NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 28 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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+`"`10`"fP Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
28 May 1983
28 May 1983
Copy 285
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Top Secret
Contents
Israel-Syria-Lebanon: Israeli Alert .......................................... 1
Greece-US: New Demands in Base Talks .............................. 2
India-US: Reactor Safety Issue .............................................. 3
Mongolia-China-USSR: Expulsion of Chinese ........................ 4
USSR: Sakharov's Status ........................................................ 5
Panama-US: National Guard Chief's Visit .............................. 6
Portugal: Agreement on New Government ............................ 7
Ell Salvador: Military Activity .................................................... 9
UK-US: Concern About Demonstrations ................................ 10
Italy: Labor Unrest .................................................................. 10
Denmark: Anti-INF Resolution ................................................ 11
Spain-US: Aircraft Purchase Delayed .................................... 11
Turkey-Iraq: Border Incursion ................................................ 12
South Korea-China: Decision on Hijacking Depositions ........ 12
Special Analysis
USSR-Eastern Europe: Obstacles to a CEMA Summit ........ 13
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Israel yesterday emphasized its concern about the Syrian
command post exercise-due to end today-by putting its armed
forces on alert, announcing a limited callup of reserves, and
undertaking a modest reinforcement on the Golan Heights and in
Lebanon.
Syrian Defense Minister Tlas yesterday acknowledged the Syrian-
Israeli air clash of Tuesday.
Syrian forces in Lebanon
The US Embassy in Tel Aviv reports most Israelis believe that the
Syrian actions are intended to frighten Lebanese President Gemayel
into abandoning the Lebanese-Israeli accord. The Israelis maintain
President Assad's tactics have caused moderate Arab states to
reduce their backing for the accords. To demonstrate that there is
.broad domestic support for the government's policies on Lebanon,
Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Arens yesterday briefed
Labor Party leaders on the Syrian moves
Comment: Israeli mobilization and reinforcement probably will
increase Syrian concern, but both sides appear to want to avoid a
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The tough new demands made by the Greeks in the base
negotiations with the US suggest that Prime Minister Papandreou may
view any compromise at this point as a political liability.
The Greek negotiator presented a new draft on Tuesday that asks
for $3 billion in US security assistance over a five-year period and
cancellation of Greece's foreign military sales debts in exchange for
goods of equal value. Upon the expiration of the accord, the US would
be required to withdraw its military forces within a year. Athens also
wants Washington to guarantee a Greek-Turkish military balance.
Greece had increased pressure on the US even before submitting
its new demands. Papandreou recently alleged that US aircraft
participating in a NATO exercise had violated Greek airspace, and the
government press encouraged labor strikes last week at the US
airbase at Hellenikon.
Comment: The new demands are the toughest to date and raise
basic doubts about the prospects for a new agreement. The weight of
evidence suggests that Papandreou still sees a need to make a deal,
but on his terms.
Although Athens knows that it has no real alternative to
Washington as a source of military aid and support, the lagging
economy is eroding the government's popularity and bringing it under
increasing leftist pressure. As a result, Papandreou may believe that
he cannot sign an agreement now that entails real compromise. The
new demands may be a sign of Papandreou's desire to procrastinate
until he has more room to maneuver.
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INDIA-US: Reactor Safety Issue
The chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission has
advised US officials that one of two reactors at the power station has
been shut down because it can no longer be operated safely. He
warns that this will become a public issue.
Although the chairman has publicly denied the existence of any
hazards, the Indian press has reported radiation leaks and
overexposure of plant personnel.
Comment: The degraded condition of the reactors increases the
possibility of a serious radiation leak into the densely populated
Bombay area. This danger will persist at least until the spare parts are
installed, a major cleanup is completed, and the reactors are reloaded
with new fuel, which is now available from France. The Indians believe
that the spare parts can only be obtained from the US.
Indian officials are anxious to avoid a prolonged shutdown
because new public revelations about. technical shortcomings could
discredit the nuclear power program. If a nuclear accident were to
occur, the Indian press and public would be likely to blame the US.
Moreover, senior Indian nuclear officials who have favored a
conciliatory approach to the US might be replaced.
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Too Secret
MONGOLIA-CHINA-USSR: Expulsion-of Chinese
Mongolia's moves against longtime Chinese residents in
Ulaanbaatar will be yet another irritant in Sino-Soviet relations.
The Chinese Ambassador in Ulaanbaatar, in a recent
conversation with his Japanese counterpart, expressed indignation
over Mongolian moves to expel the Chinese. He claimed that several
of the measures, ranging from work restrictions to new housing
regulations, are designed to force the Chinese out of the country.
