NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 4 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 4, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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~~~f Director of
', CY~# 285
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
4 August 1983
CPAS NID 83-182JX
~A~QST TS83
?Ay 2 8 5
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Top Secret
Contents
Central America: Deadlocked Diplomacy .............................. 2
Japan-USSR: Tokyo Proposes Trade Talks ............................ 5
USSR-Middle East: Call for a Role in Peace Process ............ 6
USSR-Sri Lanka: Soviet Reaction .......................................... 7
Belgium: Playing Politics With INF .......................................... g
Ethiopia: Doubts About Counterinsurgency Prospects .......... 9
Bulgaria-US: Zhivkov on INF and Bilateral Ties ...................... 10
Special Analyses
Chad: Regional Attitudes ........................................................ 12
Nigeria: Election Outlook ........................................................ 14
Top Secret
4 August 1983
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Top Secret
CENTRAL AMERICA: Deadlocked Diplomacy
The recent meeting in Panama of the Foreign Ministers of the
Central American nations and the Contadora group-Venezuela,
Mexico, Colombia, and Panama-was stalemated by procedural and
substantive problems.
A Honduran official says the Contadora group planned to have all
five Central American countries sign a broad declaration of intent,
followed by separate memoranda of understanding between
Honduras and Nicaragua and between EI Salvador and Nicaragua.
The Central Americans-except Nicaragua-were aware of this
strategy and undercut the step-by-step approach by presenting a
document calling for simultaneous resolution of all regional problems
and rejecting bilateral arrangements.
In addition, the document noted several shortcomings in the
10-point program drafted last month at a summit meeting of the
Contadora countries. According to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister,
these include the program's omission of guarantees that democratic
elections would be held in all the Central American nations and of
mechanisms to ensure arms reductions.
A Nicaraguan counterproposal, which included demands that the
US withdraw its naval presence and halt planned military exercises in
the region, was rejected. The meeting concluded with agreement by
the Contadora ministers that more time was needed to discuss the
conflicting approaches.
Comment: The Central American countries-except Nicaragua-
appear increasingly resentful of what they view as the Contadora
group's efforts to mediate bilateral agreements. This, coupled with
their deepening perception of the Sandinistas as the common threat,
suggests they will maintain their unity in subsequent meetings while
resisting outside efforts to impose solutions.
Another meeting of the nine nations appears likely later this
month. Contadora strategists, meanwhile, probably will try to identify
some common ground in the conflicting documents before renewing
their efforts.
Top Secret
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2 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
JAPAN-USSR: Tokyo Proposes Trade Talks
Japanese Foreign Minister Abe's recent announcement of an offer
to hold working-level trade talks with the USSR does not appear to
portend a softening of Tokyo's overall policy toward Moscow.
Officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry report that, during
discussions last month in Moscow on UN issues, Japanese diplomats
suggested an ad hoc meeting between the Japanese Embassy's
economic counselor and a Soviet Trade Ministry official. Such a
meeting originally was suggested by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kapitsa during his visit to Tokyo in April.
Comment: Contrary to Japanese press reports, the offer falls
short of resuming the annual bilateral trade talks last held in the
spring of 1981. An official in the Foreign Ministry noted that the public
announcement of the offer was timed to coincide with that of the
Long-Term Grain Agreement between the US and the USSR. The
appearance of improvement in US-Soviet economic relations without
some movement by Japan would subject the government to strong
The offer also is consistent with Prime Minister Nakasone's policy
of maintaining a dialogue with the USSR while adhering to a tough line
on issues affecting the Western alliance. Abe recently reaffirmed the
hard line in an unusually blunt speech that condemned Soviet
expansionism and called for greater Japanese efforts to halt the flow
of advanced technology to the USSR.
The Soviets probably will take the Japanese up on their offer.
They may broach the subject with Abe next week, when he visits
Moscow on his return from the Middle East. Meanwhile, Soviet media
are continuing criticism of Japan's foreign policy, especially Tokyo's
security ties with Washington.
