NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 7 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010208-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 208
• Publication Date: January 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of O Y'f-
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
7 January 1983
281
X
7 January 1983
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Warsaw Pact: Summit Declaration Stresses Disarmament . . . 1
Israel-Lebanon: Status of Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Lebanon-Syria: Trouble in the North. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-Cuba: Military Deliveries in 1982 . . . . . . . . . . 4
India: Setback for Gandhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Africa: Shortage of Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
UK: New Defense Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ireland: Terrorist Organization Banned . . . . . . . . . . 7
Mexico: Widespread Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nicaragua-US: Protest Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Angola: Possible Talks With Insurgents . . . . . . . . . . 9
EC: Steel Output Drops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Special Analysis
South Africa: Coloreds Support Participation . . . . . . . 10
7 January 1983
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The declaration issued yesterday stresses disarmament, avoids
harsh rhetoric, and seems intended primarily for West European
audiences.
The declaration reiterates the whole range of
Soviet disarmament proposals over the past decade, por-
trayed against a background of escalating international
tension. Like the brief communique on Wednesday, it
highlights a proposed NATO - Warsaw Pact treaty mutually
renouncing the use of military force.
The statement "supports and welcomes" unspecified
Soviet initiatives to end the arms race and "notes" the
"contribution" General Secretary Andropov made on 21 Decem-
ber, when he offered to reduce Soviet intermediate-range
missiles in Europe to the combined total of British and
French missiles. It also expresses hope that "all Euro-
pean states" will contribute to progress in US-Soviet
talks on limiting medium-range nuclear weapons. There
is no call for increased Warsaw Pact military capabili-
ties, despite Andropov's allusion to the need for this
in a subsequent interview.
Comment: The restrained tone, comprehensive re-
iteration of disarmament proposals, and call for a Euro-
pean contribution to US-Soviet talks represent an open
appeal for West European support. The gloomy assessment
of the international situation seems intended to add new
urgency to the proposals. The absence of a call for
more defense and the subdued reference to Andropov's
proposal of 21 December--on which Romanian President
Ceausescu has his own view--suggest there were some dif-
ferences among the party chiefs.
West European reaction to the declaration has
been cautious. Allied officials recognize its intended
purpose and are anxious to avoid a flat rejection that
could play into Soviet hands.
7 January 1983
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After four meetings, Lebanese and Israeli negotiators have
not jet agreed on an agenda because of continuing disagreement over
a formula on normalising relations.
Israel continues to insist that the Lebanese have
to commit themselves to the principle of normalization
before meaningful discussion can take place on with-
drawal of Israeli troops. The Lebanese, seeking to
avoid antagonizing the other Arab states, say they can-
not accept normalization under pressure of an Israeli
military presence or apart from progress in a broader
peace process.
Following the third round of talks on Monday,
Israel agreed to drop its insistence on the phrase
"normalization of relations" as a specific agenda item
in exchange for language meaning essentially the same
thing. The Israelis accepted Lebanon's proposal for a
discussion of "mutual relations," which would include
issues that they insist upon, such as trade and travel
across the border.
The Lebanese Government subsequently backed off,
however, after strong objections by Prime Minister Wazzan,
an important Muslim leader. Wazzan argued that the
Israeli demands go far beyond legitimate security con-
cerns.
Comment: The proposed agenda that emerged from the
fourth round of talks yesterday still incorporates the
phrase "normalization of relations" and therefore is
likely to be rejected again in Beirut. Israel is un-
willing to allow Wazzan and his Muslim constituency to
have veto power over the negotiation process. The
Israelis are convinced that Lebanon can make more con-
cessions, and they accuse the US of stiffening Beirut's
resolve not to do so.
7 January 1983
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FACTIONS IN TRIPOLI
PRO-SYRIAN ANTI-SYRIAN
Arab Democratic Party Popular Resistance
Ali Id Group Shiite Resistance Party
24 October Movement
Communist Action - Soldiers of God
Organization (Muslim Brotherhood)
Iraqi Baath Party
(Lebanese Branch)
UNDOF
Zone
Syrian
controlle
Mediterranean
Sea
BEIRUT
L e b a n
n
Syria
Ldkr,
,03; ',twr:
,- DAMASCUS
Tyre
GOLAN
l HEIGHTS
(Israeli
\ ~~~^ l occupied)
Israel
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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The factional fighting in Tripoli reflects the struggle over
Syria's continuing presence in northern Lebanon but will have no
immediate effect on the stability of Lebanon's central government.