Mongolian harassment of the Chinese community of some 8,000
began at least a year ago when the government charged that many of
the Chinese were engaged in socially unproductive activities and
announced a series of actions against them.
during the last two months Chinese have
been forcibly returned to China in groups of 50 to 100 per day.
Those being expelled reportedly have received rough treatment
from the Mongolians and have been greeted as heroes after entering
China. They have not been allowed to continue on to Beijing, however,
and neither the Soviet nor the Chinese media have mentioned the
issue.
Comment: The continuing expulsions could not have been
ordered without Soviet approval. Moscow may have endorsed the
move to reassure Mongolia that any improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations will not be at Ulaanbaatar's expense.
So far, the Chinese have not made a public issue of the matter.
They could raise it at any time, however, or bring it up at the next
round of Sino-Soviet consultations. The talks, according to Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister KaDitsa. are still scheduled to resume in
Beijing in October.
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Top Secret
USSR: Sakharov's Status
Elena Bonner, the wife of dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov,
may be trying to put pressure on the government to allow her and her
husband to emigrate.
Next week Bonner hopes to meet with Academy of Sciences
President Aleksandrov to request medical treatment for herself and
Sakharov in an Academy hospital in Moscow. She has informed
diplomats and newsmen that both she and Sakharov have sent
personal messages to Aleksandrov.
This action follows an invitation from the Norwegian Government
to establish permanent residence there and the offer of a teaching
position by a university in Vienna. Bonner has publicly indicated that
Sakharov would accept either invitation. On 11 May, however, TASS
stated that Sakharov was ineligible for "foreign trips," because of his
knowledge of "state and military secrets."
Comment: Bonner's action may be designed to keep Sakharov's
plight in the public eye and expedite a favorable decision on
emigration. Although her tactic may backfire, there is some evidence
that the regime may be willing to allow the couple to emigrate.
Constant official harassment since early last year has contributed
to Sakharov's physical and emotional decline, and he is now resigned
to leaving. The authorities may want him to appeal for exit permission,
thereby allowing the regime to avoid the appearance of bowing to
Western pressure.
The Soviets have always been sensitive to Sakharov's special
standing at home and abroad, and they may believe they have only
limited leverage in dealing with him. By allowing him to emigrate,
Moscow might hope to improve its record on human rights at the
CSCE review meeting and other international forums.
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PANAMA-US: National Guard Chief's Visit
National Guard Commander Paredes hopes his official military
visit to the US next week will demonstrate his political acceptability to
Washington and strengthen domestic support for his planned
presidential campaign.
Paredes's advisers are trying to arrange meetings during the visit
with key US policymakers and Congressional leaders. Paredes has
announced he will step down from his Guard post in August and
accept a nomination for president if it will contribute to national unity.
The US Embassy reports that Paredes intends to place himself at
the disposal of US officials to help resolve the crisis in Central
America. He reportedly may offer extensive Panamanian assistance,
which could include military support, to anti-Sandinista forces in
Comment: The visit comes after the overwhelming approval in
April of a new constitution, and Paredes-as presidential frontrunner
and a leading supporter of constitutional reform-is seeking to
capitalize on the two events. He probably believes that media
coverage of his visit will help restore his standing as a national leader,
which was damaged earlier this year by his unfounded charges of
impropriety against the US Ambassador.
The trip may help to resolve a number of contentious military
issues between the US and Panama, including the continued US use
of Canal Zone facilities for regional US military operations and the
future status of the US Army School of the Americas. Although
Paredes probably only seeks a lower profile for US.activities in the
Canal Zone, he almost certainly views the sugar quota as a quid pro
quo for the continuation of the US school beyond 1984.
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PORTUGAL: Agreement on New Government
President Eanes yesterday invited Socialist' Party leader Soares to
head the next government.
Eanes tapped Soares as the Socialists and Social Democrats
entered the final phase of their negotiations for a coalition. The two
parties, which together command a majority of the seats in
parliament, finished first and second, respectively, in the
parliamentary election on 25 April.
Comment: The new government should be in place by mid-June
and able to resume base negotiations with the US by early July. The
Socialists and Social Democrats have agreed to make a tough
austerity program the gove'rnment's principal goal. The incoming
Finance Minister is a widely respected and politically independent
economist, who probably will have considerable influence in the
cabinet.
Basic differences between the coalition partners over policy and
power are likely to reappear quickly. Moreover, Soares's hold over
the Socialists could slip somewhat if he gives up the day-to-day
management of the party this fall and assumes the largely honorific
post of party president.
Despite this prospect, the new cabinet might continue to support
Soares. The coalition parties are disturbed about rumors that Eanes
may be about to launch a new party aimed directly at their
constituencies.
