NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 13 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010164-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 164
• Publication Date: May 13, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIG
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
13 May 1983
fop9ecrer
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(PAC Alin R.1IA- 1Y
13 May 1983
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Contents
Poland-USSR: Polemics With Moscow ..................................
Iran-Persian Gulf: Efforts To Improve Relations ..................
Iran: Clerical Power Struggle ....................................................
South Korea-China: Aftermath of Hijacking ..........................
3
4
5
Netherlands: Delaying Decision on INF ..................................
8
USSR: Treason Trial ................................................................ 10
Mexico: Strike Threats ............................................................ 11
Panama-US: Potential Presidential Candidate's Visit ............. 11
Austria: Government Formed .................................................. 12
Taiwan: Setback for Key General ............................................ 12
Special Analysis
France: Mitterrand's Problems Increasing .............................. 13
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POLAND-USSR: Polemics With Moscow
The rebuttal yesterday by the Polish weekly Polityka of the
charges of ideological laxity levied on 6 May by a Soviet journal
suggests that Premier Jaruzelski will stand by his moderate advisers
and might use the incident to increase his credibility at home.
Polityka's low-key reply corrected quotations in the Moscow New
Times article and cited Jaruzelski's speeches calling for reform and
political accommodation with Polish society. An editor of Polityka, in
talking with a US Embassy officer, seemed to en'oy the controversy
and gave no sign of feeling intimidated.
Some Poles, according to a Western journalist, are trying to play
down the event. They are suggesting that the New Times article also
is an attack by Soviet hardliners on General Secretary Andro ov
because he allegedly has already endorsed Jaruzelski.
Comment: The Soviet article is the clearest indication of
Moscow's concern about the failure of the Polish party to shake its
lethargy. Airing this concern in New Times rather than in the more
authoritative Pravda suggests, however, that the Soviets want to
leave some room to maneuver. They may hope that the Poles will
postpone their long-delayed Central Committee plenum on ideology
until after Moscow has had a similar plenum, possibly next month
The Soviets probably are frustrated by continuing signs that
Jaruzelski does not trust the party appartus and that he places more
emphasis on building up the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth
and on establishing good ties with the Church to reach an
accommodation with Polish society.
Slighting the party apparatus also irritates Polish hardliners. They
may now be arguing more forcefully that, with the regime's control
generally assured, it is time to turn the political reins over to party
professionals. There are few signs that Jaruzelski will heed such
advice.
Soviet efforts to influence developments in Poland through media
criticism have sometimes backfired. Such criticism frequently has
given new stature to those who are criticized and lends credence to
their claims of seeking a Polish solution to problems. The Polish
hardliners almost certainly will be encouraged by the Soviet criticism,
and they may intensify efforts to discredit Jaruzelski or to undermine
the Pope's visit.
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GuiUT Coopernfloun councH Members
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People's Democratic
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Iran
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emen
(S. Ye"}/j/
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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IRAN-PERSIAN GULF: Efforts To Improve Relations
Iran has invited a delegation representing the six-member Gulf
Cooperation Council to Tehran to discuss the war with Iraq and has
told Saudi Arabia it wants to improve relations.
The Foreign Ministers of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates-
the Council members that have the closest ties to Iran-are to travel
to Tehran tomorrow. The Foreign Ministers also are to visit Baghdad
and then report to the Council.
Comment: The Council members will remain skeptical about
Iran's sincerity, but they believe the opportunity to try to end the
war-and, more immediately, to cap the damaged oil wells-has to
be explored. Iran may only be trying to drive a wedge between Iraq
and its Arab supporters. Although there are signs that some Iranians
are beginning to seek a political solution to the war, the Iraqi missile
attack yesterday on the Dezful area probably will strengthen the
resolve of Iranian hardliners.
This is the first friendly approach by the Iranians to the Council as
a whole, as opposed to selected members. In the past, Tehran
portrayed the organization as a threat to the Iranian revolution.
