has given rise to speculation that the regime could
face a new succession at any time.
The Soviets have good reason to be concerned over the issue.
Although Yuriy Andropov has been party chief for only a year, his
advanced age and uncertain health have raised questions among
Soviets and Westerners alike about the length of his tenure. The
illness that prevented Andropov from attending the revolution
ceremonies early this month points to the Soviet leadership
predicament.
Andropov took office at age 68, almost 10 years later in life than
any of his predecessors. Concern about his physical status began the
day of Brezhnev's funeral and has heightened since.
Last June, Finnish officials were surprised that Andropov was
permitted to make an appearance before the foreign press that
highlighted his poor condition. A long-scheduled meeting with West
German Chancellor Kohl had to be delayed. His 12-week absence
from public view since late summer, and the postponement of a
planned trip to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact summit, and the fall meetings
of the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet all contributed to
doubts about Andropov's health. I
The official explanation that Andropov has a "cold" is clearly an
understatement of the problem, but the specific nature of his ailment
remains carefully concealed. A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade
passed along a story that Andropov had diabetes. At another time,
however, the source said Andropov had kidney trouble.
A Radio Moscow official told US Embassy officers that
Andropov's health was not good and that he had kidney trouble. This
week a US Embassy source in Rome said Andropov had a heart
seizure during kidney surgery, and that he is on dialysis.
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At the same time, sickness, death, and the consequences of
earlier political battles have so reduced leadership ranks that the
regime appears less prepared for a new succession than it was when
Brezhnev died last year. The party now has the smallest Politburo
since the early 1950s, and there is no leader in the Secretariat who
has experience comparable to that of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, or even
Andropov.
As in the past, the succession decision is most likely to be made
in the Politburo by the senior corps of remaining leaders. At present,
no new succession candidate seems to have a better than 50-50
chance to be selected. This situation strongly suggests that the next
succession, if it should occur in the near future, will be more
controversial than the last one.
The best placed prospects are in the Secretariat. Even candidates
in this category-senior secretaries Chernenko, Gorbachev, and
Romanov-have significant political liabilities. The lack of ideal
candidates could lead the Politburo to turn to others outside the
Secretariat, such as Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov.
It will be in the Politburo's interest to move quickly in order to
avoid conflict and political paralysis and to project an image of
decisiveness abroad. Only if the Politburo is unable to reach a
consensus would the decision shift to the more than 300-voting-
member Central Committee, but this appears unlikely.
A new leader would emerge within a matter of days, but he
probably would not have the power, authority, and prestige that
Andropov had when he gained the post. He would be likely to
encounter more difficulty in consolidating his position. As a result, the
possibility of protracted turmoil within the leadership cannot be ruled
out.
After Andropov
Even if the next leader could positively be identified-and
Gorbachev and Romanov seem to be frontrunners-his present views
insofar as they could be discerned probably would provide only a
general sense of the direction Soviet policy would take in the
immediate post-Andropov period. These views probably would be
modified as he attempted to gain support and even further altered by
political calculations, the exigencies of events, and the broader
perspective of his new post. Foreign policy specialist Andropov, for
instance, has concentrated on economic problems.
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As of now, the younger candidates to succeed Andropov-
Gorbachev and Romanov-seem to share Andropov's basic
domestic policy views. Both men probably view Soviet economic
problems as the most important on the domestic agenda. Both are
strong advocates of discipline and greater efficiency in labor and
production, and both are vigorous leaders who seem open to
innovation, experimentation, and change, although within strict
ideological bounds.
Romanov, an inveterate ideological conservative, cracked down
on dissidents as Leningrad leader. Gorbachev, in contrast, at least
appears to be more pragmatic and could be more flexible on
ideological and social matters.
Chernenko's views on Soviet domestic issues are more widely
known than those of his younger colleagues in the Secretariat. He has
long advocated investment in consumer goods sectors, greater
attention to the social factor in domestic affairs, and traditional
solutions to economic problems. In recent pronouncements on
ideology, however, he has taken a more conservative line.
On foreign policy, certain stylistic differences seem apparent
within the party Secretariat. Gorbachev, although lacking in foreign
policy experience, gave an impression of quiet self-assurance,
flexibility, pragmatism, and intelligence during his recent trip to
Canada. He hewed closely to the established foreign policy line in
both public and private remarks.
Romanov, with over 20 trips abroad and fairly wide contact with
foreign diplomats over the years, has far greater experience in foreign
affairs. He has taken a harder line than Gorbachev in their published
statements on foreign policy issues.
Romanov's remarks in the foreign policy area have tended to
focus on arms control issues, and he seems to take a special interest
in US-Soviet relations. While most of his public remarks reflect a
hardline, ideological position, in private he has posed on occasion as
a partisan of better relations with the US.
Chernenko's public remarks during the Brezhnev era were more
enthusiastic than those of most other Soviet leaders in his support of
improved relations with the West, particularly the US, and of arms
limitation. In the crisis atmosphere of an early Andropov succession,
however, no new leader could afford to look weak or indecisive, nor
could he retreat from any challenge, real or imagined, to Soviet
interests abroad.
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Emphasis on Collective Leadership
If another succession occurs soon, no new leader is likely to have
the power, authority, and prestige that Andropov had when he gained
the post. Any of the candidates would probabl encounter more
difficulty in consolidating his position
The presence of strong political rivals from the outset-not a
problem for Andropov-would make the maneuvering in the
Politburo intense and the new general secretary's position more
vulnerable. The age structure of the Politburo might allow a younger
candidate to consolidate power sooner, as older members die off, but
rivalry among younger leaders would intensify.
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