(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010111-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 111
• Publication Date: June 24, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cent riO
unuGuuogence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
24 June 1983
PAS NID 83-148JX
24 June 1983
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Contents
Chad: Dissident Attacks ..........................................................
3
Chile: Military Support for Pinochet ........................................ .
4
Honduras: Friction Over Training Center ................................
5
NATO: Controversial Statements on Arms Reductions ..........
6
Philippines: Austerity Measures ..............................................
7
Portugal: Economic Program ..................................................
8
Netherlands: Announcement on Cruise Missiles .................... 10
Turkey: Government Rejects Party Members ........................ 11
Special Analysis
Italy: Election Preview .............................................................. 12
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24.June 1983
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Libyan-backed Chadian dissidents began attacking President
Habre's northern stronghold at Faya-Largeau yesterday, but the
Libyans have not yet provided air support.
The rebels attacked from both the north and west. Chadian
officials say initial skirmishes occurred, around forward defenses
about 6 kilometers from Faya-Largeau
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OHabre's forces have set up a second defensive perimeter closer 25X1
to Fava-Laraeau and that the town has been hit by some artillery fire.
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Chadian Foreign Minister Miskine says Libyan aircraft had taken
part in the attacks. Other Chadian officials deny this, however
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Meanwhile, a Chadian delegation is to arrive in Lagos this
weekend to discuss the continued closure of the border with Nigeria.
Comment: The dissidents are better equipped than government
forces, but they are not well organized, and the battle could go on for
days. Some of the 16 SU-22 fighter-bombers currently at Aozou are
likely to be used on strike missions, and Libya also may consider
employing the TU-22 medium bombers now deployed at Sabha.
Other than the few technical advisers serving with the dissidents,
Libyan ground forces do not appear to be participating in the fighting.
Lagos probably will not consider a full reopening of the border
until Chad admits responsibility for initiating the hostilities in the Lake
Chad area, makes a public apology, and returns Nigerian prisoners
and war dead.
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CHILE: Military Support for Pinochet
The current unrest may have eroded some of President Pinochet's
military support, but top Army leaders-the key to his power-show
no sign of wavering.
US attache reports suggest that, despite the mounting political
pressures, Army officers still back the President. At a recent infantry
day ceremony, they enthusiastically pledged their loyalty. Air Force
commander General Matthei also promised his service's backing for
Pinochet.
Comment: Pinochet relies largely on his power base in the Army,
and in the past he has faced down the other, less-powerful services.
He handpicked the Army's two senior commanders, who seem more
suited to playing supporting roles than to seizing command. A coup
by junior officers is unlikely because rank is still highly respected.
Opposition labor and political elements probably will have to
demonstrate extended staying power and cohesion throughout the
summer months nifi antly Pinochet's hold on the
presidency
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HONDURAS: Friction Over Training Center
Government leaders are trying to deflect criticism in the Congress
of the Regional Military Training Center.
The legislature has approved the establishment of the center, but
only after a week of debate. US officials say the primary objection in
Congress focused on the training of Salvadoran troops and not on the
increased US military presence at the center. Armed Forces
Commander Alvarez played down Salvadoran participation in a
lengthy, closed-door session with the legislators.
Nonetheless, some members of Congress remain concerned that
aiding their traditional Salvadoran enemies could eventuall
jeopardize national security.
The Salvadoran Foreign Minister recently
told US officials, however, that his government is unwilling to concede
territory to settle the dispute
Comment: Many legislators are still angry about their exclusion
from initial consultations, and opposition to the center is likely to
continue. Congressional criticism probably will decline if the deputies
believe that the committees will give them more influence on future
decisions.
Although Tegucigalpa is likely to continue to use the center as a
lever for obtaining more US military and economic aid, there is little
chance that it would close the facility. The government also may hope
to get Washington's support in the border dispute, but El Salvador
probably will not make concessions.
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NATO: Controversial Statements on Arms Reductions
Official reactions in Western Europe to recent statements to the
press by the chairman of NATO's Military Committee about unilateral
nuclear arms reductions emphasize that his comments reflect only his
personal views.
Admiral Falls, former Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff,
reportedly said that the West may have more nuclear weapons than it
needs. He also maintained that, if arms control talks fail, the West
could unilaterally reduce its stockpile, especially the shorter range
battlefield nuclear weapons.
In addition, Falls argued that the effectiveness of sea-based
nuclear systems probably eliminates the need for further
development of air-launched and land-based systems and might
allow a return to deterrence at lower levels of nuclear arms. He did
express support for NATO's INF modernization, however, because of
its political rationale.
NATO Secretary General Luns told the press on Tuesday that the
Admiral's comments do not reflect Alliance policy or the views of
other senior NATO authorities. In an informal meeting, NATO
representatives described Falls's statements as "outrageous" and a
"betrayal of trust."