Iran's conciliatory movement toward Saudi Arabia is also a
change. During the past year, Tehran has tried to improve ties with
individual Council states, particularly the UAE and Kuwait, but Tehran
radio has had only the harshest criticism for the Saudi Government.
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IRAN: Clerical Power Struggle
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani's political position may have been
weakened by the regime's recent crackdown on the Tudeh Communist
Party and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats.
Rafsanjani's place as leader of the prayers on Friday in Tehran-a
major forum for political statements-was taken last week for the first
time by an influential conservative cleric who has been critical of the
Rafsanjani-led Assembly. Rafsanjani's conservative deputy presided
over the Assembly last week, when about half the members praised
the crackdown on Tudeh.
President Khamenei, a leading rival of Rafsanjani and head of the
Islamic Republic Party, has announced that the current party
congress will revise the leadership and confirm its program.
Rafsanjani is deputy head of the party.
Comment: Khamenei may benefit, at least temporarily, from
Rafsanjani's troubles. Nonetheless, the Speaker's setback does not
mean that his political position has been irreparably weakened. He is
one of the most powerful members of the regime, and a successful
effort to weaken him would require the support of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Despite his defeat on the Tudeh issue, Rafsanjani is still pushing
hard for adjustments in Iran's war strategy. In a speech on Monday,
he stressed the need to avoid high casualties and spoke out against
an invasion of Iraq. His remarks reinforce indications from other
sources that Tehran is reviewing its war policy and other controversial
issues and that it may be preparing policy changes.
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SOUTH KOREA-CHINA: Aftermath of the Hijacking
South Korea is cautiously optimistic about prospects for further
contacts with China following the smooth negotiations on the hijacked
aircraft, but Beijing is unlikely to be responsive.
Seoul is especially pleased that the Chinese agreed to use each
country's official title in the signature block of the joint memorandum,
which it views as an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the South
Korean Government. Both sides endorsed a cooperative approach to
handling similar emergencies in the future. South Korea has
announced that the hijackers will be arraigned after the aircraft and
the injured crewman who is recuperating in Seoul are returned to
China.
Comment: Beijing's determination to curtail such politically
embarrassing incidents appears to have prompted its decision to deal
directly with the South Koreans. It probably feared that other
passengers or members of the crew might ask for political asylum,
which Taiwan would exploit for propaganda purposes.
The Chinese have played down the political implications of their
talks with South Korea and are likely to believe they can limit the
damage to their carefully cultivated relations with North Korea. They
will proceed cautiously in any further dealings with Seoul about the
fate of the hijackers to avoid giving Moscow an opportunity to exploit
the incident with P'yongyang.~
The South Koreans clearly will continue to look for ways to
expand their dialogue with China, but they appear to have no illusions
that an early breakthrough is possible. Seoul aimed essentially to
strengthen precedents for handling such incidents and to establish a
cordial negotiating atmosphere with Beijing.
North Korea almost certainly is somewhat troubled by the
incident and probably has made a private protest to China.
P'yongyang's official silence thus far, however, suggests it calculates
that the incident is an isolated event that will not have a lasting effect
on regional political relations.
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NETHERLANDS: Delaying Decision on INF
Prime Minister Lubbers announced on Wednesday that his
government probably will wait until after the end of the year to make
its INF deployment decision because he does not expect the Geneva
negotiations to yield clear-cut results before then. Lubbers added,
however, that the Netherlands will proceed with deployment
preparations in hopes of stimulating increased Soviet willingness to
negotiate. The US Embassy reports that the Dutch announcement of
a potential deployment site is expected at about the same time as
publication of the 10-year defense plan, scheduled for September.
Comment: The 10-year plan is likely to outline a program for
reducing the number of Dutch nuclear tasks within NATO and for
cutting defense spending below the 2-percent annual real growth rate
the government projected last November. Dutch leaders argue that
the reductions in nuclear roles are necessary to maintain support for
INF deployment. Once the nuclear tasks issue is resolved, the Dutch
will begin consultations with NATO-perhaps as earl as next week-
on their reduction plans.