(S NF)
The major adversaries are the Syrian-backed, largely
Alawite Muslim militia of the Arab Democratic Party and
a loose coalition of Sunni Muslim militias called the
Popular Resistance. The Arab Democratic Party repre-
sents both the Alawite Syrian regime and the interests
of a growing Alawite population in Tripoli, a predomin-
antly Sunni city. (S NF)
Comment: Northern Lebanon has always identified
more closely with Syria than with Christian Beirut, and
Damascus has a strong interest in maintaining Syrian
control over the area. Damascus views activities by the
Muslim Brotherhood and Iraqi surrogates in Tripoli as
threatening to the Assad regime. In the past, the Syrians
have instigated civil disorder in the city to demonstrate
the need for continuing their presence in Lebanon and
to curb anti-Syrian factions. (S NF)
The presence of Syria's Defense Minister Tlas in
Tripoli yesterday is an indication of the country's con-
cern, but Damascus probably will not intervene militarily
as long as local Alawite protagonists hold their own and
fighting is limited to Tripoli. The Lebanese Government,
while incapable of influencing events in the city, is
not threatened by them.
7 January 1983
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USSR-CUBA: Military Deliveries in 1982
Soviet shipments of arms and military-associated gcon-
tinued to improve Cuban military capabilities Zast year.
Aircraft and air defense equipment included 20
MIG-23s, some 30 MIG-21s, and at least three SA-9 surface-
to-air missile launchers. Thirty Czech-built L-39 jet
trainers have been delivered, and they form the nucleus
of a new fighter training school. Cuba received its first
12 MI-24 helicopter gunships in January.
The Cuban Navy received four Osa-II missile patrol
boats, a degaussing ship--used to help make warships
less vulnerable to magnetic torpedoes and mines--and
two medium amphibious landing ships.
Comment: Some of the new aircraft probably are re-
placing older fighters. Cuba has greatly increased the
number of late-model MIG-21s in its Air Force in the last
15 months. Most of the MIG-23s are more advanced Flogger
B interceptor models that will join a squardron of MIG-23
fighter-bombers Cuba has had since 1978.
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in 1982 may also
have included additional SA-6 equipment. The arms--most
notably the landing ships and aircraft--increase somewhat
Cuba's capability to provide military support to allies
in the Caribbean region. It will take Cuba another year
or two to integrate all of its new weapons into the armed
forces.
7 January 1983
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LAKSHADWEEP :.
ISLANDS
(India)
~1;ne a1 ~andr`arn
t rnntint ..daimr
o sI
ao
KILOMETERS
ISLANDS
(India) ?
NICOBAR q
ISLANDS o-
(India)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Prime Minister Gandhi's Congress Party suffered severe set-
backs in legislative assembly elections in three key states on
Wednesday.
In Andhra Pradesh, the Telegu Desam Party thus far
holds nearly a four-to-one edge over the Congress Party
and has already won a majority of the state's 294 legis-
lative seats. In Karnataka, an opposition coalition
leads Gandhi's party but will need the support of a
Hindu communal party and some independents to form a
government. In Tripura, the Congress Party has failed
to dislodge the Communist Party in control there.
Comment: The election outcome in Andhra Pradesh
and Karnataka--long bastions of Congress strength--will
increase dissidence in Gandhi's party and may threaten
her control of party affairs. The Prime Minister and
her son campaigned hard in both states, and she almost
certainly views her party's defeats as a personal repu-
diation.
The Congress Party has been in increasing disarray
in the south over the past year as dissidents--disgruntled
over Gandhi's practice of running state governments
controlled by her party--have either left the party or
sabotaged it by voting for opposition candidates. The
victory in Andhra Pradesh of film star Rama Rao's Telegu
Desam Party, although largely the result of his great
personal appeal, also reflects a revival of regional
parties in India.