The representatives agreed that Luns should give Falls a severe
reprimand, and they are considering disciplinary action against him
before he retires later this month. The Canadian Foreign Minister,
speaking before Parliament on Tuesday, dissociated his government
Comment: Falls's remarks are getting extensive play in the
European press, and they will appeal to those West Europeans who
want to reduce nuclear arsenals and NATO's reliance on them.
Opponents of NATO's INF modernization probably will seize upon the
interviews as showing that one of the organization's highest ranking
officers does not fully support its nuclear policy.
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PHILIPPINES: Austerity Measures
with its financial crisis.
President Marcos announced on Wednesday that the peso will be
devalued by 8 percent and that five major industrial projects will be
canceled. Other large projects requiring foreign exchange will be
subject to a strict review. In addition, Manila is eliminating domestic
oil price subsidies.
Both the devaluation and the elimination of oil price subsidies
were promised in earlier negotiations for new loans with the IMF and
World Bank. The US Embassy attributes the delay in implementing
them to political pressures on Marcos, and it says that the
postponement is largely responsible for the IMF's criticism this week
of Philippine economic performance. The Embassy also reports that
the balance-of-payments deficit for the first half of this year reached
$600 million-twice the government's target.
Comment: Even with the austerity measures in place, Manila may
have difficulty avoiding some form of foreign debt rescheduling. Some
commercial bankers are already refusing to renew short-term credits.
and others probably will be disturbed by the IMF's criticism.
Manila is especially worried about any falloff of short-term credits.
Its current short-term indebtedness may total twice the official figure
of about $4.5 billion, and its foreign exchange position is precarious.
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PORTUGAL: Economic Program
The new government probably will win easily today in its first
parliamentary test, a vote of confidence on a program to combat the
economic crisis.
The government is proposing a largely unspecified program
designed to narrow the current account deficit and a complementary
but equally vague two- to three-year plan to promote economic
recovery. In a separate vote, the government will request blanket
permission to act by decree during the Assembly's summer recess.
Prime Minister Soares wants to enact the toughest economic
measures quickly, free from the possibility of parliamentary sabotage
by the Communists.
A government official says Lisbon intends next week to raise the
prices of subsidized goods, increase taxes, and temporarily halt
government investment projects by the end of this month. He believes
that extensive layoffs at publicly owned corporations, the introduction
of a three-day workweek, and salary reductions also are likely.
Comment: Although the economic program is likely to pass, the
government may have more difficulty obtaining permission to act by
decree. Policy differences within and among the ruling parties
probably will test government discipline. Moreover, some coalition
members are likely to fear that giving the government a free hand
would be exploited by the Communists, who are threatening to
foment social unrest.
The planned austerity measures, together with the recent
12-percent devaluation, demonstrate the new government's resolve
to attack economic problems. They would both reduce real personal
income and increase unemployment.
Additional measures presumably will be taken following
negotiations this summer with the IMF for a $300-400 million standby
loan. These are likely to include tightening domestic credit and
reducing monetary growth, raising interest rates, and lowering limits
on public-sector expenditures. Lisbon probably will have difficulty in
meeting IMF limits on the creation of domestic credit, however, in
view of the increased dependence of public-sector firms on domestic
loans to meet their current obligations.
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NETHERLANDS: Announcement on Cruise Missiles
Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers may announce today his
government's choice of a site for ground-launched cruise missiles.
According to the US Embassy, both Foreign Minister van den Broek
and Defense Minister de Ruiter have approved the draft text.
Comment: Although The Hague had planned to wait until
September to name the site, it may have elected to make an early
decision because of pressure from the peace movement. It probably
also is encouraged to proceed by the outcome of a meeting between
the Inter-Church Peace Council and anti-INF mayors earlier this
month that concluded there was little they could do to prevent the
basing of cruise missiles. The Dutch, however, almost certainly will
claim that the choice of a site-probably Woensdrecht-in no way
commits them to eventual deployment.
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TURKEY: Government Rejects Party Members
The ruling military council reportedly has rejected most of the
founding members of the new Turkish Social Democratic Party,
including its leader, Erdal Inonu. The political parties law enacted in
April gives the council the authority to turn down, without explanation,
any founding member of a new party. This action follows the regime's
dissolution last month of the conservative Great Turkey Party and its
rejection this month of several members of the country's numerous
fledgling parties.
Comment: The council's move probably is designed to reduce
the appeal of the Social Democrats, whose popularity in recent weeks
has underscored the comparative weakness of the center-left,
military-backed Populist Party. While the rejection of the Social
Democrats is unlikely to affect the parliamentary election scheduled
for November, the generals' credibility might suffer somewhat over
the near term. The move is another indication that the military is
determined to "guide" the political process for some time.
