NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 9 SEPTEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010134-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 134
• Publication Date: September 9, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
9 September 1983
CPAS N/D 83
19- eptember 1983 25X1
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Contents
Lebanon: Druze Threats .......................................................... 1
USSR: Soviet Claims ................................................................ 2
Eastern Europe: Mixed Reaction to Shootdown .................... 3
Western Europe: Responses to Attack on Airliner ................ 4
Nicaragua: Insurgent Activity .................................................. 5
South Korea: Further Reactions to Shootdown ...................... 8
Chile: Tense Weekend Expected ............................................ 8
China: Implications of Membership in IAEA ............................ 9
Special Analysis
Syria-Lebanon: Damascus's Goals ........................................ 11
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Druze leader Walid Junb/att is threatening retaliation against two
Christian villages in the A/ayh-Shuf region if the Lebanese Army does
not stop its advances into Druze areas.
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he will not bear any responsibility for the safety of largely Christian
populations of Dayr al Qamar and Suq al Gharb-both in range of
Druze artillery-unless the Lebanese Army pulls back. Druze forces,
which had surrounded Dayr al Qamar on Wednesday, began
bombarding the town Thursday afternoon, but the shelling stopped
overnight, according to a Christian radiobroadcast.
Comment: The Druze advance since Monday probably has had
the twofold objective of eliminating any Christian threat in the Shuf
mountains and improving the Druze bargaining position in future
negotiations. By threatening Beirut and holding some Christian towns
hostage, Junblatt probably hopes to wring concessions from the
government. A massacre of Christian civilians, however, would only
strengthen the hand of Christian hardliners who oppose any
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The Soviets claim privately to have evidence that the downed
Korean airliner was on a mission for the US.
There has been no high-level public Soviet commentary since
Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement in Madrid on Wednesday.
Moscow has presented a demarche to the US, however, asserting that
the Soviets have information confirming that the intrusion of the
Korean airliner was "organized by the US special services." The
Soviets say they will not make the information public for reasons of
secrecy.
According to press reports, the Soviet Ambassador to Japan said
yesterday that the Soviets had recovered debris and documents from
the crash and would deliver them to Japan "in the near future." He
indicated that the Soviets have not identified the crash site, but he
gave the coordinates of four sites where the debris was found. The
Ambassador also said that the Soviets had not recovered survivors or
bodies as of Tuesday.
TASS reported that senior Soviet military and political leaders will
give a press conference today in Moscow for foreign journalists.
These leaders include Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, Party
Central Committee information chief Zamyatin, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Korniyenko.
Comment: The sites listed by the Ambassador form the corners
of an area somewhat removed from the locations where Soviet search
efforts have been concentrated. The South Korean airliner probably
broke up at a fairly high altitude, and pieces most likely are widely
scattered.
By claiming to have found debris in international waters, Moscow
may be attempting to reinforce its refusal to permit the Japanese to
search in Soviet waters. The debris could have drifted considerable
distances since the airliner crashed more than a week ago. Soviet
surface ships continue to search in dispersed areas, suggesting that
no major section of the airliner has been found.
The announced press conference probably is intended to permit
the officials a chance to explain the shootdown publicly. They are
likely to release additional details and probably will provide
"evidence"-in all likelihood fabricated -supporting their position.
The official Soviet position holds that the US sent the airliner on a
spying mission and that the military performed its duty in defending
Soviet borders.
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EASTERN EUROPE: Mixed Reaction to Shootdown
The Yugoslavs, Romanians, and Hungarians have avoided harsh
criticism of the US while the other East European states have echoed
the Soviet line.
The Yugoslav media criticized the Soviet action but gave some
credence to Soviet charges of US responsibility. Yugoslav
commentators expressed the overriding concern that the incident
should not irretrievably damage East-West relations.
The Romanians have made no official response and have avoided
any mention in the media. The Hungarians have supported the Soviet
line but only in a moderate and low-key manner. A Hungarian press
summary of Foreign Minister Varkonyi's speech to the closing session
of the Madrid CSCE meeting yesterday contained no direct criticism
of the US.
The other East European states have strongly defended the USSR
and condemned the US, although Polish commentary has been
somewhat less vitriolic. A Bulgarian Politburo member strongly
attacked the US yesterday in a National Day speech.
