NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 17 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010058-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: August 17, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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L5X1
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
17 August 1983
CPAS NID 83-1 3 X
17 August 1983 25X1
Copy 285
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Top Secret
Contents
Libya-Chad-Sudan: Potential Threat to Nimeiri .................... 1
Poland: Regime Preparing for Protests .................................. 2
Angola-South Africa: Invasion Fears .................................... 3
USSR-East Germany: Tougher Policy on Air Violations ........ 4
France-Chad: More Military Support ...................................... 5
Nigeria: Tensions Over Elections ............................................ 5
USSR: Exercise Announcement .............................................. 6
Pakistan: Opposition Protests ................................................
Special Analyses
Chad: Implications of a Partition ............................................ 9
Lebanon: Gemayel's Precarious Position .............................. 11
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17 August 1983
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Several hundred Sudanese dissidents sent from Libya to Chad in
the past month could assist Libyan leader Qadhafi's campaign to
topple Sudanese President Nimeiri.
Comment: Nimeiri's decision to allow US AWACS planes to use
the airfield at Khartoum to monitor Libyan involvement in Chad
almost certainly has intensified Qadhafi's determination to oust the
Sudanese leader.
Neither Chad nor Sudan is able to control movement across the
border. Although Qadhafi has not yet sponsored forays into Sudan by
Sudanese dissidents, protracted insurgent control over eastern Chad
would make it easier for him to do so. There were indications during
Libya's invasion of Chad in 1980 that Sudanese dissidents attached
to Libyan forces planned to begin operations across the Chad-Sudan
border.
A large part of the population of western Sudan has long been
alienated from the government, and the area probably would be
fertile ground for antiregime activity from Chad. Subversion in this
region is unlikely to become as serious as the growing insurgency in
southern Sudan, but it could make Nimeiri spread his hard-pressed
security forces more thinly.
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POLAND: Regime Preparing for Protests
The authorities are taking steps to counter demonstrations that are
planned for the end of the month to commemorate the founding of
Solidarity.
The provincial governor of Gdansk yesterday declared that for the
next 30 days violators of regulations on public gatherings will face
summary trials. Such prosecution also applies to those who distribute
and display illegal literature and posters.
The announcement follows a small demonstration on Monday by
Solidarity activists at the Gdansk shipyard. During the protest, former
Solidarity chief Walesa reiterated the threat by an underground group
to begin a seven-day job action next week unless the government
initiates talks with workers.
Last Friday Walesa told the US Charge that support for the union
remains solid in the shipyard and that he expects a large turnout at
the end of the month during the third anniversary of the Gdansk
agreements. He also believes that the police will provoke violence at
the planned demonstrations.
Comment: Walesa's use of more aggressive tactics is aimed at
maintaining his credibility with the shipyard workers. He also may
calculate that the regime will be forced to tolerate symbolic protests if
he is present, because workers might react violently if he were
arrested. Walesa almost certainly does not expect his actions to lead
to negotiations.
As the end of the month approaches, the government probably
will deploy additional security forces, particularly in Gdansk, to make
a show of force and to be available for contingencies
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2 17 August 1983
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RUFF UMBRA
Recent Actions in Angola
Q UNITA controlled
South African
buffer zone
Angolan/Cuban
garrison
Zaire
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Angola
," Cangamba
Battle,.,
Zambia
Secret NOFORN
634934 8-83
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TCS 2893/83
17 August 1983
Namibia
Boundary representation la
riot necessarily authoritative.
Botswana
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Angola appears shaken by recent South African and UNITA
activities,
Luanda has announced that South Africa has increased its forces
in southern Angola and sent ground troops into the UNITA-controlled
southeast. Angola also claims that South African aircraft bombed
positions near Mulondo and Quiteve over the weekend and provided
air support to UNITA forces attempting to capture Cangamba.
South Africa recently told the US that it is continuing sweeps
against SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola but plans no large-
scale offensives soon.
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Luanda's allegations of South Afric 25X1
airstrikes at Cangamba have been denied by Pretoria. 25X1
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Comment: UNITA apparently is consolidating its hold on the
southeast by attacking the few sizable Angolan garrisons remaining in
the region. The outcome of the battle at Cangamba is unclear, but
casualties were heavy. South African participation is unconfirmed.
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USSR-EAST GERMANY: Tougher Policy on Air Violations
Increased Soviet and East German complaints about Western
violations of East German airspace probably reflect East Berlin's
political and commercial concerns and are not an attempt to threaten
retaliation for INF deployment in West Germany.
The US Mission in West Berlin reports that Soviet air traffic
controllers at the Berlin Air Safety Center have objected to Western
aircraft deviating from the established air corridors. They say that, if
protests are insufficient, stronger measures may be warranted. Pilots
usually leave a corridor to avoid bad weather.