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Special Analysis
The final week of the election campaign for the next parliament
has been marked by continued voter disenchantment and bitter
exchanges between major party leaders. Discussion of substantive
issues has been disrupted by public reactions to new political
scandals. The failure of any group to capture voter enthusiasm
suggests that the outcome will be a largely unchanged party
arrangement. As a result, the economic problems that plagued the last
government probably will be addressed by the same political leaders.
The ninth postwar parliamentary election was forced a year early,
following the Socialists' withdrawal of support for Prime Minister
Fanfani's four-month-old coalition in late April. Most parties,
particularly those of the left, were not prepared to face an election. As
the campaign draws to a close, the Christian Democrats,
Communists, and Socialists have been unable to remedy their
shortcomings.
The Political Lineup
Socialist Party leader Craxi, who caused the crisis, has
antagonized his coalition partners in the last four governments and
various segments of the public with his political arrogance and his
obvious ambition to become his party's first prime minister. Although
Craxi hopes to increase the party's 10-percent share of the vote in the
election of 1979, his abandonment of the Fanfani government last
month probably has reduced the Socialists' prospects.
The Christian Democratic Party, the country's largest and most
consistently successful political group, was caught in the midst of a
major reorganization when Fanfani's government fell. Ciriaco De Mita,
the party's energetic new secretary, has been forced to accelerate his
rebuilding of the party.
De Mita has weeded out 25 percent of his party's outgoing
deputies and senators and has replaced them with new faces. His
most publicized success in trying to maintain or better the party's
38-percent showing in the election of 1979 is the inclusion of former
Bank of Italy director Guido Carli on the party's slate of candidates.
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The Communists, who fell in 1979 to 30 percent of the vote from
their high in 1976 of 34 percent, are bogged down in their continued
quest to legitimize themselves as a democratic party. They have failed
to win any new support as a leftist democratic alternative to govern
Italy.
In their quest for a broader electoral base, the party's leaders
have included an unusually large number of independent nonparty
figures among their candidates. This tactic is unlikely to result in any
significant breakthroughs.
Both the Communists and the Christian Democrats have tried to
obtain the Socialists' backing. Craxi initially criticized both sides, but
he then rejected the Communists and proposed an exclusive
governing pact with the Christian Democrats. This bid, however,
offended the minor parties and was ridiculed by De Mita.
Disgruntled Voters
The voters reportedly are taking a dim view of this display of party
rivalry. They resent having to choose among professional politicians
who seem more interested in furthering their power than in resolving
the country's problems.
Many Italian journalists are speculating that voter annoyance with
the political process could yield an unprecedentedly high number of
abstentions or spoiled and blank ballots. Various opinion polls
support this view and also show an unusually high.number of
Nevertheless, the polls indicate that party tallies will change little
from the last election. Each of the three major parties, however, could
suffer just enough slippage to threaten their leaders' power.
Following the recent scandals involving his party, Craxi's future
will be in jeopardy if the Socialists fail to win 12 percent of the vote.
The arrests of Neapolitan criminals this past weekend have seriously
implicated the Christian Democrats and allegedly some leading
national party figures in the Naples area. If this scandal hurts the party
at the polls, De Mita could come under pressure to step down as party
secretary.
If there are any winners, they will be the small parties. The
Republicans, with a highly popular leader in Giovanni Spadolini, may
nearly double their previous 3-percent share of the vote.
Assessments of the election's outcome are complicated by the
style of the campaign, which has been radically different from that of
previous contests. The voters have shown little interest in traditional
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outdoor rallies, and candidates have made extensive use of radio and
television. In addition, as scandals have broken, the media have
driven home the already high public concern about morality in
government.
Outlook
Party power alignments are unlikely to undergo more than small
numerical changes, and a renewed multiparty coalition centered on
the Christian Democrats probably will emerge from the election.
Residual bitterness between Craxi and De Mita over the campaign
rhetoric and their differences over the implementation of austery
measures could make coalition negotiations long and difficult.
The next prime minister could be a new leader. This might
indicate an attempt to break out of the stagnated political
atmosphere of recent years and a recognition of the need to reduce
corruption.
Former Bank of Italy director Carli may play a key role in any new
government's review of economic problems. Lingering campaign
animosity and the taint of scandal m ck Craxi's
quest for the office of prime minister.
Public discontent could increase substantially if the new
government does not make genuine efforts to get the economy
moving again. The issue of making major revisions in the structure of
government, which was featured early in the campaign, could come to
the fore again and lead to disturbances.
The installation of another five-party government would virtually
ensure that INF deployment in Sicily would proceed on schedule. On
the other hand, a protracted crisis over the formation of a coalition or
public discontent with the new government could have a negative
effect on this issue.
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