Comment: The more moderate approaches of Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary reflect the larger stake of these countries in
good relations with the West, and a greater ability-particularly in the
case of Yugoslavia and Romania-to preserve their own foreign
policy lines. They are particularly anxious to avoid antagonizing the
Yugoslavia has traditionally steered an independent course
between East and West, but Romania and Hungary must balance
their desire for continued good relations with the West against their
Warsaw Pact obligations. Bucharest may break its silence soon, but it
probably will refrain from taking a clear-cut stance. Budapest may
come under pressure to give more vigorous support to Moscow but
will do the minimum required.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Responses to Attack on Airliner
A common West European response to the Soviet downing of the
South Korean airliner is developing, but consensus is proving elusive.
At the closing CSCE meeting in Madrid, the NATO Allies-except
for Greece-deferred final agreement on a two-week suspension of
flights to Moscow beginning next Thursday, according to press
reports. France also refused to participate in the ban. The decision
may be concluded in Brussels today, following a meeting of NATO
ambassadors to discuss collective action.
Senior West German officials doubt that a government-ordered
60-day suspension would be legal or effective and fear Soviet
retaliation against communications with West Berlin, according to the
US Embassy in Bonn.
French Foreign Minister Cheysson reportedly questions the legal
validity of even a token suspension but supports action by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. The US Ambassador
comments that the French are sensitive to appearing to follow US
directions, and one French Foreign Ministry official noted that an
official boycott of civil aviation would involve disproportionate costs
to France.
Italian airline pilots yesterday joined the boycott of
flights to Moscow.
Comment: With the close of CSCE, the UN Security Council and
the International Civil Aviation Organization are the most likely forums
for condemnation of Moscow by the West European governments.
The EC Foreign Ministers probably will continue consideration of
sanctions and diplomatic action at their political cooperation meeting
Monday in Athens.
The West European nations agree that specific action is needed
before indignation subsides, but the concerns expressed by some
governments may make further agreement possible only on minor
symbolic measures. Individual countries may take additional steps.
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NICARAGUA: Insurgent Activity
The increased actions by the insurgents are likely to cause the
Sandinistas to take a tougher position in regional negotiations.
According to press reports, two small aircraft bombed Sandino
Airport and a communications station south of Managua early
yesterday, damaging the airport terminal building. One of the aircraft
was shot down. Sandinista officials say it took off from Costa Rica,
and Eden Pastora's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance claims
responsibility for the action.
Comment: The attack on Sandino airport is the most dramatic
insurgent action so far. Pastora evidently hopes to use such moves to
gain more attention and increase his following inside Nicaragua.
The Sandinistas probably will condemn the attack during the
current Contadora peace negotiations in Panama to reinforce their
charges that Nicaragua is a victim of external aggression. They
probably will also accuse Costa Rica of harboring Pastora's forces,
which will damage their relations with San Jose.
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South Korea is urging additional international sanctions against
the Soviets. The Prime Minister has announced that Seoul is
considering organizing a joint investigation team of countries that lost
citizens in the attack. A high-level official has proposed joint action by
South Korea, Japan, and the US to press claims against the Soviets.
The government-guided South Korean press is now emphasizing the
need for actions to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, including
strengthening trilateral security collaboration with the US and Japan.
Comment: While strongly supporting the measured US response
to the shootdown, Seoul is attempting to demonstrate to a highly
emotional domestic audience that it is dealing effectively with the
crisis. The Korean press initially characterized the American response
as lukewarm and indecisive, and the Foreign Minister has come under
heavy criticism in the National Assembly for the alleged hesitancy and
timidity of Seoul's own reaction.
CHILE: Tense Weekend Expected
Democratic opposition leaders are evaluating the success of
yesterday's national protest and preparing responses to the arrests of
The government has
maintained a firm but controlled response to the latest protests, and
security police entered neighborhoods yesterday only when it
appeared the situation would get out of control.
Comment: Interior Minister Jarpa's call for progovernment
supporters to develop their own self-defense groups could lead to
more serious violence over the weekend. So far, however, the clashes
probably have not been serious enough to prevent the resumption
next week of the dialogue between the government and the moderate
opposition.
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CHINA: Implications of Membership in IAEA
Beijing's formal application this week to join the IAEA reflects its
growing interest in acquiring foreign technology-especially from the
US-to develop its nuclear power program. China has increased its
efforts this year to obtain commercial nuclear power equipment and
technology to meet its urgent energy needs. It has ample foreign
exchange for such purchases. China hopes to build as many as five
nuclear plants by the end of the century and needs to begin importing
plants and equipment to help reach that goal.