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-SAN 4
SALVADOR
North
Pacific Ocean
.u Per uin
- /J oe4FPrec
by gover
-,J forces
$ j
Brr ge destroyed l{or
Honduras,
T*GUCIGAIPA
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Top Secret
EL SALVADOR: Military Activity
Government forces reoccupied Perquin in northern Morazan
Department last weekend, bringing the town under government
control for the first time since early February. There was little
insurgent resistance. The guerrillas struck elsewhere this week,
however, overrunning a government detachment and blowing up a
bridge on the Inter-American Highway. They used the occasion to
announce the beginning of a new military offensive.
Comment: The reoccupation of Perquin is largely symbolic
because the Army does not have enough troops in Morazan
Department to secure an area so deep in guerrilla-held territory.
Nevertheless, the local commanders in the operation displayed good
leadership and took. constructive civic measures. The lack of
resistance indicates the guerrillas probably have shifted the bulk of
their forces in preparation for new attacks elsewhere. Most of the
targets are likely to be in the east, where the insurgents are strongest.
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British officials are concerned about possible clashes between
antinuclear protestors and US security personnel during
demonstrations set to begin on Tuesday at the US Air Force facility at
Upper Heyford. Spokesmen for the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament say they intend to blockade the base for several days.
Government officials also have indicated that they want to review with
Washington regulations concerning the use of force against
demonstrators at US bases.
Comment: Antinuclear extremists may hope to provoke an
incident with the US at a time when the election campaign is at a
crucial stage and the Tories are enjoying a sizable lead in the polls.
Defense Secretary Heseltine is determined to maintain normal
operations at the Air Force base. He probably will deploy additional
police and urge US personnel to keep away from the demonstrations.
Heseltine also is convinced that antinuclear demonstrations will
continue after the election and wants to ensure that London and
Washington are in agreement about how to handle them.
. Following a series of wildcat demonstrations, Italy's three largest
labor federations called a nationwide general strike yesterday to
protest the protracted deadlock in renegotiating a new contract for
the large and militant metalworkers' union. The union is demanding a
reduction in annual worktime under the terms of the labor-
management-government accord signed in January. The labor unrest
has become an issue in the campaign for the national parliamentary
election on 26 and 27 June with the Socialists joining the Communists
in alleging Christian Democratic complicity with management.
Comment: The general strike probably is an attempt by labor
leaders to calm worker unrest while seeking a compromise. Despite
the polemics, all sides are interested in concluding the contract
negotiations as quickly as possible before the election. The
Communists reportedly fear that labor violence might push some
voters toward the right.
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Passage of an opposition-sponsored resolution on INF in the
parliament on Thursday probably will encourage the Social
Democrats to criticize the government's foreign and security policies
more vigorously, including funding for INF infrastructure. The
resolution demands an extension of the Geneva negotiations,
suspension of deployment during that time, and linkage of INF and
START talks to include British and French systems and to a freeze on
strategic nuclear systems. Prime Minister Schlueter has reaffirmed
the government's support for NATO's dual-track decision and says he
will not resign over the issue. The government, nevertheless, has to
present the main points of the resolution at a NATO meeting next
Comment: Schlueter and his ministers are determined not to
relinquish power over a security issue, believing they have a mandate
to continue their economic reform program.
SPAIN-US: Aircraft Purchase Delayed
The Council of Ministers on Wednesday postponed a final
decision on the selection of the F-18 as Spain's future attack aircraft.
The US Embassy reports dissatisfaction with provisions offered by
McDonnell-Douglas for the manufacture of components in Spain, and
it notes press speculation that Madrid may reduce its purchase from
Negotiations with the US firm are to continue until
Tuesday, when Spain has to sign a contract or forfeit its $8.9 million
downpayment.
Comment: Even though the European manufacturers have
offered to reduce the roughly $3 billion price of a Tornado deal by
$250 million, Madrid probably will purchase the F-18. The Air Force
wants the F-18, and postponment of the final decision appears to be
another attempt to secure further concessions.
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Turkish troops conducted a limited
operation earlier this week against Kurdish dissidents in Iraq in
retaliation for recent Kurdish attacks on Turkish border guards.
A
Turkish Foreign Ministry statement issued yesterday noted that the
operation was successful and that the two governments had recently
consulted on the Kurdish problem.
Comment: The government'in Ankara views Kurdish separatism
as part of the broader domestic terrorism problem that plagued the
country before the military takeover in 1980. Although the
government has made great strides in controlling most aspects of
terrorism, it views Kurdish separatism and harassment of Turkish
security forces as a continuing problem. Because of Baghdad's
preoccupation with its war with Iran, the Kurds in Iraq have grown
increasingly defiant and have used Iraq as a base for activities in
Turkey.
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SOUTH KOREA-CHINA: Decision on Hijacking Depositions
South Korean President Chun has decided against seeking
depositions from China for the trial of the six persons who hijacked
the Chinese airliner to South Korea earlier this month.
