NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 21 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top
Central
Intelligence
OCPAS'/CIG
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
21 November 1983
O
CPAS N1
21 November 1983
Copy 2 8 5
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Top Secret
Contents
USSR-PLO-Syria: Authoritative Pravda Commentary ............
Nicaragua: New Initiatives ......................................................
1
2
Iran-Afghanistan: Military Tensions ........................................
Philippines: Armed Forces Gird for Protests ..........................
4
5
Bolivia: Coup Plotting ..............................................................
Israel-Lebanon: Airstrikes ......................................................
7
8
West Germany: Party Votes on INF ........................................
Czechoslovakia: Charter 77 Dissidents Arrested ..................
9
9
East Germany-West Germany: Communications Accord .... 10
USSR-Cuba: Deliveries of Military Equipment ........................ 11
Chile: Protest Rally Aftermath ................................................ 11
Special Analysis
Libya: Qadhafi's Arab Policy .................................................. 12
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21 November 1983
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Top secret
USSR-PLO-SYRIA: Authoritative Pravda Commentary
The Soviets made clear in an unsigned editorial in Pravda on
Saturday that, while they disapprove of the drive against PLO leader
Arafat by Syrian-backed PLO rebels, they will not risk damaging their
relationship with Damascus to stop it.
The editorial lamented the "senseless" clashes between the
Palestinians and quoted Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement of
11 November on the urgent need for a resolution of the dispute. It
noted that the USSR has been trying to resolve the dispute among the
Palestinians through political means.
Pravda claimed that "imperialists" were taking advantage of the
Palestinian strife to wage an anti-Syrian campaign. It said the fighting
is especially inopportune because the US and Israel have plans for
expanding "armed inteference" in Lebanon and "direct aggression"
against Syria.
The editorial said that under its present leadership the PLO's
international prestige had grown, but it made no mention of Arafat.
It noted that the USSR's stand on the dispute is based on an
understanding of the "important" role of the PLO in the struggle
against Israel and the US and on solidarity with Syria, which is now
the "most important" force in that struggle.
Comment: The article is the most comprehensive Soviet
commentary to date on the rebellion against Arafat. An unsigned
editorial in Pravda signifies high-level party clearance.
The editorial's unmistakable endorsement of Syria's primacy
contrasts with the implicit mild criticism of the Syrian role in the
dispute that was contained in Gromyko's public comments during
Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the USSR earlier this month.
Moscow may have believed it was necessary to refute claims by
Western and Arab media that Gromyko had clashed with Khaddam
over the issue. At the same time, the reference to Soviet efforts to
resolve the PLO rift seems designed to convince moderate Arabs that
Moscow is doing its part.
The Soviets, by failing to mention Arafat or to criticize the rebels
directly, appear to be keeping their options open. Should Arafat fall,
they will not want to be encumbered in their relations with the new
PLO leadership by a record of clear opposition to the rebellion.
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Top Secret
The Sandinistas are taking new domestic and international
initiatives in an attempt to deflect mounting pressures. 25X1
The US Embassy reports that the Sandinistas recently said they
are ready to agree to end support to insurgents in the region. A
Salvadoran insurgent leader told the press on Saturday that
representatives of the Salvadoran guerrillas would leave Nicaragua
because of the danger of a US invasion.
Comment: The Sandinistas may be placing themselves apart
from the Salvadoran insurgents to indicate a willingness to negotiate
with the US. It is still unclear whether they will close the command and
control center in Managua and cut off the supply of arms and
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21 November 1
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Top Secret
IRAN-AFGHANISTAN: Military Tensions
Tehran fears Kabul will retaliate for continued Iranian aid to
insurgent groups.
The Soviets and the Afghans have been increasingly concerned
about Iranian aid to insurgent groups. Nonetheless, they probably will
continue to limit any retaliation to attacks on Afahan camns in Iran or
on Iranian border posts that aid insurgents
Iranian clerics who do not wish to antagonize the USSR want to
limit aid to the insurgents, while others favor an increase. Although
Iranian aid is important to the insurgents in Herat Province and the
mountainous central region, it apparently is only a small share of the
total received by the guerrillas
The Afghans being moved away from the border probably are
Sunnis, who are distrusted by the Iranian Shia regime. Iran wants the
insurgents to establish pro-Khomeini organizations in Afghanistan in
return for Iranian aid, something of little interest to most Sunni
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Top Secret
The Philippine military is preparing for anticipated antigovernment
demonstrations this week.
