NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 28 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010198-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 198
• Publication Date: September 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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E`E f~ Director of
Central
Intelligence
~a~rsecre+-
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
28 September 1983
-Tvp-s.ert-
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Contents
Lebanon: Cease-Fire Talks Postponed
Philippines: Opposition Plans
International-US: Reactions to President's UN Speech
Iraq-Iran: Baghdad's Diplomatic Offensive
Cuba-Angola: Possible Increase in Cuban Support
Cape Verde-US: President Pereira's Visit
Pakistan: Local Elections
9
10
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I up oCbICI
LEBANON: Cease-Fire Talks Postponed
Factional militia leaders already are expressing pessimism about
the national reconciliation talks, following the postponement from
yesterday to today of the preliminary meeting on security
arrangements.
The committee is to work out arrangements to maintain the
cease-fire for Beirut and for the mountainous areas of the Shuf and
Alayh Districts. Committee members, representing the Army, the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia, and Druze and Shia Amal forces
could not agree on a location to hold the talks.
Lebanese Forces leader Fadi Frem warned that the Christian
militia would reject any proposals that damage Christian interests in
the coming reconciliation discussions. Druze chief Junblatt stated
that "nationalist" forces should be ready to consolidate their military
positions to achieve their political objectives.
Comment: The procedural delay in starting the talks indicates
that the various factions remain uncompromising. Progress in the
security talks probably will be slowed by the process of selecting
neutral observers-an issue that was not resolved in the negotiations
leading to the cease-fire. The longer it takes to come to grips with the
demands of the rival factions, the more precarious the cease-fire will
become.
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PHILIPPINES: Opposition Plans
Moderate opposition groups are planning more antigovernment
demonstrations in coming weeks, while radicals appear to be focusing
their efforts on President Reagan's visit in November.
United Democratic Opposition leader Laurel has told US Embassy
officials that the opposition will try to capitalize on the funerals of the
students killed in the rioting on 21 September. The United Democratic
Opposition also is sending teams to the provinces to try to exploit
disenchantment with the government. Other moderate opposition
leaders plan to continue demonstrations to force President Marcos to
bargain with them.
Press reports state that several moderate political parties will
focus on US diplomatic facilities.
Other reporting confirms that for now the radical National
Democratic Front will devote most of its efforts to anti-US
propaganda. At the time of the President's arrival, however, both the
radicals and the moderates intend to stage sit-ins and provoke
clashes with police that would prevent his motorcade from leaving the
airport.
Comment: Antigovernment moderates remain in disarray, while
the National Democratic Front is increasing its influence in shaping
opposition activity. The Front probably will become even stronger if
the moderates dare to challenge the government's increasingly strict
security measures in the days ahead. In the current atmosphere, only
the radical groups are likely to be able to promote sizable
demonstrations.
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INTERNATIONAL-US: Reactions to President's UN Speech
The governments of Western Europe and Japan have endorsed
the recent US arms control proposals, while the USSR says they
contain nothing new but stops short of outright rejection.
The NATO Allies and Japan are stressing that President Reagan's
speech contained substantial concessions to the USSR and
demonstrated US seriousness about arms control. The West
Germans and the other Allies emphasize that the new proposals were
worked out in close consultation with them. Many Allied governments
are urging the Soviets to make concessions in order to move the INF
talks forward, and they are reaffirming that missile deployments will
begin on schedule this year in the absence of firm negotiating results.
West German opposition leader Vogel says that he sees
movement in the negotiations and that consideration of British and
French missiles is the remaining obstacle to progress. He is again
calling for combining START and INF.
Soviet commentators say the arms control proposals contain
nothing new, but Moscow has not explicitly rejected them. TASS
claims the speech reflected exasperation at the "growing gulf"
between the US and the Nonaligned Movement. It offers a lengthy
catalogue of US military activity in the Third World in an effort to
refute the President.
During a luncheon for visiting Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
Chnoupek in Moscow yesterday, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
termed the US and NATO positions "lopsided" and "patently
unacceptable." He did not cite the latest US proposals.
Comment: The Allies almost certainly believe the US will have to
spell out its negotiating position in more detail before missile
deployments begin later this fall.
Moscow's lack of outright rejection of the arms control proposals
in the US speech suggests that the Soviets want to study the
proposals more carefully. They probably believe that a quick,
authoritative rejection would increase West European doubts that
they are negotiating in good faith and thereby would weaken the
political opposition to INF deployment. The attention the Soviets have
given to the President's remarks on the Third World indicates that
they also are concerned about the impact his speech will have there.
