NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 26 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
26 November 1983
Top Seer-e!
CPAS NID 83-276JX
26 November 1983 25X1
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Top Secret
Contents
Cuba-USSR: Frictions Over Grenada ...................................... 1
Ell Salvador: Political and Military Developments .................. 2
Nicaragua: New Radar Site ....................................................
Ell Salvador-West Germany: Closer Ties ................................ 5
Poland: Releasing Political Prisoners ...................................... 6
USSR-Belgium: Gromyko's Planned Visit .............................. 7
USSR-Albania: Soviet Reconciliation Efforts .......................... 7
Special Analysis
Philippines: Opposition Becoming More Radical .................. 8
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Top Secret
CUBA-USSR: Frictions Over Grenada
Tensions in the Cuban-Soviet relationship-already uneasy over
economic issues-have increased as a result of the events in
Grenada.
The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico reportedly has criticized the
Cubans who sought refuge in the Soviet mission in St. Georges for
trying to smuggle weapons aboard the US aircraft during the
evacuation from Grenada. According to the US defense attache,
Soviet Embassy officials in Mexico were markedly cool toward their
Cuban counterparts during a recent reception marking the USSR's
national day.
. The Soviet Embassy reception in Havana-an important annual
event attended by President Castro and other top Cuban leaders-
was canceled this year, ostensibly because of Cuba's mourning over
its dead in Grenada. According to a Western Ambassador, however,
there were rumors in Havana that the Soviets had been told Castro
would refuse to attend.
Comment: Havana-noting that Castro's frequent public
criticisms of former Prime Minister Bishop's chief rival, Bernard
Coard, have been ignored by the Soviet media-may harbor
suspicions about the relationship between Moscow and Coard. In
addition, Moscow's inaction during the demise of the Grenadian
revolution was in sharp contrast to the Cubans' willingness to fight.
The Soviet behavior probably has reminded Castro of his vulnerability
and of the lack of a firm defense commitment from the USSR.
Despite these problems, however, economic necessities will force
Castro to acquiesce to Soviet political and economic demands. Soviet
economic aid to Cuba in 1982-almost $4.6 billion-was equivalent
to 20 to 30 percent of Havana's national output.
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EL SALVADOR: Political and Military Developments
The Constituent Assembly has formally established 25 March'
1984 as the date for the presidential election, and Defense Minister
Vides plans important changes in military command and control.
? The three largest parties in the Assembly have pushed through a
temporary decree that enables the government to expedite the
election process without the benefit of a completed constitution or
permanent electoral law. The three smaller parties voted against the
proposal, because it does not guarantee that an electoral registry will
be used or that local municipal and legislative contests also will be
Inauguration of a new president for a five-year term is scheduled
for 1 June 1984. Military candidates will be permitted to run for office
so long as they request retirement from active duty within eight days
after a new constitution goes into effect.
Meanwhile, recent battlefield reverses and US pressure may lead
to important command changes within the armed forces, according to
the US Embassy. The Defense Minister reportedly wants to
restructure the six military zones to correspond more closely to actual
guerrilla fronts, and he intends to install more capable leaders in
combat roles. He also will seek agreement within the military
hierarchy to appoint a new chief of staff who will work through an
Comment: Legislative action on the election process follows a
week of greater progress in the Assembly toward completion of a new
constitution. Civilian politicians, who may be receiving advice from
military officials, appear to be increasingly aware of the negative
impact on national morale if the political process is allowed to
languish.
Although Vides now seems more anxious to restructure military
command and control, he still will need the acquiescence of his
colleagues in the officer corps. Moreover, any moves soon to improve
the military's combat operations are unlikely to resolve other
institutional problems. These include participation by security force
personnel in death squads and other illegal activities.
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Top Secret
NICARAGUA: New Radar Site
The Sandinistas are constructing a radar site outside of Managua,
according to the US defense attache. The installation, which is on the
highest ground on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, includes a Soviet-
produced early warning radar and what possibly are two height
finders. The equipment reportedly was moved to the site at niaht last
week,)
Local residents say Cubans are working on the installation,
Comment: Radars of the types described by the attache would
considerably improve Sandinista capabilities to support the defensive
operations of jet fighters, if Managua acquires MIGs
or other such aircraft. The radars
also can provide early warning information to antiaircraft artillery sites
in the region.
EL SALVADOR-WEST GERMANY: Closer Ties
The Salvadoran Government will approve a recent West German
request to post a new ambassador in San Salvador according to the
US Embassy. Bonn recalled its Ambassador and suspended
development aid in 1980, claiming that unrest in the country made it
too dangerous for West German personnel to work there. The
Bundestag committee for economic cooperation has approved a
resumption of development aid for El Salvador, earmarking some
$7.5 million in the draft budget for 1984 for that purpose.
Comment: Officials in the Foreign Ministry until now have
resisted pressure from conservative elements in Chancellor Kohl's
government to reverse this decision, largely out of fear that Bonn
might become too closely associated with US policy in the region. The
announcement that El Salvador will hold presidential elections next
March will allow Bonn to point to positive political developments in
El Salvador as justification for this reversal. The West German
Government also probably hopes to improve the election prospects of
the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party.