Gandhi almost surely will not call early parliamen-
tary elections. Many observers thought she might do so
had she done well in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. A
national election is not required until 1985.
7 January 1983
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Sub-Saharan Africa: Oil Refineries and Pipelines
,Cape Verde
Western
Sahara
Portuba{l
f
Central African
Republic
Algeria
15,000 y~
Liberi ema am C
4tdlan 5,530'70,000. P aomeintroon
e
40,600 L01776 (beinged 20,000 60000 lame Lmboh
to 60,000)0,000) Equatorial Guinea:
. 'Malta ~,~
is Mediterranean Sea
Biack Sea
Port Sudan Sea
26 (tao
Tanzania
r ode
Assab
I1.4;3(I
Kenya
-Nairobi
South
Atlantic
Ocean
-ii, Refinery
Capacity (barrels per day)
Oil pipeline (product pipeline
unless otherwise noted)
K tome tern
Cabinda
5,000
16, 1 50
Luanda it
36,000
Cape Town.}*
100,000
Mozambique 111 Tamatave
11440
Madagascar Mauritius
Nome; and bovitilary representation
are not neeeeLdly outheritatie
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AFRICA: Shortage of Oil
Top Secret
A number of African states are experiencing or are threatened
with oil shortages that could further depress their economies this
year, increasing the prospect of political instability.
Western banks, concerned about Liberia's inability
to repay its debts, have refused to continue financing
its oil purchases. Unless Monrovia can find new funding
soon or imposes drastic rationing, severe oil shortages
are likely, which could cause unrest.
Tanzania defaulted on some payments for oil in 1982
and is also having difficulty securing new loans to fi-
nance oil imports. Zaire says it will be able to pav
for only 70 percent of its oil needs in 1983.
Recurring guerrilla attacks on Mozambican roads and
railways have reduced landlocked Malawi's oil stocks.
Periodic disruptions by the Mozambican insurgents of an
oil pipeline to Zimbabwe and the sabotage last month of
a major Mozambican oil depot have made Zimbabwe more
dependent on oil brought in through South Africa.
Several other states in eastern Africa are likely
to be short of oil soon. Kenya has had to reduce pur-
chases of crude, and its plans to cut back on reexports
of refined products will aggravate existing shortages in
Comment: The situation is providing opportunities
for radical Middle Eastern states that have been seeking
to expand their influence in Africa. Iran has offered
to sell oil at attractive terms to several countries with
large Muslim populations, and Algeria reportedly has
begun to help southern African states pay for Algerian
oil. Libya, which became Ghana's main source of oil
last year, has been expanding its military ties with the
Rawlings regime.
A number of African states will be asking the US
for increased assistance this year. They presumably
will also urge Washington to take the lead in spurring
the global recovery they believe will bolster their
faltering economies. Recovery would increase world de-
mand for oil, however, causing international petroleum
prices and the Africans' oil bills to rise, perhaps
7 January 198-3
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Michael Heseltine
New British Defense Secretary
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UK: New Defense Secretary
Prime Minister Thatcher has named Michael Heseltine,
one of the Conservative Party's rising stars and a poten-
tial party leader, to replace John Nott as Defense Sec-
retary.
Comment: Heseltine is an accomplished speaker,
and his selection reflects Thatcher's intention to pre-
pare for a heated debate on defense policy in a possible
election year. His talents will also prove useful in
the forthcoming debate on the official findings on the
Falkland Islands conflict, to be published later this
month. Thatcher admires Heseltine's administrative
abilities and probably expects him to keep a close watch
on defense expenditures. The UK's military chiefs re-
portedly preferred other candidates whom they considered
to be more willing to endorse increased defense spending,
but they probably are not greatly concerned that Hesel-
tine will alter existing defense policies.