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Soviet authorities probably hope that the treason trial of dissident
Valeriy Repin-a member of the Solzhenitsyn Fund-will help
discourage contacts between dissidents and foreigners. In March
Repin publicly confessed to crimes he committed on behalf of the
Fund, which aids political prisoners and their families through
financial contributions from Soviet citizens and foreigners. He
admitted that the Fund was used by foreigners to "collect intelligence
information" and to "disseminate anti-Soviet material," and he
named both Soviet and US citizens allegedly involved. Sergey
Khodorovich, the head of the Fund in Moscow, was arrested last
month.
Comment: The move against Repin follows a recent increase in
Soviet press allegations of US espionage activities in the USSR. The
arrest of, Khodorovich may indicate that he also will be charged with
treason.
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The government probably will try to avert possible strikes by
granting workers a larger wage increase than currently promised.
Labor leader Velazquez is threatening strikes against some 11,000
companies, including the government oil monopoly, to persuade the
government to allow a more favorable wage settlement. One
opposition party is calling for a general strike, but Velazquez stresses
that his demands are nonpolitical.
Comment: President de la Madrid recognizes that organized
labor's loyalty is important to continued political stability, and he is
likely to agree to a small concession on wages. The Minimum Wage
Commission probably will add about 5 percentage points to the
promised 12.5-percent hike and could make it effective several weeks
sooner than its scheduled start in July. Although labor leaders
understand the necessity for maintaining austerity, they are likely to
continue to urge the government and business to accept still higher
minimum wages to deflect complaints from the rank and file that their
interests are being ignored.
The US Embassy reports that Paredes
would like to meet with senior US officials to underscore his
acceptability to Washington. He is undecided about his candidacy
and retirement from the Guard, but he reportedly does not plan to
remain as Guard Commander beyond December.
Comment: Paredes probably believes the visit will strengthen
sagging support for his candidacy and restore his standing as a
national leader. Unfounded charges of impropriety made by Paredes
against the US Ambassador earlier this year raised questions about
his suitability for high public office. Panama's business community
had hoped to benefit from improving US-Panamanian relations and
was particularly upset by the incident.
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The Socialist Party and the liberal Freedom Party almost certainly
will endorse the new coalition, negotiated during the fourth round of
talks since the national election on 24 April. The government will be
led by former Vice Chancellor Sinowatz, who was selected earlier by
former Chancellor Kreisky as his successor. Press reports say the
smaller Freedom Party will get the justice, defense, and economics
portfolios and three state secretary posts. The parties agreed to a
compromise on the tax increases proposed by the previous
government, which had been the major obstacle during the
negotiations.
Comment: The Socialist and Freedom Parties together hold a
comfortable nine-seat majority in the parliament, and individual
defections are unlikely to threaten the coalition's stability. Major
changes in foreign and domestic policy are improbable. With
Kreisky's departure, however, the government will attract less
attention abroad.
TAIWAN: Setback for Key General
Taipei announced earlier this week that General Wang Sheng has
been shifted from director of the powerful General Political Warfare
Department to head of the Joint Operations Training Department. The
change separates Wang from the new domestic intelligence collection
organization established under him only last month. In addition, the
General's powerful subcommittee of the Kuomintang Central
Committee, which was established in 1980 to deal with Beijing's
reunification initiatives, reportedly has been abolished.
Comment: Wang's efforts to increase his influence may have
irritated President Chiang, who has always opposed the
concentration of too much power in the hands of any one
subordinate. Nonetheless, the General retains an extensive network
of proteges and supporters, including a large faction on the Central
Committee.
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Special Analysis
FRANCE: Mitterrand's Problems Increasing
Recent demonstrations by students and small businessmen have
marred the second anniversary of President Mitterrand's election.
There are few similarities between the current unrest and the massive
student and worker upheaval which nearly toppled President de
Gaulle in 1968. French officials are concerned, however, that
disturbances could spread as the government's austerity measures
take hold in coming months. Mitterrand probably will be able to resist
widespread pressures to abandon austerity, but at the cost of
increasing public dissatisfaction with his domestic policies.