Opposition groups are planning protest activities throughout the
country-including a general strike and demonstrations-for the
period leading up to the late Senator Benigno Aquino's birthday on
Sunday, with Manila the focal point. More than 13,000 individuals
demonstrated in a city northwest of Manila. yesterday. The Catholic
Church plans to read a highly critical pastoral letter at churches
around the country on Sunday.
The military reportedly expects that the demonstrations will be
the largest since Aquino's murder and that they will increase in size
beginning on Friday.
Comment: The protests this week will be a major test for the
opposition, which has been unable to convince President Marcos to
initiate major political reforms regarding the succession or elections.
Weakened by serious internal divisions, the opposition nonetheless
has been preparing for these protests for several months, and they
are likely to rival in size the mass rally of 21 September, which
attracted several hundred thousand demonstrators. The active
support of the Church-which is issuing its third antigovernment
letter this ear-will lend further impetus to the protest activities.
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The military was unhappy with the way it handled security during
the rally in September, when violence erupted near the presidential
palace and elsewhere in the capital. There is no evidence that the
armed forces are planning a massive crackdown on dissent,
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Top Secret
BOLIVIA: Coup Plotting
Coup plotters are discussing a possible move against Bolivian
President Siles if protests this week against economic austerity
measures are sufficiently widespread to give them justification.
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Anez, who has been plotting for
several months, remains the main threat to Siles. Leaders of the three
largest opposition political parties, however-including two former
presidents-have been plotting a "constitutional coup," a scheme to
marshal congressional support to force Siles to resign. There has
been some contact between the two groups.
Labor boss Juan Lechin, a bitter opponent of the President, has
called for a national strike beginning today to protest price increases
for food, fuel, and transportation and the 60-percent devaluation.
Opposition party leaders also are planning protest demonstrations.
The US defense attache in La Paz does not believe protest activity will
be severe enough to enable the plotters to remove the President.
Comment: Siles knows about the various plots and took a
calculated risk in announcing the economic measures. He will resist
the politicians' efforts to compel him to resign and thus force his
military and civilian opponents to use unconstitutional means if they
decide to try to oust him.
It is not clear whether Anez and others have yet won the backing
of the commanders of key military units, who are sensitive to US
support for the constitutional process. The level of social unrest this
week will essentially determine if these units decide to support an
attempted coup.
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Top Secret
Beirut
International
Airport
Mediterranean
Sea
Buhayray
al Oir'awn
21 November 1983
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Top Secret
Israeli aircraft struck Palestinian positions in Syrian-controlled
territory near Bhamdun, Ayn Sawfar, and Falugha yesterday in
apparent retaliation for a guerrilla attack near Sidon on Friday in
which one Israeli soldier was killed and five wounded. Press reports
indicate that one aircraft was lost during the raids, and Syria publicly
has claimed responsibility for the downing. Eyewitness reports
indicate that the Syrians' reaction to the airstrikes was limited to
antiaircraft artillery and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile
firings.
Comment: Attacks on Israeli forces in Lebanon will continue
despite retaliatory raids on Palestinian or other targets, because
many of these attacks are carried out by local Lebanese. As long as
Israeli aircraft do not strike Syrian positions, Damascus has little
incentive to try to prevent such attacks.
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Top Secret
WEST GERMANY: Party Votes on INF
The Kohl government appears certain of victory in the Bundestag
voting on INF expected tomorrow despite the overwhelming vote by
the Social Democratic Party congress on Saturday to reject INF
deployment. Only 17 of the 400 delegates to the party congress-
including former Chancellor Schmidt-refused to join the consensus,
although Schmidt announced he would not support the government in
the vote. In contrast, about 75 percent of delegates at the Free
Democratic Party congress supported party chairman Genscher's
position favoring deployment-a higher percentage than voted in
favor of the dual-track decision two years ago. Three of the Free
Democratic Party's most prominent leftists endorsed deployment,
while two of its 37 Bundestag deputies indicated thev would not
support the government's resolution.
Comment: Except for the two dissenting Free Democratic
deputies, probably no member of the governing center-right
coalition-which has a 30-seat majority in the Bundestag-will vote
against deployment or abstain. Schmidt's announcement makes it
unlikely that any Social Democrats will support the government
position, although the former Chancellor and a few Dart
conservatives may abstain.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Charter 77 Dissidents Arrested
Prague police apparently arrested three leading members of
Charter 77 on Friday after the group had published a letter indirectly
critical of planned Soviet missile deployments in Czechoslovakia.