IRELAND: Terrorist Organization Banned
The new government under Prime Minister FitzGerald
has outlawed the Irish National Liberation Army, a Marxist
offshoot of the Irish Republican Army. INLA members are
now subject to trial before a special antiterrorist court
and sentencing to seven-year prison terms for membership
in an illegal organization. The INLA, outlawed in the
UK, was responsible for the bombing in Northern Ireland
last month that killed 11 British soldiers and six civil-
ians. It has also robbed banks and conducted other
terrorist acts in the Republic.
Comment: The Irish have maintained close security
cooperation with the British, particularly in the border
area between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and a re-
cent ruling by the Irish Supreme Court may pave the way
for extradition of terrorists to the North. FitzGerald,
who is anxious for better relations with the UK and
would like to arrange a meeting with Prime Minister
Thatcher, probably hopes that banning the INLA will help
improve the climate for political discussions about North-
ern Ireland.
7 January 1983
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Mexican States With Electoral Fraud Protests
United States
Mexico
North
Pacific
Ocean
Buis tos
Potosi
Jalisco
MEXICO.
El Salvador
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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MEXICO: Widespread Protests
Opposition political parties, predominantly of
the right, have occupied some 40 city halls in five
states to protest alleged fraud in recent local elec-
tions. These moves may also be designed to test how
far President de la Madrid is willing to go with his
announced policies of local political reform. Protests
in the state of Chiapas have been violent, with two
deaths reported. According to Mexico City newspapers,
12 of the demonstrations have been resolved peacefully
over the past several days--with new elections promised
in some instances--but the other takeovers are continuing.
Comment: Incidents of this sort are not uncommon
and also occurred after local elections last year, but
normally they are not so widespread. The Mexican Govern-
ment has not openly intervened thus far, but it is firmly
in control and probably is working behind the scenes to
prevent bloodshed. The administration's desire to avoid
violence is underscored by the restraint of the federal
police in dealing with a recent nonpolitical protest.
De la Madrid will have to decide how far he will push
political reform, which may pit him against local ruling
party officials.
A Nicaraguan diplomatic note accuses the US of respon-
sibility for a series of recent armed attacks, kidnapings,
and overflights by exiles operating along the border with
Honduras. The Nicaraguans complain that previous protests
to Honduras have been ignored and say that they consider
the US to be the source of these problems. The note calls
on the US to accept unconditional talks, which it asserts
the US has always rejected.
Comment: While the new incidents described in the
protest probably are not as serious as those that took
place in mid-December, they do reflect continued pres-
sure by anti-Sandinista guerrillas. The Nicaraguans
filed some 60 protests with Honduras last year about
similar actions. By addressing the latest complaint dir-
ectly to the US, the Nicaraguans probably hope to build
their case against alleged US aggression as the Nonaligned
Coordinating Bureau prepares to meet in Managua next
week.
7 January 1983
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ANGOLA: Possible Talks With Insurgents
Negotiations between the ruling Popular Movement
and UNITA insurgents are to begin soon, according to a
guerrilla spokesman. The rebels claim that recent
military successes have forced the government to seek
a rapid end to the insurgency.
Comment: Although low-level talks are possible,
there is no persuasive evidence that the national leader-
ship is preparing for serious peace negotiations with
UNITA. President dos Santos probably would like an
accommodation with the insurgents and has been gradually
strengthening his position in the faction-ridden regime,
but Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners still appear
strong enough to block a settlement. UNITA apparently
has intensified its military operations in recent months,
although it has not made major territorial gains. Greater
UNITA military pressure and further consolidation of
power by dos Santos would improve prospects for negotia-
tions.
EC: Steel Output Drops
The EC Commission estimates that Community steel
production fell more than 20 percent in the second half
of 1982, as compared with the first half. Output is esti-
mated to have dipped 11 percent for the year as a whole
and to total only 110 million tons, the lowest level in
more than a decade. Most of the reduction was caused by
declining consumption within EC countries. Although ex-
ports to the US dropped in the second half of 1982, ex-
ports to all non-EC countries enera11 remained constant
throughout the year.
Comment: Exports of steel to the US appear to have
been affected more by declining US demand than by US lim-
its on imports of EC steel. When US consumption rebounds,
however, exports to the US may be constrained by the US-EC
steel accord signed last October. Slumping EC production
is intensifying pressure on EC governments to protect
their steelmakers and halt industry layoffs.
