NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 30 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010132-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 132
• Publication Date: June 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
30 June 1983
Top Sec. et
(PA. NO al-15,11Y
30 June 1983
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Top Secret
Contents
Italy: Impact of Election on INF .............................................. 1
Suriname: Trying To Build Popular Support ..........................
France-Chad: Efforts To Assist Habre ....................................
Mexico: Dealing With Economic Problems ............................
Laos-Kampuchea-Afghanistan: Decrease in CW Attacks .... 8
Brazil: President's Health Problems ........................................ 10
Libya-Morocco: Qadhafi's Visit .............................................. 11
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30 June 1983
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ITALY: Impact of Election on INF
The Christian Democrats' losses in the national election this week
probably will not hinder deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily,
although shaken coalition leaders could bow to opponents' demands
for a parliamentary debate on the issue.
Comment: Only the Communists sought to make an issue of INF
in the campaign, and no additional government decisions are
required to permit deployment to proceed. The new parliamentary
lineup will permit reconstitution of the former governing coalition that
supported INF, provided the Christian Democrats can reach a new
agreement with their allies. Most of the smaller parties gained ground
on the Christian Democrats, and they are certain to demand a larger
share of power in a new government.
Party leaders will be absorbed in sorting out the new power
relationships and also will be distracted by urgent economic problems
for the next few weeks. The Communists, who have taken a stand
against deployment, are likely to be cautious about provoking .
opposition to INF. They do not want to undermine their efforts to
portray themselves as a reliably pro-Western party.
On the other hand, public opinion polls show that 54 percent
unconditionally oppose deployment of missiles, and there have been
repeated calls from the Communists and labor leaders for a full
parliamentary debate on the matter. Defense Minister Lagorio has
played a strong role in recent governments in opposing this pressure.
Although the odds favor a new government based on the current
coalition formula, its hold on power will be even more fragile now that
the Christian Democrats have been weakened. Under these
circumstances, Rome probably will have more trouble dealing with
INF-particularly if opponents are able to turn negative public opinion
into active opposition as deployment nears.
Much could depend on the shape of the new government and the
presence. in it of strong leaders like Lagorio and Foreign Minister
Colombo. If the next government permits parliamentary debate on
INF, political support for deployment could be weakened.
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SURINAME: Trying To Build Popular Support
Army Commander Bouterse is renewing his efforts to enlist public
support for his regime by staging a rally today condemning foreign
Public gatherings have been scheduled in Paramaribo and some
outlying districts. In keeping with the main theme of, the rally. anti-US
and anti-CIA signs have proliferated in Paramaribo.
The US Embassy reports that demonstrations and effigy burnings
will be staged near the US and Dutch Embassies and that a petition
will be presented to US representatives. A similar protest at the Dutch
Embassy in March was orderly, and available reporting indicates that
US citizens are not in danger.
The regime has threatened to fire any government employees
who fail to participate. According to the Embassy, Bouterse is
expected to announce the end of the Friday night curfew, a limited
amnesty for suspected dissidents, and possibly some manner of
accommodation with Suriname's traditional political parties.
Comment: Bouterse is trying to arouse nationalist sentiment
favorable to his regime by scheduling the rally to coincide with an
important national holiday and by raising the threat of foreign
intervention. The expected announcement of some limited
concessions also is an effort to gain support. Although past rallies
have failed to inspire much enthusiasm, the holiday atmosphere and a
promise of free food and drink probably will draw a sizable number of
young people and unemployed.
The tenor of Bouterse's remarks at the rally may indicate whether
he is changing his views toward the US and the Netherlands. In recent
speeches he has specifically attacked the CIA but generally has
avoided criticizing the administration or the US Government as a'
whole. This suggests he may be adopting a more flexible attitude
toward relations with Washington.
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4 30 June 1983
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30 June 1983
l African
ublic
Sudan
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The French continue to take the lead in rallying support for
President Habre's government.
France is continuing to airlift supplies to Habre's forces. In
addition, the US Embassy in Paris reports that a more direct French
role in Chad is being discussed in the Mitterrand government.
According to the Embassy, Foreign Minister Cheysson is opposed to
direct intervention but the military, foreign intelligen e. and
the President's office are more flexible on the issue.
An adviser to President Mitterrand told a US Embassy official
yesterday that dissident leader Goukouni probably would not mount
an early attack on N'Djamena. The adviser believes Goukouni's forces
will try to capture Abeche in order to destroy morale on Habre's side
and cause his government to collapse from within. He had little doubt
about Libyan participation in planning the attack on Faya-Largeau.