Comment: China's application is intended to indicate to Western
suppliers of nuclear equipment, especially the US and Japan, that
China intends to assume a more responsible attitude in international
nuclear dealings. Beijing presumably hopes the application will help
smooth the way for concluding a nuclear agreement with the US in
time to allow it to be signed during Foreign Minister Wu's visit to the
US next month. After joining the IAEA, China expects to gain greater
access to other Western nuclear equipment. Japanese firms are
particularly anxious for a nuclear agreement between China and
Japan to facilitate such trade.
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Syrian Presence in Lebanon
Armored division
Mechanized infantry
division
Commando/Special
Forces regiment
Deployment area
TOTAL STRENGTH
Men 51,000
Tanks 900
Artillery 375
BEIRUT
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Israel
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Syria
'-*DAMASCUS
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Special Analysis
President Assad is pursuing a strategy of calculated risks in
Lebanon designed to head off the consolidation of a government that
he believes is dominated by the Christian Phalange Party and is linked
to Israel. He also aims to give Damascus an important voice in
determining Lebanon's political orientation and to make Syria central
to the success of any peace initiative in the region.
Assad has said repeatedly that Lebanese President Gemayel's
regime represents only the Phalange and amounts to an imposition of
minority confessional rule on the majority. A Syrian memorandum to
the Arab League earlier this week charged Beirut with having turned
Lebanon into an Israeli protectorate.
At the same time, Assad has professed willingness to continue
working through diplomatic channels to achieve a resolution of the
crisis. He told Special Envoy McFarlane on Wednesday that Syria
sees no need now to expand its presence in Lebanon or to move
beyond its present positions, and he hopes circumstances would
permit Syria's withdrawal. His conciliatory comments reflect his larger
interest in achieving acceptance by Washington as the key to any
progress in US-sponsored initiatives in the region.
Syrian Strategy
Assad probably calculates that by providing assistance to pro-
Syrian militias he can maintain pressure on Gemayel, weaken the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia, and undermine any prospects for
the Lebanese Army to take control of the regions vacated by the
Israelis.
Direct Syrian intervention in the Shuf appears unlikely. Druze
successes thus far, and Syria's capability to stir up diversionary
clashes in Beirut, relieve Assad of any need to risk such intervention.
Damascus reportedly is prepared to deploy troops in support of
the Druze if the Army and the Lebanese Forces appear to be on the
verge of a major victory. Assad might judge that the Israelis would not
respond to a move limited to the Shuf.
continued
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By putting pressure on the Damascus-backed National Salvation
Front to stiffen its political demands, Assad clearly hopes to compel
Beirut to abrogate the agreement it signed with Israel in May. In
addition, Assad probably expects the continuing sectarian tension
and military stalemate will compel Gemayel to accept a government
of national unity that would be more responsive to Damascus. He
would expect it to move toward constitutional reforms designed to
give Muslims a greater political voice.
Damascus almost certainly will continue to argue that Syrian units
in Lebanon will be withdrawn only if Israel withdraws completely,
regardless of the outcome of negotiations for a cease-fire and an
internal political settlement. Refusal to withdraw while Israel retains
security advantages acquired by military invasion preserves Syria's
claim to Arab financial support as a "confrontation state."
The Syrian military presence also strengthens Assad's hold over
PLO leader Arafat. The PLO depends on Syria for freedom of
operations and for supplies, and Syria has been influential in the
Fatah rebellion in the Bekaa Valley.
Outlook
The Syrian military presence in Lebanon, totaling some 50,000
men, gives Assad a range of alternatives. Ultimately, he probably
intends to trade withdrawal for security concessions from Beirut and
for assurances from the US that recovery of the Golan Heights will be
included in a new, broader approach to the peace process. In the
meantime Syrian troops provide a channel of support to the pro-
Syrian militias and hold out the threat of direct intervention if Syria's
Assad now sees an opportunity to supplement the Syrian-
assisted military challenge to Gemayel with political pressure in
negotiations for a cease-fire and national reconciliation. If the
negotiations fail, Damascus can increase its indirect support to the
pro-Syrian militias or stir up new sectarian fighting in Beirut. If the
negotiations proceed, the Syrians can urge their surrogates in the
National Salvation Front to hold out for major concessions from
Gemayel.
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