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POLAND: Releasing Political Prisoners
This week a member of the Polish legislature announced that only
77 persons convicted or temporarily arrested before 22 July for
political offenses are still in jail. As recently as 4 November a
government spokesman had said that 161 remained in jail, according
to the US Embassy. The regime has extended to 31 December its
offer of amnesty to martial law violators still in hiding. It claims that
686 have given themselves up thus far.
Comment: Church and underground Solidarity sources have told
Embassy officers they accept the regime's statistics as accurate. The
continuing release of political prisoners probably is intended as a
conciliatory gesture at a time when tensions over proposed price
increases for food are running high. Although the government clearly
hopes more fugitives will take advantage of the amnesty, which would
help promote the appearance of normalization, few are likely to
respond.
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USSR-BELGIUM: Gromyko's Planned Visit
Belgian officials report Foreign Minister Gromyko will visit
Brussels in January or February. The trip is being arranged at the
Soviets' initiative as a return visit for then-Foreign Minister
Nothomb's trip to Moscow in 1981. Meanwhile, the officials say they
expect a delegation from the Supreme Soviet-scheduled to arrive
shortly in Belgium-to try to persuade Brussels that late last week the
US withdrew an alleged INF proposal.
Comment: A visit by Gromyko to Belgium early next year would
be well-timed for the Soviets to try to exploit any reaction in Western
Europe against NATO's initial INF deployments. The Belgian
Government has not yet made a formal decision to proceed with the
deployment of cruise missiles, now scheduled to be operational in
early 1985. Nothomb and other Belgian officials have resisted
Moscow's efforts to sow discord between Belgium and its NATO
Allies, however, and Foreign Minister Tindemans is likely to maintain
this firm position while dealing with Gromyko.
USSR-ALBANIA: Soviet Reconciliation Efforts
TASS argued on Thursday for a normalization of the USSR's
relations with Albania. Moscow's appeal was accom anied b
allegations of a US threat to Albania's securit .
Comment: The Soviets usually make public appeals for a
normalization of relations around the time of Albania's national
holiday on 29 November. The press appeal probably was meant to
convey Moscow's continued interest
The Albanian leadership, can be
counted on to reject the Soviet overtures.
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Special Analysis
PHILIPPINES: Opposition Becoming More Radical
Protest activities this weekend probably will rival the mass rally of
21 September, when hundreds of thousands participated. If so, the
demonstrations will add to pressures on President Marcos to make
major political concessions, which he has so far resisted. At the same
time, it would make it harder for the moderate opposition to resist
radical views and policies, because leftwing groups have been
increasingly active in planning these events.
The moderate opposition has secured new support as a result of
the widespread belief that the government was involved in the Aquino
assassination, but it has been unable thus far to organize that
support. It is divided internally, has lost its most charismatic leader,
and lacks a strong organization. The moderates have been forced to
yield ground to new alliances of radicals that are taking the lead in
organizing protests.
Nonetheless, a broad consensus is emerging among the
moderate opposition on the need for major reforms on succession
and legislative elections. Members of the business elite share the
concerns of moderate opposition politicians about the need for
political reform, and in recent months they have organized frequent
demonstrations in Manila's financial district and have been
conducting a dialogue with Marcos.
The church tomorrow will have its third pastoral letter this year
read throughout the country. The letter criticizes the government and
The Left's Growing Influence
Since the assassination, the Communist Party has been
infiltrating legal opposition groups with great success. The US
Embassy reports that the party's National Democratic Front has
heavily penetrated the "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All" group,
which is organizing much of the activity this week. Increasing leftist
infiltration is making it more difficult to distinguish between moderate
and leftist opposition groups and is the main reason for the growing
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If the protests this weekend are as large as expected, much of the
credit will go the the "Justice" group, and the moderate United
Democratic Nationalist Organization will have difficulty reestablishing
itself as the leading element of the opposition movement.
political reforms sought by the moderates.
In any case, the Communists are likely to continue making
progress in the next few months-particularly among organized
labor-because of the reaction to the financial crisis and recent
austerity measures. Over the longer run, they probably will be the
chief beneficiaries of the further polarization that seems certain to
develop as a result of Marcos's refusal to allow the more substantial
Challenges for Marcos
Marcos presumably views the disunity in the moderate opposition
as an advantage that will help him survive the crisis. He has alternated
between offering concessions to his opponents and threatening them.
His agreement to restore the vice presidency in 1987 and to permit
smaller electoral districts, as well as his promise to make new
appointments to the elections commission, are unlikely to quiet
dissent.
If the demonstrations become violent this weekend, Marcos will
have a difficult choice. Although the security forces in Manila probably
can handle any violence, the President does not want to appear
besieged. If a forceful crackdown on demonstrators were to produce
more widespread violence, Marcos's standing would suffer in
Outlook
If the demonstrations are small, Marcos will be more reluctant to
move forward with political reforms. Barring serious health problems,
his prospects for riding out the crisis would be improved, at least for
the next few months. Nonetheless, the disaffection of some key
interest groups from his government and the growing radicalization of
the opposition encourage new challenges to his control in the longer
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