The principal target of student demonstrators is a proposed
reform of the state-run university system that would lower entrance
requirements. Although this would fulfill Socialist promises to
"democratize" higher education, it also would impose new test
requirements on students who are close to receiving degrees. The
Education Minister defends this as a necessary step to reduce the
disproportionate number of students in training for the liberal
professions.
The US Embassy reports that student leaders associated with
conservative and rightwing parties have sought to capitalize on
discontent over the reform among medical, law, and economics
students by organizing strikes. They claim that their objective is to
alter the reform rather than to challenge the government's authority.
Students from traditionally "leftist" faculties of history and sociology
generally have remained silent or have accused the strikers of trying
to politicize student concerns.
Small groups of rightwing extremists were responsible for most of
the violent clashes with police last week, according to the US
Embassy. Prime Minister Mauroy yesterday charged that rightwing
extremists are using the continuing demonstrations to sow disorder.
Opposition party leaders have been careful not to encourage the
striking students to push the government too hard, fearing that it
would benefit from a public backlash to any widespread rioting.
Economic Grievances
The demonstrations by small businessmen reflect their anger over
a number of the government's economic and social policies. They
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regard the recent austerity measures as the last straw. The
businessmen, however, apparently have not made specific demands
for changes in government policy and have not sought to temper their
strong ideological opposition to Mitterrand.
The major labor unions are increasing their criticism of the
austerity measures. Union leaders correctly view the measures as a
significant shift away from the government's earlier preoccupation
with reducing unemployment and maintaining real incomes of
workers. Although one generally moderate union has called for a one-
hour strike next Wednesday, the major pro-Socialist and Communist-
controlled labor federations a parently have refused to join any
nationwide protest.
Political Repercussions
Thus far, the government has been able to contain the scattered
domestic unrest by combining a show of force-including quick
police reaction in Paris-with conciliatory gestures. Mitterrand
recently set the public tone for government actions by declaring that,
while the state's authority has to be respected, he will not ignore
legitimate complaints against specific policies. Although Mauroy
yesterday rejected student demands to postpone parliamentary
debate on the reform scheduled to begin on 24 May, he indicated that
the government would consider significant amendments.
The government already has had some success on the labor front.
Last week striking medical workers agreed to return to work following
the government's decision to review its reorganization of the state-run
hospital system.
Nevertheless, the proliferation of often unrelated protests
evidently is eroding public confidence in Mitterrand's stewardship of
domestic affairs. According to a recent poll, 53 percent of the voters
disapprove of his performance over the past two years and only
33 percent approve.
In addition, a number of reports indicate growing disaffection in
leftist ranks over the austerity measures. One top Socialist Party
official, who is known for his hostility toward the French Communists,
has publicly echoed Communist warnings that the measures are
weakening worker support for the government. Leftwing Socialists
are pushing for what promises to be a bitter debate on the measures
at the Socialist Party congress in October.
Outlook
Despite the public protests and the criticism from his leftist
supporters, Mitterrand will try not to make any major adjustments to
continued
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his austerity program during the coming months. US Embassy
reporting and press accounts indicate that the President and his most
influential advisers believe that a premature return to expansionist
policies and a sharp turn toward increased protectionism would
wreck their hopes for economic recovery before the legislative
elections in 1986.
The government will face a formidable challenge to its policies
next fall, when major unions are expected to push for wage hikes
exceeding current government guidelines. Although union leaders
probably will be more responsive to rank-and-file pressures for work
stoppages, they will find it difficult to coordinate their actions
effectively. In any event, they almost certainly will stop well short of
If labor unrest and civil disorder were to become widespread,
some opposition party leaders probably would consider calling for an
early legislative election. Mitterrand, however, would be likely to
reject such a call. Any questioning by the opposition of the
government's legitimacy could help to rally leftist support for
Mitterrand, particularly if rightwing extremists were believed to be
provoking violence.
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