NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 21 APRIL 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010107-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 107
• Publication Date: April 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
CC~~S/CIC
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
21 April 1983
yep-see*et-
CPAS N/D 83-094JX
21 April 1 25X1
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Toa Secret
Contents
Libya-Brazil-Nicaragua: Decision on Aircraft ........................
China-i/ietnairn: A Warning From Beijing ................................ 3
Italy: Early General Election Possible ...................................... 4
Chad: Dissident Maneuvering .................................................. 7
USSR-Iran: Status of Relations ......................................... 8
Honduras: New Subversive Front ............................................ 10
CEMA: Negotiations for a Summit .......................................... 11
Special Analysis
Poland: Prospects for Unrest .................................................. 12
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21 April 1983
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LIBYA-BRAZIL-6NICARAGl9A: IDeclaiion on Alrcreft
Brazil's decision to send the Libyan aircraft that were destined for
Nicaragua back to Tripoli without their cargo of arms has complicated,
relations with Libya.
Brazilian spokesmen have announced that the weapons probably
will be returned later. No mention has been made of whether the
transports are carrying aircraft.
Libyan leader Qadhafi is publicly criticizing his officials for not
revealing the contents of the aircraft to "friendly" Brazilian
authorities. Earlier he demanded the return of the arms
Comment: Brazil will try to extricate itself from the incident
without further antagonizing Libya. Both countries want to keep
recent bilateral military deals intact.
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CHINA-VIETNAM: A Warning From Beijing
Beijing's recent statements and its increased military activity
suggest that China will at least continue to harass the Vietnamese until
they end their dry-season offensive in Kampuchea.
Comment: Beijing, despite its saber-rattling, probably wants to
keep its military activity limited to artillery attacks, reconnaissance
patrols, and small ground operations. The clashes could grow,
however, if Vietnam retaliates against China or expands its operations
into Thailand. The Chinese might try to administer "another lesson"
by concentrating a large force to overwhelm and destroy an isolated
military or economic target.
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ITALY: Early General Election Possible
Party leaders maybe about to force an early general election.
Renewed tension among the members of Prime Minister Fanfani's
four-party government is prompting speculation that the parliament
will be dissolved on 12 May. Party officials expect that this would
open the way for national elections to be held on 26 and 27 June,
concurrently with partial local administrative elections. Fanfani says
privately that early elections are likely and that he will discuss the
matter with President Pertini.
Former Prime Minister Spadolini, who heads the small Republican
Party, is the only party chief now calling publicly for an early election,
but the Communist Party's daily newspaper is reporting the election
speculation enthusiastically. The Socialists are to meet tomorrow
decide whether to withdraw their support from the government.
Comment: A national election would be unlikely to produce major
shifts in parliamentary strength, but even minor gains could prompt
Socialist leader Craxi to try to persuade the other center-left parties
that he should be prime minister. Craxi's cautious decision to support
Fanfani last year rather than demand a national election damaged his
reputation as a decisive leader. This could impel him to act now, even
though some of his lieutenants will argue that the party may grow still
stronger if it waits.
Top Secret
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Gouro
Fon,~ard
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bases
seasonal
highwater
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hlabre's main
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Mabre's
sfrangholds
reint`orced
1 April 1983
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CHAD: Dissident Maneuvering
Libyan-backed dissidents are trying to mount guerrilla operations
against government forces in western Chad while both sides continue
preparing for hostilities in the north.
The US Embassy in N'Djamena reports that President Habre is
concerned about recent Libyan reconnaissance flights over the
Kanem region in the west. Last week rebel patrols were sighted in the
area for the first time. Insurgent recruits have reportedly begun
infiltrating the region from refugee camps in northern Nigeria, and
some military officers in Benin claim that the Libyan arms delivered to
Cotonou last month will be shipped through northern Nigeria to the
Kanem area.
Comment: If the dissidents begin operating in the Kanem region,
both the area around N'Djamena and Habre's only supply route to the
north could be threatened. The majority of government troops are
tied down in the north, and Habre does not have the resources to
counter a new threat.~~
Each side appears capable of defending its most important
positions in the north. The rebel position at Ounianga Kebir remains
vulnerable, however, and Habre's troops are likely to attack it soon.
The dissidents have the men and equipment to attack government
forces but currently seem to lack the will to strike first.
The French probably will offer only limited quantities of arms and
equipment. If a direct intervention by Libya appeared imminent,
however, they would be likely to increase their aid.
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USSR-IRAN: Status of Relations
Tensions between Moscow and Tehran remain high over a variety
of issues, but there have been recent indications that both sides are
seeking to limit the deterioration in relations.
The chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department
visited Tehran early this month for talks with the Deputy Foreign
The Soviet Government expressed condolences over the
earthquake in northern Iran early this month, and Ayatollah Khomeini
officially thanked Moscow. Iranian media noted last weekend that a
Soviet aircraft had arrived in Tehran with relief supplies for the
earthquake victims.
A new Iranian Ambassador arrived in Moscow last week, filling a
post that had been vacant for more than a year. At about the same
time, the Soviets announced that Aeroflot flights between the two
capitals will resume soon.
but positive signs since his visit suggest that the to s result
some progress toward limiting the decline in relations.