The East Germans have protested to West Germany about
airspace violations several times in recent months. They also objected
to the West German Transport Minister's recent indirect call for a
boycott of East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport. To earn hard currency,
the East Germans have been offering low-fare flights through
Comment: The East Germans are usually sensitive about
violations that ignore their sovereignty. They may have turned to the
Soviets for help because of concern that airlines serving West Berlin
have increased their passenger traffic-business that could have
gone to Schoenefeld.
If the West concedes to Soviet protests, some West Berlin-bound
air traffic would be diverted to a more distant corridor, which would
increase the expense to the airlines and cause passenger delays. This
would indirectly aid the East German airline operating out of
The Soviets may become more aggressive in defending East
German airspace. In the past, their aircraft and helicopters have often
tracked and occasionally forced down violators.
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4 17 August 1983
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FRANCE-CHAD: More Military Support
Comment: The F-1s probably will be used to protect the Jaguars,
if they are sent into Chad. French pilots would be more than a match
for their Libyan counterparts. If the additional troops are sent, they
will be equipped with Milan antitank missiles, some probably mounted
on helicopters. Paris has asked the US for Redeye antiaircraft
missiles, and it might also request Stinger antiaircraft missiles.
Nearly complete results from the gubernatorial elections indicate
that President Shagari's National Party has won at least 11 of 19 state
contests. In 1979 his party won only seven states. The US Embassy
reports that tensions are running high in several states where
opposition incumbents have been ousted by National Party
candidates. Although there have been few instances of unrest, the
government has ordered curfews and a ban on demonstrations in at
least six states.
Comment: Political stability has depended largely on each major
ethnic group retaining political control in its own traditional homeland.
Current election trends suggest the President's party has made some
unprecedented inroads in areas that until now had been fully
controlled by ethnic groups opposed to his northern-dominated
National Party. The people in these areas probably will attribute
National Party victories to election rigging. The opposition may call
for a boycott of senatorial elections this weekend, and violence could
erupt.
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5 17 August 1983
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17 August 1983
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rho United Staten Government hae not recognized
the orportation of Eetunia, Lalvia. end Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary ,preeent,tion
ie not neceas. rily euth oritative
Soviet Union
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The Soviets announced on Monday to all the military attaches in
Moscow from the signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act that they
will conduct an exercise in the Odessa Military District from
5 to 10 September. The exercise will involve about 23,000 troops and
will feature coordinated ground and air force operations. The
announcement of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops is
optional under the Helsinki Accords. Hungary is the only Warsaw Pact
country to make such announcements routinely.
Comment: This is the first time that the USSR has announced an
exercise below the 25,000-troop threshold. The move apparently is
part of Moscow's recent efforts to appear conciliatory and open
about its military actions as INF deployments approach. The exercise
may involve regularly scheduled field training, which usually precedes
end-of-cycle readiness inspections.
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6 17 August 1983
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Demonstration site
Province-level boundary
A
'/Chinese line\
of control
India
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative,
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I __j
17 August 1983
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PAKISTAN: Opposition Protests
Opposition demonstrations, which began on Sunday as part of a
civil disobedience campaign, continued on Monday in Karachi and
resumed yesterday in several other cities in Sind Province. Police
were stoned and government vehicles were burned in several places,
and in one town the office of a progovernment organization was
bombed. The US Consulate General in Karachi says the protests are
becoming more identified with the Pakistan People's Party of former
Prime Minister Bhutto and are attracting some student support. Some
of those offering themselves for arrest in Sind are prominent
landlords and local religious leaders.
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Comment: Although the police thus far appear to have the
demonstrations under control, the opposition has shown more vigor
and better organization than expected by local observers. President
Zia could have difficulty dealing with a strong protest movement in
Sind, where there has long been opposition to martial law. His hold on
power would not be threatened, however, so long as he retains the
Army's support and the unrest does not spread to Punjab Province.
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Special Analysis
CHAD: Implications of a Partition
There is no evidence that the French and the Libyans have
reached an understanding to partition Chad, but the current military
situation raises the possibility of an informal division. A likely dividing
line probably would run roughly from Salal to Abeche. An attempt to
partition Chad, however, would prove short-lived and unsatisfactory to
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diplomatic reporting indicate that an
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emissary of French President Mitterrand arrived in Tripoli on Sunday.
The French almost
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certainly are using these contacts to explore whether Libyan leader
Qadhafi would be willing to settle for anything less than total control
France probably is open to a solution that would provide for an
informal division of Chad, leaving the northern areas under dissident
control. According to press reports, Foreign Minister Cheysson has
identified himself with the long-held French view that only the
agricultural south is "useful" and worth defending. On the other hand,
Mitterrand-who is already being criticized for a weak performance in
domestic affairs-risks being seen by the public as having "failed" to
The Libyans probably would not view partition as a final solution,
particularly if it left President Habre in power. By introducing Libyan
ground forces into Chad, Qadhafi has clearly demonstrated that he is
willing to use force to preserve what he regards as Libya's vital
interests in the area. A cease-fire at this point, however, would reduce
the chances of a direct confrontation with French forces.