Meanwhile, Egypt, Sudan, and Zaire-Habre's primary African
backers-have publicly urged all countries "concerned with African
security" to support the government in N'Djamena. A French official
yesterday complained, however, that moderate Francophone African
leaders are reluctant to condemn Libya publicly and to accept cuts in
French aid to help cover the costs of assisting Habre.
Comment: If Libya's involvement in Chad increases, support in
the French Government for a more direct role in Chad would grow. On
the other hand, a continued lack of public backing from additional
African moderates could strengthen the arguments of French officials
opposed to direct intervention.
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MEXICO: Dealing With Economic Problems
Austerity measures, devaluations, and steep cuts in trade
financing have substantially improved Mexico's balance of payments,
but the resulting recession is provoking growing domestic economic
problems.
The improvement in Mexico's external accounts results from a
decline by two-thirds in imports in the first five months of 1983.
Despite continuing capital flight, a large trade surplus and new IMF
and commercial bank loans have increased foreign reserves, allowing
the second installment of the $5 billion commercial bank loan to be
postponed for a month or two.
The drop in imports, however, has hit private-sector business
hard. According to Mexican Treasury officials, industrial production is
declining at an annual rate of 12 percent.
A recent poll of businessmen showed that 76 percent of their
firms project losses this year and almost as many plan further layoffs,
while 15 percent are near bankruptcy. Economists in the private
sector estimate that unemployment is now in the 20- to 30-percent
range and that underemployment is close to 50 percent.
Overall economic activity is declining at an annual rate of 5 to 6
percent, and inflation is hovering close to 100 percent. The higher
value-added tax and contractions in industrial output and imports
have hurt normal commerce badly, driving many businesses into
barter and black market activity. At the same time, domestic budget
cuts have curtailed government and other service activities.
Comment: Maintaining austerity will be increasingly difficult
because public-sector spending will have to bear the brunt of future
cost cutting. Until now, Mexico has relied on cuts in imports to reduce
spending, and job losses have been confined to the private sector.
Debate is likely to intensify among decisionmakers over whether
to continue austerity measures or to relax them to offset increasing
social pressures. Finance Minister Silva Herzog appears to be the
chief proponent of austerity, but others are counseling increased
spending on social programs to keep domestic consumption at
acceptable levels.
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LAOS-KAMPUCHEA-AFGHANISTAN: Decrease in CW Attacks
There has been a marked decrease this year in the number of
reported deaths attributed to chemical warfare attacks in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan.
In Laos, 12 chemical attacks have been reported, but there have
been no confirmed lethal chemical warfare-related deaths this year.
According to medical evidence, however, an unidentified nonlethal
incapacitant or irritant agent that causes blistering has been used
against resistance groups.
In Kampuchea, no reports of chemical warfare-related deaths
have been confirmed this year, although one alleged victim of an
attack in March had detectable levels of toxin in her blood. The
insurgents say they have been the targets of frequent attacks
involving irritants and riot-control agents.
In Afghanistan, no deaths attributable to chemical warfare have
been confirmed since last February. The guerrillas, however, have
reported continued use of an unidentified agent that causes
unconsciousness for several hours with little side effects and no
systemic medical problems.
Comment: The apparent decline in chemical warfare attacks may
in part reflect a reaction by the Soviets and their allies in the three
countries to international concern about the use of lethal chemical
agents.
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8 30 June 1983
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A government spokesman announced yesterday that President
Figueiredo,will travel to a clinic in the US next month to determine the
need for heart surgery. Figueiredo intends to turn the government
over to Vice President Chaves-for two months during his absence.
Figueiredo's three top military advisers reportedly will oversee major
policy decisions.
Comment: If Figueiredo does step down, public uneasiness
almost certainly will increase. The military advisers, who will protect
the interests of the armed forces under the regency of the civilian
Chaves, are likely to weaken the austerity program even further to
avoid provoking domestic unrest.
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Libyan leader Qadhafi's scheduled visit to Morocco today is part
of his current effort to improve bilateral relations with other Arab
governments and promote Arab unity. The Moroccan press
announced yesterday that the visit would provide an opportunity "to
consolidate relations" and review problems in the region.
Comment: Qadhafi's trip may lead to another short-lived
improvement in bilateral ties, such as the one that occurred in 1980.
In addition to rallying general support for Arab unity, Qadhafi may be
trying to involve Libya in the movement toward greater cooperation
among the Maghreb countries. Following his recent statement playing
down support of the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara, Qadhafi
could be seeking a return commitment from King Hassan to eliminate
aid to anti-Qadhafi dissident organizations based in Morocco. He also
could be trying to preempt possible Moroccan support to Chadian
President Habre.
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TCS 2853/83
30 June 1983
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