Nevertheless, fundamental differences persist on such issues as
the USSR's support for Iraq, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and
Tehran's repression of Iranian Communists. These make a significant
improvement in relations any time soon unlikely.
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Four Honduran extreme leftist groups recently announced from
Managua that they have formed a new unity organization dedicated to
solidarity with the Sandinistas and increased violence. The new front
includes the most radical Honduran groups, which were responsible
for most of the numerous bombings and kidnapings last year. The
announcement coincides with a statement by Nicaraguan junta leader
Daniel Ortega threatening Honduras with renewed subversion.
Comment: Ortega's statement may be a warning to Tegucigalpa
to review its position concerning the training of Salvadoran troops in
Honduras, the installation of a US-manned radar system, and its
support of insurgency against the Sandinistas. The Honduran
extremist groups are divided, but they have some ability to attack US
and Honduran targets-especially if the Sandinistas provide
assistance. The orthodox Honduran Communist Party, which has
been unsuccessful in its terrorist experiments, is conspicuously
absent from the front. The Communists apparently have set up
political headquarters in Managua, however, thus strengthening their
ties to the Sandinistas.
Top Secret
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CEIV9A: Negotiations for a Summit
A high-level Soviet delegation visited Bucharest last week and
discussed preparations for the still-unscheduled CEMA summit.
Bucharest radio has reported that the talks with President Ceausescu
dealt with the need to expand cooperation within CEMA and the
question of energy and raw material supplies. The delegation also
visited Budapest. Meanwhile, a leading Soviet expert on CEMA last
week said the summit will react in part to developments at the
Williamsburg Summit late next month.
Comment: The delegation probably sought to persuade Romania
and Hungary to drop their opposition to closer integration, but the
effort is unlikely to have succeeded. Moscow apparently is waiting to
see what policy emerges at Williamsburg before further defining its
views on trade ties with the West.
Top Secret
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Tod ~e~ret
special analysis
P?LAN?: Prospects for Ur~rea~
Some demonstrations are likely in early May despite government
threats of retribution and suggestions that protests could jeopardize
the papal visit in June. The authorities are prepared to quell open acts
of defiance, but an extensive use of force would undercut their claims
that the situation is gradually returning to normal. The Church
probably will not consider postponing the Pope's visit unless there is
widespread violence and bloodshed.
In 1982 the first major demonstrations against martial law
occurred on May Day and on 3 May, Poland's prewar constitution
day. Thousands of Poles in a dozen cities participated in the protests.
In recent weeks the underground's five-man Temporary
Coordinating Committee has called for similar demonstrations in May
and for a boycott of official celebrations. There is no evidence,
however, that the Committee expects a massive turnout.
Walesa's Role
Former Solidarity leader Walesa indicated last month to US
Embassy officers that he wanted to help maintain calm in early May.
His recent meeting with the Temporary Coordinating Committee and
his indirect support of its appeal for demonstrations, however, may
lead to wider popular involvement.
Since his release from internment last November, Walesa has
gradually become more active by signing appeals and by meeting with
former union advisers and the underground. Walesa probably has
been frustrated by the regime's efforts to ignore him, and he is likely
to derive some satisfaction from the publicity resulting from his recent
harassment by the authorities.
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The Government's Response
The Minister of the Interior publicly warned on 22 March that the
authorities would not tolerate the planned demonstrations. On
Tuesday the government and the party issued another warning that
demonstrations could delay normalization and the lifting of martial
law. ~~
In addition, the police have tried to intimidate prospective leaders
and participants in demonstrations. They recently have arrested
several dozen underground activists, shut down illegal printing
presses, and confiscated illegal radio transmitters. They also have
arrested a former unions op kesman and have increased harassment
of those close to Walesa.
To identify potential trouble spots, the government announced
earlier this week that the military's Special Operations Groups would
be sent out to numerous cities and villages. These groups previously
have been useful in assessing the public mood.
Government leaders also have tried to enlist the Church more
directly in preventing demonstrations. They are arguing that
opposition forces are seeking to force the Vatican to postpone the
Pope's visit.
Church leaders believe that demonstrations would serve no useful
purpose. According to Western journalists, Cardinal Glemp met
briefly with Walesa on Sunday. Glemp may have asked Walesa to use
his influence to prevent demonstrations-advice that Walesa
apparently is now less willing to heed.
Outlook
The demonstrations probably will not reach the size or scope of
those of last August, when about 125,000 people took to the streets.
Most Poles are no more ready to challenge the authorities now than
they were last year, and the prospective papal visit will inhibit
participation
If necessary, the authorities will use the range of tactics they have
perfected to disperse demonstrators. The regime probably will seek,
however, to avoid resorting to excessive force. In addition to using the
papal visit to demonstrate a return to normality, the government
wants to persuade Western governments to remove sanctions.
In the weeks following the demonstrations there could be a period
of general calm. The Temporary Coordinating Committee is not likely
to call for additional large-scale protests before June, because it
believes that a papal visit will improve morale and lead to a greater
popular willingness to support and engage in antiregime activity.
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