Charter 77 avoided taking an explicit stand on the deployments,
stating in the letter that 15 to 20 of the Charter signatories had been
warned two weeks ago that a negative stand would mean 10 years in
prison. The letter also told peace groups in the West that they should
be concerned about human rights as well as arms issues. The US
Embassy has reported rumors of a small demonstration and
circulation of a petition opposing the deployments.
Comment: While this opposition will not alter the regime's
commitment to accept the deployments, Prague is clearly hoping to
curtail any expression of dissent that might politicize the population,
which is already grumbling about stagnating living standards.
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Top Secret
Bonn and East Berlin have agreed to renew for 1983-90 their
accord on postal and telecommunications services on the eve of
the Bundestag debate on INF. East Germany will receive about
$75 million annually to maintain and improve mail and telephone
service, as well as a one-time advance of about $38 million this year
toward the cost of service improvements. The previous agreement,
which expired at the beginning of this year, brought East Berlin about
$35 million annually. The two sides also agreed to construct a fiber
optic telecommunications cable between West Germany and West
Berlin, at an additional cost to Bonn of about $7 million.
Comment: Bonn probably hopes that momentum created by
this agreement and other recent contacts will sustain overall inter-
German relations during the period of INF deployment. East Berlin is
more narrowly concerned about safeguarding its flows of hard
currency with new formal arrangements before it has to join any
political Warsaw Pact countermeasures to INF. The East Germans
may also hope to use the deployment atmosphere as an excuse to
continue resisting political concessions to Bonn. This would be
consistent with Moscow's apparent decision to keep its economic
relations with the West Germans separate from political ones.
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USSR-CUBA: Deliveries of Military Equipment
us far this year the Cubans have received from the Soviets at
least 72 T-62 tanks, 25 T-54 or T-55 tanks, and 137 pieces of towed
field artillery. These shipments have increased the number of tanks in
the Cuban inventory to as many as 950 and the number of artillery
pieces to as many as 720.
Comment: Most known Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba-in 1982
were fighter aircraft and naval vessels, but arms deliveries this year
have consisted primarily of ground force equipment. The tanks will
enable Cuba to replace the remaining T-34 tanks in its regular Army
inventory. The new artillery is the same type that the Cubans currently
have, and it probably augments rather than replaces existing artillery.
Some of.this equipment, however, may be intended to replace
equipment the Cubans have sent to other Third World countries-
such as Angola, which this year has received at least eight Cuban
arms shipments, including one that involved 33 T-54 or T-55 tanks.
CHILE: Protest Rally Aftermath
The large and peaceful rally Friday in Santiago demonstrated that
the moderates of the Democratic Alliance continue to dominate the
opposition movement. Although it was the largest opposition
demonstration to date, estimates of the turnout indicate that it did not
draw the 200,000 protesters the organizers had hoped for.
Democratic Alliance President Silva, in his address to the crowd,
criticized the government's economic policies and human rights
record and renewed demands for President Pinochet to resign.
Alliance leaders will try to keep the pressure on by holding rallies
around the country.
Comment: The rally probably will not increase pressure on the
government to grant new political concessions. It will enhance the
credibility of the moderates, in part because it shows that they are still
able to force Communist and other leftist groups to abide by fairly
strict guidelines for protests. Opposition leaders recognize, however,
that their momentum will be difficult to sustain after mid-December,
when holidays and summer vacations will reduce public interest in
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Special Analysis
LIBYA: Qadhafi's Arab Policy
Top Secret
Libyan leader Qadhafi's failure to secure the chairmanship of the
OA U at the summit last June has prompted him to make some
changes in foreign policy. Since the summit, Qadhafi has been
pursuing better relations with virtually all Arab governments, including
moderates he has traditionally regarded as enemies. Most Arab states
have welcomed Qadhafi's overtures, because they believe dealing
with him in the context of Arab cooperation offers the best chance of
curbing his radicalism. In doing so, they hope to reduce the chance of
a US-Libyan clash and superpower rivalry in the region.
Qadhafi inaugurated his fence-mending policy during hastily
arranged visits to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and North Yemen
immediately after the summit. Shortly thereafter, he visited Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia.
At each stop, Qadhafi offered his good offices in solving regional
disputes, emphasized pan-Arabism, and urged a common front
against Israel. He has even indicated a willingness to improve
relations with Sudan and Somalia, two of his bitterest foes.