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China might try to interfere in the judicial process. Taiwan's interests
also are being given greater consideration.
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the hijackers would be sentenced but turned over to Taiwan
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"after an appropriate time has passed."
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Comment: Chun may believe that Chinese involvement would
eventually put Seoul in a position of having to hand out stiff sentences
for the hijackers-a move that would upset many hardline anti-
Communists in his government. The Chinese will be unhappy with
light sentences and, if the hijackers end up in Taiwan, will conclude
that Seoul is not interested in developing closer contacts.
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Eastern Europe: Trade With the USSR
and Non-Communist Countries
Current Billion US $
}..ss. ., ,~ ??r ..I .1 ;1 ... I s. 1 .. ::~: , Ig ...., I`. .del
0 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
Eastern Europe: Energy Imports from
the USSR as a Share of Total Energy
Consumption
Total
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
27
27
46
17
13
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Tory Secret
Special Analysis
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Obstacles to a CEMA Summit
The Soviets and their East European allies have not been able to
set a date or agree on an agenda for the long-awaited CEMA summit.
Different reports indicate the meeting is to be held some time between
next month and early next year. The principal issue in dispute is a
Soviet proposal for more economic integration, which would give
CEMA far-reaching authority over planning and production.
Brezhnev endorsed the idea of a summit over two years ago, and
its continuing postponement has to be embarrassing to General
Secretary Andropov. With the major Western leaders meeting in
Williamsburg, Andropov must be concerned about his inability to
bring together his East European counterparts.
Soviet economic managers want to use the summit as an
occasion to cut Soviet aid. Party officials and ideologists are seeking
to reorient the economies of the CEMA countries away from the West
Moscow argues that closer association and coordination is
necessary to deal with the economic malaise in the region. The
Soviets also want to develop scientific and technical cooperation and
reduce trade ties with the West in order to reduce their vulnerability to
possible Western embargos
Romania and Hungary are the most vigorous opponents of Soviet
attempts to extend CEMA's authority. Despite its need for economic
assistance, Bucharest remains unwilling to submit to changes in
CEMA that it believes would threaten its independence. Budapest
does not want to damage its trade relations with the West, and it does
not want to slow down, much less reverse, its current moves toward
Czechoslovakia appears to be Moscow's strongest supporter on
this particular issue. With its economy tied more tightly to CEMA
programs than those of the rest of Eastern Europe, Prague has long
argued that the failure of CEMA members to honor their
commitments has damaged economic growth. Prague, however,
probably would prefer to achieve closer integration by enforcing
existing contracts and agreements.
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Other East European Concerns
The East Europeans want a guarantee of future deliveries of
Soviet energy and raw materials, but they fear that at the summit
Moscow could instead announce additional cuts or tougher
conditions. The Romanians have complicated the issue by calling for
equal treatment of all CEMA members in an effort to get Soviet oil on
favorable terms. Bucharest has had to pay world market prices and
hard currency, or goods that would earn hard currency, for its limited
purchases of Soviet oil.
Other issues on which the CEMA members do not agree include:
- Possible Soviet attempts to drop the principle of
unanimity in CEMA in favor of majority rule.
- The CEMA pricing structure.
- East European and Soviet proposals to alter the exchange
rates used for trade within CEMA.
- Soviet proposals for a unified food program and for the
use of more East European labor and investment for
projects in the USSR.
If Moscow prevails, Eastern Europe will have to accept lower
limits on Soviet oil deliveries, higher prices for some Soviet goods,
and requirements to provide labor and other resources for Soviet
construction.
East European countries would receive few gains from increased
integration. As their economic problems continue, the USSR's allies
are likely to conclude that any promised benefits from increased
dependency on each other will not be realized any time soon, if at all.
The cutbacks in Soviet oil supplies that began last year and the
reduction of Polish coal deliveries in 1981 serve as reminders of the
pitfalls of closely integrated economies.
Outlook
A TASS commentary earlier this month, acknowledging the need
for long and thorough preparation, suggests that failure to reach
agreement on an agenda has dissuaded the Soviets from pushing for
a summit now. Such pressure could lead to a more public airing of
Moscow's'differences with its allies. Even if a summit were convened,
it probably would do no more than paper over differences.
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The Soviets, however, are unlikely to abandon their efforts to
transform CEMA. They probably will lobby intensively through
bilateral channels in an attempt to wear down individual East
European countries that are resisting closer integration.
Moscow will continue to argue that a summit is more urgent than
ever in order to counter recent adverse publicity about the discord
within CEMA and to respond to whatever transpires at Williamsburg.
If the regular annual meeting of the premiers of CEMA countries
convenes this summer it is likelv to provide indications of the degree
of Soviet success.
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