If Qadhafi were to go along with such an agreement, he would be
likely to use the north as a base for continuing the insurgency,
banking that his staying power would be greater. The Libyans could
keep an intervention force of a few thousand troops in Chad for an
extended period, although they probably would curtail operations so
long as French forces remained in their path. Qadhafi, however, would
have to be mindful of the effect of a prolonged occupation on morale
in his armed forces and the increased potential for a coup attempt.
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9 17 August 1983
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One of the main factors that has impelled Paris to defend Habre's
regime is the fear that a failure to act would undermine French
credibility and influence in the region. Many African states would
regard any territorial compromise as a French defeat. They also
almost certainly would see even an informal partition as a violation of
OAU principles and a clear threat to their territorial integrity.
A temporary cease-fire accompanied by negotiations among all
parties would attract more support, particularly from Nigeria.
Nevertheless, Habre's strongest backers-Sudan, Egypt, and
moderate Francophone countries-would be especially reluctant to
accept any agreement that detracts from the Chadian leader's
legitimacy or that grants recognition or acceptance of Libyan gains.
Habre and dissident leader Goukouni are unlikely to agree to
anything other than a temporary cease-fire. The President will not
accept negotiations that effectively put Goukouni's forces on an equal
footing with his government. Moreover, since Habre's most trusted
lieutenants and main fighting force come from the north, a prolonged
cease-fire could lead to dissension and increase his vulnerability to a
coup.
Goukouni also would hesitate to settle permanently for half of the
country. Any significant slowdown in his drive south would aggravate
divisions in his coalition, which includes dissidents from southern and
central Chad.
Any arrangement between the French and the Libyans is unlikely
to last. Neither Habre nor Goukouni is inclined to want to stand still
for much longer than it takes to resupply their independent-minded
A unilateral move by Habre, however, would cause a crisis in
Chad's relations with France. It probably would reinforce efforts by
the French to groom alternate leaders, or give Paris an excuse to
break with Habre and withdraw from Chad. On the other hand, a push
southward by the Libyans and the dissidents would again confront
France with the reality that only it can prevent Habre's defeat.
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10 17 August 1983
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Special Analysis
LEBANON: Gemayel's Precarious Position
President Gemayel's inability to act decisively to resolve the latest
factional fighting further erodes his fragile power base. He is afraid to
challenge extremist Christian militia commanders, who are again
flouting Beirut's authority and alienating Muslims and Druze from the
government. Gemayel's political paralysis is undermining efforts to
strengthen the control of the central government.
The principal goal of the 4,000-man, Phalange-dominated
Lebanese Forces-the largest militia in the country-is to preserve
Christian hegemony in Lebanon. In recent months the Lebanese
Forces militia has defied Gemayel by operating openly in East Beirut
and by staging terrorist attacks against Druze and Muslim targets.
The President's ability to control the Lebanese Forces is further
hindered by the growing opposition of his father-who is leader of the
Phalange Party-toward his son's government. During the clashes
last week between the Lebanese Army and Druze militiamen, Pierre
Gemayel publicly suggested that civil war is a real alternative if
negotiations fail to resolve Lebanon's factional disputes. Without his
father's backing, the President probably lacks the political strength to
A Paralyzed Presidency
Gemayel probably will continue to heed US suggestions that he
try to arrange a national reconciliation. His efforts will be blocked,
however, by Christian militia commanders and by Muslim and Druze
leaders who will not cooperate until Gemayel restrains the Lebanese
If Gemayel dares to arrange political compromises without the
backing of the Lebanese Forces, he may risk assassination
continued
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17 August 1983
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Neither Gemayel nor Army commander Tannous-who has had
close ties with the Phalange-appears willing to use the Army to
challenge the Christian militias directly for fear of setting off a new
civil war. Gemayel is intent on preserving his own position. He
probably will hold discussions with Muslim and Druze leaders, but the
prospects for compromise are poor.
An Alternative to Gemayel
Gemayel's continued ineptitude may encourage latent
presidential ambitions in Tannous, who advocates a united Lebanon.
Tannous might eventually try to step in to pick up the pieces if the
President falters. In 1958 Lebanon's President was replaced by the
Army commander.
Tannous probably does not have enough political strength to
succeed Gemayel if the President departs the scene soon. Lebanese
politicians would prefer to elect a more traditional Christian leader.
Tannous, however, would be likely to try to use his position as Army
commander to exercise influence in any new government and to put
himself in a better position to obtain the presidency.
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12 17 August 1983
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