Top Secret
5 4 August 1983
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USSR-MIDDLE EAST: Call for a Role in Peace Process
Pravda's top Middle East commentator on Tuesday issued
Moscow's strongest public call in months for the USSR's participation
in an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. His article, which was carried by
the unofficial Soviet news agency Novosti, but not by Pravda, claimed
that Washington's failure to recognize Soviet interests in the Middle
East heightens tensions there and drives US peace plans into a "blind
alley." The commentator suggested reviving the Soviet-US
declaration of October 1977 to facilitate a peace settlement and
emphasized that the USSR will not abandon its friends in the Middle
Commenf: The Soviet message almost certainly was aimed at
both the Arab world and the US. It probably was timed to coincide
with US special envoy McFarlane's current trip to the Middle East and
specifically designed to reinforce Syria's criticism of US efforts to
arrange peaceful settlements in the region. The Soviets' use of an
"unofficial" news agency allows them to stress their point without
committin their restige in the event that this latest call falls flat. ~
Top Secret
6 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
Initial coverage by Soviet media of the violence in Sri Lanka has
been straightforward and factual. On Monday, a Moscow domestic
television news broadcast did note that the Sri Lankan authorities
were trying to mask their inability to halt the disorders quickly by
blaming the country's "progressive forces" for the trouble and
banning the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Sri Lanka. The Soviet
news commentator also said some observers believe that the
disorders are becoming anti-Indian.
Comment: Moscow apparently believes that New Delhi's
restrained reaction to the crisis constrains it from exploiting the
problems of President Jayewardene's government. By raising the
allegedly anti-Indian nature of the violence, the Soviets seem to be
implicitly hinting that Prime Minister Gandhi should be more critical of
the Sri Lankan Government. Moscow's attitude could change if the
government blames the USSR for fanning the riots and carries
through with plans to expel a large number of Soviets. Such a move
probably would result in a prolonged period of strained relations.
Top Secret
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7 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
BELGIUM: Playing Politics With INF
Belgian officials are pushing the US to change the activation date
of the ground-launched cruise missile repair facility from 1987 to
1985. The facility will be placed in Belgium as part of a package of
economic inducements to help win acceptance of INF. The Belgians
now say they want the repair facility to begin operations as close as
possible to the scheduled deployment of the first contingent of
Comment: The politically predominant Social Christians face
divisive economic problems and the prospect of increased "peace"
demonstrations this fall, and they continue to be wary of the INF
issue. Economic benefits are an integral part of the government's
strategy for gaining approval for deployment. Walloon Social
Christians, who are balking at formal announcement of Florennes as
the base site and who are worried by their party's declining fortunes,
clearly want to demonstrate their ability to bargain for tangible
Top Secret
8 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
ETHIOPIA: Doubts About Counterinsurgency Prospects
Ethiopian officials believe that the securit situations in Eritrea
and Tigray have deteriorated markedly 25X1
Eritrean insurgents last month inflicted several major 25X1
defeats on government forces, leading provincial leaders to doubt
the can ever control the insur enc .
25X1
25X1
Comment: Mengistu remains committed to a military victory in
both provinces, and he almost certainly will not consider making any
significant concession. Despite the pessimism of local officials, he is
likely to push ahead with more offensives. In the past, Mengistu has
replaced or executed commanders for challenging this policy and has
been able to divert blame to subordinates for the government's
military failures. He also has blamed his Soviet advisers, who have
been heavily involved in both campaigns
Tou Secret
9 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
General Secretary Zhivkov earlier this week denied to the US
Ambassador that Bulgaria is considering deploying Soviet missiles,
but he implied that Bulgaria would respond to US INF deployments
with some defensive measures. Although Zhivkov complained about a
US "campaign" against Bulgaria, he said that Sofia's own anti-US
propaganda could be "corrected" if bilateral relations were to
improve. He also urged the US not to "ignore" Bulgaria, invited
Secretary of State Shultz to visit, and promised to look into bilateral
problems.