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Range of Super Etendard Aircraft Carrying Exocet Missiles
*BAGHDAD
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KILOMETERS 300
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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28 September 1983
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Top Secret
IRAQ-IRAN: Baghdad's Diplomatic Offensive
Iraq is mounting a new diplomatic offensive to win support for its
position in the war with Iran, and Tehran has again warned shippers
using the Persian Gulf.
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz is scheduled to meet with senior US
officials this week while attending the UN General Assembly in New
York. According to the US Interests Section in Baghdad, he will visit
Bonn and possibly Rome for talks next week. Iraqi Deputy Premier
Ramadan is scheduled to visit London from 5 to 7 October.
Iran's President Khamenei, meanwhile, publicly warned the Gulf
states yesterday not to allow their ports to be used by ships carrying
war materiel to Iraq.
Comment: Iraq's diplomatic offensive almost certainly is tied to
the projected delivery of Super Etendard aircraft from France.
Baghdad has threatened to use the planes, which are equipped with
Exocet missiles, to attack oil tankers calling at Iran's Khark Island
export terminal.
The Iraqis probably will play on Western fears that Iran will
retaliate against an attack on its oil lifeline by closing the Persian Gulf
to all traffic. They want Western countries and Japan to buy less oil
from Iran and to block Iran from buying arms on the black market.
The Iraqis also want Washington to put pressure on the Gulf states to
increase their aid payments to Iraq.
Baghdad is likely to hope that its threat will force Tehran to the
negotiating table. If it does not, the Iraqis might hope that it would
force Western powers to intervene in the Gulf to ensure the safety of
all oil exports, including those from Iraq.
Iraq probably will not hesitate to use the Super Etendards if it
cannot ease its economic situation. For the time being, however,
Baghdad is likely to believe it can achieve more by manipulating the
threat to use the aircraft.
The latest warning by Tehran reflects its growing concern-and
escalating rhetoric-in recent weeks as the possibility of Super
Etendards in Iraq's arsenal has increased.
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6 28 September 1983
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Top Secret
CUBA-ANGOLA: Possible Increase in Cuban Support
Cuba may be preparing to augment its military role in Angola.
Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Alarcon told the press last week that
Havana is ready to send more troops to Angola if Luanda requests
them. The Angolan Ambassador to Cuba made a similar declaration
last week at a press conference in Havana, stating that Luanda would
ask for more assistance from its friends if South Africa increased its
"acts of aggression." In addition, Havana domestic radio recently
quoted Angolan President dos Santos as saying that more Cuban aid
would be sought if needed.
Meanwhile, the US Interests Section in Havana says that some
Cuban officials are concerned about the growing level of popular
discontent over Cuban casualties in Angola. Some Angolan students
in Cuba reportedly have been mistreated.
Comment: The statements by Cuban and Angolan officials
probably are intended to underscore Havana's continuing
commitment to the survival of the dos Santos regime and its
willingness to increase assistance. They also may be aimed at
preparing the Cuban public in case Havana expands its role in fighting
the increasingly effective UNITA insurgents.
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7 28 September 1983
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President Aristides Pereira
President since independence from Portugal in
I~>7~ ... age ~9 ... astute, pragmatic, moderate
Inc' ito maintain strictly nonaligned foreign polio .
faces no Serious domestic opposition.
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28 September 1983
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President Pereira, who arrives in Washington next week, faces a
bleak economic situation and is under pressure from the USSR and
Libya to grant them military access to his country's strategic port and
Cape Verde suffers from repeated drought, an absence of
important raw materials, overpopulation, and substantial
unemployment. It produces only 10 percent of its food needs, and in
1982 the value of imports exceeded exports by a ratio of 40 to 1.
Cape Verde relies on remittances from emigrants abroad-
$20 million annually from those in the US-and international aid to
keep its economy afloat.
Pereira presides over a socialist-oriented, one-party state and
faces no serious political challenge. He has consolidated his moderate
faction's control, and he keeps close watch on pro-Soviet radicals. F_
Cape Verde depends on the USSR for arms, and it is fostering
better relations with the West to ensure continued aid. It repeatedly
has refused naval access to the USSR and transit rights for Libyan
aircraft flying to Central America. Pereira periodically plays host to
South African and Angolan representatives as they engage in informal
Comment: Pereira is likely to express concern about declining US
aid levels-now totaling about $2 million annually. He also will want to
discuss Namibia, Western Sahara, and Chad. While disapproving of
Libyan actions in Africa, he will avoid public criticism of Tripoli.
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9 28 September 1983
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