7 January 1983
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Coloreds Support Participation
The Colored Labor Party's qualified endorsement this week of
new constitutional structures proposed by Prime Minister Botha's
goeernment is likely to stir greater nonwhite political ferment.
Although the resolution passed overwhelmingly at the party congress,
as many as one-third of the delegates probably went along reluctantlt~.
Several senior party members have already resigned in protest, and
Gatsha ButheZesi, leader of the large Zulu tribe and one of the
most prominent black South African Leaders not banned or jailed,
has condemned the decision.
The plan calls for Coloreds, who compose 9 percent
of the South African population, and Asians, who make up
3 percent, to participate with whites in a three-chamber
parliament and a multiracial cabinet. Blacks--73 percent
of the population--would be excluded and allowed political
rights only in their official tribal "homelands." In
accepting the government proposal, the party vowed to use
it to negotiate for further reforms, including participa-
tion by blacks.
Including the Coloreds
The constitutional proposal is the latest in a series
of political arrangements the government has devised to
mollify Coloreds, who were stripped of their political
rights in the late 1950s. The government's overall aim
is to bring Coloreds and Asians into the white system as
potential allies against blacks.
Under the proposal, Coloreds would have a voice in
their local affairs and a highly circumscribed role at
the national level. Although this increases the Coloreds'
power, it does not respond to their fundamental demand
that apartheid be dismantled.
7 January 1983
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Botswana
*WINDHOEK
Namibia
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Zimbabwe
Mozainbiq'ie
Indian
Ocean
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The political strength of the Labor Party is uncer-
tain. Its last test at the polls was in elections during
the late 1970s for the now defunct Colored Representative
Council. The party was the clear winner then, but only
a small percentage of the Colored electorate voted.
Much of the Colored community probably remains
apathetic, and some have become more radical than the
Labor Party's leadership. Colored youths especially have
shown increasing interest in the banned African National
Congress and other radical black groups.
The split within the party is likely to grow. Its
Natal branch--particularly conscious of the heavy popula-
tion of Zulus in the province--and many of the party's
younger members may form a separate party rejecting par-
ticipation. Other disaffected members are likely to join
with more radical Coloreds to boycott elections.
Although the press reports that the leader of the
Indian Reform Party--the major Asian party--opposes the
new setup, the group may well give the proposals quali-
fied support at its congress later this month. Like the
Coloreds, the Indians are tempted by the benefits of a
closer relationship with the white power structure.
The Indians nevertheless are likely to be even more
divided than the Coloreds. The Reform Party's claim that
it represents opinion in its community is even more dubi-
ous than that of the Colored Labor Party. Fear of Zulu
anger is especially compelling among Indians, who are
concentrated largely in Natal.
Prospects
Prime Minister Botha, who split his National Party
by going ahead with the constitutional reform, is the
main beneficiary of the Labor Party's decision. A re-
jection by that group would have left him without a
significant group to work with in the Colored community
and would have subjected him to even more severe attacks
from the Conservative Party, the breakaway Afrikaner
group that rejects even limited political association
with nonwhites.
Top Secret
7 January 19&-3
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Although Botha can expect at least some Coloreds
to work in his new system, they will not ensure even a
facade of smooth operation. Unless the government offers
further concessions, those who participate will be under
considerable pressure from their constituencies to dis-
rupt the system.
The establishment of the new constitutional arrange-
ments probably will require several years. During this
time, more polarization is likely within the Colored and
Asian communities. Past patterns of political intimida-
tion could again emerge between those wishing to take
part in the system and those opposed.
The avowed purpose of trying to open the system to
an increased role for blacks may not save the Coloreds
and Asians from further alienating blacks who have long
been suspicious of these minorities. A violent reaction
by blacks is not likely soon, but relations between
blacks and other nonwhites inevitably will be damaged,
and some clashes could occur. More significantly, the
successful inclusion of even some Coloreds and Asians
in the new system is likely to increase the political
frustration of blacks as they see the South African
Government "reform" itself without a nod to their
political rights.
7 January 1983
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