Comment: Zhivkov has proposed a regional meeting on a Balkan
nuclear-free zone. Although he probably would not be eager to have
the USSR put missiles in Bulgaria, he would be unlikely to refuse if
Moscow insisted. It will be difficult for Zhivkov to offer concrete
improvements in bilateral ties without a substantial improvement in
Soviet-US relations. Nonetheless, Zhivkov's gesture suggests he
wants to play down his reputation as a Soviet puppet and offset
damaging allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the attempted
assassination of the Pope and in narcotics smuggling.
Top Secret
10 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
Upper
Volta
it
OUAGADOUGOU
NIAMEY
Niger
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Top Secret
4 August 1983
Lake
Chad
;}
Turkey _~~
urrnern ..
.n ....y
Uganda
Saudi
Arabia
ADDIS ABABA*
Ethiopia
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
CHAD: Regional Attitudes
African governments are concerned about the longer term
implications of the expanded fighting in Chad, especially if Libyan
leader Qadhafi emerges with a victory. Most, however, have chosen to
keep a low profile as the best way to protect their own interests. ~
Nigeria recently opened its borders to Chad to allow the shipment
of vital supplies, but it is preoccupied with national elections. The
military, moreover, remains angered by the recent fighting over the
disputed Lake Chad border.
Zaire's more active support has left it exposed and largely
isolated. If the military tide turns against President Habre's forces,
President Mobutu will come under pressure to withdraw the limited
forces he has provided N'Djamena.
Sudan has a longstanding fear that apro-Libyan government in
N'Djamena would make eastern Chad a staging ground for attacks by
Libyan forces or Sudanese dissidents. President Nimeiri will continue
to allow other countries to use his country for shipments of military
aid to Habre's troops, but economic problems and the growing
insurgency in the south prevent Khartoum from providing troops or
weapons.
North African Positions
Egypt is concerned about the threat that aLibyan-supported
regime could pose to Sudan, and it probably will continue to furnish
diplomatic support and some arms to Habre. Cairo is unlikely to send
its own troops, however, as long as Sudan's security is not directly
The Maghreb countries have been especially careful not to
disrupt relations among themselves or to discourage Qadhafi's recent
interest in improving relations. In addition, Morocco has financial
difficulties and is preoccupied with the war in Western Sahara.
Algeria's opposition to any outside interference in the region has led it
to refuse overflights for French and other aircraft engaged in supply
Top Secret
12 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
Qadhafi's Options
Western support for Habre has raised the stakes for Libya, and
Qadhafi has responded with the air attacks of the past few days.
Tripoli, however, probably will not launch a ground invasion of Chad
similar to the 7,000-man operation in 1980.
Qadhafi would be more likely to continue to provide advisers, a
limited number of forces, and the bulk of the dissidents' arms and
equipment. If airstrikes do not force Habre to pull back from Faya-
Largeau, Qadhafi probably will help the insurgents to regroup.
Although Qadhafi would view this as a tactical defeat, he presumably
would calculate that, over the long run, Habre's allies would be
unwilling to offset Libya's commitment to the dissidents.
Top Secret
13 4 August 1983
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25X1
L~J~ I
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Top Secret
Nigerian Federal States and Tribal Groups
CaOtlgOla
Lake'
had
The "Holy North"-75-100% Muslim
Former Northern Region boundary
State boundary
Kilometers
Gabon Congo
Top Secret
4 August 1983
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IP:OA #.~ ~ U
,< ~"~s
Cross
Rivers
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
After four years of civilian rule, Nigeria again faces the hurdle of
getting safely through national elections that are likely to provoke
controversy and violence. Political stability will depend largely on
popular perceptions of the fairness of successive weekly elections for
president, state governors, federal legislators, and state assembly
positions. President Shagari is favored to win a second term in the
voting on Saturday, but his party may lose ground in the legislative
elections. Disputes over alleged vote rigging at any stage could cause
violence and force the military to intervene to restore order or even to
resume control of the government.