The Libyan leader's new course is intended in part to forestall
criticism and perhaps military and financial assistance from other
Arabs to forces opposing Libya's intervention in Chad. He is
particularly anxious to deter Morocco from again providing military
support to Chadian President Habre's government. Qadhafi's denial
of Libyan involvement in Chad is designed in part to make it easier for
Arab governments to remain neutral.
Qadhafi also seems to sense a significant change in the alignment
of forces in the Arab world caused by Syria's new prominence. He
may judge Arab moderates are now particularly vulnerable to
arguments against the US role in the Middle East and to demands for
a more united, militant Arab stand against Israel. He also may be
responding to domestic uneasiness that tends to develop whenever
he puts too much distance between Libya and other Arab states.
Courting the Saudis
Concerns about US military intentions toward Libya and the risk
of a potentially disastrous fight with the French in Chad probably have
helped persuade Qadhafi to seek the protection generally afforded by
closer relations with moderate Arabs. He has again turned much of
his attention to Saudi Arabia because of its influence with other
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 Riyadh usually tries to keep its lines open to radical governments
in the region. It was pleased with Libyan efforts several months ago to
mediate a dispute with Tehran over the number and activities of
Iranian pilgrims visiting the holy city of Mecca during the pilgrimage
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Arabs, its Islamic prestige, its special relationship with the US, and the
tolerant attitude the Saudis sometimes take toward him.
this year.
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Despite these developments, Saudi leaders distrust Qadhafi and
still regard him as dangerous and erratic. At the same time, they see
an opportunity to try to curb his disruptive behavior by easing his
isolation in the region. They have urged Moroccan King Hassan and,
unsuccessfully, Sudanese President Nimeiri to respond to Qadhafi's
offers of friendship
As part of the Saudis' effort to reduce Qadhafi's isolation, they
considered a stopover in Tripoli this month by Saudi naval vessels
built by and purchased from the US on their way to Jidda.
Relations With the Maghreb
Qadhafi's overtures to countries in the Maghreb have elicited
cautious responses. In an effort to join an Algerian-sponsored
regional cooperation effort that was moving apace without him,
Qadhafi stopped rejecting Maghreb unity as too "regional" and
declared that North African cooperation should be a first step toward
Arab unity. He also hinted that Libya would be on its good behavior
and that he might provide financial assistance to some of his
neighbors.
As an important first step, Qadhafi dropped his strong
endorsement of the Polisario guerrillas in their struggle against
Morocco for control of Western Sahara-a required move for dealing
with Morocco and one welcomed by Tunisia and Algeria. Early in
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August Qadhafi reportedly told a group of pro-Moroccan Saharans
that he believed a Saharan state would add to divisions in the Arab
world and that his previous support for the Polisario insurgents had
been a mistake.
Neither King Hassan nor other North African leaders put much
stock in the durability of Qadhafi's commitments. Nonetheless, they
hope to take advantage of his new posture to develop economic and
political accords that will give him some stake in maintaining better
relations.
Morocco agreed to the resumption of full diplomatic relations and
some joint economic programs during the summer. Tunisia has
encouraged Libyan participation in highway and electrification
projects and trotted out the red carpet for visiting Libyan military and
diplomatic officials.
Algeria's President Bendjedid, who seems especially committed
to containing Qadhafi, has dealt with him more forthrightly. He has
warned that Libya has to halt its adventurist foreign policies.
Prospects
Qadhafi's conciliatory stance ensures that most Arab leaders will
continue low-cost gestures to keep him on his current track. They
generally believe Qadhafi can best be handled within the Arab
context, with only behind-the-scenes assistance from the US when
Libyan threats against them assume dangerous dimensions. To
indulge Qadhafi, they occasionally ut some distance between
themselves and the US. p
This approach facilitates maintaining a dialogue with Qadhafi. It
also is appealing to domestic and broader Arab constituencies who
are wary of US influences in the region. These motives probably
explain Hassan's acquiescence to a Moroccan-Libyan communique
last July that hinted at US "hegemonism" in the region.
Beyond such gestures, Qadhafi's attempts to radicalize the Arab
moderates are unlikely to have any success. Even his less extreme
positions are unacceptable to most Arabs, and his claim of speaking
for the Arab masses has no credibility with them.
None of the governments currently courting Qadhafi is likely to
jeopardize any aspect of relations with the US on his behalf. They
might, however, appear insensitive to US concerns about what they
view as their political obligation to a fellow Arab.
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