The US Embassy reports that few substantive issues have
emerged during the campaign and that even the country's economic
problems probably will have little impact. As in past. elections,
candidates from the six officially recognized parties have emphasized
personalities and have appealed to tribal loyalty while trying to heal
intraparty feuds.
Shagari's National Party, which has the most financial resources
and the broadest base of cross-tribal support, is the front-runner.
Opposition efforts to unite behind a common presidential candidate
have been thwarted by personal rivalries and longstanding ethnic
Thus far, partisan violence-a normal feature of Nigerian
campaigns-has been less than expected. Nevertheless, the number
of politically inspired disturbances has increased as the elections
have approached. All parties have squads of thugs responsible for
intimidating voters and stuffing ballot boxes.
Possibility of Election Fraud
The federal election commission's inept handling of procedures
and its pro-Shagari bias has prompted criticism from the opposition.
The commission's performance almost certainly will raise serious
doubts about the validity of the elections. Last week, for example, the
commission released voter registration lists that show marked
increases in states where the National Party expects to run well.
Top Secret
14 4 August 1983
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Party
Presidential
Results in
1979
Bases of Strength
Candidate and
Ethnic Group
Federal
Governor-
ships
Senate
House
National Party of
Nigeria
Shehu Shagari*
(Hausa-Fulani)
36
168
7
Hausa-Fulani in
northern states;
minority tribe states.
Unity Party of
Nigeria
Obafemi Awolowo*
(Yoruba)
28
111
5
Five predominantly
Yoruba states in
southwest.
Nigerian People's
Party
Nnamdi Azikiwe*
(Ibo)
16
78
3
Two predominantly
Ibo states in
southeast and in
some minority tribe
states.
People's
Redemption Party
Hassan Yussuf
(Hausa-Fulani)
7
49
2
Northern states of
Kano and Kaduna.
Great Nigeria
People's Party
Waziri Ibrahim*
(Kanuri)
8
43
2
Northeastern states
of Gongola and
Borno.
Nigerian Advance
Party
Tunji Braithwaite
(Yoruba)
Not recognized until 1982
* Party nominee in 1979.
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The 80,000-man police force is ill equipped to monitor some
150,000 polling stations, supervise vote counting, and control
extensive violence. Shagari clearly prefers not to involve the military
in administering the elections. The Army has contingency plans to
back up the police, however, and it has been placed on alert for the
The Presidential Race
Despite some inevitable disputes and strife, most Nigerians are
likely to accept the election results if they are not rigged too blatantly.
Shagari is in a good position to be reelected on the first ballot.
Complex electoral laws, however, require a candidate to win a
nationwide plurality of the popular vote and at least 25 percent in
If Shagari fails on the first round, he will be forced into a runoff 10
days later, probably against southern Yoruba leader Awolowo. Unless
the opposition unites behind Awolowo-which seems unlikely-
,.---.. _. ..
If the President loses, however, there could be serious unrest in
the north. Awolowo is widely disliked in that region.
Even if Shagari wins, intense competition for state and legislative
offices, along with charges of vote manipulation, will keep political
tension high throughout the month and lead to a spate of postelection
court challenges by defeated candidates. Despite public pledges by
the major candidates to preserve Nigeria's fragile democratic
institutions, Awolowo and other likely losers might find it difficult to
accept defeat passively.
Parties that appear in danger of losing control in their ethnic
strongholds might try to scuttle the remaining elections or to incite
their supporters to violence. In turn, the government could feel
compelled to suspend any remaining elections, declare a state of
emergency, and call out the Army to restore order.
There is no evidence that the military wants to resume power. To
preserve national unity and stability, however, it probably would try to
Top Secret
15 4 August 1983
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Top Secret
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